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**THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS OF  
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# INVESTIGATIONS REPRESENTING THE DEPARTMENTS

GREEK LATIN COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY  
CLASSICAL ARCHÆOLOGY

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## **A GREEK HAND-MIRROR**



## A GREEK HAND-MIRROR IN THE ART INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO

FRANK BIGELOW TARBELL

It is but little more than twenty years since Rayet, in the text to Plate 22 of the *Monuments de l'art antique*, commented upon the strange fact that Greek hand-mirrors, such as are known from Attic vase-paintings and reliefs to have been in common use, had not been found. The lacuna signalized by Rayet has since been filled. Besides the very early hand-mirrors found by Dr. Tsountas at Mycenæ, there now exist in the museums of Athens and other cities not a few such mirrors or parts of mirrors, of Greek manufacture, and dating from *ca.* 600 B. C. onward. One class has the handle cast in one piece with the disk. In half a dozen known instances the handle is covered with reliefs of early style, while examples with plain handles, from the Argive Heræum and elsewhere, exist in considerable numbers in the National Museum of Athens. Another class, which was certainly in use throughout the fifth century B. C., and probably later, does not have a complete handle of bronze, but a short shank, which is either of one piece with the disk or cast separately, and which evidently fitted into a handle of wood, bone, or ivory, now generally lost. In case the shank is of a separate piece, it is likely to have some ornamental form where it joins the disk, *e. g.*, Ionic or quasi-Ionic volutes with palmettes, as in the examples published in the *Ἐφημερίς Ἀρχαιολογική*, 1884, Plate VI, 4 and 5; a siren, as in one from Cyprus in the British Museum (*Catalogue of Bronzes*, No. 246); an Eros, as in the one published in the *Jahrbuch des archäologischen Instituts*, 1888, p. 246; or a Victory, as in one in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris (*Catalogue des bronzes*, No. 1349).

It is to this class that the mirror represented in Plate I belongs. It was bought in 1890 of Messrs. Rollin et Feuarent, of Paris, by Martin A. Ryerson, Esq., of Chicago, and has been deposited by him in the Art Institute of this city. It is said, on what evidence is unknown, to have been found in Etruria. At all events, it is clearly of Greek, and not Etruscan, manufacture.

The mirror-disk has a diameter of nineteen centimeters. The reflecting surface is very slightly, and at present not quite uniformly, convex. The edge of the disk is ornamented with the "egg" pattern (not visible in the illustration), within which is a fine bead pattern. The back of the disk is plain.

The handle is at present detached from the disk, but the original connection is sufficiently guaranteed by traces upon the latter. At the back the bronze part of the handle is prolonged upward into a palmette, which served to make the attachment to the disk secure. In front the ornamental feature consists of a relief of a siren in

front view, with recurved wings, surrounded by scrolls and palmettes. A strip of bead pattern above the siren's head matches that on the disk. The volutes of the two lower and smaller palmettes turn outward. Those of the two upper were intended to turn inward, but, through an inadvertence of the artist, one of the volutes of the upper palmette on the left is reversed in direction. The entire composition may be compared with that on a standing mirror from Hermione in the Louvre (Reinach, *Répertoire de la statuaire*, Vol. II, p. 702, e), where again a slight asymmetry is observable. Of the two the present specimen has the advantage in the compactness and appearance of solidity of the design.

An especial interest is lent to the Chicago mirror by the fact that the handle proper, into which the shank of the bronze attachment fits, is here preserved. The circumstance is unusual, and, as far as I know, unique, among Greek hand-mirrors of the historical period. As the result of a microscopic examination kindly made by Professor F. R. Lillie, it appears that this handle is of bone, and not of ivory. It is eleven centimeters in length, and is bored through from end to end. The bronze shank, now securely in place, seems to extend about three and one-half centimeters into the tube. In form the handle is not quite cylindrical, but tapers downward, until at the bottom it expands into a sort of collar. It is now much corroded, but the original polished surface is preserved here and there. There is no decoration, except that of incised rings; a group of three at the top, then two, then one, then two, and finally two on the collar.

For determining the date of this mirror there is no evidence except the style of the bronze relief. The workmanship on the face of the siren is not sharp enough to afford a basis of judgment, but the composition as a whole finds its nearest analogies in objects assignable to the fifth century B. C., such as the bronze handles figured in the *Antiquités du Bosphore cimmérien*, Plate XLIV, 3 and 7, and the mirror from Hermione in the Louvre, referred to above. The recurved wings of the siren, contrasted with the more truthful shape of those to be seen, *e. g.*, on the hydria figured by Professor Furtwängler in the *Sammlung Sabouroff*, text to Plate CXLIX, if not decisive, are at least favorable to this dating. So likewise is the character of the palmettes, with their relatively large volutes. Signs of the archaic period, such as may be seen in some of the small bronze sirens of the Athenian Acropolis (Ridder, *Bronzes de l'acropole*, figs. 112-14), being absent, 450 B. C. may be taken as an approximate date.





GREEK HAND-MIRROR



**A CANTHARUS FROM THE FACTORY OF BRYGOS**



# A CANTHARUS FROM THE FACTORY OF BRYGOS IN THE BOSTON MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS

FRANK BIGELOW TARBELL



THE vase which I am permitted by the authorities of the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston to publish was acquired by the Museum in 1895 and is mentioned in the *Report* of the Museum for that year on p. 20, under No. 24, as well as in the *Archäologischer Anzeiger* for 1896, p. 96, under No. 24. According to information believed to be trustworthy, it was found in Boeotia. The drawings reproduced in the head-piece and on Plates II and III are by the skilful hand of Mr. F. Anderson.

The vase is a cantharus,<sup>1</sup> measuring 0.247 meter in height to the top of the handles. It has been broken, but not seriously. Only a few small bits are missing, and the design has suffered no serious loss, except on the head of the female figure. The preliminary sketch, made before the clay was thoroughly hardened, is distinctly

<sup>1</sup> The shape resembles closely that of an early black-figured specimen in Berlin, No. 1737 (GERHARD, *Etruskische und campanische Vasenbilder*, Plate XIII, 1-3), and of a red-figured one in the Cabinet des médailles, Paris (photograph by Giraudon, No. 92). Although this form of drinking-cup is represented with great frequency on Attic monuments, chiefly vases, of the sixth century and the early fifth, actual specimens are comparatively rare in the Attic black-figured and early red-figured styles. For this and other reasons it seems likely that the form, like several others used for pottery, was designed for metal, and that the representations in art were often intended to be understood as of metal.

There is another type of cantharus (*Catalogue of Vases*

in the *British Museum*, Vol. III, p. 18, fig. 19), characterized by a bridge extending from each handle to the rim of the bowl and by a spur on the outside of each handle below the bridge. This type seems to occur somewhat more frequently in Attic pottery than the foregoing. It is represented on certain coins (e. g., *British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins*, "Central Greece," Plate VII, 3; Plate XIII, 10, 11, 16; "Thessaly, etc.," Plate XXI, 13, 19, 20; *Coins of the Ancients*, Plate 12, 4), but is almost unknown in vase-paintings. An instance, however, is found on an unpublished white lecythus in Munich.

A third type is exemplified by the cantharus of Epigones (*Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, B, IX).



traceable in places. The hair of the woman is done in streaks of alternately lighter and darker brown. Light yellowish brown is used for the lines on the upper part and inside lower part of the woman's chiton, for the minor anatomical markings of the three male figures, for the hair on the front of Zeus's body, for his gaiters, and for the criss-cross markings of the palm tree. Purple is used for the ribbons which confine the woman's and the boy's hair, for the woman's girdle, and for the soles and straps of Zeus's sandals. The black background is of a greenish tinge.

The subjects of the designs demand but little explanation, inasmuch as they offer nothing novel. On the one side (Plate II) a bearded male figure, wearing only a himation and holding a scepter in his left hand, is in hot pursuit of a fleeing woman, who turns toward him with a gesture of appeal. The male figure is almost certainly Zeus. The woman may be intended for *Ægina*, as on a stamnos in the Vatican (*Museo Gregoriano*, II, Plate XX), where the name is attached; but, in view of the number of Zeus's similar adventures, she is best left anonymous.<sup>3</sup> She wears an Ionic chiton, which she pulls up with her right hand for greater freedom in running. The garment appears as if open on the right side, but this is probably only an error in drawing. Over the chiton the woman wears a himation. Her back hair hangs down, the ends being gathered up into a bunch, tied with a ribbon.<sup>3</sup> Behind Zeus is an altar with a palm tree, showing that the scene is conceived as taking place in or near a sacred precinct,<sup>4</sup> probably of Apollo.

On the other side of the cantharus (Plate III) Zeus is seen again in pursuit. He is dressed as before, except for the addition of sandals and what appear to be gaiters.<sup>5</sup> The object of his pursuit is this time an immature boy, *Ganymedes*.<sup>6</sup> The latter wears a himation and, as frequently, carries a hoop and stick.

More interesting than the subjects is the question of authorship. It is obvious that the vase belongs in the early part of the fifth century, and is the work of a man of unusual talent. Nor is it difficult to narrow the determination further. The dots upon all four himatia, the dotted border of Zeus's himation and his obliquely striped scepter in the *Ganymedes* scene, the rendering of the woman's hair in shades of brown, the liberal indication of hair along the median line of Zeus's body, and the

<sup>3</sup> OVERBECK, *Griech. Kunstmythologie*, Bd. II, pp. 398-402.

<sup>3</sup> The same arrangement of the hair occurs on the *kylix* by Peithinos in Berlin, No. 2279 (*HARTWIG, Meisterschalen*, Plate XXV), on a *kylix* in Corneto (*ibid.*, Plate LXXV), and on a *hydria* in the Cabinet des médailles, Paris (photograph by Giraudon, No. 75). Cf. also the archaic *Artemis* from Pompeii (*Römische Mittheilungen*, 1888, p. 282).

<sup>4</sup> JAHN (*Archäologische Aufsätze*, pp. 149, 150) called attention to the frequency with which an altar is introduced into scenes of abduction. According to him it means that the event is thought of as taking place at a religious festival, and it reflects the fact that on such occasions Greek girls had a liberty of public appearance not usually accorded to them.

<sup>5</sup> The articles in question are commonly described as

high boots (*διδυμίδες*). But in the case before us the footgear proper, to judge by the purple straps, ends just above the ankles. I conceive that the leg-coverings are separate from the footgear. They may perhaps be bandages, wound about the legs and held in place by cords (indicated in black). On the British Museum *kylix* E. 69, ascribed to Brygos (*Wiener Vorlegeblätter*, VI, 2), the representation is similar, except that there the dabs of brown color, instead of being confined to the legs, appear also between the straps of the sandals, as if the bandages were wound about the feet as well as the legs. On E. 264 in the British Museum the representation seems to agree with that on the Boston cantharus. On E. 276 and E. 361 the black lines are drawn about the legs, but the brown dabs are omitted; and this appears to be a common mode of representation.

<sup>6</sup> OVERBECK, *Griech. Kunstmythologie*, Bd. II, pp. 515-18.

peculiar arrangement of the hair at the back of Zeus's neck<sup>1</sup> are all in the style of Brygos (if we may for convenience so call the man who decorated the cylices signed with *Bpûyos ἐποίησεν*). And, though each of these features may be found in the work of one or more of his contemporaries, taken collectively they point pretty strongly to him. Again, the triple ends of the hair-ribbons and of the girdle are characteristic of Brygos. But more decisive still are the narrow eyes, sensitive nostrils, and parted lips of the faces, and the headlong impetuosity of movement in the figures. These indications are sufficient to assure us that this vase was not merely produced under the influence of Brygos, but was decorated by his very hand. It is thus one of the most important treasures in the Greek vase collection of the Boston Museum.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the satyr on the left of the fragment in Castle Ashby (HARTWIG, *Meiserauchen*, Plate XXXIII, 2), attributed to Brygos. Several instances occur also on a cylix in the style of Duris (*ibid.*, Plate LXVI).





DESIGN FROM CANTHEBUS IN THE STILE OF BAYCOS





DESIGN FROM CANTHARUS IN THE STYLE OF BAYGOS



THE MEANING OF ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς IN WRITERS OF  
THE FOURTH CENTURY





## THE MEANING OF ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς IN WRITERS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY

ROY C. FLICKINGER

THERE are several passages in Aristotle's *Poetics* that are of great importance to the student of scenic antiquities, whatever his opinion may be regarding a raised stage in the Greek theater of the fourth century before Christ. They were brought into the controversy long ago, but the adherents of each theory have contented themselves with merely stating their own interpretation of the isolated point at issue, in opposition to that of their opponents, without careful analysis of the entire context in each case. Consequently no progress toward the complete understanding of these passages has been made. They were first cited as having a bearing upon the stage question by Mr. H. Richards, in the *Classical Review*, Vol. V (1891), p. 97:

Before we accept Dr. Dörpfeld's theory that the actors in a Greek theater performed in the orchestra, and not on the stage, some explanation ought to be forthcoming of certain passages in the *Poetics* of Aristotle, in which the contrary seems to be implied. Aristotle several times uses ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς in a way very hard to reconcile with the new theory. . . . These passages (to which others of a similar kind could be added from later writers) appear to be decisive, unless any one will maintain that σκηνή came to be applied to the orchestra or some part of it. But is there any evidence for that? And, further, does not the word ἐπὶ imply something raised above the level?

In 1895<sup>1</sup> Mr. F. B. Jevons, in the Gardner-Jevons *Manual of Greek Antiquities*, p. 678, wrote: "Aristotle repeatedly uses the phrase ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, in which σκηνή can scarcely mean the orchestra or any part of it, and ἐπὶ naturally means 'on' and implies elevation;" and M. Octave Navarre, in *Dionysos*, pp. 105 ff.: "Aristote dit que la tragédie ne peut pas représenter plusieurs événements à la fois, mais seulement 'la partie de l'action qui s'accomplit sur la scène et par les acteurs.' La scène est, on le voit, désignée de la façon la plus nette comme le lieu affecté aux acteurs." In the following year Dr. Emil Reisch,<sup>2</sup> in Dörpfeld-Reisch, *Das griechische Theater*, pp. 284 ff., published the following explanation:

Wie die Schauspieler ἀπὸ σκηνῆς kommen und sprechen, so bewegen sie sich in der Regel während des Spieles ἐπὶ σκηνῆς, in der Nähe der Skene, ja häufig genug bleiben sie auf den Stufen des Hauses oder in dem von den Paraskenien begrenzten Vorraum des Hauses. Daher können sie kurzweg als οἱ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς bezeichnet werden; doch ist zu bemerken, dass dieser Ausdruck niemals so wie οἱ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς im Gegensatz zum Chor gesagt wird, weil auch der Chor

<sup>1</sup> In the *Revue critique*, Vol. XXVI (1892), p. 450, Mr. S. Reinach referred to Mr. Richards's argument with apparent approval. CHRIST, "Bedeutungswechsel einiger auf das griech. Theater bezüglichen Ausdrücke," *Jahrb. f. class. Phil.*, Vol. CIL (1894), p. 39, said: "Die vierte Bedeutung,

welche das Wort σκηνή auf das gedielte podium, oder wenn man das nicht zugeben will, auf den Platz beschränkt, auf dem gespielt wurde," quoting Aristotle's use.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Dörpfeld agrees with his collaborator in this; cf. *ibid.*, p. 346.

häufig in der Nähe der Skene zu thun hat. Es ist also damit durchaus nicht eine Scheidung der Schauspielpersonen beabsichtigt.

Allerdings würde der Ausdruck ἐπὶ σκηνῆς von den Schauspielern auch dann gebraucht werden können, wenn der Vorraum vor dem Hause durch eine Bühne gebildet würde. Aber bloss aus diesem Ausdruck heraus lässt sich das Vorhandensein einer Bühne nicht erschliessen. Denn es wäre natürlich ein arger Fehlschluss, wenn man aus den Worten ἐπὶ σκηνῆς und ἀπὸ σκηνῆς folgern wollte: σκηνή heisst "Bühne." . . . Nach dem, was wir über die Bedeutung von σκηνή auseinander gesetzt haben, können für ἐπὶ σκηνῆς in der erwähnten typischen Verwendung (οἱ oder τὰ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς) nur zwei Uebersetzungen in Betracht kommen: "auf dem Hause" und "bei dem Hause."

Die erstere Auffassung hätte selbst dann ihre Bedenken, wenn man in der Skene eine Bühne annehmen wollte, die wie die römische Bühne einen integrierenden Bestandteil des Schauspielhauses gebildet hätte. Denn dann wäre eher die Wendung ἐν σκηνῇ "in scaena" zu erwarten. Die zweite Auffassung dagegen hat alle sprachlichen Analogien für sich. Dass das Vorwort ἐπὶ (mit Genetiv, Dativ und Accusativ) nicht nur zur Bezeichnung von Höhenunterschieden, sondern auch zur Bezeichnung der Nachbarschaft zweier auf gleichem Boden befindlicher Dinge verwendet wird, dürfte wohl bekannt genug sein. Aber es ist vielleicht nicht überflüssig, darauf hinzuweisen, dass ἐπὶ gerade mit den Bezeichnungen des Hauses sehr häufig in diesem Sinne verbunden zu werden pflegt. . . . Die Beispiele dürften genügen, um zu der Annahme zu berechtigen, dass man die Wendung ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ursprünglich im Sinne von ἐπὶ οἰκίας "vor, bei dem Hause" gebraucht hat. Natürlich erhielt der Ausdruck dann sehr bald formelhafte Geltung und bezeichnet kurzweg: "auf dem (vor der Skene befindlichen) Spielplatz."

Mr. A. E. Haigh, in *The Attic Theatre* (2d ed., 1898), pp. 189 f., has said:

Aristotle in many places speaks of the songs of the actors as τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς, in opposition to the songs of the chorus, τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ. Further, he speaks of the actor's part as being played ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς. According to the usual interpretation of these passages, he means that the actors played their part "upon the stage," and sang their songs "from the stage." Dörpfeld, however, proposes in these cases to translate the word σκηνή as the "background," and not as the "stage." He supposes Aristotle to mean that the actors performed "at the background,"<sup>3</sup> and sang their songs "from the background." He denies that the two expressions imply the existence of a stage. Now, the translation that he suggests may be possible, as far as the Greek is concerned. But it is very difficult to believe that they are the right translations in these particular passages of Aristotle. Aristotle's words seem to clearly imply that there was some essential and conspicuous difference between the position of the actors and that of the chorus. But if, as Dörpfeld thinks, they all performed together in the orchestra, there would be no such distinguishing mark. It is true that the actors might, for the most part, be rather nearer the stage buildings; and the chorus might, for the most part, be rather more distant from them. But practically they would be standing in the same place; there would be no pronounced difference. Aristotle's words appear to be explicable only on the supposition that the actors appeared upon a stage, the chorus in the orchestra.

More recently Professor A. Müller, "Untersuchungen zu den Bühnenalterthümern," *Philologus*, Supplementband VII (1899), pp. 6-12, wrote:

Wir müssen derselben [*i. e.*, Reisch's view] jedoch unsere Zustimmung versagen, da wir uns verpflichtet fühlen, auf Grund der folgenden Erörterung das Vorhandensein einer Bühne im attischen Theater als sicher anzunehmen.

<sup>3</sup> It will be observed that Haigh's "at the background" by no means accurately reproduces the Dörpfeld-Reisch "auf dem Spielplatz."

Wir gehen davon aus, dass die Schauspieler ihren eigenthümlichen Standort in der Nähe des Spielhauses hatten, und dass dieser durch die im Druck hervorgehobenen Worte der folgenden Stellen des Aristoteles bezeichnet wird, zu dessen Zeiten noch ebenso im Theater gespielt wurde, wie im V. Jahrhundert (S. Dörpf., S. 379). . . . Giebt es nun Stellen, an denen Personen, welche sich von der Parodos aus zu dem gewöhnlichen Standorte der Schauspieler begeben, einen Aufstieg, oder solche, welche vom gewöhnlichen Standorte der Schauspieler zur Parodos gehen, einen Abstieg vornehmen müssen, so ist der Schluss geboten, dass jener Standort erhöht war. Und solche Stellen finden sich in den ältesten Komödien des Aristophanes.<sup>4</sup> . . . Wenn nun die vorstehende unbefangene Erörterung einiger aristophanischer Stellen und Scholien das Ergebniss geliefert hat, dass der gewöhnliche Standort der Schauspieler erhöht war, und wenn bei Aristoteles die Schauspieler *ἀπὸ σκηνῆς* heissen, ihre Partie *τὸ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς* und ihre Lieder *τὰ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς* genannt werden, so ist der Schluss gerechtfertigt, dass dieser erhöhte Standort eben *σκηνή* hiess.

In the course of an investigation on the subject of the Greek theater and drama in the time of Plutarch I have found myself obliged to trace the history of the word *σκηνή* from the earliest times in order to determine, as precisely as possible, its exact meaning everywhere, and particularly in such phrases as *ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς*, *ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς*, and *ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ*, which occur with great frequency in the later literature. The subject itself is not a new one. The large collection of material brought together by Wieseler in 1870, in the *Ersch-Gruber Encyclopädie*, Vol. IV, pp. 159 ff., s. v. "Griechisches Theater," has furnished investigators in the field of scenic antiquities with a large proportion of their instances of the word's use. Notable among these scholars are Christ,<sup>5</sup> Müller,<sup>6</sup> and Reisch.<sup>7</sup> The two former adhere, in the main, to the outline of the successive changes of meaning of *σκηνή* laid down by Wieseler, while the last-named adopts an explanation consistent with the Dörpfeld theory of the stage, eliminating the meaning "stage" for the classical period of Greek literature. All of these scholars have contributed to the solution of the perplexing problem in a greater or less degree, but nevertheless all have, in my opinion, been too prone to classify their material *en masse* under convenient rubrics largely determined by their own position in the stage controversy, instead of subjecting each separate instance or category to a discriminating scrutiny, testing first the context in which the word occurs and then ranging the instances appropriately in accordance with a strictly historical view of the development of the meanings of the word or the phrase. It so happens, therefore, that the same passage is often used by both parties to prove things exactly opposite, as is illustrated by the quotations given above concerning the Aristotelian usage.

In the course of my study I became convinced that Aristotle's use of the term,

<sup>4</sup> Here follows a discussion of those passages in Aristophanes that involve the use of *ἀναβαίνειν* and similar expressions. This phase of the subject has been already sufficiently treated by WHITE, "The 'Stage' in Aristophanes," *Harvard Studies*, Vol. II (1891), pp. 164 ff.; CAPPS, "The Stage in the Greek Theater," *Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.*, Vol. XXII (1891), pp. 64 ff.; BODENSTEINER, "Scenische

Fragen," *Jahr. f. class. Phil.*, Supplementband XIX (1893), pp. 699 f., 721.

<sup>5</sup> *Jahr. f. Phil.*, Vol. CIL (1894), pp. 38 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Bühnenalterthümer* (1886) and *Philologus*, Supplementband VII (1890), pp. 3 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Zeitschrift f. d. österr. Gymnasien*, Vol. XXXVIII (1887), pp. 276 ff., and *Das griechische Theater* (1896), pp. 283 ff.

so far as it extended, was quite consistent with that of Plutarch and his contemporaries; in fact, that only by gaining a correct idea of the meaning of the phrases in question in Aristotle could one secure the right point of departure for the interpretation of the idioms in Plutarch. The Aristotelian passages were first attacked in a discriminating way and made the basis of a general classification by Edward Capps, who, however, has published only an abstract of his conclusions.<sup>8</sup> Approaching the subject originally from the point of view of Plutarch's usage, I have found myself in substantial agreement with Professor Capps's conclusions, and at his suggestion, and availing myself of his collections, with which he allowed me to supplement my own, and his constant criticism and advice, I have thought it well to state fully the case as far as concerns Aristotle, reserving for a later occasion the results of my studies in Plutarch and the later literature—except in so far as it may seem advisable to quote here later instances in illustration of the usage of the earlier period. I take this opportunity to acknowledge my obligations to all my predecessors in this field.

Before the middle of the fourth century the phrases ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς and ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς do not occur with reference to the theater. My excuse for restricting myself in the present paper to the consideration of the usage of a single period, the fourth century, is the overwhelming importance of that period for the stage question. From the fifth century we have a large number of extant plays, and practically no one now contends for the Vitruvian stage in that century.<sup>9</sup> From later times theater ruins are numerous, but for the fourth century itself our evidence is comparatively scanty. But the opponents of the Dörpfeld theory insist upon identifying the proscenium with the Vitruvian stage, and the extant remains which give positive evidence of a proscenium happen not to be earlier than the latter half of the fourth century. At about this time, therefore, as Haigh,<sup>10</sup> Bethe,<sup>11</sup> and others<sup>12</sup> maintain, the actors, who had before this performed upon a low platform, were elevated suddenly to the full height of the proscenium. This could have been accomplished only by the sacrifice of the chorus, as the advocates of the high stage now clearly see; and they accordingly take refuge in the current but doubtful tradition, to the effect that the chorus was either given up altogether or "its functions were merely those of the modern band" or "of mere interlude-singers." Exactly what changes in the drama this period witnessed has not yet been fully made out, and we cannot enter upon the chorus question here.<sup>13</sup> However, even among those who accept Dr. Dörpfeld's theory for the fifth century,<sup>14</sup> there is a

<sup>8</sup> "Ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς and Similar Expressions," *Am. Jour. Arch.*, Vol. V (1901) p. 31.

<sup>9</sup> Except FUCHSTEIN, *Die griechische Bühne*, who announces in his preface that he disregards all evidence from the literary sources. In his review of this book, *Classical Review*, Vol. XV (1901), pp. 470 ff., Haigh seems ready to abandon the position which he had consistently maintained from the beginning.

<sup>10</sup> *The Attic Theater*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 155 ff.

<sup>11</sup> *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Theaters im Alterthum*, pp. 243 ff., and *Gött. gelehr. Anzeiger*, 1897, pp. 728 ff.

<sup>12</sup> CHRIST, *Sitzungsberichte der bayer. Akad. der Wissenschaften*, 1894, pp. 26 f.

<sup>13</sup> For the evidence in favor of the existence beyond the limits of the fourth century of both the tragic and the comic chorus, see CAPPS, "The Chorus in the Late Greek Drama," *Am. Jour. Arch.*, Vol. X (1895), pp. 283 ff.; LEO, *Rhein. Museum*, Vol. LII (1897), pp. 509 ff.; A. KORTE, "Das Fortleben des Chors im griechischen Drama," *N. Jahrb. f. Phil.*, Vol. V (1900), pp. 81 ff.; REISCH, *Das griech. Theater*, pp. 258 ff., and in the Pauly-Wissowa *Real-Encyclopädie*, Vol. III, p. 2402, s. v. "Chor;" and CAPPS, *Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.*, Vol. XXXI (1900), pp. 133 f.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. WHITE, *Harvard Studies*, Vol. II (1891), p. 187, note 1; and ROBERT, *Hermes*, Vol. XXXII (1897), p. 447, and in *Gött. gelehr. Anzeiger*, 1897, pp. 39 ff.

tendency to go over to Vitruvius for the period represented by the Lycurgus theater at Athens and by the theater at Epidaurus—the last quarter of the fourth century. In this dearth of evidence and abundance of conjecture anything bearing on the general question is of exceptional importance. But the subject of the present discussion is not merely important; though its bearing has been strangely overlooked, it is really fundamental. If ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς in Aristotle and his contemporaries means “on the stage,” and if ἐπὶ in this phrase necessarily “implies elevation,” we need no more evidence—the great question is decided.

For the subject under discussion much has been made of Plato,<sup>15</sup> *Symposium*, 194b: ἐπιλήσμων μὲντ' ἂν εἴην, ὃ Ἀγάθων, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτην, εἰ ἰδὼν τὴν σὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην ἀναβαίνοντος ἐπὶ τὸν ὀκρίβαντα μετὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ βλέψαντος ἐναντία τοσοῦτ' θεάτρῳ, μέλλοντος ἐπιδειξέσθαι σαυτοῦ λόγους, καὶ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἐκπλαγέντος, νῦν οἰηθείην σε θορυβηθήσεσθαι ἔνεκα ἡμῶν ὀλίγων ἀνθρώπων.

I should be forgetful, Agathon, said Socrates, of the courage and spirit which you showed when your compositions were about to be exhibited, when you came upon the ὀκρίβας with the actors and faced the whole audience<sup>16</sup> altogether undismayed, if I thought you would on the present occasion be disturbed by a small company of friends.

The scholiast on this passage, and Hesychius s. v. ὀκρίβας, give this explanation: ὀκρίβας· τὸ λογιεῖον, ἐφ' οὗ οἱ τραγωδοὶ ἡγωνίζοντο· τινὲς δὲ κιλλίβας τρισκελῆς, ἐφ' οὗ ἴσταντο οἱ ὑποκριταὶ καὶ τὰ ἐκ μετεώρου λέγουσιν, and Timaeus, *Lex. Plat.*, ὀκρίβας· πῆγμα τὸ ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ τιθέμενον, ἐφ' οὗ ἴσταντο οἱ τὰ δημόσια λέγοντες. Evidently these writers had no clear idea of the word's meaning. Moreover, the appearance of the poet with the actors shows that here we have to do, not with the ἀγών, but with the προάγων,<sup>17</sup> and that was held, not in the theater, but in the odeum.<sup>18</sup> The passage, then, whatever its precise interpretation may be, is not relevant to the present discussion. In the present unsatisfactory state of our information regarding the προάγων, therefore, we are scarcely warranted in drawing sweeping conclusions from Plato's reference to that ceremony.

Aristotle uses the phrase ἐπὶ (τῆς) σκηνῆς four times in the *Poetics*, viz.: (1) XIII, 6, p. 1453a; (2) XVII, 1, p. 1455a; (3) XXIV, 4, p. 1459b; and (4) XXIV, 8, p. 1460a; and Demosthenes uses it once (5) in *Or.*, XIX, 337. I shall now consider these passages in turn.

1. XIII, 6, p. 1453a: διὸ καὶ οἱ Εὐριπίδῃ ἐγκαλοῦντες τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτι τοῦτο δρᾶ ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις καὶ πολλὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτῶσιν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν ὥσπερ εἴρηται ὀρθόν. σημεῖον δὲ μέγιστον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων

<sup>15</sup> Cf. A. MÜLLER, *Bibliotheca*, p. 365, notes 3, 4, who gives a list of previous authorities; also WIESSELER, *loc. cit.*, p. 206, note 20; OEHMICHEN, *Woch. f. klass. Phil.*, Vol. IX (1892), p. 1142; NAVARRE, *op. cit.*, p. 106, note 2; and MÜLLER, *Philologus*, Supplementband VII, p. 55.

<sup>16</sup> Till the close of the fifth century the almost exclusive meaning of θέατρον was “audience;” cf. WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORFF, *Hermes*, XXI (1896), pp. 602 f.

<sup>17</sup> Other interpretations were reviewed and rejected by RHODE, *Rhein. Mus.*, Vol. XXXVIII (1883), pp. 253 ff. It is likely, too, that under the term ὑποκριταί all of Agathon's performers were included, chorus as well as actors. Cf. the story told in the *Vita Euripidis* of Sophocles and his chorus at the προάγων after the news of Euripides's death.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. schol. Aeschines *Ctesiphon*. § 67.

τραγικώταται αἱ τοιαῦται φαίνονται, ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν, καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ εὖ οἰκονομεῖ ἀλλὰ τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται.

Aristotle has been saying that a well-constructed plot should be simple, and should imitate actions which excite pity and fear—the pity that is aroused by unmerited misfortune, the fear that is stirred by the misfortune of a man like ourselves. The reversal of fortune should, therefore, be from good to bad. The practice of the stage, he adds, bears out our view (σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον), for tragedies nowadays are founded on the story of a few heroes whose fortunes illustrate this principle. The earlier poets had treated any legend, whatever the nature of the issue. A perfect tragedy, however, should be so constructed. He then adds:

Hence they commit the same error [*i.e.*, as the earlier poets] who censure Euripides just because he follows this principle in his plays, many of which end unhappily. It is, as we have said, the right ending. The best proof is that on the stage and in dramatic competitions such plays, if they are well represented, are the most tragic in effect; and Euripides, faulty as he is in the general management of his subject, yet is felt to be the most tragic of the poets.<sup>19</sup>

In this chapter Aristotle finds confirmation of his statement of the principles of tragic composition in the practice of successful poets and in the effect that tragedies constructed according to his rules actually have upon the audiences. He appeals twice to the “practice of the stage,” as Butcher renders τὸ γιγνόμενον. The contrast is between plays which are technically perfect and those which, in spite of technical faults, do actually succeed in exciting the emotions of pity and fear. The test is the actual performance. There is no suggestion involving the work of the actors as opposed to that of the chorus. Assuming that they are well put on (ἂν κατορθωθῶσιν), the plays of Euripides, with all their faults, are most effective when actually produced (ἐπὶ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων). The combination of σκηνῶν with ἀγώνων shows that σκηνή has here the common meaning of “performance.” The phrase may be regarded as an example of hendiadys, and means nothing more or less than “at scenic contests.” This is precisely the meaning of the modern phrase employed by Butcher, “on the stage and in dramatic competition”; only we must not allow the modern connotation of “stage” as the actors’ platform to affect our interpretation of the Greek phrase, in which the work of the chorus is necessarily included. This point will be made clearer in the discussion of the other passages. In post-classical Greek another phrase is sometimes used in the same meaning—ἐπὶ θεάτρῳ, *e. g.*, schol. *Vesp.* 1291: ἐψηφίσατο ὁ Κλέων μηκέτι δεῖν κωμωδίας ἐπὶ θεάτρῳ<sup>20</sup> εἰσάγεσθαι. “Cleon had a bill passed that no more comedies should be exhibited at spectacles.” To express this thought Aristotle would probably have said ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν εἰσάγεσθαι.

2. XVII, 1, p. 1455a: δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὁμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [δ'] ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ’ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πρᾶττομένοις εὗρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λαμβάνοι [τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου δ’ ἐπετιμᾶτο Καρκίνῳ· ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιδάραος ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνῆκει,

<sup>19</sup> In translating the *Poetics* I have used Butcher's version (2d ed.) with slight adaptations.

<sup>20</sup> V, ἐπὶ θεάτρῳ; R, ἐπὶ καθρ; the others, ἐπὶ τῷ θεάτρῳ.

δ μὴ ὀρώντ' αὐτὸν [θεατῆν]<sup>21</sup> ἐλάνθανεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσεν δυσχερανάντων τοῦτο τῶν θεατῶν.

In constructing the plot and working it out with the proper diction, the poet should place the scene, as far as possible, before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the utmost vividness, as if he were a spectator of the action, he will discover what is in keeping with it, and be most unlikely to overlook inconsistencies. The need of such a rule is shown by the fault found in Carcinus. Amphiarus was on his way from the temple. This fact escaped the notice of the poet, who did not visualize the situation. On the stage, however, the piece failed, the audience being offended at the oversight.

Since we have no knowledge of the plot of the play, the hint given by Aristotle is necessarily obscure. But the inconsistency that Carcinus overlooked is, nevertheless, indicated with sufficient clearness. The poet had not, in constructing his plot, carefully worked out the language of his characters (τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι. Butcher's "diction" is faulty) so that it should harmonize with their actions. Here Amphiarus was on his way back from the temple, whither he had previously departed, but on his reappearance speaks of having come from somewhere else.<sup>22</sup> The contrast here is similar to that in the passage previously discussed—between the crucial test of the performance before spectators and the intrinsic merits of a play. There the practical success of Euripides is set over against defects in technique; here the practical failure of Carcinus against the (implied) merits of his drama. When writing the play the poet, by failing to visualize his plot, overlooked an inconsistency; but when the play was performed (ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς), it failed because of this small defect.<sup>23</sup> To introduce into the interpretation of this passage a reference to a stage for actors, as contrasted with the orchestra for the chorus, is to violate common sense and reason. Here also σκηνή stands for the theater itself; ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς is equivalent to the later ἐπὶ τοῦ θεάτρου, and means, by metonymy, "at the performance." An excellent parallel is found in Plutarch, *Moralia*, p. 845a: (Δημοσθένης) ἐκπεσὼν δέ ποτ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας.

3. XXIV, 3, 4, p. 1459 b: διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μῆκος ἢ ἐποποιία

<sup>21</sup> The emendation of Gomperz for ὀρώντ' τὸν θεατῆν of the manuscripts. A careful examination of the context shows that the poet, not the spectator, was blamed for overlooking the inconsistency. The phrase ὀρώντ' . . . ἡμισυ λαμβάνει applies to him, and its echo, μὴ ὀρώντ' . . . ἐλάνθανεν, naturally does the same. Dacier saw the proper application, and read ποιητῆν for θεατῆν, which Susemihl adopted. Butcher brackets τὸν θεατῆν, but the passage then lacks the definite reference to Carcinus that is required. Vahlen's conjecture, ὀρώντ' αὐτὸν, though perhaps easiest to explain palaeographically, breaks down at the same point. Gomperz's emendation gives the evident meaning of the passage, and from it the present reading could easily have been derived by some scribe's writing τὸν θεατῆν between the lines as a comment on αὐτόν, which he misunderstood.

<sup>22</sup> This is better than to assign the error to faulty stage management, *e. g.*, that Amphiarus made his exit through one of the parodoi, and then on his return entered from the building represented by the proscenium. Susemihl, pp. 254, 162b (2d ed.), frankly confessed ignorance of the fault involved; WELCKER, *Die griechischen Tragödien*, Vol. III, p. 1065, brought nothing of value to the discussion.

H. DÜNTZER, *Rettung der Arist. Poetik*, p. 177, saw the point correctly, though vaguely, but found an impossible contrast between ἐξ ἱεροῦ and ἐνὶ σκηνῆς. TEICHMÜLLER, *Arist. Forschungen*, Vol. I, 104 f., read θεατῆν, and thought the spectators were offended because they did not see the return of Amphiarus from the temple actually represented before their eyes instead of being merely described. But that would not have involved a *συναπτοῖον*. Gomperz in *Aristoteles Poetik* (1897), p. 111, suggests that the appearance in another rôle of the actor who played Amphiarus's part while he was supposed to be absent offended the audience. But this occurred in nearly every play.

<sup>23</sup> Euripides, on the contrary, is commended for his care in such details, *viz.*, for telling the audience whence a character comes and whither he is going. The opening line of the *Troades* is a case in point: Ἦσαν λιπὼν Αἰγαιὸν ἀλμυρὸν βάθος, where the scholiast remarks: ὁλος ἐνὶ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ Εὐριπίδης. "Euripides was wholly intent upon, *i. e.*, was ever thoughtful of, his audience." Cf. PLUTARCH, *Moralia*, p. 342b: (Alexander, entertaining the Persian ambassadors), οὐδὲν ἡρώτα παιδικόν, . . . ἀλλ' ὁλος ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις ἦν τῆς ἡγεμονίας; and HORACE, *Sat.*, I, 9, 2: totus in illis.



καὶ τὸ μέτρον. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὅρος ἱκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος. εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτο, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων ἐλάττους αἱ συστάσεις εἴεν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τραγῳδιῶν τῶν εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν τιθεμένων παρήκοιεν. ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος πολὺ τι ἡ ἐποποιία ἴδιον διὰ τὸ ἐν μὲν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα πραττόμενα πολλὰ μέρη μμείσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος μόνον. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ διὰ τὸ διήγησιν εἶναι ἔστι πολλὰ μέρη ἅμα ποιεῖν περαινόμενα.

Epic poetry differs from tragedy in the scale on which it is constructed, and in its metre. As regards scale or length, we have already laid down an adequate limit: the beginning and the end must be capable of being brought within a single view. This condition will be satisfied by poems on a smaller scale than the old epics, and answering in length to the group of tragedies presented at a single sitting. Epic poetry has, however, a special capacity for enlarging its dimensions, and we can see the reason. In tragedy we cannot imitate several actions carried on at one and the same time; we must confine ourselves to the action on the stage and the part taken by the players. But in epic poetry, owing to the narrative form, many events simultaneously transacted can be presented.

A tragic plot is restricted as to time and place, i. e., it cannot represent more than one event at a time. Now to represent simultaneous events we need several groups of characters and as many places for their action. But tragedy can present but one group of characters at a time acting in but one place, viz., that represented in the scenery of the theater. Whenever in a play the scene of action has once been localized, there it must remain, and no performers can be introduced inconsistent with this location. Now the chief cause of this restriction was the chorus. Its constant presence effectually prevented the tragic poet from shifting the scene of action, as the epic poet could readily do in his narrative, and as the modern dramatic poet, freed from this serious limitation, can do without violating the laws of his art. The fifth-century dramatists keenly felt the restraint put upon them and tried to gain a larger freedom. Æschylus in the *Eumenides*, Sophocles in the *Ajax*, Euripides in the *Alcestis*, Aristophanes in the *Thesmophoriazusae*, and the unknown author of the *Rhesus* succeeded in removing the chorus for a moment while the scene was changed; but they could not introduce a new set of characters in the new scene, because the traditions of the drama imposed upon the poet a single chorus for each piece. The utmost that the poets did in this direction was done in the early period of tragedy, when chorus and actors changed their characters between the longer episodes—an arrangement from which developed the group of four plays forming a tetralogy. Aristotle, of course, did not dream of a tragedy without a chorus, and in formulating the laws which govern this branch of the imitative art, accepting the chorus as an essential part of tragedy, simply defined the conditions which arise from its presence. It is evident, therefore, that under the term οἱ ὑποκριταὶ he had in mind all of the performers concerned in representing the action which the poet brings before our eyes, the chorus as well as the actors.<sup>24</sup> The restriction as to the performers which the

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Note 17 above, and Triclinius's scholium to the *Agamemnon*, quoted by WECKLEIN, "Studien zu Euripides,"

*Jahr. f. class. Phil.*, Vol. VII (1875), p. 432: πεντακτῆκα εἰς οἱ τοῦ τραγικοῦ χοροῦ ὑποκριταί.

tragic poet can introduce into a given plot is, however, only an incident of the limitation—imposed by the constant presence of the chorus—as to *the place of action*. To this consideration, therefore, Aristotle properly gives the precedence—*δεῖ μμείσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς μέρος*. Out of the many actions going on at the same time which the epic poet may draw into his narrative, the tragic poet must select that one which takes place at the scene of action determined upon at the outset. To make clearer the necessity of the poet's confining himself to this one scene, Aristotle adds the second item—*καὶ τὸ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν μέρος*. We might properly render the sentence under consideration thus: "But he must confine himself to that portion of the story that is defined by the scene of action chosen and that falls to the performers appropriate to this scene." *Ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς* here again might have been replaced by the later phrase *ἐπὶ τοῦ θεάτρου*, and, far from referring to the place where the actors stood, manifestly embraces all who are concerned in the dramatic representation.

4. XXIV, 8, p. 1460a: *δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγηδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα· ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα ἀνφανέη, οἱ μὲν ἐστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δ' ἀνανεύων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔπεσιν λανθάνει.*

The element of the wonderful is admitted in tragedy. The irrational, on which the wonderful depends for its chief effects, has wider scope in epic poetry, because there the person acting is not seen. Thus, the pursuit of Hector would be ludicrous if placed upon the stage—the Greeks standing still and not joining in the pursuit and Achilles waving them back. But in the epic poem the absurdity passes unnoticed.

Aristotle is evidently thinking of *Iliad*, XXII, 205 f.:

*λαοῖσιν δ' ἀνένευε καρῆατι δίος Ἀχιλλεύς,  
οὐδ' ἔα ἰέμεναι ἐπὶ Ἑκτορι πικρὰ βέλεμνα,*

and is trying to show why a scene that was excellent in an epic could not be dramatized. In Homer there are two groups of characters: (a) Achilles and Hector, and (b) the Greek army. They are all *ὑποκριταί* ("performers") in the sense in which the author used that term in the preceding passage. In Aristotle's imaginary dramatization of this incident these groups represent the actors (*ὁ δέ*) and the chorus (*οἱ μὲν*) respectively. In the epic account of the pursuit the episode seems natural, for the picture placed before our eyes is on an heroic scale, and we do not find ourselves offended by minor picturesque, if incongruous, details; but "on the stage," "auf der Bühne," "sur la scène," i. e., in dramatic representation, it appears ridiculous. The contrast is once more perfectly plain, and if we should try to restrict the meaning of *σκηνή* to an elevated "stage," a place for actors alone, we should then have to explain how both actors and chorus are here included under that phrase.

It is fortunate that so many fourth-century examples of the use of *ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς* are preserved by so careful and accurate a writer as Aristotle, and in passages that yield satisfactory results upon analysis. The sole instance of its occurrence in

Demosthenes is so colorless that any attempt at deriving from such a passage a satisfactory conception of the phrase's meaning would have been vain; yet, now that from other sources we have gained a suitable meaning, the usage there is found to accord with it. For the proper understanding of such passages, therefore, these Aristotelian examples are of inestimable worth.

5. Demosthenes, *Or.*, XIX, 337: καίτοι καὶ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἴσως εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη. πάντῃ γὰρ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φρονεῖν αὐτὸν ἀκούω, ὥς καθυποκρινόμενον ὑμᾶς. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖτ' ἀτοπώτατον ἀπάντων ἂν ποιῆσαι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν τὰ Θυέστου καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Τροίᾳ κακὰ ἡγωνίζετο, ἐκεβάλλετ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξεσυρίττετ' ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων καὶ μόνον οὐ κατελείεθ' οὕτως, ὥστε τελευτῶντα τοῦ τριταγωνιστεῖν ἀποστήναι, ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς καὶ μεγίστοις τῆς πόλεως πράγμασι μύρι' εἵργασται κακὰ, τηνικαῦθ' ὥς καλὸν φθεγγόμενφ προσέχοιτε.

And yet, perhaps, I must speak also about his voice, for I understand that he is very proud of that, too, presuming that he will overpower you by his acting. It appears to me, however, that it would be an act of extreme absurdity on your part, if, when he played the miseries of Thyestes and the heroes at Troy, you drove and hissed him from the theater and all but stoned him, so that he finally retired from playing his third-rate parts, yet now, when not merely in dramatic performances, but in public and most momentous affairs of the state, he has wrought endless miseries, you should pay attention to him as a fine speaker.

Demosthenes is calling attention to the different scenes of Æschines's failures, which were not confined to his theatrical efforts but extended to his public career as well. 'Επὶ τῆς σκηνῆς has no more definite application to his standing-place as an actor in the theater than ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων above, or than ἐν Διονύσου in *Or.*, V, 6, 7: πάλιν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατιδὼν Νεοπτόλεμον τὸν ὑποκριτὴν . . . . κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον τὰ μέγιστα τὴν πόλιν . . . . παρελθὼν εἶπον εἰς ὑμᾶς. . . . καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν τούτοις αἰτιάσομαι τοῖς ὑπὲρ Νεοπτολέμου λέγοντας ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς. εἰ γὰρ ἐν Διονύσου τραγωδοῖς ἐθεάσασθε, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῶν πραγμάτων ἦν ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οὕτως οὐτ' ἐκείνου πρὸς χάριν οὐτ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς ἀπέχθειαν ἠκούσατε; or than ἐν θεάτρῳ in Theophrastus, *Charact.*, XI: ὁ βδελυρὸς τοιοῦτος οἶος . . . . ἐν θεάτρῳ κροτεῖν, ὅταν οἱ ἄλλοι παύονται καὶ συρίττειν οὐς ἡδέως θεωροῦσιν οἱ λοιποί. Though ἐν Διονύσου and ἐν θεάτρῳ may include both performers and spectators, while ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς is restricted to the former, none involves specific reference to any particular part of the theater.

These are the only examples of the phrase in the extant literature of the fourth century. I add a few later instances which illustrate the same usage: schol. *Thesm.*, 101: μονωδεῖ ὁ Ἀγάθων ὡς πρὸς χορόν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς,<sup>25</sup> ἀλλ' ὡς ποιήματα συντιθεῖς. διὸ καὶ χορικὰ λέγει μέλη αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς χορικὰ δέ. "Agathon sings a solo as though he were addressing a chorus, not as if he were in the theater, but as composing verses [at home]. Accordingly, he says also the choral parts all to himself, though still as choral parts." Lucian, *Apol.*, 5: οἱ [i. e., tragic actors] ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς σκηνῆς Ἀγαμέμνων ἑκάστος ἢ Κρέων ἢ αὐτὸς Ἡρακλῆς εἰσιν, ἔξω δὲ Πῶλος ἢ Ἀριστόδημος . . . . γίγνονται. "At dramatic performances in the theater each of the tragic actors

<sup>25</sup> ὑπὸ σκηνῆς, the manuscripts.

is Agamemnon or Creon or Heracles himself, but outside of the theater he is simply himself." Arg. Eurip. *Orestes*: τὸ δράμα τῶν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς εὐδοκιμούντων, χείριστον δὲ τοῖς ἡθεσι. The "staging" of a Greek play obviously included the place of the chorus as well as that of the actors. Plutarch, *Moralia*, p. 785b: Φιλήμωνα δὲ τὸν κομικὸν καὶ Ἀλεξιν ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ στεφανουμένους ὁ θάνατος κατέλαβε. "Death seized Philemon and Alexis while they strove successfully in the theater." Of course, in this instance there is no mention of actors at all, but of poets who were contestants in the theater with their plays. Libanius, *Praefat. ad Demosth.*, 2: ἰστόρηται γὰρ τινα Βάταλον Ἐφέσιον αὐλητὴν γενέσθαι, δς πρῶτος ὑποδήμασι γυναικεῖσι ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐχρήσατο. "Batalus [as his effeminacy caused him to be nicknamed, though his name was really Tigranes; cf. schol. *Æschines*, I, 126], the Ephesian flute player, was the first to wear women's sandals at a performance in the theater." In the Greek theater flute players performed in the orchestra.<sup>26</sup> Though Libanius may have had in mind the custom of the Roman theater, more probably he was simply quoting the words of a much earlier writer. Plutarch, *Moralia*, p. 337e: ἀγωνιστῇ γὰρ ἡγεμονίας ὑποκριτὴν ἐπέισήγαγε, μᾶλλον δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τὸ διάδημα κοφὸν διεξῆλθε τῆς οἰκουμένης. "For he brought in against his opponent one to play the rôle of power, but as in a play a 'mute' took the part of ruler of the world." *Ibid.*, p. 709d: ἀλλὰ δεῖ σκοπεῖν πρῶτον τίς ὁ καλῶν ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ σφόδρα συνήθης, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πλουσίων τις ἢ σατραπικῶν, ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς δορυφορήματος λαμπροῦ δεόμενος ἢ πάνυ χαρίζεσθαι τῇ κλήσει πεπεισμένος καὶ τιμᾶν, ἐπάγεται, παραιτητέος εὐθύς. "But it is necessary in the first place to see who gives the invitation. For if it is no one very intimate, but someone of either wealth or power—one who needs, as at a dramatic performance, a splendid suite, or is convinced that he is bestowing favor or honor by the invitation—one must ask at once to be excused." *Ibid.*, p. 791e: ὁ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς δορυφόρημα κοφὸν ἦν δνομα βασιλέως. "As in a play, Aridaeus was a 'mute' escort of power, a nominal king."

Now ἀπό with the genitive is the counterpart of ἐπὶ with the genitive. Therefore, if ἐπὶ means "on top of," ἀπό means "from on top of;" but if ἐπὶ conveys no implication of elevation and means simply "at," then ἀπό denotes merely motion, or derivation, from.<sup>27</sup> Now in the phrase under discussion, ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, we have found that σκηνή, which in its earlier usage meant a specific part of the theater structure, was used by metonymy for the whole performance-place. Meaning originally the booth used by the performers in dramatic exhibitions, then the structure that served not only as a dressing-room, but also as the scenic background (cf. the term σκηνογραφία, which occurs first in Aristotle), the enlarged, tropical meaning was a perfectly natural development when the "performance-place" to be designated was the place for dramatic exhibition. For any other kind of exhibition in the theater, for example the dithyramb, in which the σκηνή structure had no part, ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς would scarcely have been an appropriate designation of the place of the performance, but rather

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Phrynichus, RUTHERFORD, *New Phrynichus*, p. 250.

<sup>27</sup> An illustration, which happens to involve the word

σκηνή, is found in THEOCRITUS, XV, 16: φύκος ἀπὸ σκαῆς ἀγορεύων. The φύκος was to be had ἐνι σκαῆς, "at the shop."

ἐπὶ τῆς θυμέλης (i. e., ὀρχήστρας). Consequently οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, or the later term, σκηνῖται, embraced all of the participants in a dramatic representation—ὑποκριταί, χορός, ποιητής, χορηγός, and διδάσκαλος—as did τραγῳδοί at an earlier period. Now if it were desired to distinguish between the two kinds of dramatic performers, since οἱ ἐπὶ (or, from a different point of view, ἀπὸ) τῆς θυμέλης was already used of the dithyrambic chorus and could not possibly be applied to the actors, that term would naturally be used to designate the dramatic chorus as well, and οἱ ἐπὶ (ἀπὸ) τῆς σκηνῆς would be used in the restricted sense for the actors alone. It was thus, in my opinion, that the distinction arose between the two phrases, rather than because the σκηνή was the place *par excellence* for the actors, as is generally assumed on the basis of the dictum of Pollux. One would naturally expect that οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς and οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς would assume the meaning “actors” contemporaneously, though, as a matter of fact, Aristotle uses only the latter in the new sense and retains the old meaning of the former. It is fortunate that this so happened, otherwise it would be impossible to trace the phrase’s history with any degree of certainty. Probably the fact that the σκηνή was thought of as the home of the actors, as Reisch has pointed out, accounts for the use of ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς in the new meaning before ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς. In the development of their meanings, and the differences between them at any particular time, these phrases are precisely paralleled by οἱ σκηνικοί and οἱ θυμελικοί. In other words, σκηνικός was first used to distinguish dramatic from other performers in the theater, and later, following the course of development above indicated for οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, came to be applied to actors alone. Of course, when a raised “stage” was introduced, such an application of these expressions was doubly appropriate,<sup>28</sup> because the local distinction was emphasized—not, however, because ἐπὶ implies elevation.

We are now in a position to estimate properly the phrase ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς in Aristotle. In two passages, which may be un-Aristotelian, ἀπὸ (τῆς) σκηνῆς is used of the lyrical utterances of actors. *Poetics*, XII, 1, 1452b: κοινὰ μὲν ἀπάντων ταῦτα, ἴδια δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς καὶ κόμμοι. “These [*i. e.* prologue, episode, exodos, and choric song] are common to all plays, peculiar to some are the κόμμοι and the songs of the scenic performers.” *Ibid.*, XII, 2: κόμμος δὲ θρήνος κοινὸς χοροῦ καὶ <τῶν> ἀπὸ σκηνῆς. “A kommos is a dirge by both the chorus and the scenic performers.” Cf. also Aristotle’s *Problem.*, XV, 918b: τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ αἷτιον καὶ διότι τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς οὐκ ἀντίστροφα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χοροῦ ἀντίστροφα; *ibid.*, XXX, 920a: διὰ τί οὐδὲ ὑποδωριστὶ οὐδὲ ὑποφρυγιστὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ χορικόν; . . . ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς, μμητικὴ γάρ; *ibid.*, XLVIII, 922b: ταῦτα δὲ ἄμφω χορῷ μὲν ἀνάρμοστα, τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς οἰκειότερα· ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μμηταί. The use of χορός, χορικόν, etc., in these passages gives to the phrase ἀπὸ (τῆς) σκηνῆς the restricted meaning desired. As soon as the “choral” element is taken out, “scenic” must refer to the actors alone, although, strictly speaking, both chorus and actors were included in

<sup>28</sup> Cf. the recent controversy—arising from FRIE’s dissertation, *De Certaminibus Thymelicis*, Basel, 1900—between

Bethe and Dörpfeld in *Hermes*, Vol. XXXVI (1901), pp. 597 ff., and *ibid.*, Vol. XXXVII (1902), pp. 249 ff. and 483 ff.

the term "scenic." Cf. Demosthenes, XVIII, 180: (βούλει) σὲ δὲ μὴδ' ἦρω τὸν τυχόντα (θῶ), ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὰ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς, Κρεσφόντην ἢ Κρέοντα ἢ δὲ ἐν Κολλυτῷ ποτε Οἰνάμαον κακῶς ὑποκρινόμενος ἐπέτριψας. "Do you want me to count you as no ordinary hero, but as one of these 'scenic' performers, Cresphontes or Creon or Œnomaus, whom once upon a time, at Collytus, you 'murdered' with your bad acting?" This fling was directed at Æschines, whose ill luck as an actor of tragic rôles was notorious.

Finally, both those who insist that ἐπὶ with the genitive invariably "implies elevation," and their opponents who claim that it means "before," are equally led astray by the exigencies of the argument. Reisch, in the statement quoted above: "Dass das Vorwort ἐπὶ (mit Genetiv, Dativ und Accusativ) nicht nur zur Bezeichnung von Höhenunterschieden, sondern auch zur Bezeichnung der Nachbarschaft zweier auf gleichem Boden befindlicher Dinge verwendet wird, dürfte wohl bekannt genug sein," proposes to cut the Gordian knot of the most perplexing word in the language in a manner that will satisfy but few. Only a small proportion of the examples that he cites are of any value to the present discussion. Let us consider the following passages: In two instances σκηνή has its untechnical meaning of "tent": Plutarch, *Brutus*, 45: πηληγαῖς κολασθέντας ἐπὶ σκηνῆς [before, or at, the commander's quarters] γυμνοὺς ἀποδοθῆναι τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν πολεμίων; and Arg. Soph. *Ajax*: καταλαμβάνει Ἀθηνᾶ Ὀδυσσεῖα ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς διοπτεύοντα τί ποτε ἄρα πράττει. In three cases ἐπὶ is used in connection with the scenic background. Arg. Soph. *Antigone*: ὑπόκειται δὲ τὰ πράγματα ἐπὶ τῶν Κρέοντος βασιλείων; schol. Soph. *Trach.* 1275: ἐπ' οἴκων; and Arg. Aristoph. *Equites*: εἶκε [sc. Δημοσθένης] ὡς ἐπὶ οἰκίας δεσποτικῆς ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον. And in still two other instances it is used in connection with the spectators: schol. Eurip. *Troil.*, 1: ὅλος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ Εὐριπίδης, and schol. Eurip. *Hippol.*, 524: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα, ἃ φρονῶ, ἀρκέσει τοῖς ἔνδον διηγῆσασθαι φίλοις, ὅποιά ἐστι, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεάτρου ταῦτα ἐκφέρειν. "The nature of my other plans it will suffice to relate to my friends within, and not to disclose them before the whole audience."

In dealing with this matter Professor Gildersleeve shrewdly observes:

In the vast majority of instances ἐπὶ with the genitive denotes characteristic superposition and it may still denote superposition in such standing expressions as ἐπὶ τέγους, ἐπ' οἰκίματος. . . . Any form of superposition will answer the conditions — a rest in front, a step in the doorway. . . . Dr. Forman . . . adduces an interesting example, Demosthenes, LVIII, 40: ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων καὶ τοῦ βήματος, in which ἐπὶ retains enough literalness for the second member. But, whatever the local exigencies may be, the phraseological, the adjectival character of the combination is unmistakable. οἱ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς as a technical term is simply οἱ σκηνῖται, the "hutmen." The rarity of ἐπὶ with the genitive of mere proximity in the best period, the large possibilities of the "upon" element even then — all this is abundantly shown in Dr. Forman's dissertation. That ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς is more common than οἱ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς, a fact on which Reisch lays great stress, is a very simple matter. Ἀπὸ σκηνῆς is ἐπὶ σκηνῆς from a different point of view. Sporadic examples in which ἐπὶ with the genitive seems to mean "before" do not strengthen the σκηνή argument, which may quietly repose on the phraseological use of ἐπὶ. "On the playhouse

side" is all the theory demands, and the phrase was fixed long before the time of the earliest passage cited.<sup>29</sup>

Ἐπὶ does not necessarily and always mean "upon." When σκηνή means "tent," ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς means not "on the tent," but "near," "at," or "before" it. In its original theatrical use the phrase meant, as Professor Gildersleeve so aptly expresses it, "on the playhouse side," and referred to the space before and in the vicinity of the scene building. In its fourth-century usage it always pointed a contrast; in some cases it indubitably included the chorus in its application, while it never expressly excluded it. In fact, it had no more definiteness of reference than ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ. Those who translate the phrase by "on the stage" use a perfectly legitimate English expression that reproduces fairly well the original, but they violate their scholarship and their native tongue when they try to force into the ancient phrase a meaning that is incidental in the history of the modern expression.

<sup>29</sup> (Gildersleeve's notice of FORMAN's dissertation "On Used to Denote Superposition," *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XVIII (1897), p. 120.  
the Difference between the Genitive and Dative with ἐπὶ

# **THE PROCONSULATE OF JULIUS AGRICOLA**





## THE PROCONSULATE OF JULIUS AGRICOLA IN RELATION TO HISTORY AND TO ENCOMIUM

GEORGE LINCOLN HENDRICKSON

It has been the defect of much which has been written in the effort to explain the literary form of the *Agricola* of Tacitus, that each student has seized upon some single aspect of the work and, discerning the analogy of this part to some phase of encomiastic, biographical, or historical literature, has sought in this direction to find the key to the composition of the work as a whole. So, for example (to take two or three illustrations), Hübner<sup>1</sup> endeavored to identify the *Agricola* with the Roman *laudatio funebris*, and found naturally not a little that supported his contention, in fact more than was conceded by most of his critics, who seemed unwilling to allow the qualifications with which he guarded his contention. More recently, Professor Gudeman<sup>2</sup> has sought to demonstrate that the *Agricola* corresponds exactly to the rhetorical rules for formal encomium, especially as set forth in the type of imperial panegyric known as the βασιλικὸς λόγος. The effort at special identification was in both cases erroneous, and depends upon certain elements which the *Agricola* has in common with works of the two literary forms named. Again Andresen,<sup>3</sup> led by a certain formal resemblance between the manner of historiography and the form of the chapters extending from the description of Britain (10) to the end of Agricola's proconsulate (39), pronounced this section a preliminary fragment of the *Histories*, and denied to it any biographical character whatever.

It has remained for Professor Leo, in his masterly sketch of ancient biographical literature,<sup>4</sup> to furnish the proper setting for the *Agricola*, and to trace the history of that encomiastic biography which in Greek and in Roman literature had its own development, related to and yet distinct from such types of formal encomium as the *laudatio funebris* or the βασιλικὸς λόγος. The long history of this literary form, with its multitude of tributary influences, cannot here be reviewed. In criticism of Leo's general conclusions, I should only wish to see emphasized somewhat more distinctly the influence which the Roman national custom of the *laudatio funebris* must have had upon giving to the biographies of friends or relatives recently deceased a marked encomiastic character. The *laudatio funebris* was pure encomium, and differed in no essential respect from the Greek theory and practice of encomium; for it is obvious that the funeral oration, not less than political and forensic eloquence, passed entirely into the sphere of theory prescribed by Greek rhetoric. But in Greek literature encomium

<sup>1</sup> *Hermes*, Vol. I (1866), p. 439.

<sup>2</sup> Edition of the *Agricola*, Boston, 1900.

<sup>3</sup> "Die Entstehung und Tendenz des taciteischen Agri-

cola," *Festschrift des Gymnasiums zum Grauen Kloster* (Berlin, 1874), pp. 293 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Die griechisch-römische Biographie*, Leipzig, 1901.

was one of the progenitors of biography, and biography is frankly recognized by Polybius<sup>5</sup> as legitimately encomiastic, in contrast to the objective truth of history. Thus, whether from the Roman institution of the *laudatio funebris*, or from the analogy of Greek prototypes (or from both sources), the Roman biographies of deceased contemporaries were professedly laudatory.

It is not, however, to criticise the general results of Leo's investigations, but to express a partial dissent from his conclusions concerning the *Agricola*, that the following pages have been written — and written, it may be said frankly, with some inward reluctance against entering the field of so endless a discussion.<sup>6</sup> But no question is settled until it is settled right, and the very correctness of Leo's assignment of the *Agricola* to its general place in the history of biography is a legitimate incentive to expressing disagreement with a detail of his treatment — a detail, however, of no mean proportions, since it has to do with considerably more than half of the life. It concerns, as my title indicates, that part of the treatise which narrates the deeds of Agricola's proconsulate in Britain, together with the introductory survey of the geography and ethnology of the island and its conquest down to the time of Agricola's advent. These chapters, says Leo (p. 231), "are treated in a manner which removes them from the character of biography. This fact has of course often been observed, and attention has been called to it by many, especially by Andresen. To be sure, the narrative has reference to Agricola, and from chapter 18 on he is the leading figure, but not otherwise than a commander would be in any military history."

Nevertheless, there remain certain very essential differences between the greater part of this narrative and the usual manner of historiography (as employed by Tacitus himself, by Livy or Sallust), which make it incorrect, I believe, to affirm that this portion of the work is, in its essence, historical, or analogous to any historical narrative in which a commander plays a similar leading rôle.

Before turning to the analysis of the campaigns of Agricola, I shall consider briefly two introductory points which have a direct bearing on my main argument, although they lie outside of the portions of the text which I have here chosen for discussion.

*Non tamen pigebit vel incondita ac rudi voce memoriam prioris servitutis ac testimonium praesentium bonorum composuisse. Hic interim liber honori Agricolae soceri mei destinatus, professione pietatis aut laudatus erit aut excusatus* (chap. 3, *extr.*). It seems to be held very generally that this statement places the *Agricola* in relationship to the *Histories* as a preliminary work of a similar kind.<sup>7</sup> But if these words

<sup>5</sup> X, 21 (24), 8 (cited below, p. 25).

<sup>6</sup> Although Professor Leo's work is the immediate stimulus to the present publication, yet the essential outlines of this study were formulated several years ago, and first presented in academic lectures of the autumn of 1899.

<sup>7</sup> Andresen's is the most extreme form of this view (*loc. cit.*, p. 301): "Die Historien betrachtet er in der That als

sein erstes Werk, dessen ungebildete Sprache er bei den künftigen Lesern desselben entschuldigen zu müssen glaubt; der Agricola ist nur ein Vorläufer, eine Vorstudie, oder wenn man will, geradezu ein Theil der Historien." The general tendency of interpretation may be seen from a few typical utterances: "Hoc libro ut dignissimo exordio historica auspicatus est, etc." (HAASE, *Tac. op.*, I, xix).

be so interpreted, it surely must be for reasons other than the grammatical sense which they yield. For without attaching any peculiar meaning to *interim*, does the passage, in fact, say anything more than that in the meantime, before the publication of a historical record of the period through which they have just passed, this work is put forth *honori soceri mei destinatus*? That the present work (*hic liber*) stands in any relation of kind to the promised one is in no way conveyed by the grammatical form of the sentence. Whatever relationship is suggested between the character of the two works lies implicit in the quasi-technical terminology, *memoriam* (history) and *honori* (encomium), and this relationship is rather one of difference than of similarity. In the lack of a sufficiently flexible theory of classification, history is, to be sure, sometimes associated with epideictic oratory (Cic., *Or.*, 37). But Aristotle, it would seem,<sup>8</sup> saw that history belonged in a separate category, and subsequent theorists draw with utmost sharpness the distinction between history and encomium.<sup>9</sup> The goal of encomium is the presentation of τὸ καλόν (*honestum*), of history τὸ ἀληθές. The former may euphemize, suppress, amplify, in order to admit no impression but that of the meritorious or praiseworthy; the latter is bound to strict objectivity and impartiality. Accordingly we find in the preface to both of Tacitus's historical works the avowal of unpartisan devotion to truth, which befits the historian.<sup>10</sup> Here, however, he says with similar explicitness that the present work is devoted to the *honor* of his father-in-law, Agricola. Its subject-matter is, therefore, *honestu*, such things as shall redound to the praise of the person commemorated.<sup>11</sup> Thus the phrase *honori desti-*

"Tacitus will also seiner Agricola . . . als eine historische Schrift betrachtet wissen" (HOFFMANN, *Z. f. Ost. Gym.*, Vol. XXI (1870), p. 251). Of a more general character and without specific reference to this passage, WOLFFLIN, *Archiv*, Vol. XII, p. 116: "Dass der Agricola und die Germania aber in das Gebiet der Geschichtsschreibung fallen und ihren Platz neben den Historien und Annalen haben, darf als zugestanden vorausgesetzt werden." Even Professor Gudeman speaks of chaps. 18-39 (the πράξεις of Agricola) as the "strictly historical portion of his biography," and on this theory justifies the presence of the speeches in the *Agricola* (*Int.*, p. xvi).

<sup>8</sup> NICOL. SOPH. (Sp. III, p. 483, 18): ὁ ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος . . . τέταρτον παρὰ τὰ τρία τὰ προλεχθέντα τὸ ἱστορικὸν ἐκάλεσε. There is apparently no suggestion of this in the *Rhet.* or *Poet.*, and from what work it is derived does not appear.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. POLYBIUS, X, 21 (24), 6, cited below, p. 25, and LUCIAN, *De hist. cons.*, 7, who complains of historians as ἀγνοῦντες ὅτι οὐ στενὴ τῇ ἰσθμῷ διώριστα καὶ διατεταίχιστα ἡ ἱστορία πρὸς τὸ ἐγκώμιον, ἀλλὰ τι μέγα τεῖχος ἐν μέσῳ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν. It has seemed worth while to emphasize a well-known distinction in view of Professor Gudeman's statement, p. x: "In fact the line of demarcation between a historical narrative and an encomium was a very slight one." In support of this he cites Doxopater (WALZ, II, p. 413): οὐδὲν διοίσει φιλῆς ἱστορίας τὸ ἐγκώμιον. But a conclusion based upon the apodosis of a conditional sentence is insecure. The writer is discussing the definition of encomium as a λόγος ἐπαινετικός and demands that καὶ αὐτῆς shall be added: ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ (Walz and presumably the

MSS. read μὲν) τοῦτο προστέθῃ, οὐδὲν διοίσει φιλῆς ἱστορίας τὸ ἐγκώμιον. The further quotation from Ammianus Marcellinus with which he supports his statement is likewise evidence of the distinction between encomium and history. Ammianus, in the preface to his treatment of Julian, says: "His deeds are so great that the unvarnished record of them is in itself almost encomiastic—*ad laudativam paene materiam pertinebit*" (XVI, 1, 3). Gudeman takes the passage out of its context and causes it to appear as if Ammianus had said that any historical record of events is almost encomium.

<sup>10</sup> *Hist.*, I, 1: *sed incorruptam fidem professis neque amore quisquam et sine odio dicendus est.* *Ann.*, I, 1: *inde consilium mihi pauca de Augusto et extrema tradere, mox Tiberii principatum et cetera, sine ira et studio, quorum causas procul habeo.*

<sup>11</sup> For *honestum* (τὸ καλόν) as the goal of the *genus laudativum*, v. the rhetoricians *passim*. QUINTILIAN (III, 4, 16) criticises those *qui laudativam materiam honestorum . . . quaestione contineri putant* as restricting the field too narrowly. For the application to a subject-matter analogous to the *Agricola* cf. PLIN., *Ep.*, VIII, 12, 4: *solicitarer vel ingenio hominis . . . vel honestate materiae. Scribit exitus inlustrium virorum, in his quorundam mihi carissimorum. video ergo fungi pio munere, quorumque exsequias celebrare non licuit, horum quasi funebribus laudationibus, scribis quidem sed tanto magis veris, interesse.* The phrase *supremus honor* is used of the *laudatio funebris* in QUINT., *Decl.*, p. 296, 6 (Ritter).

*natus* places the *Agricola* in a relationship of implied antithesis to the impartial truth of history, and this implicit contrast is, I suspect, expressed further in the mild adversative force which *interim* so frequently combines with its temporal significance. So far, then, from indicating a relationship of similarity to the promised *Histories*, the words imply rather a contrast, the fulfilment of a filial obligation before the author turns to a task absolved from any considerations except those of truth.

The work is thus expressly dedicated to the honor of *Agricola*; its subject-matter is *honestas* as exemplified in him. That the praise of others, however great their merits, is a source of envy and rancor instead of generous recognition, is one of the tritest complaints of the panegyrist of all ages—*urit enim fulgore suo qui praegravat artes infra se positas*. The complaint begins with the earliest prose encomium,<sup>12</sup> and its history can be traced through the whole ancient literature of panegyric. To this weakness of human character Tacitus alludes in the familiar words at the beginning of his preface: *quotiens virtus . . . supergressa est ignorantiam recti et invidiam*.<sup>13</sup> He would imply that in the purer days of Rome the appreciation of virtue was generous, as the opportunity to display it was easy. But since we must reckon with the jealousy of a baser time, one must ask indulgence for the bestowal of praise. The plea is justified by the filial relation of the biographer to his subject (*professione pietatis*). Tacitus gives, it will be seen, a certain specific motive to the famous *petitio veniae* in the degeneracy of the times. But this is no more than a touch of art to deprive the plea of a certain general and commonplace character by assigning to it the appearance of a reason peculiar to the author or the time. For as the complaint of the *invidia* (φθόνος) which the praise of merit encounters is a commonplace in encomiastic literature, so the *petitio veniae* was a recognized device of rhetoric to anticipate and conciliate the prejudice which envy would inspire. Examples are not, however, numerous or, at all events, have eluded observation. The theoretical formulation of the matter is given very briefly by the rhetorician Apsines in the chapter *περί διηγέσεως* (Spengel, I<sup>2</sup>, p. 257, 20): αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐγκωμιαστικαὶ (διηγήσεις) καὶ εὐεργεσιῶν διέξοδον ἔχουσιν· αὐταὶ τοίνυν πομπικώτεραι καὶ πανηγυρικώτεραι· πρόσσεστι δὲ αὐταῖς τὸ ἐπαχθές (*invidia*)· τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐπανορθωτέον ἢ διὰ τῶν προπαραιτήσεων (*deprecationes, petitiones veniae*) ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι τὸν λόγον τὰ πολλὰ προσποιούμενον παραλείπειν ἢ ἐξ ἀναιρέσεως τὰ πολλὰ εἰσάγοντα κτλ. Cf. also Aristides, Sp. II, 506, 8: τοῦ δὲ μὴ φορτικῶς ἐπαινεῖν . . . τρόποι εἰσὶν οἷδε. πρῶτον . . . ὡς συναναγκασθεὶς ἐπὶ τοῦτο δοκῇ συνενεχθῆναι . . . τρίτος τρόπος ὅταν πρὶν εἰπεῖν τι συγγνώμην ἐφ' οἷς ἂν μέλλῃ λέγειν αἰτῇται κτλ. Another example of such a *προπαραίτησις* we may learn of, or rather infer, from Pliny's account of an address which he had delivered on the dedication of a library at Comum, and was preparing to publish. The subject-matter was encomiastic, and dealt with his own generosity and that of his parents: *anceps hic et lubricus locus est, etiam cum illi necessitas lenocinatur*. The *necessitas* (cf. the passage

<sup>12</sup> Cf. ISOC., *Evag.*, 6: τούτων δ' αἰτίας ὁ φθόνος κτλ.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. THEON (π. ἐγκ.), Sp. II, 110, 13: καλαὶ δὲ εἰσι πράξεις . . . τὸν τῶν πόλλων φθόνον ὑπερβαλλόμεναι.

of Aristides above) lay in the filial duty to commemorate adequately the munificence of his parents, and this obligation of filial affection afforded a ground of indulgence (*lenocinatur*), without, however, wholly eliminating the difficulties which envy imposes upon all praise: *etenim si alienae quoque laudes parum aequis auribus accipi solent, quam difficile est optinere ne molesta videatur oratio de se aut de suis disserentis? nam cum ipsi honestati tum aliquanto magis gloriae eius praedicationique invidemus* (*Ep.*, I, 7, 6).

Tacitus thus conceived of it as a duty imposed by filial regard to write the life of his father-in-law, and it could not occur to him to do this otherwise than in the form of encomiastic biography, which tradition and personal feeling prescribed. But to the difficulties of praise which lie in the nature of human relations was added the special character of the times which ill brooked the prominence of the individual. It was, therefore, a matter of special art to find a form which should accomplish the desired end of laudatory biography without the offense which simply encomium was certain to convey. For the early life of Agricola there was no reason why the ordinary forms of biographical characterization should not suffice (4-9). In the praise of the youthful Agricola there could be no offense. But the events on which his real claims to a lasting place in memory should rest, and in which his greatness of character was most fully revealed, his exploration and complete conquest of Britain, were of a different character. Their importance was such, and they touched so closely, by contrast or comparison, the interests of others still living, that a form of presentation was requisite which should at once accomplish the end sought, and, by the appearance of historical objectivity, disarm criticism and envy. This part of the work, therefore, is cast in the conventional form of history, and even with a certain affectation of observance of the form where, in fact, it is deserted. It is at the same time to be remembered that the conditions of biographical treatment of eminent Romans under the empire were peculiar. The form of classical biography which Plutarch presents has to do, in nearly every case, with men whose careers were varied—political, military, literary, etc. But for an Agricola or a Corbulo the essential matter of biographical record was the proconsular career. In his province the efficient proconsul was a monarch about whose personality, for the time being, the history of a part of the empire revolved. It was inevitable, therefore, that for such portions of a life biographical treatment should pass over to some extent into the related territory of history. But in such cases, though the historical form might be employed, the record of events was likely to be, as in this part of the *Agricola*, essentially in the manner of encomium.

What that manner was is well known to us from the extant specimens of such literature and from the theoretical precepts of the rhetoricians. In its most formal aspects it is a classification of the *πράξεις* under certain *ἀπερά* as rubrics. It is thus that Cicero praises the *scientia rei militaris*, *virtus*, *auctoritas*, *felicitas* of Pompey by illustrations chosen from his career. The rhetorical formulation of this method may

be illustrated by a single citation from the theorists (Menander, Sp. III, p. 373, 5): *διαίρει ἀπανταχοῦ τὰς πράξεις ὧν ἂν μέλλῃς ἐγκωμιάζειν εἰς τὰς ἀρετάς*. More analogous to, and yet in details very different from, the *Agricola* is the narrative part of the *Agesilaus*, which is introduced with the words (I, 6): *ὅσα γε μὴν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ διεπράξατο νῦν ἤδη διηγέσομαι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους αὐτοῦ κάλλιστα νομίζω καταδήλους ἔσεσθαι*. A single further illustration of the method may be added from an encomium of Julian's, in *Constant.*, p. 4 D: *ἐφ' ἅπασιν δὲ τούτοις (προσέκει) ὥσπερ γνωρίσματα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῶν τὰς πράξεις διελθεῖν*. Brief recognition of this conception of biography is made by Tacitus himself in chap. 1: *adeo virtutes isdem temporibus optime aestimantur quibus facillime gignuntur*. That is, the literary record of a life is essentially a presentation of *virtutes*, or character, as illustrated in a man's deeds (*facta moresque posteris tradere*). It is from this point of view that most of the chapters under consideration are written. How widely they differ from Tacitus's historical manner will be illustrated below. Concerning the first chapter of the geographical description of Britain (10), and the motives for the uprising in the administration of Suetonius Paulinus (15), a word later; but now let us turn to the campaigns of Agricola in illustration of what has been said above.

In the first summer, although it was already half gone, Agricola made two important expeditions, the one against the Ordovices, and the other against the island of Mona. Both are narrated rather as revealing the energy and discernment of Agricola than as historical events of significance in themselves. The army looked upon its campaigns for the season as over, and the enemy were on the watch to follow up an advantage recently gained. Meantime they awaited quietly an opportunity to test the temper of the new legate. The troops were dispersed to their stations, the conditions were adverse to an expedition for that season (*tarda et contraria bellum inchoaturo*), while the advisers of Agricola urged against offensive operations. The whole situation is studiously presented to show the allurements to inactivity which confronted Agricola. It affords thus a background against which to set in effective contrast the energy which he at once displayed. The expedition against the Ordovices was immediately followed up by the invasion of Mona, the motive assigned for which reveals the characterizing significance of the narrative (*non ignarus instandum famae*). The difference between this account of the invasion of Mona and the one described in *Ann.*, XIV, 29 (under Suetonius Paulinus) is especially significant of the distinction between the historical and the encomiastic method of treatment. In the *Agricola* practically the whole of the highly rhetorical narrative is directed to showing the ingenuity and perseverance of the leader in finding means of getting his troops across in the absence of ships, and to describing the effect of wonder and dismay which the display of such resourcefulness produced upon the islanders: *ita repente inmisit, ut obstupefacti hostes, qui classem, qui navis, qui mare expectabant, nihil arduum aut invictum crediderint sic ad bellum venientibus*. The

whole passage is a striking example of a highly elaborated *αὔξησης* (almost to the point of frigidity), directed to the praise of the *ratio et constantia ducis* (vs. 20). Contrast with this the simple statement of the same method of invasion in *Ann.*, XIV, 29: *equites vada secuti aut altiores inter undas adnantes equis transmisere*. There follows then, in the *Annals*, a vivid picture of the natives of the island gathered upon the shore, the fanatical behavior of the Druids, the alarm with which the scene inspired the Romans, the rout of the inhabitants, the stationing of a garrison, the destruction of the sacred groves, and an allusion to the custom of human sacrifice. In the one case we have a narrative of facts and events of a universal, historical significance; in the other, the rhetorical amplification of a single point to illustrate a quality of an individual character.<sup>14</sup> The remainder of the chapter is expressly devoted to drawing inferences for the characterization of Agricola from the deeds of this first season: renown and recognition which followed (*clarus ac magnus haberi*), contrast of his vigor with the ostentation and inactivity of others in the beginning of their administration (*quippe cui ingredientem provinciam, quod tempus alii per ostentationem, etc.*), modesty of bearing in the face of success (*dissimulatione famae famam auxit*).

Apart from the emphasis thus laid upon characterization as distinguished from narrative, the chapter reveals a conspicuous feature of encomiastic style in the constant employment of comparison (*σύγκρισις*), express or implied.<sup>15</sup> I have pointed out above how the whole situation on Agricola's arrival is presented with careful reference to affording a background of obstacles against which to display the efficiency of Agricola in overcoming them. Of a similar character are such explicit contrasts as (vs. 10): *et plerisque custodiri suspecta potius videbatur*; or (vs. 27): *quod tempus alii . . . transigunt*. To this syncritical figure (*σχῆμα συγκριτικόν*) belongs also the rhetorical *αὔξησης* cited above, expressing the surprise of the inhabitants of Mona, who had looked for an invasion by a fleet and, in dismay at the unwonted attack, thought nothing invincible *sic ad bellum venientibus*.

In the passage of the rhetorician Apsines quoted above (p. 6), one of the resources of encomiastic narrative is designated as *ἀναίρεσις*, that is, so to speak, the painting of a negative background against which to set in sharper outline a positive picture. It is obviously a form of the *σχῆμα συγκριτικόν*. It was recognized as a means of lending dignity and impressiveness to style,<sup>16</sup> and in practice it is constantly

<sup>14</sup> Cf. LUCIAN, *Quomodo hist. cons.*, 7 (speaking of the faults of historians): ἀμελήσαντες οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ ιστορεῖν τὰ γεγενημένα τοῖς ἐπαίροις τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ στρατηγῶν ἐνδιατρίβουσιν.

<sup>15</sup> On the encomiastic significance of *σύγκρισις* in general, see the writers of *προγυμνάσματα*, THEON, Sp. II, 112; APHTHONIUS, *ibid.*, 42; HERMOGENES, *ibid.*, 14, and *passim*. Cf. HERMOG., 13, 3: μεγίστη δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκωμίοις ἀφορμὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν συγκρίσεων. The *σύγκρισις* was sometimes formal and elaborate, sometimes merely incidental. The most formal *σύγκρισις* in the *Agricola* is in chap. 41 (cited below, p. 31); the

other examples are for the most part implied comparisons (introduced with such phrases as *non alius, non ut plerique*, or with the figure of *ἀναίρεσις*) merely touched in passing. The theory of them would seem to be alluded to by NIC. SOPH., Sp. III, 481, 17: ἵνα μὴ πάντῃ ἐκλύγῃται (ὁ λόγος) μόνον μνήμην ποιουμένων ἡμῶν . . . πειρασόμεθα εἰς ἀρετὰς ἀναφέρειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ ἐπάγειν κατὰ μέρος τὰς συγκρίσεις.

<sup>16</sup> HERMOGENES, π. ἰδίων (Sp. II, 307, 3): σχήματα δὲ λαμπρὰ ὅσα καὶ εὐειδῆ, ὅταν αἱ ἀναίρεσεις κτλ. Cf. also Sp. III, 125, 13, and 130, 8.



found in professedly encomiastic passages. It is especially frequent in characterizing descriptions, as, for instance, in chap. 5: *nec Agricola licenter, more iuvenum qui militiam in lasciviam vertunt, neque segniter*, etc. . . . *sed noscere provinciam*, etc.; or, again, chap. 8: *nec Agricola umquam in suam famam gestis exsultavit: ad auctorem ac ducem ut minister fortunam referebat*. See also the whole of chap. 9. In all these cases it is constantly combined with (as in the first example from chap. 5, above), or is the expression of, a *σύνκρισις*. The form *nec* or *non* (frequently repeated in anaphora), followed by *sed*, is the most common. Or, as above, in the example from chap. 8, the positive antithesis may be introduced in adversative asyndeton. The phenomenon is one of considerable interest as an index of stylistic tone, and deserves more detailed investigation along with the whole question of rhetorical *σύνκρισις*. It is this figure of *ἀνάλυσις* in which the concluding words of the chapter are cast: *nec Agricola prosperitate rerum in vanitatem usus, expeditionem aut victoriam vocabat victos continuisse; ne laureatis quidem gesta prosecutus est, sed ipsa dissimulatione famae famam auxit, aestimantibus quanta futuri spe tam magna tacuisset*.

Chap. 19 contains a description of the civil administration of Agricola. It does not record particular measures which he introduced to perfect the internal organization of the province, but characterizes his discernment (*animorum provinciae prudens*) in the recognition of the source of evil, and his wisdom and justice in a reform. The only matter of a general historical value which the chapter contains is the explanation of the abuses which had marked the exaction of tribute before Agricola, appended as a contrast to the characterization of his reform in this respect.

As in the preceding chapter, so here, expressed and implied *σύνκρισις* plays a prominent rôle: *domum suam coercuit, quod plerisque haud minus arduum est quam provinciam regere* (vs. 4); *circumcisis quae in quaestum reperta ipso tributo gravius tolerabantur* (vs. 14)—an implied *σύνκρισις* which is then elaborated in the description of former abuses. Note especially the end of this section, which the editors paragraph absurdly with chap. 20: *haec primo statim anno comprimendo egregiam famam paci circumdedit, quae vel incuria vel intolerantia priorum haud minus quam bellum timebatur*. The words summarize in the form of a contrast the encomiastic significance of the preceding characterization. The figure of *ἀνάλυσις* is a marked feature of the style of this section also.

The narrative of the second summer is perhaps the best illustration to be found of the statement made above, that the conventional form of an annalistic record is preserved in these chapters, where on examination the matter is found to be purely characterizing and encomiastic. This brief section, set off in the historical manner between the words *sed ubi aestas advenit* (20, 3) and *sequens hiems* (21, 1), contains neither topography nor names. It is a chapter of characterization pure and simple, and the effort of commentators to locate the geography is futile, if not absurd.<sup>11</sup> The

<sup>11</sup> Cf. WALCH, p. 282, GUDEMAN, *ad loc.*, and FURNEAUX, *Int.*, p. 40. Furneaux adds in a note: "The friths and forests (*aestuaria ac silvas*) are again alluded to in Agricola's speech, chap. 33, 19. The *silvae* also mentioned in

words themselves show that there is no thought of describing historically recorded operations, but merely of displaying Agricola in the capacity of leader: *sed ubi aestas advenit, contracto exercitu multus in agmine, laudare modestiam, disiectos coercere; loca castris ipse capere, aestuaria ac silvas ipse praetemptare; et nihil interim apud hostis quietum pati, quo minus subitis excursibus popularetur; atque ubi satis terruerat, parcendo rursus invitamenta pacis ostentare*. The form is the so-called historical infinitive which we have seen in the preceding chapter and which plays so large a rôle elsewhere in abstract characterization.<sup>18</sup> The conclusion of the chapter returns to the convention of an annalistic narrative and gives as the result of the campaign a concrete statement: *ut nulla ante Britanniae nova pars <pariter> illacessita transierit*. But, as we have seen, the part of Britain in question is assigned neither geographical location nor name. It is merely a stage on which to display Agricola in the rôle of an efficient leader.

In similar alternation, as at the end of the first year's campaign, the next chapter is devoted to works of peace. The annalistic form is again preserved, and the chronology of this activity is placed in the second winter of Agricola's administration. But the briefest glance at the contents of the chapter will show how artificial the annalistic formula is. For here are stated results which the whole seven years of Agricola's office would scarcely have sufficed to accomplish; in short, nothing less than the transition of a people from relative barbarism to the refinements of civilization. There can be no doubt that Tacitus means, in fact, to indicate the results of Agricola's influence throughout his whole term of office. But the form chosen has the appearance of referring the efforts of Agricola to a single winter. The description is undoubtedly meant to furnish evidence of the wholesome plans (*saluberrima consilia*) of Agricola for his people, and the satirical remark at the end, *idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset*, is in reality marginal, so to speak—a gloss of Tacitus the satirist upon the text of Tacitus the encomiast.

The campaign of the third summer gives us, at length, the suggestion of a geographical location; but it is worth while to note how little significance is attached to the historical narrative, and how it is wholly devoted to illustrating the efficiency of Agricola: *tertius expeditionum annus novae gentis aperuit, vastatis usque ad Tanaum . . . nationibus*. The encomiastic element contained in the statement of new discoveries (*sumendae res . . . novitate primae*, Cic., *De Or.*, II, 347) constitutes the main sentence, to which is appended a statement of the operations and their location. The sentence following similarly looks to the praise of Agricola, in that even under adverse conditions his army was not attacked: *qua formidine territi hostes quamquam conflictatum saevis tempestatibus exercitum lacessere non ausi*. The narra-

both places appear to suit those parts, but are probably less distinctive." This reference to Agricola's speech should have sufficed to show that the writer is dealing with a most general description of the difficulties which confront the march of an army. (Cf. 33, 14; 31, 6; 28, 13.)

<sup>18</sup> With the whole passage cf. Statius's characterization of Bolanus (*Silv.*, V, 2, 41): *Bolanus iter praenosse timendum, | Bolanus tutis iuga quaerere commoda castris, | metari Bolanus agros, aperire malignas | torrentum nemorumque moras* (cf. *aestuaria ac silvas praetemptare*), etc. Cf. also the Ps. Tibull. panegyric of Messalla, vss. 82-8.

tive continues: *ponendisque insuper castellis spatium fuit*—a statement which is made the starting-point for a characterization of Agricola's strategic skill in selecting suitable places for fortification (and, with discerning regard for the persuasiveness of his description, it is put in the mouth of military experts who accompanied Agricola): *adnotabant periti non alium ducem opportunitates locorum sapientius legisse*. The encomiastic σύγκρισις contained in these words (*non alium ducem*) is continued in the following, where the despair of the enemy in the face of constant attacks is explained: *quia soliti plerumque damna aestatis hibernis eventibus pensare tum aestate atque hieme iuxta pellebantur*. The remainder of the chapter is wholly characterizing: *nec Agricola umquam per alios gesta avidus intercepit*, etc. At the end we have the only example which the work affords of allusion to a quality of Agricola's character which was open to criticism and had, apparently, in fact been criticised by his subordinates and soldiers: *apud quosdam acerbior in conviciis narrabatur*, etc. But it is a mistake to believe, as has often been said, that this passage furnishes evidence for the impartiality of Tacitus's characterization. On the contrary, it is evidence of the encomiastic tone of the whole. That is, a criticism which was made upon Agricola by others is accepted, but not allowed to stand without interpretation: he was, to be sure, harsh, but *adversus malos*; to the good he was ever kindly (*comis bonis*). The rhetorical theory of such ἀντιθέσεις (that is, things which stand in the way of praise) and of their appropriate λύσεις is alluded to by the technicians, for example, Nicolaus Sophista, Sp. III, p. 481, 28: ζητητέον δέ, εἰ ἀντίθεσιν ἐπιδέχεται τὸ ἐγκώμιον. . . . εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἰδιαζούσης ὕλης ἐμπέσοι, ὃ ἀποκρύψαι οὐ δυνάμεθα διὰ τὸ τὸν ἀκροατὴν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν, τῇ τε μεθόδῳ αὐτὸ καθαιρήσομεν καὶ τὰς λύσεις ἐπάξομεν ἰσχυροτέρας, ἵνα πανταχόθεν τὸ τῆς ἀντιθέσεως βλάβος λύηται (cf. also Menander, *ibid.*, p. 370, 30). The final words of the chapter afford an implied σύγκρισις, which, as editors have seen, probably contrasts Agricola with Domitian: *Ceterum ex iracundia nihil supererat secretum, ut silentium eius non timeres: honestius putabat offendere quam odisse*.

Chap. 23 tells briefly of the regular occupation (*obtinendis*) of the territory which had been explored in the preceding summer and winter, by which the conquest of Britain proper was rendered complete (*summotis velut in aliam insulam hostibus*). The narrative takes much for granted, since we have learned of no specific expeditions which would adequately explain the subjugation of all parts of Britain. But results, with their significance for the praise of Agricola, rather than the historical development of events, are the goal of Tacitus's writing, and this brief section emphasizes the complete conquest of Britain proper in phraseology which shows that this success was but a manifestation of that valor which would not stop until the extreme bounds of the island had been explored. To be sure, Agricola is not named, but it is obvious that whatever is here attributed to the *virtus exercituum* is meant to stand for the *virtus Agricolae*.

It is interesting to observe the art with which, by a series of cumulative expressions, the encomiastic significance of the final penetration of Caledonia is enforced.

Here it is merely suggested negatively as something without which a substantial success would have been achieved (*ac si virtus exercituum et Romani nominis gloria pateretur inventus in ipsa Britannia terminus*). In chap. 27 it is the ambition which fires the army with enthusiasm for further advance (*penetrandam Caledoniam inveniendumque tandem Britanniae terminum*). In chap. 33 pride in the accomplished fact is the basis of Agricola's appeal to the valor of his soldiers before the great battle (*finem Britanniae non fama nec rumore sed castris et armis tenemus*).

Chap. 24 is extremely vague in respect to geographical detail (*nave prima transgressus*), and here again, as elsewhere, the emphasis rests upon the encomiastic implications contained in the main sentence: *ignotas ad id tempus gentis crebris simul ac prosperis proeliis domuit*. The remainder of the chapter, devoted to the description of Ireland and plans for its invasion, serves to illustrate the discerning statesmanship of Agricola in recognizing the strategic position of Ireland with reference to Spain as well as to Britain. In the artistic arrangement of the work it affords a digression from the monotony of successful campaigns, and in this respect is comparable to chaps. 19 and 21, devoted respectively to the civil administration of Britain and to Agricola's influence upon the private life and civilization of his province.

The account of the sixth campaign (25) opens with a brief statement of the scene of operations and of the reasons which led to the employment of a fleet (*portus classe exploravit*). These words are then made the starting-point for an elaborate and highly rhetorical *αὐξησις*, of which the encomiastic *locus ex novitate* (*ab Agricola primum adsumpta*) affords the starting-point. It continues with a vivid and picturesque description of the effect which the combination of a land and sea force produced, of the rivalry and enthusiasm of soldiers and sailors, of the despair and dismay of the enemy. The whole treatment is declamatory and epideictic. Take, for example, the phrase *hinc terra et hostis, hinc victus Oceanus militari iactantia compararentur*. The high rhetorical color is obvious in itself, but a comparison with the declamatory epigrams in praise of Claudius and his expedition to Britain (*P. L. M.*, IV, 29-36) will reveal more clearly the essential affinities of such language. A single illustration may suffice (*ibid.*, 35): *oceanus iam terga dedit, nec pervius ulli || Caesareos fasces imperiumque tulit: || illa procul nostro semota exclusaque caelo, || alluitur nostra victa Britannis aqua*. The section is characteristic. Of the movements of army or fleet we learn nothing, nor is any hint given of the geography of the operations beyond the Bodotria. But, as we have seen, such information lay outside of the author's plan and belonged in the realm of history. He is here only concerned to emphasize the fact that Agricola was the first to employ a fleet and to indicate the effect of dismay which it produced upon the inhabitants. In the description which follows of the gathering of the Caledonians and their initiative in attacking Roman strongholds, especially noteworthy for our purpose is the statement: *regrediendum citra Bodotriam et excedendum potius quam pellerentur ignavi specie prudentium admonebant*. That members of Agricola's staff may have given such

advice, there is no reason to question. But their presence here is probably only a foil against which to set the bravery and generalship of Agricola in clearer light. It is another manifestation of the *σχῆμα συγκριτικόν* which has confronted us so often.

In the following it is to be noted that Agricola knows how to keep in touch with the enemy's plans (*cum interim cognoscit hostis pluribus agminibus irrupturos*) and to foil the snare that they set for him (*cum Agricola iter hostium ab exploratoribus edoctus . . . adsultare tergis pugnantium iubet*, 26, 4). Such skill and knowledge was a constant source of military encomium, so that it has even found formulation in the precepts of the rhetoricians for encomium.<sup>19</sup> At the same time it is not to be denied that the historical tone is preserved in this chapter almost perfectly, and the personality of Agricola here, at all events, is no more obtrusive than would be that of a commander in almost any historical narrative.

This statement applies also to the opening of the following chapter, where, as in 23, by assigning a thought to the army, Tacitus makes it possible to utter with rhetorical exaggeration what is one of his chief claims for the merit of Agricola: *exercitus nihil virtuti sui invium et penetrandam Caledoniam inveniendumque tandem Britanniae terminum continuo procliorum cursu fremebant*. The encomiastic significance of these words appears most clearly when they are put in comparison with the impatient statement of Pliny in *N. H.*, IV, 16 (102): *XXX prope iam annis notitiam eius Romanis armis non ultra vicinitatem silvae Caledoniae propagantibus. Inveniendum tandem Britanniae terminum* is the answer to this complaint. (Cf. also the discussion of this passage above in connection with 23, 1, and 33, 12.) The words which follow are the obverse of the syncrisis made above between the determination and skill of Agricola and the cowardice of his advisers: *atque illi modo cauti ac sapientes prompti post eventum ac magniloqui erant*. They are followed by a significant comment which reveals that Tacitus would claim for the merit of Agricola the successes which a victorious army was prone to attribute to its own prowess: *iniquissima haec bellorum condicio est: prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni imputantur*.

Concerning chap. 28 (the revolt of the Usipian cohort) every defender of the biographical unity of the *Agricola* has felt it necessary to discover an explanation which shall bring it into relation either to the character of Agricola or to the artistic structure of the work as a whole. But obviously it is futile to seek in it for any element of characterization, and it is equally absurd to find in an annalistic narrative of this sort the high emotional tension which calls for a moment of suspense before the final dénouement. But, though it cannot be said in any way to contribute to our

<sup>19</sup> Cf. MENANDER, Sp. III, 373, 20: ἐκφράσεις δὲ καὶ λόγους καὶ ἐνέβρας καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως· εἰτα ἑρεῖς ὅτι σὺ μὲν τοὺς ἐκείνων λόγους καὶ τὰς ἐνέβρας διὰ φρόνησιν ἐγίνωσκας, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ πραγματοποιήτων εὐδὲν συνίσταν. The naïve injunction of the rhetorician is almost equaled by the bald simplicity of the practice of writers of the highest rank. Cf. TACITUS, *Ann.*,

I, 51, 8: *salutisque, per quos exercitus regressus, insedere. quod gnarum duci*, etc.; *ibid.*, II, 20 (after describing the Germans' plan of ambush): *nihil ex his Caesari incognitum*, etc.; *ibid.*, XIII, 40, 3: *repente agmen Romanum circumfundit (Tiridates), non ignaro duce nostro*, etc. STATIUS, *Silv.*, V, 2 (*laudes Bolani*), 40.

knowledge of Agricola, yet for his contemporaries the connection of this famous adventure with his administration must have possessed no little biographical interest. The affair had made a sensation in its day, and the survivors who had reached Roman territory through the devious paths of servitude and sale, reporting their adventure, had attained a notoriety which we can only understand when we realize how vague and remote the unexplored Northern Ocean was felt to be (*ac fuere quos . . . indicium tanti casus inlustravit*). These deserters had accomplished what neither Roman military expeditions nor geographical explorers had as yet succeeded in, the circumnavigation of Britain, and, according to Dio Cassius, it was only in consequence of this that Agricola sent out his own expedition of exploration (66, 20): *καὶ τοῦτου καὶ ἄλλους ὁ Ἀγρικόλας πειράσσοντας τὸν περίπλου πέρψας ἔμαθε καὶ παρ' ἐκείνων ὅτι νῆσός ἐστιν*. Of this there is no suggestion in Tacitus, but a reason for suppressing the fact might lie in the desire to ascribe the idea of circumnavigation to Agricola's own initiative. Still, the account of Dio Cassius differs in some essential points from Tacitus, so that it must have been derived from a different source. The fact of the existence of a different account of the matter is in itself significant of the celebrity of the episode, and still more the circumstance that it is essentially the only event of Agricola's proconsulship which Dio records. It may be observed in conclusion that Calgacus in his speech before the battle (32, 19) instances this desertion as evidence of the unstable organization of the Roman army. The episode is thus made by Tacitus himself to contribute to the series of obstacles which the generalship of Agricola has to overcome.

The following chapter begins with the record of a domestic blow, the loss of a son—obviously an item of biographical rather than historical significance, and it affords occasion for laudatory characterization of Agricola's conduct under this grief. It assumes again the form of a *σύγκρισις* (*neque ut plerique fortium virorum*, etc.). This brings us, then, to the confronting of the two forces at Mons Graupius, and the speeches of the opposing leaders, Calgacus and Agricola.

The introduction of these harangues by the opposing leaders on the eve of conflict is purely in the manner of historiography, for such speeches as are found elsewhere in ancient biography are of a more personal and characterizing kind. They continue thus the historical form which has been observed in the annalistic record of Agricola's deeds. The general's speech in ancient historiography has a manifold significance. In part it is employed to lend color to the dramatic picture of the whole scene and circumstances of the battle; in part to summarize the historical situation and thus afford a setting for the event of victory or defeat; again it is a means of characterizing the speaker, and of enabling the historian to interpret by the general's own words the character which preceding or following events reveal. Of these considerations the last may here be dismissed, since there could be little point in the indirect characterization of Agricola which the speech would afford, when he has already been characterized directly in much detail. As for Calgacus, there is no reason why he should

be characterized at all. He has not been named in the narrative before, and here he simply steps forth from the throng for the sake of affording a personality to whom words may be assigned, representing the situation from the side of the Britons. But apart from the rhetorical opportunity which is afforded, it is obvious that the speeches summarize the whole course of Agricola's conquests, and prepare the reader for the successful outcome of the battle which was the crowning achievement of Agricola's administration.

The burden of the first part of Calgacus's speech (30) is, that on the Britons there gathered rests the last hope of freedom from the Roman yoke (*hodiernum diem . . . initium libertatis toti Britanniae fore*). They are still free, but beyond them there is no resource—*nullae ultra terrae ac ne mare quidem securum imminente nobis classe Romana*. In earlier contests against the Romans hope of succor had been derived from the fact that they remained still uncorrupted by the touch or sight of servitude (*priores pugnae*, etc.—a form of *σύνκρισις* with encomiastic suggestion, contrasting the conditions of this struggle with all others which Roman commanders had engaged in against the Britons); they were the last of lands and of liberty (*nos terrarum ac libertatis extremos*), and their remoteness had defended them to that day: *sed nunc terminus Britanniae patet, nulla iam ultra gens*. Not satisfied with the conquest of all lands, the Romans now penetrate the mystery of the sea (*iam et mare scrutantur*—rhetorical *αὔξησις*, from the side of the Britons, of Agricola's employment of a fleet). The Romans (32) had been strong only by the dissensions of the enemy who were now united. The Roman army is made up of diverse elements which adversity will scatter. All inducements to victory are on the side of the Britons. The Romans are not fighting for homes nor for native land. They are few in number, unacquainted with their surroundings, and terrified by them. The Britons, Gauls, and Germans, who make up the Roman army, will recognize the identity of their interests with ours, and desert them as did recently the Usipian cohort.

In this speech, apart from the reproaches which are directed against the nature of Roman domination (especially chap. 31), there are two main thoughts developed with all the resources of rhetorical art: (1) that Agricola had pursued resistance to Roman rule to its last stronghold, and (2) that in this conquest the Romans were at a great disadvantage to their adversaries from almost every point of view. Both are, from a negative point of view, sources of encomium to Agricola in the successful outcome of battle.

The speech of Agricola (33) begins with a rhetorical recapitulation of the seven years of campaigns, and it reveals at once in this the main object of these speeches, namely, to present, in the strong rhetorical light which usage rendered appropriate for such military harangues, the claims which the author advances for the praise of Agricola: For seven years he had campaigned successfully with the cordial support of his army (*neque me militum neque vos ducis paenituit*) against almost insurmountable difficulties (*paene adversus ipsam rerum naturam*). As a result they had

advanced beyond the limits set by their predecessors (*egressi ego veterum legatorum, vos priorum exercituum terminos*), and now actually occupied the very limits of Britain, which before were only known by vague rumor or report (*finem Britanniae non fama nec rumore sed castris et armis tenemus*). The passage concludes with the exultant ἐπιφώνημα—*inventā Britannia et subacta*.<sup>20</sup> With these words the speech opens, and here for the first and only time is it possible for Tacitus to state directly in strong encomiastic αὔξησις the two claims for distinction derived from the deeds of Agricola, his explorations (*inventā*) and his conquests (*subacta*). His speech continues with conventional exhortation and praise to his soldiers, and allusion is made to the difficulties of their situation (*neque enim nobis aut locorum eadem notitia aut commeatum eadem abundantia*). At the end of the chapter he alludes in romantic phraseology to the glory of adventure and, if need be, of death at the very boundaries of the world (*nec inglorium fuerit in ipso terrarum ac naturae fine cecidisse*).<sup>21</sup> The succeeding section is taken up with conventional depreciation of the enemy, but the brief hortatory peroration returns to the encomiastic τόπος with which the speech opened—*transigite cum expeditionibus, imponite quinquaginta annis magnum diem*, etc. These final words contain the gist of the whole situation. They enable Tacitus to say what in his own person he could not claim without invidious comparison—that Agricola had set the crown on the work begun by Claudius; he had completed the exploration and conquest of the island. By putting the words in the mouth of Agricola, in the form of an exhortation to his army on the eve of battle, they are deprived of all arrogance or invidious suggestion of comparison with the merits of others. The device is analogous to a well-recognized rule of ancient rhetoric which Aristotle formulates thus (*Rhet.*, III, 17, p. 1418b, 24): εἰς δὲ τὸ ἥθος, ἐπειδὴ ἓνα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπὶ φθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, . . . ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν. We see here again a conspicuous illustration of what we have noted above in the annalistic record of Agricola's campaign, namely, the skilful use of a form peculiar to historiography for the ends of encomium. Encomium, dealing with deeds of acknowledged greatness, does not hesitate to dwell with epideictic amplification of language upon the merits which are claimed for the subject of praise. But neither were the deeds of Agricola so well known, nor was his place in the history of Roman conquest so generally acknowledged, as to render such treatment possible;<sup>22</sup> nor, again, had his position been one of such eminence that his merits could be exalted above those of other governors of Britain without alienating the sympathy of men still living. Tacitus, therefore, by choosing the form of a historical narrative, and by placing in the mouths of the opposing generals the titles to praise which he would claim for Agricola, attained the

<sup>20</sup> QUINT., VIII, 5, 11: *est enim epiphonema rei narratae vel probatae summa acclamatio*.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *P. L. M.*, IV, 29 (referring to the expedition of Claudius).

<sup>22</sup> "That the essential features [of the βασιλικὸς λόγος] are common to biographical writing in general might have been taken for granted, even if Menander (III, 398, 25) had

not expressly confirmed it: οὐ γὰρ ἴδιον τοῦτο μόνον τοῦ βασιλέως τὸ ἐγκώμιον, ἀλλὰ κοινὸν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς οἰκοῦντας τὴν πόλιν" (GUDEMAN, *Int.*, p. x, n. 1). The citation apart from the context would seem convincing if we chose to ignore τοῦτο. But reference to the text shows that τοῦτο τὸ ἐγκώμιον refers to the topic παρὶς as a source of praise. It is this which is "common to all the residents of the city."



end at which he aimed, and avoided at the same time the odium which attaches to direct praise.

That this portion of the *Agricola* which is presented in the form of historiography looks consistently to the praise of Agricola will probably be conceded. It remains to consider Leo's utterance (cited above, p. 4) that "from chap. 18 on Agricola is the leading personality, but not otherwise than the commander would be in any history of military campaigns." If this is true, then, of course, it must be conceded that a large part of the *Agricola* is historical rather than biographical or encomiastic in treatment. I feel convinced, however, that the foregoing analysis has supplied sufficient evidence to refute such a statement. But it will perhaps not be carrying our investigation too far afield, if we undertake to test the truth of this statement by comparison with the history of another military campaign under the leadership of a general for whom the historian entertains a similar warmth of personal feeling. The justice of comparing Tacitus with himself in this respect will not be questioned; for if the comparison reveals identity or similarity of treatment, or if, on the other hand, it reveals fundamental difference, we shall possess, so to speak, the author's own judgment as to the literary character of this portion of the *Agricola*.

That there is a certain similarity in Tacitus's portraiture of Agricola and Germanicus, each the successful leader of Roman arms in the establishment of the imperial frontier and each the victim of an emperor's jealous hate, has been observed more than once, and in general the two descriptions lend themselves very naturally to comparison. But in the technique of characterization of the two men there is a difference so marked and striking that it can only be attributed to fundamentally different conceptions of the nature and purpose of the two works. In the *Agricola*, as we have seen (and I confine myself here exclusively to the record of campaigns, chaps. 18-29), events are recorded and their significance for the personality of the hero is pointed out in such a way as to reveal that the emphasis of the narrative lies upon the characterization. It is, furthermore, noteworthy that not a single officer other than Agricola is allowed to appear upon the scene by name, although it would have seemed natural in a historical narrative to designate at least the commander of the fleet which played so important a rôle in the conquest of Caledonia, and which accomplished the circumnavigation of Britain and the exploration of the Northern Sea. In the reform of the civil administration of the island the Roman procurator must also have played a prominent part, for without his co-operation such changes in the levying of tribute as are recorded must have been quite impossible. It is not too much to affirm that the encomiastic nature of the *Agricola* is responsible for such suppression.

The campaigns of Germanicus on the German frontier are described in the *Annals* beginning at I, 33, and continuing, with the interposition of some other material, as far as II, 26. The account covers the expeditions of the years 14, 15, and 16 A. D.

It is, of course, a much more detailed narrative than the record of expeditions in Britain, and this in itself would be an adequate explanation for the fact that the deeds of the lieutenants of Germanicus come in for a conspicuous share of attention. The three officers who had charge of fitting out the fleet in the third campaign are mentioned by name (II, 6), and even the name of an eagle-bearer who protected a Roman envoy against the mutinous violence of the legionaries is recorded (I, 39). But the difference in fulness of narrative and historical importance of events, which might account for such differences of treatment as these, will not explain the fact that throughout this whole campaign, exceeding by many pages the length of the corresponding part of the *Agricola*, the events recorded are very rarely used for the purpose of direct characterization of the leading figure. Germanicus is almost constantly before us, in speech or plans or action, but the reader is left to draw his own inferences and to interpret the character dramatically from the course of the narrative. There is not a single characterization of Germanicus in the field comparable to *Agr.*, 20; nor, again, of his strategic skill in the selection and defense of camps as in 22. There is no characterization whatever of the civil administration of his province (*Agr.*, 19 and 21). In general, the narrative is dramatic in the highest sense, and scarcely once does the writer lay down the rôle of narrator to point out the bearing of events upon the character of his hero. Such characterization as is found is for the most part implicit in the narrative. Exceptions are few and of slight extent, as, for instance, in chap. 33, where upon the first introduction of Germanicus it was necessary for the writer to place the reader in possession of his attitude toward him. It is given first as an expression of the general feeling of the Roman people: *unde in Germanicum favor et spes eadem*, a statement which elicits from Tacitus a personal indorsement: *nam iuveni civile ingenium, mira comitas et diversa ab Tiberii sermone vultu, adrogantibus et obscuris*. But even this case differs from the examples of the *Agricola* under discussion, in which the characterizing significance of events is pointed out.

Apart from this passage, throughout the remainder of *Annals*, I, the character of Germanicus is unfolded only in action or in his own words. This will appear from a survey of the passages of this book which convey a suggestion of personality. They are so few that they may be adduced here. His unselfish support of Tiberius: *sed Germanicus quanto summae spei propior, tanto impensius pro Tiberio niti* (I, 34); he replies to Sergestes *clemente responso* (I, 58), though the epithet is rather strategic than personal; his *pietas* toward the memory of Varus and his army (I, 61); in the performance of the last rites on the scene of their defeat he placed the first sod upon the tumulus—*gratissimo munere in defunctos et praesentibus doloris socius* (I, 62); Germanicus relieves the soldiery out of his own purse and assuages the memory of disaster by his personal kindness (I, 71).

But the principal characterization of Germanicus is reserved for the eve of the decisive battle (II, 12). The extraordinary reserve of Tacitus in his historical works in the matter of direct personal analysis is nowhere better illustrated. The charac-

terization takes a dramatic form, not that of the course of events, but the singular and almost bizarre device of representing Germanicus as stealing forth in disguise into the streets of the camp in order to test the temper of the soldiers by their own utterances in their own haunts (II, 13): *adsistit tabernaculis fruiturque fama sui, cum hic nobilitatem ducis, decorem alius, plurimi patientiam, comitatem, etc.*<sup>23</sup>

Of more directly encomiastic character is a brief statement of Germanicus's strategic skill in II, 20, where, after describing the plans of the enemy, Tacitus continues: *nihil ex his Caesari incognitum: consilia locos, prompta occulta noverat astusque hostium in perniciem ipsis vertebat*; and just beyond: *quod arduum sibi cetera legatis permisit*. The passage is comparable to *Agr.*, 25 *extr.* and 26 *init.*, and is almost the only considerable passage of direct praise which the whole episode contains. In II, 22, after giving the inscription placed upon the trophy raised by Germanicus, Tacitus adds: *de se nihil addidit, metu invidiae an ratus conscientiam facti satis esse*. The words furnish another illustration of the difference between encomium and history. As a historian Tacitus designates two possible motives. The encomiast would not hesitate to select the one which should yield the greater praise to his hero. The contrast is well shown by *Agricola*, 18 *extr.* (after the successes of the first campaign): *ne laureatis quidem gesta prosecutus est, sed ipsa dissimulatione famae famam auxit*. To complete the list of passages which have more or less direct characterizing significance for Germanicus, we may add the description of the energy with which the war was continued after the naval disaster to the Romans (II, 25): *eo promptior Caesar pergit*, etc., and the brief mention of the generosity which was shown to the soldiers in making good individual losses (II, 26). But in all this there is but slight trace of that type of characterization (through the implications of acts) which confronts us constantly in the *Agricola*. It is possible that some passages have been omitted; yet I have gone over the text repeatedly, and I suspect rather that I have included more than really belongs here. The difference between the portion of the *Agricola* under consideration and the treatment of Germanicus in the *Annals* is clear and marked. In the *Agricola*, although the external form of historiography is preserved, yet in its essence the account is in the manner of encomium, in which, as was pointed out above, the *πράξεις* are adduced, not as historical events *per se*, but as indications of traits of character (*ὡς περ γνωρίσματα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπερών*).

The truth of this statement will appear from a brief review of the principal characterizing incidents and the encomiastic comment elicited by them which these chapters of the *Agricola* contain: The unexpected attack upon the Ordovices immediately upon his arrival, as an index of the energy of Agricola in contrast to the delay advised by his officers and expected by the army; recognition of the importance of

<sup>23</sup>The significance of this episode for Tacitus's technique of characterization is pointed out by BRUNS, *Die Persönlichkeit in der antiken Geschichtsschreibung*, Berlin,

1899. Cf. also NORDEN, *Antike Kunstprosa*, Vol. I, p. 87: "Tacitus, der grösste Psychologe unter den Historikern, ist doch sehr zurückhaltend."

following up a first success (*non ignarus instandum famae*) by the attack on Mona; ingenuity and perseverance (*ratio et constantia ducis*) in finding a means of crossing in the absence of ships; contrast of the effect produced by his activity with the vanity and ostentation of most proconsuls on entering their province; modesty in success (18). Recognition of the wrongs of the province (*animorum provinciae prudens*) and determination to make his reforms strike at the root of evils; discipline of his own servants; justice in the administration of civil affairs; *σύγκρισις* with the carelessness and harshness of his predecessors (19 and 20, 1-3). Efficiency as a commander and characterization of him in the field (20). Encouragement of the arts of peace (21). Conquest of new territory; strategic skill as shown in choice of sites for fortification; persistence, in contrast to the relaxing of effort of predecessors; generous recognition of deeds of others; interpretation by Tacitus of his reputed *acerbitas*, with implied *σύγκρισις* (22). Completion of the conquest of Britain proper and determination not to stop at that point, ascribed to the *virtus exercituum et Romani nominis gloria* (23). Statesmanship shown in plans for the conquest of Ireland (24). The first to employ the aid of a fleet (with strong encomiastic *αὔξησις*); bravery and resourcefulness, in contrast to the cowardice of his military advisers (25 and 26). Zeal of the army to complete the exploration and conquest of Britain, and enthusiasm of the officers who had before counseled retreat; reflection that the merit of success is claimed by all, the disgrace of defeat is attributed to one (27). Humanity of Agricola in grief (29).

It is evident that in this record of events, with the characterizing comment which accompanies it, we have portrayed, through the medium of typical deeds, a series of qualities, and it is apparent that Tacitus aims to present to us an all-sided picture of Agricola in the rôle of a provincial governor. He is shown to us not only as a warrior, resourceful and efficient in the field, self-reliant, generous to his subordinates, and modest in success, but also as a radical reformer in provincial administration, a patron of the arts of peace, a statesman discerning the importance of further conquests for the advantage of the empire as a whole.

If it has now been made clear that the essential affinities of chaps. 18-39 of the *Agricola* are rather with encomiastic narrative than with historical, we may turn to the consideration of some portions of the section preceding, which sets forth the geography and ethnology of Britain and gives a brief survey of its conquest down to Agricola's time. The bearing of this portion upon the personality of Agricola has generally been held to be even more remote than the record of his campaigns which we have just reviewed. But let us turn at once to the text. In the opening sentence Tacitus assigns as a reason for describing *Britanniae situm populosque* the fact that the complete subjugation of Britain has put him in possession of knowledge which others lacked. With their rhetoric he will not vie: the merit of his narrative shall be fidelity to facts. The matter is presented thus with the appearance of utmost

objectivity, and the name of Agricola is suppressed throughout. Tacitus speaks as a historian who has made his investigations and now presents the results. The form is distinctly historical and not encomiastic. But the moment the reader reflects that the source of Tacitus's information is Agricola, and that he is the author of the explorations which replaced ignorance and report by knowledge, it will be seen that the very objectivity of narrative is encomium in its most persuasive form. Nor are expressions lacking to impress upon the mind of the reader the indebtedness of history to him. Throughout this chapter the encomiastic significance of each of the more important items recorded is emphasized: the complete conquest of Britain (*quia tum primum perdomita est*); the certainty that it was an island (*tunc primum Romana classis circumvecta*); the discovery of unknown islands beyond (*incognitas ad id tempus insulas quas Orcadas vocant*). The encomiastic value of such phrases may be seen from the rhetorical doctrine of appropriate topics of praise as presented, for instance, by Cicero (*De Or.*, II, 347): *sumendae res . . . novitate primae*, or by Theon (*Sp.* II, p. 110, 21): *ἐπαίνεται δὲ εἰσιν αἱ πράξεις . . . καὶ εἰ μόνος ἔπραξέ τις ἢ πρῶτος ἢ ὅτε οὐδεὶς κτλ.* In practice it might be illustrated at great length, but one or two examples will suffice: (*Cons. ad Liv.*, 19) *ille . . . ignotumque tibi meruit, Romane, triumphum* || *protulit in terras imperiumque novas*. Cf. also the epigrams in praise of Claudius's expedition into Britain, e. g., *P. L. M.*, IV, p. 69 (30): *victa prius nulli, nullo spectata triumpho* || *inlibata tuos gens patet in titulos*. Compare also with the whole chapter the praise bestowed upon Cæsar by Antony in the funeral oration which Dio Cassius presents in XLIV, 42, 5, where, after enumerating the varied conquests and explorations of Cæsar in Gaul, Germany, and Britain, he concludes: *ἐμβρατὰ μὲν τὰ πρὶν ἄγνωστα, πλωτὰ δὲ τὰ πρόσθεν ἀδιαρεύνητα . . . ποιήσας*.

That Tacitus conceived of this matter as a source of praise to Agricola is here only suggested in the manner pointed out. The full encomiastic import of it he reserves for rhetorical elaboration in the speeches of Calgacus and Agricola (*vide supra*): first negatively, in the words of Calgacus (chap. 30), concluding with *sed nunc terminus Britanniae patet*, and then positively, in the speech of Agricola—*finem Britanniae non fama nec rumore sed castris et armis tenemus*. They are the counterpart to the simple statement of the ignorance of earlier writers in chap. 10 (*nondum comperta*). Contrast also with the direct statement of the complete discovery and subjugation of Britain in chap. 10 the rhetorical outburst of Agricola's speech—*Britannia inventa et subacta*. One may compare further with the more sober description of the remoteness of the extreme coast of Britain in chap. 10 (*hanc oram novissimi maris*) the effective rhetorical appeal to the imagination of the soldiers in 33 *extr.*: *nec inglorium fuerit in ipso terrarum ac naturae fine cecidisse*. To no inconsiderable extent the narrative of chap. 10 paves the way for the more expressly encomiastic and rhetorical treatment in the subsequent course of the work.

But, in spite of the soberness of tone of this chapter, there is noticeable a certain exaggeration in the treatment of Agricola's explorations which can scarcely be

attributed to the author's ignorance of the status of geographical knowledge. For, while Tacitus only affirms that Britain was then for the first time circumnavigated by a Roman fleet, he still leads the reader to believe that this circumnavigation established a disputed fact of geography (*insulam esse Britanniam adfirmavit*). But in reality, as Furneaux observes (p. 28), all earlier writers—Cæsar, Diodorus, Strabo, Mela, Pliny—speak of it without hesitation as a triangular island.<sup>24</sup> Similarly it seems hardly credible that Tacitus should be ignorant that earlier geographers had named and located the Orkneys, and his claim that they were discovered by Agricola (*ignotas ad id tempus insulas invenit*) is open to the suspicion of exaggeration from the manifest hyperbole of the further statement concerning their subjugation (*domuitque*).

In the rapid survey of the conquest of Britain down to Agricola's time, it has impressed many as remarkable that approximately one-third of the space should be given up to a statement of the motives which led to the uprising in the administration of Suetonius Paulinus (reported indirectly in chap. 15). This whole preliminary survey is designated by Andresen as wholly without relation to the personality of Agricola, but this chapter he finds especially irrelevant, and sees in it evidence for his view, that Tacitus in chaps. 10–39 is writing a history of Britain, and not a biography of Agricola. As for the rest of this division, it will not, I think, seem remarkable to an unbiased reader that the record of Agricola's campaigns should be prefaced by a brief account of the work accomplished by his predecessors. It may not, however, be so obvious why in this very rapid sketch so much space is given to the causes of the uprising led by Boudicca. But, first, to approach the matter negatively, it may be said that, had Tacitus here been concerned only to write a history of Britain, he surely could not have passed over the great battle, with which the insurrection was quelled, so briefly (*quam unius proelii fortuna veteri patientiae restituit*, 16), after devoting so much space to the motives which led to the revolt. The treatment of the episode in the *Annals* (XIV, 35–37) reveals what must have been expected here of a historian: the wrongs of the Britons and the provocation to revolt (indirect speech of Boudicca, chap. 35), exhortation of Suetonius to his soldiers (36), description of the battle (36, 11–37, 8). The battle was one of the great and decisive struggles of Roman arms against the resistance of Britain to Roman subjugation (*clara et antiquis victoriis par ea die laus parta*), and, historically considered, was of more significance than any of Agricola's conquests. It is obvious, therefore, that such a hypothesis as Andresen's does not adequately account for the distribution of matter as found in the *Agricola*.

The true explanation lies in the desire of the historian to put the reader in

<sup>24</sup> QUINTILIAN, VII. 4, 2, cannot be used, as it is by UELICES (*De vita et honor. Tac.*, p. 17), to show that the insularity of Britain was a matter of dispute down to Agricola's time. The words *ut si Cæsar deliberet an Britanniam impugnet, quæ sit Oceani natura*, an Britan-

nia insula (nam tum ignorabatur) refer, of course, to a declamatory theme assuming a time before Cæsar's invasion, and, as is expressly pointed out, only imply that at that time was the fact unknown.

possession of the attitude of the people of Britain toward the Roman occupation. In the record of the deeds of Agricola's several predecessors, Tacitus in his own words records the character of each administration impartially and without calculated depreciation, rising even to emphatic praise of the two immediate predecessors of Agricola (17 *init.*). But of the attitude of the islanders toward the Roman administration he says nothing in his own person. This was the dark obverse to a history of progressive conquest—the fact that Roman success had done nothing to conciliate the loyalty of a conquered people, but had used its power for extortion and the gratification of the lust of those in power. It is for this reason that the speech in the *Agricola* contains a more general statement of grievances than the corresponding speech of Boudicca in the *Annals*. The exposition of this state of affairs is assigned with dramatic feeling to the utterances of the Britons themselves, and at the same time the writer relieves himself of the odium of directing so serious an indictment against the predecessors of Agricola. That some such explanation of the spirit which had characterized the earlier administration of the province was necessary to afford a setting for the reforms of Agricola appears at the beginning of chap. 19: *Ceterum animorum provinciae prudens, simulque doctus per aliena experimenta parum profici armis si iniuriae sequerentur, causas bellorum statuit excidere*. The reforms which are then enumerated are, with approximate exactness, corrections of the abuses which are complained of in the indirect speech under consideration. The concluding words of this section set the matter in a very clear light (20 *int.*): *haec primo statim anno comprimendo egregiam famam paci circumdedit, quae vel incuria vel intolerantia priorum haud minus quam bellum timebatur*.

The foregoing argument has been directed primarily toward showing that, in spite of the historical form in which Tacitus has cast his material from chap. 10 to 39, it still remains essentially biographical, with the encomiastic connotation which that word implies. In explanation of the form I have suggested above the desire to lend greater persuasiveness to encomium by the appearance of an objective historical record and to avoid the invidiousness of direct praise. That Tacitus, at all events (whether by design or not), has attained this end is evinced perhaps most conclusively by the very fact that so many modern readers have found in the *Agricola* a historical rather than a biographical character. But for his own time I think it may be fairly questioned whether Tacitus's eloquence was interpreted otherwise than as an encomiastic utterance of filial piety, and by this I have no thought of impugning either the character of Agricola or the honesty of Tacitus, but only of interpreting the literary treatment of the subject. It is perhaps no more than an unwarranted suspicion which I would raise concerning the probable treatment of the episode of Agricola's administration of Britain in the lost books of the *Historiae*. But the fact that subsequent historians do not refer to the operations of Agricola in Britain (Dio Cassius merely alludes to the desertion of the Usipian cohort and the consequent

circumnavigation of the island) would lend color to the conjecture that Tacitus himself, in his capacity of historian, claimed less for the merit of Agricola than he had urged in the rôle of encomiast of his father-in-law. One bit of evidence Tacitus himself affords, which is at least significant of the difference between encomium and history. For Tacitus, although writing not earlier than the year 97, says simply, in explanation of his reason for describing the geography of Britain: *quia tum primum perdomita est*. But in the *Histories* (I, 2) he adds the important qualification: *perdomita Britannia et statim missa*. It is significant of the difference in the character of the two works that the *Agricola* contains not a word of the transient nature of the conquests recorded. They are treated throughout as permanent results. The loss of Britain, to be sure, might have been treated as a *τόπος ψεκτικός* against Domitian, and in a historical treatment it would inevitably have found a place with the other disasters enumerated in chap. 41; but in general it could only have been to lessen the praise of Agricola to remind the reader that the fruits of his victories were, at the time of writing, already lost. Of the same character is the unhistorical exaggeration in the treatment of Agricola's explorations to which allusion has been made above. That a conscientious historian might distribute emphasis very differently in biographical and historical treatment of the same subject-matter is well shown by Polybius's allusion to his life of Philopoemen (X, 21 (24), 5 ff.). After indicating the external differences which would characterize the historical treatment of the deeds in which Philopoemen played a leading rôle, he adds (8): "For while biography, being encomiastic in nature, demands a summary presentation of deeds with rhetorical amplification of them, history, being indifferent to praise or blame, calls for a truthful and accurate account of events with the consequences which follow upon each."<sup>25</sup>

Much confusion has been introduced into the discussion of the problems relating to the *Agricola* by the failure to separate the question of literary form from the question of ulterior political or apologetic purpose, which many have found in the biography. So, for instance, Schanz cites Hübner's and Andresen's theories of literary form as alternative views to Hoffmann's theory of the apologetic character of the treatise. But, while it is too much to say that there is no relation between these questions, yet it is obvious that a *laudatio funebris* might be an apologetic, political manifesto (as we know, in fact, that such works effected a distortion of history in the interest of certain families), and the same end could obviously have been attained through the medium of a historical narrative. Generally speaking, therefore, any demonstrable theory of form would not be inconsistent with any further demonstrable theory of purpose or tendency.

For the settlement of the question of a possible political motive in the portrayal of the last years of Agricola, our knowledge of the inner history of the time is unfortunately inadequate. Practically all those who have found in the treatise the

<sup>25</sup> ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὁ τόπος, ὑπάρχων ἐγκωμιαστικός, ἀπῆλθει ὁ τῆς ἱστορίας, κοινὸς ὢν ἐπαίνου καὶ ψόγου, ζητεῖ τὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὸν κεφαλαιώδη καὶ μετ' αὐξήσεως τῶν πράξεων ἀπολογισμὸν· οὕτως τὸν μετ' ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῶν ἐκάστοις παρεπομένων συλλογισμὸν.



program of a political creed, or a vindication of the memory of Agricola (and so of the moderate party) against the charge of dishonorable servility, have based their theories in the first instance upon the famous words in chap. 42: *Domitiani vero natura praeceps in iram, et quo obscurior, eo inrevocabilior, moderatione tamen prudentiaque Agricolae leniebatur, quia non contumacia neque inani iactatione libertatis famam fatumque provocabat. sciant, quibus moris est illicita mirari, posse etiam sub malis principibus magnos viros esse, obsequiumque ac modestiam, si industria ac vigor adsint, eo laudis escendere, quo plerique per abrupta, sed in nullum rei publicae usum, ambitiosa morte inclaruerunt.*

Students of Tacitus have debated hotly and with easy honors whether the principle here laid down is consistent with the general attitude of our author elsewhere toward the question at issue—a question which, from the time of Tiberius at least, had come to be one of the most vital problems of practical ethics for every great and influential public character. Evidence from Tacitus's own utterances can be adduced on both sides. We can show that the very men—Thrasea, Rusticus, Helvidius—whose contumacy is here so vehemently assailed, are elsewhere touched with a kindlier hand, and to the description of their deaths there is lent the suggestion of martyrdom. Even in the *Agricola*, but a few pages farther on, Tacitus recalls with horror the share which the senate was compelled to have in shedding the innocent blood of Helvidius, Rusticus, Senecio (45). And similarly at the opening of the work these same men are instanced as martyrs whose deaths put to blush the acquiescence of himself and his compeers (*dedimus profecto grande patientiae documentum*). Surely in these passages there is no thought of sparing himself for his share in the degradation of those last years of Domitian's tyranny. Nor does Tacitus fail to record elsewhere with manifest admiration utterances which reveal a bold but fruitless independence of spirit. On the other hand, it is true that he praises the moderation of men who have known how to steer a middle course *inter abruptam contumaciam et deforme obsequium* (*Ann.*, IV, 20). But the essential difference between this passage and other analogous expressions of political prudence, as, for instance, the one just cited, lies in the form and tone. Elsewhere, with a certain sadness and resignation, he commends acquiescence because of the fruitlessness of opposition. Here he passes quickly from the fact of Agricola's submission to praise of his conduct, as an example of the glory that it was possible for a good man of vigor and efficiency to win under a bad emperor. For myself I cannot escape the feeling that the arrogant *ἐπὶ κρισις* (*sciant quibus*, etc.) rings false, and betrays that the writer is making the worse appear the better cause for the ends which filial devotion demanded. For, in the first place, it is not easy to see what there could have been in Agricola's dignified acceptance, when it should be offered him, of a high proconsular post, which Tacitus could honestly designate as a "seeking for notoriety and a challenging of his own fate by contumacy and a vainglorious affectation of independence." Would not the more honorable and patriotic course have been to accept the reward which his merit had won and await the consequences? Agricola, of his

own motion, we are led to believe, would have followed this course, but was finally persuaded and terrified by his friends (*suadentes simul terrentesque pertraxere ad Domitianum*) into asking the ignoble favor of release from service. The humiliation of the request to Agricola is the aspect of the narrative which most impresses the modern reader; we are less concerned that Domitian did not blush at the odiousness of the benefit he conferred. Is this, then, that middle course between *contumacia* and *deforme obsequium* which Tacitus praised in Lepidus? Surely Tacitus has not spared his pen to make us realize how hideous the acquiescence of Agricola was. After such a scene we might concede a final judgment like that which is accorded to L. Piso (*Ann.*, VI, 10): *nullius servilis sententiae sponte auctor et quotiens necessitas ingrueret sapienter moderans*. But one is led to the suspicion of special pleading, which always played a large rôle in encomium, when we are asked to condemn the simple course of honor which Agricola might have pursued as headstrong and boastful, and are expected to admire as the highest political wisdom a maxim generalized from a scene of humiliating submission.

But I claim only to give my feeling, based upon the repeated perusal of this passage and upon a comparison with utterances of related character elsewhere in Tacitus. I do not expect to carry conviction, on a subject which does not admit of positive demonstration, to those who, having weighed the matter, find nothing unnatural or inconsistent in the treatment. But I would point out that, had Tacitus desired to give a favorable interpretation to an act of doubtful credit to his hero, he would have conformed entirely to the theories of encomiastic style in handling the matter as he has done here. Even Plutarch,<sup>26</sup> who writes as a biographer rather than as a professed encomiast, urges that defects of character which the exigencies of public life have imposed upon a man otherwise admirable are to be treated with an indulgent hand. The theory of encomium went further and prescribed rules for the encomiastic presentation of such defects. Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1367a, 32: *ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ὥς ταῦτ' ὄντα, καὶ πρὸς ἔπαινον καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, ὅλον τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ τὸν ἡλίθιον χρηστὸν κτλ.* (as here the acquiescence of Agricola is called *moderatio* and *prudentia*, the other course which lay open to him *contumacia* and *inanis iactatio libertatis*) . . . καὶ ἕκαστον δ' ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. The same doctrine as formulated by the late rhetorician Nicolaus Sophista (*Sp. III*, p. 481, 20) applies to the case in hand more accurately: *καὶ εἴπου τι ἐλάττωμα ἔχει, καὶ τοῦτο πειρασόμεθα περιστέλλειν εὐφημοτέροις λόγοις, τὴν δειλίαν εὐλάβειαν καὶ προμήθειαν (cf. moderatione prudentiaque) καλοῦντες, τὸ δὲ θράσος ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐψυχίαν, καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ πάντα ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιον ἐργαζόμενοι.* That even in a corrupt and debased state it is still possible for a man to attain distinction and lead an honorable life (*posse etiam sub malis principibus magnos viros esse*) had been affirmed by Seneca (*De Tranq.*, 5, 3): *ut scias et in adflicta republica esse occasionem sapienti*

<sup>26</sup> CIMON, 2, 4: τὰς δ' ἐκ πάθους τινὸς ἢ ἐκ πολιτικῆς ἀνάγκης ἀρετῆς τινος ἢ κακίας πονηρήματα νομίζοντας οὐ δεῖ πάνν προθύμως διιτρεχεύσας ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀμαρτίας καὶ κῆρας ἐλλείματα μᾶλλον ἐναποσημαίνειν κτλ.

*viro ad se proferendum.*<sup>27</sup> The principle must have been a more or less conventional one in encomiastic-apologetic literature, as Theon shows (Sp. II, p. 111, 25): λεκτέον ὅτι . . . καὶ ἐν πολιτείᾳ φαύλῃ τεθραμμένος οὐ διεστράφη, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἀριστος ἔγενετο, ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν Ὀλυγαρχίᾳ.

The rhetorical treatment of circumstances in which an honorable course of action is crossed by some exigency which leads to a less honorable course forms the subject of a considerable doctrine in the theory of encomium. It is presented, so far as I am aware, most fully by Cicero (*De Inv.*, II, 166 ff.). The subject is introduced in 166 with these words: *ac de eo quidem genere honestatis quod ex omni parte propter se petitur satis dictum est; nunc de eo in quo utilitas quoque adiungitur, quod tamen honestum vocamus, dicendum videtur.* At 170 he passes to a new phase of the subject: *quoniam ergo de honestate et de utilitate diximus, nunc restat ut de eis rebus, quas his attributas esse dicebamus, necessitudine et adfectione perscribamus.* Concerning *necessitudo* he continues in 173: *ac summa quidem necessitudo videtur esse honestatis; huic proxima incolumitatis; . . . hasce autem inter se saepe necesse est comparari* (as in our passage of the *Agricola* *incolumitas* is accounted the wiser consideration because of the uselessness of opposition). Therefore, though *honestas* is the higher motive, we must consider which of the two is to be consulted (174): *nam qua in re fieri poterit ut, cum incolumitati consuluerimus, quod sit in praesentia de honestate delibatum, virtute aliquando et industria recuperetur* [cf. *si industria ac vigor adsint* in our passage of the *Agricola*] *incolumitatis ratio videbitur habenda.* In such a case *vere poterimus dicere nos honestatis rationem habere*, for only in personal safety will it be possible to consult the demands of honor for the future. Therefore *vel concedere alteri vel ad conditionem alterius descendere vel in praesentia quiescere atque aliud tempus exspectare oportebit*, provided only the cause which impels us to look to our temporary advantage (*ad utilitatem*) is found adequate *quare de magnificentia aut de honestate quiddam derogetur.* We must inquire, therefore, carefully into the conditions which justify such a course.<sup>28</sup>

By way of summary of what has been said of the encomiastic character of the *Agricola* and of the bearing of this fact upon the style and upon the apologetic tendency of the work, may be noticed here Aristides's formulation of four rules of encomiastic treatment (Sp. II, p. 505, 10): λαμβάνονται δὲ οἱ ἔπαινοι κατὰ τρόπους τέσσaras, αὐξήσει παραλείψει παραβολῇ εὐφημία. Of each of these the *Agricola* has furnished examples. Of rhetorical amplification we have seen examples in detail in the invasion of Mona, the employment of a fleet, and especially in the calculated cumulative effect with which the complete discovery and conquest of Britain is presented. Of suppres-

<sup>27</sup> It is a significant contrast to Tacitus's application of the utterance that Seneca's generalization follows the example of the trial and death of Socrates.

<sup>28</sup> The same subject is touched upon briefly by QUINTILIAN, III, 8, 22. The theory is apparently alluded to by

Tacitus in the passage of the *Annals* cited above concerning L. Piso (VI, 10): *quotiens necessitas ingrueret sapienter moderans*, and perhaps also in *Agr.*, 33 extr.: *incolumitas ac decus eodem loco sita sunt.*

sion (παράλειψις) there are some minor examples, to which Hoffmann especially has called attention, and I have noted above the fact that the transient character of Agricola's conquests is not allowed to appear. Of the use of comparison (παραβολή or σύγκρισις) many examples have been adduced, and we have seen that it is one of the most characteristic features of the style of the treatise. The most formal and elaborate example, in which Agricola is contrasted with Domitian and his generals (chap. 41), is commented upon in the Appendix (p. 31). Of favorable interpretation (εὐφημία) of acts or events which were at best colorless, or perhaps even censurable, we have noted the explanation of the *acerbitas* of Agricola, and I have suggested that the ἐπίκρισις in 42 (*sciant quibus*, etc.) with its context seems to be a rhetorical defense of a course of conduct of doubtful credit. There are some other examples which might be instanced in this category, as the comment in chap. 6 on the inactivity of Agricola's tribuneship: *gnarus sub Nerone temporum quibus inertia pro sapientia fuit*.

I am aware that investigations of the sort here presented are likely to be looked upon as hypersceptical indictments of the historical accuracy of our sources. But with questions of historical fact we are here only incidentally concerned; the object of my study has been to define, if possible, the difference in literary treatment between encomiastic biography and history. Unfortunately the means of direct comparison which the treatment of the same events in the *Histories* might have afforded are not available. In Xenophon the difference in the treatment of Agesilaus in the encomium of that name and in the *Hellenica* led scholars for a long time to dispute the authenticity of the former work. In Polybius, unfortunately, we do not possess the full historical treatment of Philopoemen, and all trace of the special biography of him has disappeared. But that there was a considerable difference in the handling of the material in the two works we must believe on the authority of Polybius himself, as was indicated above. A pointed illustration of the differences between the two forms of literary treatment is afforded by the inconsistencies which are revealed in Tacitus's account of Corbulo in the latter part of the *Annals*. The immediate source of his information was, I believe, an encomiastic biography analogous to the *Agricola*. For large parts of his narrative he follows this closely, and thus introduces into history the tone and spirit of encomium. At other times he discredits its statements and endeavors to maintain the objectivity of the historian. The result is curiously inharmonious. But the detailed consideration of this question must be postponed to another time. It was on the basis of a long tradition of biographical literature, composed from the point of view of encomium, that Tacitus wrote the life of his father-in-law. That in many instances, as we have seen, details of treatment correspond to the theoretical precepts of the rhetoricians, is due rather to the biographical and encomiastic monuments from which such principles were derived, than to a conscious observance of rhetorical theory itself.

## APPENDIX

Some miscellaneous observations are here appended which it has not been found convenient to include in the continuous argument of the preceding:

5, 2: *prima castrorum rudimenta in Britannia Suetonio Paulino . . . adprobavit, electus quem contubernio aestimaret.* Cf. also 6, 18: *electus a Galba ad dona templorum recognoscenda, etc.* 9, 22: *haud semper errat fama, aliquando et elegit.* The encomiastic significance of these passages is set in somewhat clearer light by the precept of the rhetorician Theon (περὶ ἐγκωμίου), Sp. II, p. 110, 25: *δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὰς κρίσεις τῶν ἐνδόξων, καθάπερ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες Ἑλλήνι ὅτι Θησεὺς προέκρινε.* Cf. also note on *iudicium* (43, 17) below.

9, 10: *ubi officio satis factum, nullam ultra potestatis personam, tristitiam et adrogantiam et avaritiam exuerat.* So the MSS. Rhenanus's correction, which is generally adopted—*nulla ultra potestatis persona. Tristitiam, etc.*—ascribes directly to Agricola qualities which a panegyrist could scarcely name even to deny. The correction of Urlichs—*nihil ultra: potestatis personam, etc.*—seems to me simpler, but I would retain the words *tristitiam, adrogantiam, avaritiam*, which Urlichs brackets. Tacitus, in characterizing the *potestatis personam*, has allowed himself to ascribe to it, in the detached manner of a satirical historian, the conventional attributes of Roman provincial governors, unmindful that the mere mention of them in this connection conveys a suggestion scarcely to the praise of Agricola. One may compare the satirical remark at the end of chap. 21, which seems to suggest a sinister design in Agricola's measures for the civilization of his province quite at variance with the writer's purpose as an encomiast. *Vide supra*, p. 11. A parallel example is afforded by Isoc., *Euag.*, 78, which, though addressing a compliment to Nicocles, conveys a reflection upon the class to which he belongs: *πρῶτος καὶ μόνος τῶν ἐν τυραννίδι καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ τρυφαίᾳ ὄντων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ πολεῖν ἐπιτελείησας.*

10, 6: *Britannia . . . spatio ac caelo in orientem Germaniae, in occidentem Hispaniae obtenditur.* So far as I am aware, *spatio ac caelo* are universally taken as ablatives (of respect) with *Britannia*, and as such have been felt to be and certainly are otiose. They are, however, I believe, datives in hendiadys (= *spatio caeli*) with *obtenditur*. *Germaniae* and *Hispaniae* are genitives depending upon them. The position of Britain in relation to Germany and to Spain is designated by *in orientem* and *in occidentem* respectively. "Britain lies in the same latitude (*spatio ac caelo . . . obtenditur*) as that of Germany on the east and of Spain on the west." In contrast to this more general indication of geographical position, with relation to regions on the east and west, follows an exact designation of the southern boundary: *Gallis in meridiem etiam inspicitur.* The emphasis upon the proximity of Gaul may have been evoked by the inexact statement of Pliny, IV, 16, 30: *ex adverso huius situs* (the Low Countries) *Britannia insula inter septentrionalem et occidentem iacet, Germaniae, Galliae, Hispaniae . . . magno intervallo adversa.*

10, 18: *sed mare pigrum et grave remigantibus perhibent, etc.* The phenomenon does not admit of a satisfactory explanation, if we think of Tacitus as describing something actually observed by the expedition of exploration sent out by Agricola. There surely could have been no difficulty in recognizing fields of floating sea-weed or ice or even adverse currents. The encountering of a belt of calm in the vicinity of the Shetland Islands (to which Furneaux refers) may have seemed to lend confirmation to a widely diffused conception of the unknown outer ocean as a windless sea of almost immovable character. Walch cites a number of passages which allude to this in widely different periods of antiquity. In the discussions of this question I have not observed that the parallels afforded by Seneca Rhet., *Suas.* 1, have been cited: *Deliberat Alexander an Oceanum naviget.* His friends dissuade him from essaying so perilous

a task: *stat immotum mare, quasi deficientis in suo fine naturae pigra moles. . . . ipsum vero grave et defixum mare. 2 extr.: immobile profundum. 10: hic difficultatem navigationis, ignoti maris naturam non patientem navigationis. 15 (Peto . . . in navigante Germanico dicit): ad rerum metas extremaeque litora mundi|| nunc illum, pigris immania monstra sub undis|| qui ferat, Oceanum, etc.* Again, a little farther on: *atque alium flabris intactum quaerimus orbem?* But Tacitus, in *Ann.*, II, 24, says: *quanto violentior cetero mari Oceanus, etc.*

18, 23: *qui classem, qui naves, qui mare expectabant.* In explanation and defense of *mare*, Miss Katharine Allen, of the University of Wisconsin, has called my attention to *Hist.*, II, 12 *init.*: *possessa per mare et naves maiore Italiae parte.* An example, somewhat analogous to this, of a loose use of *mare* is afforded by Tibullus, I, 3, 50: *nunc mare, nunc leti mille repente viae*, where it stands "praegnanti sensu . . . pro nunc maris et navigationis pericula." In our passage *mare* gathers up in forcible climax the content of the preceding expressions *classem naves*. It is in no sense a descending series.

41, 18: *sic Agricola simul suis virtutibus, simul vitiis aliorum in ipsam gloriam praeceps agebatur.* This well-known passage seems to have been very generally misinterpreted. Commentators have read into it more than it really contains, and have found it an extreme example of Tacitean compression (*cf.* Ernesti's characterization of it as "acuminis captatio," Walch, Wex, Furneaux, and the conjectures of Madvig and Baehrens). But the passage contains no suggestion that "Agricola's glory was his doom." It is merely the conclusion of a *σύνκρισις*, which sets forth, by contrast to the weakness and inefficiency of Domitian and his generals, the swift growth of Agricola's fame. The comparison begins with 41, 5: *et ea insecuta tempora quae sileri Agricola non sinerent.* There follow then the disasters (the negative side of the *σύνκρισις*—the *vitia aliorum*) which provoked popular clamor for Agricola, *comparantibus cunctis vigorem et constantiam et expertum bellis animum cum inertia et formidine ceterorum.* The comparison concludes with the words in question: "Agricola, not only by his own virtues, but by contrast with the weakness and inefficiency of others, was hurried to the very pinnacle of fame." The correctness of this interpretation may be tested by comparison with the similar conclusion of a *σύνκρισις* of Pompey with other generals, in Cicero, *De imp. Pomp.*, 67: *quasi Cn. Pompeium non cum suis virtutibus tum etiam alienis vitiis magnum esse videamus.*

43, 16: *satis constat lecto testamento Agricolae, quo coheredem optimae uxori et piissimae filiae Domitianum scripsit, laetatum eum velut honore iudicioque.* The quasi-technical character of this last phrase seems to have been overlooked. Furneaux (with Andresen) thinks that the words *honore iudicioque* distinguish the act and the thought, and renders "the mark of respect and the esteem implied in it;" and so essentially Gudeman. But *iudicium* is a *terminus technicus* in the legal language of wills and inheritances for the judgment which animates a bequest, and so for the bequest itself. This transition of meaning is well shown by Seneca, *De Benef.*, IV, 11, 4: *quid . . . cum testamentum ordinamus non beneficia nihil nobis profutura dividimus? . . . atqui numquam magis iudicia nostra magis torquemus quam ubi remotis utilitatibus solum ante oculos honestum stetit.* For *suprema iudicia*, or *iudicia* alone, in the sense of *testamentum* see the passages in Forcellini, s. v., III, 13, of which Suet., *Aug.*, 66, affords a good illustration: *quamvis minime appeteret hereditates, ut qui numquam ex ignoti testamento capere quicquam sustinuerit, amicorum tamen suprema iudicia morosissime pensitavit, neque dolore dissimulato si parcius aut citra honorem verborum, etc.* (These last words cast some light upon *honore* in our passage. The *honorem iudicii* alone, *citra honorem verborum*, he did not desire.) Finally a parallel which sets the meaning of our passage in the clearest light, and shows that it is to be interpreted as hendiadys for *honore*

*iudicii*, is afforded by the *Laudatio Murdiae* (C. I. L., VI, 10230), vs. 6: *viro certam pecuniam legavit ut ius dotis honore iudicii augetur*. (Cf. Vollmer *ad loc.*, *Jahrb.*, Suppl. Vol. XVIII, p. 487.) Cf. also Du Cange, *s. v. iudicium*. [I note that Ruperti, *ad loc.*, makes allusion to the use of the word here noted, but without closer application to the interpretation of the passage.]

44 *init.*: A transposition of sentences from the order preserved in the MSS. is a violent remedy and one justly regarded with extreme scepticism. But since we have ample evidence that errors in the sequence of ancient texts do occur, it is legitimate for the critic to point out apparent errors of this sort and to make such suggestions of restoration as are possible. This chapter begins with a brief statement of some external facts concerning Agricola: (1) his age, (2) his appearance. Then follows a considerable reflection that Agricola, though cut off in the prime of life, had attained all that long life could have granted: *et ipse quidem, quamquam medio in spatio integrae aetatis ereptus, quantum ad gloriam longissimum aevum peregit*. The position of these words is surprising, for such a reflection would more naturally have followed the statement of his age; nor can I think that *et ipse* forms an appropriate transition from the preceding. There follows an exegetical sentence: *quippe et vera bona, quae in virtutibus sita sunt, impleverat, et consulari ac triumphalibus ornamentis praedito quid aliud adstruere fortuna poterat?* The real goods of virtue and fame are here obviously contrasted with external goods of fortune, although as yet the latter have not been named. These then follow, as the third item of external character, in a manner which, as Furneaux remarks, appears irrelevant: (3) *opibus nimis non gaudebat, speciosae non contigerant*. As a matter of arrangement it would have seemed more natural to have placed the third statement of external facts immediately after the second, before proceeding to the reflections which follow (2), especially since these reflections are rather in sequence with (1) than with (2). But further, and more decisively, we should look for (3) to precede *quippe et vera bona*, so that these words may look back in proper antithesis to *opibus*.

An arrangement of the passage which would seem to meet all the difficulties which I have named, and which others (especially Furneaux and Gudeman) have raised, would be as follows: (1) *natus erat Agricola*, etc. . . . (2) *quod si habitum quoque eius posteri noscere velint*, etc., . . . *libenter*. (3) *opibus nimis non gaudebat, speciosae non contigerant*. [From this statement of his small material wealth Tacitus passes to the suggestion of his real good fortune.] *Filia atque uxore superstitibus potest videri etiam beatus incolumi dignitate, florente fama, salvis adfinitatibus et amicitiiis, futura effugisse*. [In contrast to this statement of his good fortune in the integrity of his fame and the safety of his family and friends, Tacitus turns to the fact of Agricola's own death and shows that it was not untimely.] *Et ipse quidem, quamquam medio in spatio integrae aetatis ereptus, quantum ad gloriam, longissimum aevum peregit. quippe et vera bona* [in contrast to the *opibus* above], *quae in virtutibus sita sunt, impleverat, et consulari ac triumphalibus ornamentis praedito quid aliud adstruere fortuna poterat? nam sicut ei <non licuit> durare in hanc beatissimi saeculi lucem ac principem Traianum videre . . . ita festinatae mortis grande solacium tulit evasisse postremum illud tempus*, etc. [This sentence, introduced appropriately by *nam*, anticipates the suggestion that fortune might have granted him to see the reign of Trajan, and answers it by showing that it could only have been at the cost of witnessing the last days of Domitian. The balanced clauses *nam sicut . . . ita* would perhaps best be rendered by "for though . . . still."] I have explained this, though it is obvious enough, to meet an objection which will naturally be raised to the transposition proposed. It will be said that this last sentence is the natural complement of *futura effugisse*, and it cannot be denied that the sequence of these two parts as they stand is perfectly satisfactory. I would only urge that the sequence with *quid aliud adstruere fortuna poterat* is equally natural, as I have endeavored to point out.

44, 14: *nam sicut ei <non licuit> durare in hanc beatissimi saeculi lucem ac principem Traianum videre, quad augurio votisque apud nostras auris ominabatur*, etc. Lipsius comments: "mirum si tot annos praesagiit. Nec de Traiano ulla spes aut suspicio, nisi si deus mentem illi movit, aut nostro scriptori blanditia; quod non solet." Cf. also Hoffmann, *loc. cit. (supra, p. 5)*, p. 273. Similar auguries concerning Trajan are reported by Pliny, *Pan.*, 5 and 94, and by Dio Cassius, 67, 12, 1. They are all undoubtedly *ex eventu*, including our passage of the *Agricola*. It was a conventional feature of encomiastic literature<sup>29</sup> to assign to an early period in the life of the subject of encomium prophecies or signs of future greatness, even if they must be invented. In this case the augury is at once a source of praise to Agricola and of flattery to the emperor. The attitude of the theorists on this point is given by Menander. In speaking of portents and signs foretelling at the time of birth the future greatness of the subject of encomium, he says (*Sp. III*, p. 371, 10): *κἂν μὲν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὸν βασιλείᾳ, ἐξέργασαι· ἐὰν δὲ οἷόν τε ἢ πλάσαι καὶ ποιεῖν τοῦτο πιθανῶς, μὴ κατόκει.* And they did not hesitate, as Pliny abundantly shows. Without the cheerful injunction to persuasive invention of the necessary auguries, Quintilian presents the same theory in *III*, 7, 11: *illa quoque interim ex eo quod ante ipsum fuit tempore trahuntur, quae responsis vel auguriis futuram claritatem promiserint.*

45 *init.*: *non vidit Agricolam obsessam curiam*, etc. This is commonly designated by the editors as an imitation of Cicero, *De Oratore*, *III*, 2, 8 (referring to the death of Crassus), and perhaps no closer parallel can be cited. However, Morowski (*De Rhetoribus Lat.*, Cracovia, 1892, p. 15) has pointed out that the rhetorical figure here used is a conventional one in the declamatory literature of the first century A. D. in describing the deaths of great men. For the whole conclusion of the *Agricola*, from 44 to the end, one should compare Seneca *Rhet.*, *Suas.*, 6, 5 and 6.

The observation suggests a concluding word: We shall not understand the style of Tacitus, nor shall we be in a position properly to judge of the content of his words, until we come to see and to feel the affinity of his nature for much which, in our modern aversion to literary artifice, we designate contemptuously as rhetorical. There is a great gulf between Tacitus and the declaimers, but it is not a total difference of kind, as, for example, the difference between Seneca and Epictetus or Fronto and Marcus Aurelius. Up to a certain point, in the technique of language and rhetorical effect, Tacitus is one of them. But beyond that, it is character and range of vision, rather than fundamentally divergent ideals, which differentiate him from them.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. NORDEN ("Ein Panegyricus auf Augustus") on *Virg.*, *Aen.*, VI, 799, *Rh. Mus.*, Vol. LIV, p. 468.





**A STICHOMETRIC SCHOLIUM TO THE MEDEA OF  
EURIPIDES**



# A STICHOMETRIC SCHOLIUM TO THE MEDEA OF EURIPIDES, WITH REMARKS ON THE TEXT OF DIDYMUS

TENNY FRANK

THE line *σιγγῇ δόμους εἰσβᾶσ' ἴν' ἔστρωται λέχος*, which occurs twice in our manuscripts of the *Medea* of Euripides (vss. 41 and 380) and is cited in a third place (vs. 356) by a scholiast, has been much discussed both because of its own inherent difficulties and because of the interesting but perplexing scholia attached to it. I propose in this paper to suggest a solution of the difficulties connected with the scholia, and to point out some new conclusions to which it may lead with reference to certain readings in the manuscripts of the time of Didymus, the author of the criticism contained in the scholia.

The passage in question occurs first in all our manuscripts as vs. 41 of the *Medea*. The nurse is speaking:

εγῶδα τήνδε, δειμαίνω τέ νιν,  
40 μὴ θηκτὸν ὥση φάσγανον δι' ἥπατος,  
σιγγῇ δόμους εἰσβᾶσ', ἴν' ἔστρωται λέχος,  
ἢ καὶ τύραννον τόν τε γήμαντα κτάνη  
καῖπειτα μέλζω συμφορὰν λάβη τινά.  
δεινὴ γάρ.

Here the line is bracketed by all modern editors<sup>1</sup> as having been inappropriately inserted from vs. 380.

After vs. 356 Didymus is said by the scholiast to have found the same line, although it is not found in any of our manuscripts in that place and no editor has proposed to restore it. Here the text reads (the king of Corinth is the speaker):

προυννέπω δέ σοι,  
εἴ σ' ἢ 'πιούσα λαμπὰς ὄψεται θεοῦ  
καὶ παῖδας ἐντὸς τῆσδε θερμόνων χθονός,  
θανεῖ· λέλεκται μῦθος ἀψευδῆς ὅδε.  
355 νῦν δ', εἰ μένειν δεῖ, μίμν' ἐφ' ἡμέραν μίαν·  
οὐ γάρ τι δράσεις δεινὸν ὧν φόβος μ' ἔχει.

To the last line of this passage the following scholium is attached: οὐ γάρ τι δράσεις]

<sup>1</sup>ELMSLEY rejects vs. 41. "Nostro loco minus conveniunt ut recte Musgravius. Metuit nutrix ne liberos interficiat Medea. Qua sententia neque *σιγγῇ δόμους εἰσβάσας* dixisset neque *ἴν' ἔστρωται λέχος* . . . Non opus est ut his legantur haec verba quae melius infra v. 374 (= Nauck, 380) quam hic mihi videntur." So also BRUNCK and FORSON. VALCKENAE (ad *Phoen.*, 1286) and PIERSON (*Verisimilitia*,

p. 59) alone would read the line here rather than at 380. KIRCHHOFF brackets vss. 40 and 41: "Huc retractos e vv. 381, 2" (= NAUCK, 379, 380). Nauck rightly rejects vss. 40-43 (*Euripideische Studien*, I, p. 108). We shall examine his reasons later, together with those of DINDORF and PRINZ-WECKLEIN, who reject vss. 38-43.

Δίδυμος μετὰ τοῦτον φέρει<sup>2</sup> τὸ “σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβᾶς ἔν’ ἔστρωται λέχος” καὶ μέμφεται τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς ὡς ἀκαίρως αὐτὸν τάσσουν·

Finally the line occurs in what is now generally conceded to be its proper place, after vs. 379. Medea speaks :

οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅποιά πρῶτον ἐγχειρῶ, φίλαι,  
πότερον ὑφάψω δῶμα νυμφικὸν πυρί,  
ἢ θηκτὸν ὥσω φάσγανον δι’ ἡπατος,  
380 σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβᾶς ἔν’ ἔστρωται λέχος.

Valckenaer and Pierson have not been followed by subsequent critics in considering the line in place at 41 rather than here. It is the scholium upon the line in this place which has given difficulty:

ὧδε καλῶς κείται. Δίδυμος σημειοῦται ὅτι κακῶς οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τάσσουν·—ἐπὶ τῶν δύο τὸ “σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβᾶσα.” καύσω ἢ σφάξω αὐτούς (Schwartz). E (= Parisianus 2712) reads ἐπὶ τῶν β. A Venetian edition of the sixteenth century, whose scholia are often based on those of E, reads ἐπὶ τῶν δυοῖν (Dindorf, VII, p. 32, 5, note). Kirchhoff emends to ἐπὶ τοῖν δυοῖν. Elmsley (*ad* vs. 373) says: “Nescio quid significat ἐπὶ τῶν β.” Dindorf (*Euripides*, VII, *ad loc.*) punctuates as follows: ὧδε καλῶς κείται. Δίδυμος σημειοῦται ὅτι κακῶς οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τάσσουν ἐπὶ τῶν δύο τὸ “σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβᾶσα,” καύσω ἢ σφάξω αὐτούς. With this phrasing ἐπὶ τῶν δύο is made to refer to the two alternatives καύσω ἢ σφάξω. This interpretation is impossible. σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβᾶσα refers of course only to the one line immediately preceding it, and there never has been any valid objection to its appropriateness in connection with that line. J. van Leeuwen (*Commentatio de Antigona Sophoclea*) punctuates: Δίδυμος . . . . τάσσουν·—ἐπὶ τῶν δύο τὸ σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβᾶσα, καύσω ἢ σφάξω αὐτούς. This makes the sentence Δίδυμος . . . . τάσσουν contradict the words which directly precede (ὧδε καλῶς κείται) without an adversative particle, at the same time leaving ἐπὶ τῶν δύο quite without connection. Furthermore, both of these readings necessitate the assumption that the line in question was, in the opinion of Didymus, in place elsewhere, but an interpolation here—an assumption which can hardly be entertained. Nor does it explain the scholium at vs. 356.

Verrall (*Medea*, *ad* vs. 379) offers an emendation based on the fact that the line in question is also found at vs. 41. He says, after quoting the scholium: “ἐπὶ τῶν δύο is a corruption of the reference to the interpolation; if the text of the prologue agrees with that of Didymus, which there is no reason to doubt, it should be ἐπὶ τῷ μ’,

<sup>2</sup>MR. VERRALL (*Medea*, *ad* 356) objects to Nauck's interpretation of the word φέρει (*cf.* NAUCK, *Euripideische Studien*, I, p. 118): “Uebrigens kannte Didymus, wie wir aus den Scholien wissen, nach 356 noch einen Vers.” “The scholium merely says,” contends Mr. Verrall, “φέρει . . . , that is, Didymus brings or transfers the line to this place, not says that he found it there.” But I submit that readers of scholia will find themselves quite familiar with this use

of the word, as equivalent to “give as a reading,” “cite,” which is of course what Nauck means. Compare, in the hypothesis to the *Rhesus* (SCHWARTZ, *Scholia in Euripidem*, II, 324, 10): πρῶτοι δὲ εἰπὼ φέρονται; *ibid.*, I, 12: ἐν ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν ἀντιγράφων ἕτερός τις φέρεται πρῶτος; also scholium *ad Hec.*, 13 (SCHWARTZ, I, p. 13): ἐν μόντοις τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις “ἦν” φέρεται καὶ κοινῇ ἀνάγνωσις ἦν.

'at line 40.' For the position of the note and the nature of the case show that the observation of Didymus referred to both 379-80, which correspond to 40 and 41. The cause of the corruption is the resemblance in cursive writing of  $\mu'$  (*τεσσαράκοντα*) and  $\mu'$ , one form of  $\beta'$  (*δύο*)."

This, however, involves Mr. Verrall in a misinterpretation of the important scholium on vs. 356, of which he says (*ad* vs. 356): "I submit that this scholium must have slipped to the wrong line and belongs in reality at 380." Now, a right understanding of both scholia, which I think can be attained, will convince one that both are now in their proper place and that they are to be interpreted with reference to each other. We shall also find good reason to conclude that vs. 41 was not in Didymus's manuscript; and, if it was not there, of course he did not refer to it.

Von Arnim (*Medea*, *ad* 379), if I understand his meaning, interprets *ἐπὶ τῶν δύο* as equivalent to "in two places," i. e., at vs. 40 and at vs. 356—which is not the Greek way of expressing that idea.

Finally Evald Bruhn (*Lucubrationes Euripideae*, p. 249, note) confesses that he does not understand this phrase: "Numero autem binario id significari in codicibus et post 379 et post 40 legi verum de quo agimus fortasse recte suspicor; eum tamen sensum elicere e verbis *ἐπὶ τῶν δύο* non possum." The first part he understands still less: "Scribendum fortasse est: *Δίδυμος <δε> σημειοῦται*. Didymus enim qui post 356 legi illum versum iubeat, aperte dissideat ab eo qui scribit *ᾧδε καλῶς κείται*." But we shall see that the two phrases do not contradict each other and that a *δέ* would be out of place. Besides, we can hardly credit a critic like Didymus with the notion that these verses would be in place at 356.

We have seen how the interpretations hitherto offered have failed to explain the difficult questions which have been asked, namely: (1) What is the meaning of the scholium on 379? (2) How is this scholium connected with that on 356? (3) Why is Didymus silent about the occurrence of the line at 41, while he comments on it upon its later appearance? These questions I think will be answered if the following interpretation of the troublesome phrase *ἐπὶ τῶν δύο* meets with approval.

Some redactor of the scholia who had access to the notes of Didymus found that that famous critic cited the line *σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβάσα* after vs. 356, with a note accusing the actors of having inappropriately introduced it there (see the scholium on 356 already quoted). It was to be expected then that, in commenting on the line in its proper place, vs. 380, he should express his opinion as to its fitness in the latter place—which he does by saying *ᾧδε καλῶς κείται*—and, further, should refer to the note and citation of Didymus in the preceding place. This reference it is which has been corrupted into the meaningless words *ἐπὶ τῶν δύο*, and the reference read originally *ἐπὶ τῇ τνβ'*, "at line 352" (i. e., 356, Schwartz). The first step in the corruption was probably the loss of the second  $\tau$ , thus: *τῇτνβ* became *τῇνβ*, whence *τῶν β'*. If this emendation is correct, the scholium should read thus: *ᾧδε καλῶς κείται. Δίδυμος σημειοῦται ὅτι κακῶς οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τάσσουσιν ἐπὶ τῇ τνβ' τὸ "σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβάσα,"* and

one might paraphrase it thus: "Here the line is in the proper place (not at 357). Didymus marks the line for the reason that the actors are wrong in bringing it into the text at 352." At 352 (356, Schwartz) he had already said: "After this line Didymus cites the line *σιγῇ δόμους, κ.τ.λ.*, and blames the actors for bringing it into the text here, where it is out of place."

The last clause of the scholium, *καύσω ἢ σφάξω αὐτοὺς*, seems to be a late attempt at an explanation of *ἐπὶ τῶν δύο* after the corruption had taken place, and as such it is to be rejected. Bruhn's theory that it is a paraphrase of vss. 378, 379 is less inviting. He says: "Quibus verbis vix opus est moneam novum contineri scholium 378-79 complectens." (*Luc. Eur.*, p. 249, note.)

This emendation gives a natural interpretation to the whole scholium upon vs. 380 as well as to the one upon vs. 356, which was thought by Elmsley as well as Verrall to be out of place. Moreover, Didymus is the ultimate source of both scholia, and the question involved in both—that of an actor's interpolation—is the same. This naturally leads one to connect the reference in *ἐπὶ τῶν δύο* with the corresponding scholium upon vs. 356, rather than with vs. 41, of which Didymus seems not even to have spoken. Finally, the corruption of *ἐπὶ τῷ τυβ'* to *ἐπὶ τῶν β'* is certainly an easier one than that which Mr. Verrall assumes.

Though I do not know of similar references by verse in the scholia of the dramatists, there is sufficient actual manuscript evidence to make us certain that the method of citation by verse must have been a common one. Asconius<sup>3</sup> has at least twenty-five references by verse numbers to lines of Cicero; cf. *in Cic. Pis.*, p. 3, Orelli: *circa versum LXXX*; p. 6: *circa versum a primo CCLXX*, etc. In a similar way the scholiast of Oribasius<sup>4</sup> refers by *στίχοι* to the passages in the works of Galen which were the source of the later author's statements. See on Oribasius, IV, p. 532, 24 (ed. Daremberg), the scholiast's reference to Galen: *ἀπὸ τοῦ ζ' τῆς θεραπείτικῆς ὡς πρὸ σ' στίχων τοῦ τέλους*. See also the scholia on Oribasius, III, pp. 686, 22; 689, 12; IV, pp. 533, 4; 538, 1; 534, 6. The last citation reads: *ἀπὸ τοῦ α' βιβλίου τῆς συνόψεως τῶν χειρουργουμένων μετὰ τὸ τρίτον τοῦ βιβλίου, ὡς μετὰ ι' στίχους τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ὁμοίου κεφαλαίου*. Some examples of the same method of reference are found in Diogenes Laertius;<sup>5</sup> so, for example, in VII, 188: *τὰ δ' αὐτὰ φησι (Χρύσιππος) καὶ ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν μὴ δι' ἑαυτὰ αἰρετῶν . . . , ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ δικαίου κατὰ τοὺς χιλίους στίχους* (= "circa versum millesimum," Wachsmuth) *καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας ἐσθίειν κελεύων*. Similar references occur at VII, 33, and VII, 187. As the above-mentioned references are to prose works, they are usually not exact, being modified by some word like *circa*, *ὡς*, *κατά*. The implication is, of course, that the works referred to were numbered in the ordinary<sup>6</sup> way by the hundred-line measure with the sixteen-syllable

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the discussion by RITSCHL, *Opuscula*, I, pp. 78 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. DIELS, *Hermes*, XVII (1882), pp. 331 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. WACHSMUTH, *Rheinisches Museum*, XXXIV (1879), p. 39; SCHANZ, *Hermes*, XVI (1881), p. 310; ROHDE, *Rheinisches Museum*, XXXIV (1879), p. 562, note.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. FURR, *Rheinisches Museum*, XXXVII (1882), p. 468; SCHANZ, *Hermes*, XVI (1881), p. 309; CHRIST, *Die Atticusausgabe des Demosthenes*; GRAUX, *Revue de philologie*, II (1878), pp. 97 ff.

hexameter as a basis for the prose line. The line of the epic and drama was, generally speaking, a fixed thing, for even the lyrical parts were early arranged by cola,<sup>1</sup> and an exact reference to line could therefore be given.

I know of no other instance in the scholia to the dramatists of a numerical reference to the line of a play, nor of such a method of reference in the scholia to the other poets. But it certainly would be surprising if the grammarians who made it their business to comment upon the dramatists never hit upon this convenient device of reference by line, which was used quite freely in prose works. The same device, as Mr. Capps<sup>2</sup> has pointed out, was probably used even by the engraver of the Soteric inscription of Delphi of the year 272 B. C. The engraver, it seems, had omitted two names from the list of performers (each name forming a line) and added them at the end, each preceded by a numeral (ΕΙ and ΕΙ) referring to the line of the stone after which the name had been omitted. This is the earliest instance known, so far as I can learn, of the employment of the line-number as a means of reference.

In accounting for a discrepancy of a few lines, such as one is hereby led to assume between the text of the critic who used Didymus's notes, who calls it vs. 352, and *e. g.* Schwartz, who makes it vs. 357, one could hardly contend with confidence that the difference represents the number of lines which have been interpolated since the scholium was written; for such an assumption would have to rest upon a much more precise knowledge of the colometry of the parodos than we at present possess. Our emendation does, however, throw some new light on the state of the manuscript of Euripides which Didymus used. In the first place, it proves that the scholium to vs. 356, which has often been assumed to be out of place, is in its proper position, and that some manuscripts of Didymus read the line *σιγῇ δόμους εἰσβάσα*, etc., after that line. Secondly, by establishing the position and trustworthiness of that scholium, it proves that vss. 355, 356, which are thought by Nauck and Prinz-Wecklein to be an interpolation, were found in the manuscript of Didymus; for the scholium reads, as we have seen: *οὐ γάρ τι δράσεις*] *Δίδυμος μετὰ τούτων φέρει τὸ "σιγῇ δόμους κ.τ.λ.;"* and, as one could not possibly find any meaning for this line in this place if not connected with vss. 355, 356, it follows that the latter lines were in the text when Didymus wrote his note. One may even add, as a further suggestion, that their presence in so old a text argues to some extent for their authenticity. Nauck (*Euripideische Studien, Medea*, p. 118) questions them because they seem to weaken the forceful words which precede, and the Prinz-Wecklein edition follows him in rejecting them; but there is no real contradiction in thought, nor do I see any other adequate reason for rejection. Finally, we are led to the conclusion that vs. 41 was probably not in the text of Didymus; for it is reasonable to assume that, if it had been there, the critic would have pronounced judgment upon the appropriateness of the line there, as he evidently

<sup>1</sup> Cf. VON WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORFF, *Herakles*, I<sup>1</sup>, pp. 140 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Transactions of the American Philological Association*,

XXXI (1900), pp. 123 ff. The inscription in question is No. 2564 in Vol. II, 6, of COLLITZ's *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften*, ed. Baunack.



did at 356 and at 380. So, for instance, a scholium on vs. 148 says: τοῦτο δὲ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῆς Μηδείας φησὶν . . . τοὺς δ' ὑποκριτὰς συγκέειν, and at the end of the alleged confusion (vs. 169) the charge is repeated: Ἀπολλόδωρος μὲν οὖν φησιν ὁ Ταρσεὺς τῆς ἀμφιβολίας αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς συγκέοντας τὰ χορικά τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς Μηδείας λεγομένοις.

Now it is generally agreed that vs. 40 must be dealt with in the same way as vs. 41, since the two are mere repetitions of vss. 379, 380, which are evidently in their proper place there. It has already been remarked that Nauck rejects the two following lines also; and with good reason. It is quite evident that vss. 42, 43 depend on vs. 40. It follows that they were written after the insertion of vss. 40, 41. The whole passage in question very inappropriately gives anticipation of the plot, which had not yet assumed definite shape. The fears of the nurse concerned the children only (*cf.* vss. 36, 98, 105). If the four lines are rejected, the text reads ἐγὼ δα τήνδε, δειμαίνω τέ νιν· δεινὴ γάρ. It is quite evident that δεινὴ is an echo of δειμαίνω, and that they are not to be separated. Euripides frequently uses this very effective balance; *cf.* *Orest.*, 102–3, δέδοικα . . . δεινὸν γάρ; *Phoen.*, 269–70, φοβούμεθαι . . . γὰρ δεινὰ; *Orest.*, 1519–20, δεινὸν . . . δέδοικας. Now, as we have found good reason for the belief that Didymus (whose text was probably better than ours) did not have vs. 41, and as the four lines 40–43 are of a kind, and from the same source, we have an additional argument for their rejection. We may safely date them as post-Didymean.

I cannot agree, however, with Dindorf (*Euripides*, VII, p. 266; he is followed by Prinz-Wecklein), who finds here an interpolation of six lines. He says: "Glossator non animadvertit interpolatoris fraudem, qui post versum 37 versus intulit sex (*βαρεῖα* . . . λάβη τινα) quorum quattuor ipse scripsit, duos ex. vss. 379–80 huc rettulit."

**THE COMMENTARIOLUM PETITIONIS ATTRIBUTED  
TO QUINTUS CICERO**



# THE COMMENTARIOLUM PETITIONIS ATTRIBUTED TO QUINTUS CICERO

GEORGE LINCOLN HENDRICKSON

## AUTHENTICITY

It is now just ten years (I write in September, 1902) since I published in the *American Journal of Philology* (Vol. XIII, pp. 200-212) a brief paper in which, as I thought, I was able to adduce conclusive evidence of the spuriousness of the *Commentariolum*. Its authenticity had already been called into question on quite inadequate evidence by A. Eussner in a Würzburg *Program* of 1872, while Mommsen in the third volume of his *Staatsrecht* of the year 1887 (p. 484 and note) had alluded to the work as spurious, but without discussion of reasons for his belief apart from a single example of erroneous statement relating to the *ordo equester*. Eussner's discussion was answered at considerable length by Professor Tyrrell, first in *Hermathena* and later in Vol. I of his edition of the letters. But while the many trivial arguments of Eussner fell an easy prey to the almost indignant pen of Professor Tyrrell, yet it is, I fancy, an impartial verdict, that he succeeded in refuting Eussner rather than in defending Quintus.<sup>1</sup>

The question is naturally not a burning one, but (apart from private expressions of opinion which came to me) in the course of time I noted that my argument had won a few adherents, of whom I may name Professor Gudeman in his treatment of "Literary Frauds Among the Romans" (*Transactions of the Am. Phil. Ass'n*, Vol. XXV, p. 154, note 2), and Dr. L. Gurlitt, the eminent connoisseur of Cicero's letters, in the *Jahresbericht* for 1898 (Vol. XXVI, p. 3). But I did not convince Professor Leo, who in the course of a discussion of the date of publication of the letters to Atticus,<sup>2</sup> defended the genuineness of the *Commentariolum*, nor Schanz, who in the second edition of the *Römische Literaturgeschichte* still holds to the position originally taken by him toward the question. Most recently Dr. J. Ziehen — and his words have impelled me to revert to the subject once more — has used this discussion to illustrate the general reaction toward a more conservative point of view in the higher criticism of Roman literature,<sup>3</sup> assuming that the authenticity of the work in question is now generally acknowledged. That such is the case I shall not dispute, but I am stirred to protest when this conservative reaction is illustrated by a series of examples which places the challenging of the genuineness of the *Commentariolum* on a par with the frivolous

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Leo, "Die Publication von Cicero's Briefen an Atticus," *Nachrichten d. k. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1895, pp. 447 ff. "Tyrrell hat seine Vertheidigung geführt ohne, wie mir scheint, den Kern der Sache zu treffen."

<sup>2</sup> "Echtheitsfragen der römischen Literaturgeschichte," *Berichte d. freien deutschen Hochschultages zu Frankfurt a. M.*, 1901, p. 84. I am indebted to Dr. Ziehen himself for a copy of his valuable paper, with the general tendency and results of which I am in full accord.

doubts of the early nineteenth century concerning the orations against Catiline, the orations *post reditum* and the *pro Marcello*. The considerations advanced by Wolf, and especially by his German and Dutch emulators, against any of these orations were never more than of a most general character—suspicions of the presence of bombast, declamatory rhetoric, and the *magister umbraticus*. Of definite relations to other works of literature, which would reveal the pillager, examples were not shown.

Now in regard to the *Commentariolum* I would carefully eliminate so far as possible all considerations of a vague or general character, and so throw over voluntarily much, or rather most, that Eussner advanced. I would let the question rest upon a comparison of resemblances with literature of a time subsequent to the date at which the treatise purports to have been written, that is, subsequent to the middle of the year 64, the earliest date which can be assigned to it, if genuine. Confirmation of this result I shall then endeavor to point out from a study of the rhetorical form and style of the treatise. Although all scholars who have discussed this question concede the relationship of certain passages of the *Commentariolum* to the oration in *Toga Candida* (delivered just before the consular election of 64), and assume that Marcus Cicero borrowed from the recent campaign document of Quintus, yet I will reproduce them here for the sake of affording a complete list of the most essential parallels.

Of Antonius we read, *Com.* 8: *vocem audivimus iurantibus se Romae iudicio aequo cum homine Graeco certare non posse*. And in a fragment of the oration in *Tog. Cand.*, preserved by Asconius (edition of Kiessling and Schöll), p. 74, 26: *qui in sua civitate cum peregrino negavit se iudicio aequo certare posse*.

Concerning the death of M. Marius at the hands of Catiline, *Com.* 10: *quid ego nunc dicam petere eum consulatum, qui hominem carissimum populo Romano, M. Marium, inspectante populo Romano . . . vivo stanti collum gladio sua dextera secuerit, . . . caput sua manu tulit*. In *Tog. Cand.* p. 78, 10: *populum vero, cum inspectante populo collum secuit hominis maxime popularis, quanti faceret ostendit*: and *ibid.*, p. 80, 22: *caput etiam tum plenum animae et spiritus ad Syllam . . . manibus ipse suis detulit*.

Of these passages and of a number of other rather striking points of contact between the two works Bücheler says, p. 9: "et haec quidem aliaque de Antoni praediis proscriptis, de Catilinae stupris, de Africa provincia, de testium dictis ac iudicio etiam si pariter uterque vel tractavit vel elocutus est, tamen quod temporum rerumque aut necessitate id factum est aut opportunitate, mutuatum esse alterum non liquet." But concerning the two following passages he assumes that Marcus borrowed consciously from the recent letter of Quintus.

*Com.* 10: *qui nullum in locum tam sanctum ac tam religiosum accesserit in quo non etiam si aliis culpa non esset, tamen ex sua nequitia dedecoris suspicionem relinqueret*. In *Tog. Cand.*, p. 82, 3 (a passage which Asconius refers to a charge of incest with the vestal Fabia): *cum ita vixisti ut non esset locus tam sanctus quo non adventus tuus etiam cum culpa nulla subesset crimen adferret*. This the reading of

the lemma: Asconius in his comment (*ibid.*, vs. 8) gives *etiam si, etc.*, as in the *Com.* It is, I suppose, the cautious phraseology *etiam si aliis culpa non esset* which Bücheler means that Marcus found worth reproducing with *etiam cum (si) culpa nulla subesset*. As for the rest, Cicero had already used a similar phrase of Verres (I, 62): *ecquo in oppido pedem posuit ubi non plura [stuprorum flagitiorumque suorum] adventus sui vestigia reliquerit?*

*Com.* 12: *quis enim reperiri potest tam improbus civis, qui velit uno suffragio duas in rem publicam sicas destringere?* In *Tog. Cand.*, p. 83, 20 (which Asconius prefaces with the words *dicit de malis civibus*): *qui posteaquam illo <quo> conati erant Hispaniensi pugiunculo nervos incidere civium Romanorum non potuerunt, duas uno tempore conantur in rem publicam sicas destringere.*

It is perhaps worth noting, but scarcely of any significance for our question, that these four passages of most striking resemblance between the *Commentariolum* and the oration in *Toga Candida* occur in the same sequence in both works. Concerning this last example a significant point has been overlooked. In the first place the antithesis of *uno suffragio* with *duas sicas destringere* falls out of the figure in puerile fashion, which is not the case with Marcus's very natural phrase *duas uno tempore sicas destringere*. But furthermore—and this to my thinking is a decisive consideration—the essential antithesis in the oration is not between *duas sicas* and *uno tempore*, but between the Spanish stiletto (*Hispaniensi pugiunculo*),<sup>3</sup> which had failed to cut the sinews of the state, and the two daggers (*sicas*) which the same citizens were now attempting to draw. In the *Commentariolum* the metaphor is launched abruptly, in trivial antithesis to *uno suffragio*, with rather frigid effect; in the fragment of the *in Toga Candida* the whole phrase *duas in rem publicam sicas destringere* is the natural outgrowth of and antithesis to the preceding metaphor *Hispaniensi pugiunculo nervos incidere*. That is, once given this metaphor, the second is an outgrowth of the historical relationships, and not a random shot of rhetorical pyrotechnics as in the *Commentariolum*. But it will hardly be questioned, I imagine, that looked at *per se*, the place where the metaphor is most natural and in most organic relation to the context is most likely to be the original place of its occurrence.

Let us now turn to the oration *pro Murena*, which likewise reveals some striking points of contact with the *Commentariolum*. Some of the most essential parallels were pointed out by Eussner, along with many examples of very doubtful character, which only served to cast discredit upon his method. To these I added some further examples in my former discussion. That there is in them such closeness of resemblance as would point decisively to a relationship between the two documents has been denied by Tyrrell and Schanz. Leo, however, recognizes them along with the passages of the oration in *Toga Candida* as genuine reminiscences from the work of Quintus.<sup>4</sup> That

<sup>3</sup> ASCONIUS, *loc. cit.*: "Hispaniensem pugiunculum Cn. Pisonem appellat quem in Hispania occisum dixi."

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 449: "Dieser (Marcus Cicero) hat in die Rede in *Toga Candida* bald nach Empfang des Briefes . . .

einzelne Wendungen aus der Schrift des Bruders verflochten, und auch die Rede *pro Murena* des nächsten Jahres zeigt Anklänge an den Brief."

some relationship between the two works exists, a comparison such as the following must, I think, convince anyone. *Pro Murena*, 44: *petitorem ego, praesertim consulatus, magna spe magno animo magnis copiis et in forum et in campum deduci volo* [Com., 36: *magnam affert opinionem, magnam dignitatem cotidiana in deducendo frequentia*]; *placet mihi . . . persalutatio, praesertim cum iam hoc novo more omnes fere domos omnium concurrant* [Com., 35: *in saluatoribus, qui magis vulgares sunt et hac consuetudine quae nunc est pluris veniunt*], *et ex voltu candidatorum coniecturam faciant quantum quisque animi et facultatis habere videatur*. [Com., 34: *nam ex ea ipsa copia (assectatorum) coniectura fieri poterit, quantum sis in ipso campo virum ac facultatis habiturus*].

But it is possible, I am convinced, to go farther than merely to point out resemblances. It can be shown that certain ideas and certain expressions in the *Commentariolum* are intelligible, or fully intelligible, only in the light of the oration *pro Murena*. In Com., 55 the author admonishes Cicero, in view of the danger of bribery: *fac . . . ut intellegas eum esse te qui iudicii ac periculi metum maximum competitoribus afferre possis, fac ut se abs te custodiri atque observari sciant*. The admonition concludes with a qualification as follows: *atque haec ita nolo te illis proponere ut videare accusationem iam meditari, sed ut hoc terrore facilius hoc ipsum quod agis consequare*. The words are not likely to strike one as obscure; but it is nevertheless not easy to see why Cicero is advised to show his teeth and yet not seem to be on the point of bringing them together. It is rather a subtle balance which the words with some ineptitude enjoin. Indictments of candidates by each other during the *petitio* on charges of bribery were not unusual, and in this very canvass of 64, had not the tribune of the people, Q. Mucius Orestinus, intervened to prevent the passage of a *lex ambitus aucta etiam cum poena* (Asconius in the argument of the oration *in Tog. Cand.*, page 74), we might have had a legal action against Catiline and Antonius instead of the senatorial speech *in Toga Candida*. As it was, Cicero used the opportunity of a protest against the *intercessio* of Orestinus to deliver himself of an invective against his competitors which could not have differed greatly in moral significance from an *accusatio*. But for some reason, the author of the *Commentariolum* admonishes, Cicero must not seem *accusationem iam meditari*. The explanation of this statement is afforded by *pro Murena*, 43 ff., where at considerable length and with much sprightly banter Cicero argues that Sulpicius lost his chance of election by stopping in the midst of his candidacy to prosecute his opponents for bribery: *nescio quo pacto semper hoc fit, . . . simul atque candidatus accusationem meditari visus est, ut honorem desperasse videatur*.<sup>5</sup> The author of the *Commentariolum* has generalized this admonition (*atque haec ita nolo te illis proponere ut videare accusationem*

<sup>5</sup> My statement above, that Tyrrell denies that the resemblances between the Com. and the *pro Murena* point to a relationship of any kind between the two documents, requires correction with reference to this example: "In this case," he says (Vol. I2, p. 119 extr.), "it seems to me very

probable that Marcus in his speech availed himself of a reminiscence of his brother's Essay which he had perhaps been editing very recently." But that this cannot be the relation has been made clear.

*iam meditari*) from the statement which suited the particular exigencies of Cicero's argument in behalf of Murena.

This same special argument of the *pro Murena* serves to cast light upon still another passage of the *Commentariolum*, which by itself has afforded not a little difficulty to editors (52): *cura . . . ut etiam si qua possit ne competitoribus tuis existat aut sceleris aut libidinis aut largitionis accommodata ad eorum mores infamia*. The question at issue here among the critics is whether *ne* shall be kept or omitted. Those who look upon the text as sound (*e. g.*, Orelli) appeal to the generous admonition of sec. 40 as a parallel. Bücheler combats this interpretation vigorously, and with Palermus and Gulielmius thinks that *ne* is inappropriate. He sees in it a corruption of *nova*, and would read accordingly *ut si qua possit nova competitoribus existat infamia*.

The text is, however, sound, but it would be a mistake to attribute the thought to a generous motive. The presence of the admonition here is closely connected with the position which these words occupy as the conclusion of the *partitio* outlined in 41 — *speciem in publico*.<sup>\*</sup> This final member is introduced by the words which immediately precede the sentence under discussion thus: *postremo tota petitio cura ut pompae plena sit, ut illustris, ut splendida, ut popularis sit, ut habeat summam speciem ac dignitatem, ut etiam, etc.* (as above). In what connection with this advice concerning brilliancy and splendor of campaign the injunction under consideration (*ne competitoribus existat infamia*) stands it is not easy to see, nor is it strange that critics have found it a block of stumbling. But here again the *pro Murena* plays the rôle of commentary to the writer's thought. We have already seen that Cicero tells Sulpicius that he revealed his ignorance of the art of campaigning by prosecuting a competitor in the course of his canvass. People demand, he says (44), of their candidate an appearance of confidence, a brilliant display of resources, etc. (*petitorem ego, praesertim consulatus, magna spe magno animo magnis copiis et in campum et in forum deduci volo*). But Sulpicius, busy with his prosecution, appeared downcast and distracted: (49) *te inquirere videbant, tristem ipsum, maestos amicos. . . .: Catilinam interea alacrem atque laetum, stipatum choro iuventutis, etc.*, and so, to escape the impending success of Catiline, men voted for Murena. In the light of this description it becomes clear why the author of the *Commentariolum* urges in this connection: *ut si qua possit (possis?) ne competitoribus tuis existat infamia*. That is, following the suggestion of Cicero's description in the *pro Murena*, he advises that any notorious scandal such as might be looked for from the character of his competitors (*accommodata ad eorum mores*) be not allowed to come to public notice and (by compelling attention) transform the brilliancy and dignity of Cicero's campaign into an uninteresting prosecution.

There remains still another passage of the *Commentariolum* which I believe shows even more clearly the dependence of its author upon the *pro Murena*. I pointed out the verbal resemblance in my former article, though at that time I did not discern the

<sup>\*</sup>On the reading (for *speciem in republica* of the MSS.) see below, p. 24.



full significance of the passage for this question. In *pro Murena*, 21, Cicero ridicules Sulpicius's contention that, having been at Rome engaged in the affairs of the forum, he deserved the consulship rather than Murena, who for so many years had been absent in the army. After some further development of this theme Cicero reminds Sulpicius that the very fact of always being in Rome and in the forum causes people to grow tired of one's presence: *ista nostra adsiduitas, Servi, nescis quantum interdum adferat hominibus fastidii, quantum satietatis*. In his own case, he continues, presence had been of advantage, but only by diligent effort had he overcome its disadvantages: *mihi quidem vehementer expedit positam in oculis esse gratiam; sed tamen ego mei satietatem magno meo labore superavi*. With unmistakable reminiscence of the same phraseology, the author of the *Commentariolum* says under the caption *assiduitas* (43): *prodest quidem vehementer nusquam discedere; sed tamen hic fructus est assiduitatis, non solum esse Romae atque in foro, sed assidue petere, etc.* In this passage, apart from the striking formal resemblances, the reader will discern the whole background of Cicero's discussion in the *pro Murena* — the suggestion that mere presence in Rome is not necessarily an advantage (*quidem*), that the true reward of *assiduitas* can only come to one, as it came to Cicero, by diligent effort. The author has generalized for the purpose of his argument the exception which Cicero makes in his own case (*mihi quidem*).<sup>1</sup> In this example, as in the preceding one, the text of the *Commentariolum* has not gone unchallenged. The adversative idea introduced by *sed tamen*, which is perfectly clear in the light of the *pro Murena*, has caused difficulty, and was transposed by Eussner to the end of the section (after *rogatum*).

The resemblances of the *Commentariolum* to the long first letter of Marcus *ad Quintum fratrem* are of a somewhat different character from those thus far considered. For it is obvious that the totally different subject-matter would not afford to the author precepts *de petitione consulatus*. The resemblance is generic rather than specific. But in any theory of the spuriousness of the *Commentariolum* it must be the most natural hypothesis to assume that the letter of Marcus furnished the later rhetorician or rhetorical student with the suggestion of an epistolary *suasoria* of similar kind. No one can read the two works side by side without feeling a certain relationship between them, and yet in the matter of detailed resemblances there is nothing of a decisive character which can be adduced. In making this statement I should fear that I might seem merely to reflect the impression of a prejudiced mind if I could not appeal to the words of Bücheler on this point, written before the question of authenticity had been raised (p. 10): "Marcus par pari quodam modo rettulit missa ad fratrem epistula praeclara I, 1, quae cum in genere scribendi . . . proxime ad commentariolum hoc accedat, tum singula habet adsimilia velut ibi quae leguntur § 37

<sup>1</sup> That Cicero's treatment of the matter in the *pro Murena* arises from the particular circumstances of the case in hand seems to have been noted also by Tydeman, "In Q. Ciceronis de pet. cons. librum adnotatio," Leyden, 1838: "Nec metuenda est illa assiduitatis satietas, quam causae atque amici gratia Cicero refert."

I would note further in this connection that Tydeman finds the relationship between *Com.*, 37 and *pro Murena*, 70 so close, that Marcus "hunc Quinti locum oculis propositum habuisse videatur" (p. 55).

admodum concinunt cum Quinti sententia § 39." The passages are as follows: (Cicero says that the only exception he hears to the praise of Quintus touches his proneness to anger): *non suscipiam ut quae de iracundia dici solent a doctissimis hominibus ea nunc tibi exponam.* And a little further on: *neque ego nunc hoc contendo . . . mutare animum . . . sed te illud admoneo, etc.* Compare *Com.*, 39: *non est huius temporis perpetua illa de hoc genere disputatio, quibus rebus benivulus et simulator diiudicari possit; tantum est huius temporis admonere.*

In the oration *pro Caelio*, after reviewing the charges which had been made against Caelius of impiety toward his father and of having won the disapprobation of his fellow-townsmen, Cicero refutes them by the presence and the grief of Caelius's parents and *municipales*, and concludes: *videor mihi iecisse fundamenta defensionis meae, quae firmissima sunt si nituntur iudicio suorum.* The author of the *Commentariolum* at the beginning of the second main division of the treatise (16) discusses the significance for Cicero's canvass of the *studia amicorum*, a topic which is then analyzed at considerable length. After pointing out that the term *amicus* is of wider application in the *petitio* than in the rest of life, he says we must nevertheless remember that the friendships which depend upon natural ties of blood and affinity, or any relationship, are of first importance. The situation, it will be seen, is analogous to that set forth in the passage of the oration *pro Caelio*, cited above. The concluding words of both passages are here set side by side. *Pro Cael.*, 6: *ab his fontibus profluxi ad hominum famam et meus hic forensis labor vitaeque ratio dimanavit ad existimationem hominum paulo latius commendatione ac iudicio meorum.* *Com.*, 17: *nam fere omnis sermo ad forensem famam a domesticis emanat auctoribus.* The similarity of the two passages in relation to the general argument of both works, the identity in thought, and such verbal resemblances as *famam*, *forensis*, *dismanavit* (*emanat*), lead me to believe that we have here a genuine reminiscence of Cicero.<sup>8</sup>

But more striking than resemblances to words of Cicero, though not more decisive for proving the later origin of the work, are two passages, which I pointed out before, containing reminiscences from Horace and from Publilius Syrus respectively. I revert to them again for the sake of making my list of significant resemblances complete, and to add a further consideration which was overlooked before. Horace, *Serm.*, I, 3, 58: [Bene sanus ac non incautus (61)] *hic fugit omnis || insidias nullique malo latus obdit apertum, || cum genus hoc inter vitae versetur ubi acris || invidia atque vigent ubi crimina.* *Com.*, 54: *video esse magni consilii atque artis in tot hominum cuiusque modi vitiis tantisque versantem vitare offensionem vitare fabulam vitare insidias.* That *esse magni consilii atque artis* is the essential equivalent of *bene*

<sup>8</sup> The resemblances between *Com.*, 9 and *de Har. Resp.*, 42, I have not repeated from my former article, because the relationship is probably not a direct one. I suspect that the oration in *Toga Cand.* contained a review of the life of Catiline, similar to the passage of the *de Har. Resp.* directed against Clodius, and that the passage of the *Com.* is derived from the former of these. Cicero has many

such biographical summaries of invective (*Verr.* III, 60; IV, 128).

I would add here another parallel to which, however, I attach no particular significance. *Com.*, 2: *ita paratus ad dicendum venio, quasi in singulis causis iudicium de omni ingenio futurum sit.* With this compare *de Or.*, I, 125: *quotiens enim dicimus totiens de nobis iudicatur.*

*sanus ac non incautus* may perhaps appear more plainly from the Horatian designation of the names which malice gives to discretion (*ibid.*, 61): *pro bene sano ac non incauto fictum [artis] astutumque [consilii] vocamus*. But it is not only the fact of parallelism which leads me to think that this is a conscious reminiscence of Horace: the introductory formula *video esse* is the author's acknowledgment of a reminiscence which he could not expect to pass unobserved. This use of *video* is one of the most constant forms of introduction for a quotation, an appeal to authority, or an example based on literary evidence. For example, *de Leg.*, II, 8: *hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam*. *Or.*, 67: *video visum esse nonnullis*, and many others.

The reminiscence from Publilius Syrus is found in *Com.*, 45: *illud difficilium (est) . . . quod facere non possis, ut id iucunde neges. . . . Cum id petitur quod . . . promittere non possumus . . . belle negandum est. . . . Audiui hoc dicere quendam de quibusdam oratoribus ad quos causam suam detulisset, gratiorem sibi orationem eius fuisse qui negasset quam illius qui recepisset*. With this compare Publilius Syrus, *Sententiae* (*ap.* Gellium, 17, 14): *pars benefici est quod petitur si belle neges*. There can be no doubt it seems to me that the passage of the *Commentariolum* presents a paraphrase of the *Sententia* of Publilius, in which the point of the original saying appears first in the form *iucunde neges*, but is betrayed a moment later by *belle negandum*; while it will not escape notice that *pars benefici* of Publilius is paraphrased by *gratiorem sibi orationem*, etc. Furthermore, in a manner somewhat similar to the use of *video esse* in the reminiscence from Horace above, *audiui* here affords a sort of acknowledgment of the borrowed phrase, which the writer could not expect to pass unnoticed. The juxtaposition *belle negare* does not seem to occur elsewhere, and our passage may serve to defend the text of Publilius as presented by the MSS. of Gellius (reading *velle*). As early as the time of Macrobius *cito neges* formed the conclusion of the line and became the vulgate reading.

In view, therefore, of these resemblances I do not hesitate to reaffirm my conviction that the *Commentariolum* is the work of some rhetorical student, who chose the epistolary form in which to write a *suasoria* which should be a counterpart to Cicero's first letter *ad Quintum fratrem*. As was natural, he made use primarily of the orations of Cicero which bore most directly on his theme—of the oration *in Toga Candida* for his invective against Catiline and Antonius, and of the oration *pro Murena* for precepts *de petitione consulatus*. In one instance as we have seen (p. 5) he reproduced from the oration *in Toga Candida* the second part of a continued metaphor (*duas in rem publicam sicas destringere*), overlooking the fact that it had significance only in relation to the part preceding (*Hispaniensi pugiunculo . . . nervos incidere*). Fresh from the reading of the *pro Murena*, he not unnaturally incorporated into his treatise some ideas and expressions which are only intelligible in the light of that speech, and these instances afford the most conclusive proof of the spuriousness of the work. The letter was not, of course, meant as a forgery—it was merely a rhetorical exercise, and in the concluding words one can still seem to detect the deferential tone of a pupil asking for

criticism of his master, and commending in modest words the earnestness of his purpose: *si quid mutandum esse videbitur aut omnino tollendum, aut si quid erit prae-teritum, velim hoc mihi dicas; volo enim hoc commentariolum petitionis haberi omni ratione perfectum.*<sup>9</sup> But, as being an exercise and not a deliberate literary forgery, no care was taken to avoid anachronism in the use of the material. In lexicography and grammatical usage the language points to a relatively early date, but this cannot afford the slightest ground of objection to the conclusion that the work is spurious, as Schanz urges. We know from the elder Seneca that only a few years after the death of Cicero declaimers were busy with *suasoriae* which dealt with his career, and Asconius tells us of spurious orations which purported to be the replies of Catiline and Antonius to the oration in *Toga Candida*.

#### RHETORICAL FORM

It is a commonplace of text-criticism that we are not justified merely in rejecting, no matter how grave the suspicion which we may cast upon the text called into question; we must advance a step farther and account for the presence of the interpolation. A similar demand is made of higher criticism, although in the present case it would seem to be met adequately by the general suggestion outlined above, of a rhetorical exercise which should be the counterpart of *ad Quintum fratrem*, I, 1. But inasmuch as this does not seem to have conveyed to some of the adherents of authenticity a satisfactory explanation of the theory of origin, it will not perhaps be superfluous at this point to indicate more accurately the rhetorical source and the literary affinities of the *Commentariolum*.

Ziehen, in the paper cited above (p. 3), says: "den Zweck dieser Rhetoren-fälschung . . . vermögen wir nicht recht zu erkennen" (p. 84). To these words Gurlitt (*Jahresbericht*, Vol. 109, 1901, p. 16) replies: "den Zweck einer Schulübung, einer Suasorie, unter denen das *consilium dare* bekanntlich zu den beliebtesten Themata gehörte." Gurlitt's words I quote gratefully as giving the true name and classification to the work in the exercises of the rhetorical schools. To be sure the *suasoriae* which the elder Seneca describes (and which will occur to the reader most naturally as specimens of this form) are, in the situations which they present, of a somewhat different character. They show us Alexander or Cicero, for instance, deliberating between two alternative plans, or lines of conduct (*deliberat Alexander an Oceanum naviget; deliberat Cicero an Antonium deprecetur*), the one or the other of which is urged by the advisers who deliver the *suasoriae*. In none of them is advice given concerning the attainment of a concrete end. Nevertheless the purpose, *consilium dare*, is the same as that which underlies the *Commentariolum*. The field was obviously wide, and that the material might assume many forms, Quintilian observes (III, 8, 15): *nam et consultantium et consiliorum plurima sunt genera*.

<sup>9</sup> In one other case the conscious pupil seems to peer through (49): *ac ne videar aberrasse a distributione mea qui haec in hac populari parte petitionis disputem, hoc sequor*.

The *pars deliberativa* says Quintilian (*ibid.*, 6) *quae eadem suasoria dicitur . . . officiis constat duobus suadendi ac dissuadendi*; its goal as defined conventionally by the rhetoricians is *utilitas*, a conception which Quintilian finds too narrow and to which he adds *honestas*, especially in the *quaestio inter utile atque honestum* (*ibid.*, 24). With reference to arrangement the *suasoria* requires only a brief *prooemium*, if any be used at all (*etiam cum prooemio utimur, brevior tamen et velut quodam capite tantum et initio debemus esse contenti*); a *narratio* is likewise unnecessary in a matter of private deliberation—*quia nemo ignorat id de quo consulit* (*ibid.*, 10).

Into this rhetorical framework the *Commentariolum* falls without constraint. Cicero is bidden to deliberate on the circumstances of his *petitio* (2): *prope cotidie tibi ad forum descendenti meditandumst*; and the writer offers the results of his own reflections (*quae mihi veniebant in mentem dies ac noctes de petitione tua cogitanti*) in the form of admonition to or warning against certain lines of conduct. Of technical language, apart from that which has just been cited, which reveals the author's consciousness of the rhetorical form which he is using, one may note (46): *illud alterum (<ut false promittas>) subdurum tibi homini Platonico suadere, sed tamen tempori consulam*. (27): *hoc quod ego te hortor*, etc. (39): *tantum est huius temporis admonere* (cf. Emporius *de deliberativa materia*, Halm, p. 572, 15: *suasio est . . . admonendi causa*). *Utilitas* as the goal of the writer's admonition appears constantly in phraseology of every kind; the frequent use of *adiuvare* and *prodesse* may be noted especially (e. g., in secs. 4–6). In some cases the *quaestio inter utile atque honestum* is raised and answered without hesitation in favor of the former; as for instance in the example cited above: *sed tempori consulam*, where see the whole context 45–48. Cf. also such examples as 42: *opus est blanditia, quae etiamsi vitiosa et turpis in cetera vita, tamen in petitione necessaria est*; and 25: *potes honeste (in petitione), quod in cetera vita non queas*, etc. Practically all the utterances in the *Commentariolum* which may be classed as exhorting to dishonorable conduct belong in this category, and we shall judge them less harshly if we remember that they follow a conventional precept of the *genus deliberativum* (v. Quintilian, *loc. cit.*, 41 and 42). The end, in short, must justify the means, and the author of our treatise thought not otherwise (56): *et plane sic contende omnibus nervis ac facultatibus ut adipiscamur quod petimus* (cf. Quintilian, *loc. cit.*, 34: *videndum quid consecuri simus et per quid; ut aestimari possit plus in eo quod petimus sit commodi an vero in eo per quod petimus incommodi*). In arrangement the *Commentariolum* corresponds to Quintilian's rule cited above, in that it has a very brief *prooemium*, from which it passes over immediately to the *tractatio*: *narrationem vero numquam exigit privata deliberatio* (Quint., III, 8, 10). It is to be said, however, that the first topic of the *tractatio* in a manner supplies the place of a *narratio*, as is explained below.

This question of the relation of our treatise to rhetorical theory may be concluded with the following observations, which afford us a glimpse into the very work-

shop of the rhetorician. In introducing the question of the material of the *suasoria* Quintilian pleads for a wider range than his predecessors had admitted, and begins his treatment thus (*loc. cit.*, 15): *quare in suadendo et dissuadendo tria primum spectanda erunt: quid sit de quo deliberetur, qui sint qui deliberent, qui sit qui suadeat*. It is with reference to this precept that our author distributes his matter in the opening of the treatise proper as follows (2): *civitas quae sit, cogita, quid petas* [= *quid sit de quo deliberetur*], *qui sis* [= *qui sint qui deliberent*]. After thus making recognition of the fundamental considerations of the *pars suasoria*, this abstract rhetorical formula is repeated in reverse order with the special conditions of the particular case filled in: *ad forum descendenti meditandumst: novus sum* [*qui sis*], *consulatum peto* [*quid petas*], *Roma est* [*civitas quae sit*]. The merit which the writer claims for his performance lies not in any originality of suggestion, but in this methodical analysis and arrangement of the matter in accordance with rule (1): *ut ea quae in re dispersa atque infinita viderentur esse ratione et distributione sub uno aspectu ponerentur*.

That of Quintilian's threefold division the member *qui sit qui suadeat* is here lacking, is most natural. For whatever might be said of the qualifications of the writer to give advice, or in justification of his doing so, would belong to a preface or epilogue (as we shall see in a parallel example below), and not to the advice itself. In the situation which the *Commentariolum* presents the topic is sufficiently covered by allusion to fraternal affection as the author's motive for writing (*amore nostro non sum alienum arbitratus*, in the preface). Of the three divisions into which the *tractatio* is thus distributed, the third, *Roma est*, is treated very briefly at the end (54-6). The whole emphasis lies upon the other two divisions, and especially upon the second (*consulatum peto*), which really forms the essential *tractatio* and justifies the author's designation of his work as a *commentariolum petitionis*. I suspect, however, that the writer having in mind a threefold analysis of the *pars suasoria* such as Quintilian presents, and being unable to use the rubric *qui sit qui suadeat* as a part of his argument, cast about for a third member which should take the place of it. He found it perhaps in such a precept of the *genus deliberativum* as Cicero presents in *de Oratore*, II, 337: *ad consilium de re publica dandum caput est nosse rem publicam: that is, civitas quae sit cogita*. In further confirmation of this suggestion I would quote the words which follow in Cicero: *ad dicendum vero probabiliter nosse mores civitatis, qui quia crebro mutantur genus quoque orationis est saepe mutandum*. With this compare the following passage from the treatment of the topic in the *Commentariolum* (54): *video esse magni consilii atque artis . . . esse unum hominem accommodatum ad tantam morum ac sermonum ac voluntatum varietatem; quare etiam atque etiam perge tenere istam viam quam institisti, excelle dicendo*. (A suggestion of this third topic is contained in Quintilian (*loc. cit.*) in allusion to the passages of the *de Oratore* just cited; Cicero . . . duo esse praecipue nota voluit, vires civitatis et mores.)

The *Commentariolum* is therefore a *suasoria* composed in accordance with the precepts of rhetorical theory. A classical and genuine model of the type in epistolary

form is afforded by the letter of Cicero *ad Quintum fratrem* to which frequent allusion has been made. But in spite of generic resemblance it reveals a somewhat different character; for the advice given is of a more general ethical nature (protreptic or parae-netic) than practical and with reference to the attainment of a concrete end.<sup>10</sup> Still more essentially they differ in this respect, that the letter of Marcus is truly epistolary and maintains throughout a vital relationship with the personality of the one addressed. In form it conserves the freedom of an epistle and is wholly absolved from the constraint of a rhetorical formula. It is impossible, for instance, to detect in it any regard for rhetorical precepts such as govern the arrangement of the *Commentariolum*.

For closer parallels in this respect we must descend to the plane on which, as I have explained above, the *Commentariolum* seems to me to belong—to the declamatory literature of the schools, written under the impersonation of an historical name and situation (*prosopopoeiae*).<sup>11</sup> Of this kind there are two quasi-epistolary documents which I would cite as closely analogous in conception and technique to our letter: the two pseudo-Sallustian treatises *ad Caesarem senem de re publica*. They are edited by Jordan (3d ed., pp. 139–52) as *incerti rhetoris suasoriae*—a classification which requires no justification. The second is an epistle, as *perlectis litteris* in 12, 1, shows; that the first on the other hand is an *oratio*, as Jordan inscribes it, the form does not seem to me to indicate conclusively.<sup>12</sup> It is, however, a matter of no vital importance, for the second with its fervid epilogue shows how little check the epistolary form imposed upon the style. The arrangement of matter in both is essentially the same; for illustration the first will suffice. It consists of a *prooemium* (1) setting forth the duty of all to give Cæsar such advice as each one finds possible; a brief *narratio* (2) setting forth the situation, for the instruction of the declaimer's audience, rather than for the benefit of Cæsar (*cf.* Quintilian, above, p. 12), a *tractatio* (3–8, 6) with twofold division *de bello atque pace*, and a brief epilogue (8, 7).

The *tractatio* is introduced thus: *igitur quoniam tibi victori de bello atque pace agitandum est, . . . de te ipso primum, qui ea compositurus es, quid optimum factu sit existuma*. Although the writer here begins with the topic *de te ipso*, the division concludes with the words (5, *init.*): *de bello satis dictum*. That is the topic *qui sit qui deliberet* (Quintilian, *supra*) is merged with a portion (*sc. de bello*) of the topic *quid sit de quo deliberetur*. This latter division is made especially prominent in introducing the second part (5): *de pace firmanda, quoniam tuque et omnes tui agitis, primum id, quaeso, considera quale sit de quo consultas*. The epilogue (8, 7) summarizes the two preceding topics of the *genus deliberativum* (*quae rei publicae*

<sup>10</sup> On the distinction see Syrianus in WALZ, IV, 763 (cited by VOLEMANN, *Rhetorik*, p. 294). That the letter of Cicero belongs to the general category may be shown in rather an interesting way by comparison with the typical specimen of the *ἐπιστολή συμβουλευτική* which is contained in the pseudo-Demetrian *τύποι ἐπιστολικοί* (Hercher, p. 3, section 11). The resemblance in argument to *ad Quint. frat.*, I, 1, is noteworthy.

<sup>11</sup> *Cf.* QUINTILIAN, III, 8, 49: *ideoque longe mihi difficil-*

*limae videntur prosopopoeiae, in quibus ad reliquum suasoriae laborem accedit etiam personae difficultas*. The ordinary *suasoria* advised Cicero, for instance, but without definition of the person of the adviser.

<sup>12</sup> Jordan's reasons for assigning this title are, I presume, set forth in his treatise *De suasoriis ad Caesarem senem de re publica* (Berlin, 1868), which I regret has been inaccessible to me.

*necessaria* [de quo deliberetur] tibi que gloriosa [qui deliberet] ratus sum, quam paucissimis absolvi) and turns briefly to the third, *qui sit qui suadeat*, in the succeeding words: *non peius videtur pauca nunc de facto meo disserere*. The background of rhetorical theory which governs the arrangement of the matter is the same as in the *Commentariolum*. As there the topic *qui sit qui suadeat* was touched on but slightly in the preface (*amore nostro non sum alienum arbitratus ad te perscribere*), so in the first *suasoria ad Caesarem* it is alluded to briefly in the conclusion.

In the second *suasoria* the author sets forth in the *prooemium* his qualifications for giving advice (the topic we have just considered), but has no thought of finding anything which would not occur to Cæsar himself (*quod non cogitanti tibi in promptu sit*). His only hope is to come to the assistance of Cæsar amidst the distracting cares of military and public life: *sed inter labores militiae interque proelia victorias imperium statui admonendum te de negotiis urbanis* (2, 2). The excuse of the impersonator of Quintus Cicero for addressing Marcus is the same. He does not expect to suggest anything new (*non ut aliquid ex his novi addisceres*, sec. 1), nor does he arrogate to himself superior knowledge; he would only undertake what Cicero has not leisure for (epilogue): *haec sunt quae putavi non melius scire me quam te, sed facilius his tuis occupationibus colligere unum in locum posse et ad te perscripta mittere*.

It is noteworthy that in both the *suasoriae ad Caesarem* the *tractatio* consists of a twofold division of the topic *quid sit de quo deliberetur*, which is, however, different in each: in I, *de bello atque pace*, as we have seen; in II it is introduced thus (5): *in duas partes ego civitatem divisam arbitror, sicut a maioribus accepi, in patres et plebem*. In the *Commentariolum*, I have observed above, there is no regular *narratio*; the *tractatio* begins at once with the topic *qui sis-novus sum*. But it will be seen on a perusal of this first section that in setting forth the *subsidia novitatis*—the friends on whom Cicero may rely, the character of his opponents, etc.—the author has put the reader in possession of the main features of the situation. The *tractatio* proper thereupon occupies the large central portion of the treatise (16–54) and (as in the *suasoriae ad Caesarem* above), divides the rhetorical topic *quid sit de quo deliberetur* (*quid petas*) into two divisions (16): *petitio magistratuum divisa est in duarum rationum diligentiam, quarum altera in amicorum studiis altera in populari voluntate ponenda est*. The transition from the *studia amicorum* to the *popularis voluntas* is made in 41, as follows: *quoniam de amicitiiis constituendis satis dictum est, dicendum est de illa altera parte petitionis quae in populari ratione versatur*. Compare with this the transition at the beginning of the second division in the second *suasoria ad Caesarem* (10, *init.*): *nunc quoniam, sicut mihi videor, de plebe renovanda corrigendaque satis disserui, de senatu quae tibi agenda videntur dicam* (cf. also the first, chap. 5, *init.*).

It will thus be seen that in the conception of a situation (*Q. Cicero ad Marcum fratrem de petitione consulatus*), in the rhetorical arrangement and divisions, in the assumed motive for writing, and in the main transitions there is much similarity between the *Commentariolum* and the pseudo-Sallustian *suasoriae ad Caesarem senem*



*de re publica*. Not less striking are some details of language and treatment. A few examples will suffice to show the similarity of hortatory forms, which for convenience I take from the second *ad Caesarem*. 4, 4: *quo magis tibi etiam atque etiam animo prospiciendum est quonam modo rem stabilias communiasque*. (Com., 55: *quare etiam atque etiam perge tenere istam viam quam institisti*). 5, 8: *hos ego censeo permixtos cum veteribus novos in coloniis constituas*. (Com., 18: *hos tu homines quibuscumque poteris rationibus ut . . . tui studiosi sint elaborato*). 6, 6: *quo tibi, imperator, maiore cura fideique amici et multa praesidia paranda sunt*. (Com., 29: *quam ob rem omnes centurias multis et variis amicitiiis cura ut confirmatas habeas*). 8, 3: *haec ego magna remedia contra divitias statuo*. (Com., 56: *atque haec ita nolo te illis proponere*). 8, 5: *si pecuniae decus ademeris, magna illa vis avaritiae facile bonis moribus vincetur*. (Com., 30: *ex his principes ad amicitiam tuam si adiunxeris, per eos reliquam multitudinem facile tenebis*). 11, 3: *sed quoniam coaequari gratiam omnium difficile est, . . . sententias eorum a metu libera*. (Com., 55: *et quoniam in hoc vel maxime est vitiosa civitas . . . fac ut, etc.*).

In the treatment of the invective directed against the opponents of Cæsar there is much which is analogous to the abuse of Cicero's competitors in the *Commentariolum*. Compare the introduction to this section in 8, 6: *tibi cum factione nobilitatis haut mediocriter certandum est. quoniam si dolum caveris, alia omnia in proclivi erunt*, with the conclusion of the corresponding division of the Com., 12: *quare tibi si facies ea . . . quae debes, non difficile <erit> certamen cum eis competitoribus, etc.* Of the opponents of Cæsar, Bibulus Domitius and Cato are the only ones counted worthy of special abuse (9, 4): *reliqui de factione sunt inertissimi nobiles, in quibus sicut in titulo praeter bonum nomen nihil est additamenti* (followed by scornful allusions to the impotence of Postumius and Favonius). Similarly in the *Commentariolum* Catiline and Antonius are treated as the only significant competitors of Cicero (7): *nam P. Galbam et L. Cassium summo loco natos quis est qui petere consulatum putet? vides igitur amplissimis ex familiis homines, quod sine nervis sunt, tibi pares non esse*. The writer continues: *at Catilina et Antonius molesti sunt: immo homini novo . . . innocenti . . . optandi competitores, ambo a pueritia sicarii, etc.* With the same σχῆμα λέξεως the more important opponents of Cæsar are introduced (9, init.): *M. Bibuli fortitudo atque animi vis in consulatum erupit: hebes lingua, magis malus quam callidus ingenio*. But see the whole context of both documents for further illustration.

But in spite of many such resemblances in detail it is nevertheless to be said that the minuteness of subdivision and of detailed admonition in the *Commentariolum* is not paralleled by the *suasoriae ad Caesarem*. They move in a larger atmosphere of generalities and reveal accordingly more of the recognized traits of the declamatory exercise. But in excuse for the absence of detailed suggestions the writer of the second *suasoria* describes what he might have done in words which are (though in a different subject-matter) an accurate characterization of what the author of the Com-

*mentariolum* has done. His language may serve as evidence that such a detailed treatment of a theme was not alien to the practice of the schools (12, *init.*): *forsitan, imperator, perlectis litteris, desideres quem numerum senatorum fieri placeat, quoque modo is in multa et varia officia distribuatur; iudicia quoniam omnibus primae classis committenda putem, quae discriptio, quae numerus in quoque genere futurus sit. ea mihi omnia generatim describere haud difficile factu fuit.* One need only glance briefly at the argument of the *Commentariolum* to see how accurately it has carried out the kind of treatment which the author of the *suasoria* here indicates. For example, under the main heading of the *tractatio* (*de studiis amicorum*) the author analyzes the number and character of those whom Cicero must consider and make his friends, and enumerates the duties which must be assigned to each. A single precept typical of many will suffice in illustration (*Com.*, 20): *fac ut plane eis omnibus (amicis) . . . discriptum ac dispositum suum cuique munus sit.*

The foregoing exposition of the literary form of the *Commentariolum*, and of its relationship to undisputed products of the rhetorical schools, should afford, I think, an entirely satisfactory theory of its origin. That the author was able to maintain the rôle and the situation which he had assumed without serious violation of historical truth was due, probably, not so much to his painstaking care to avoid error in this respect, than to the security of the position which he had assumed and the method of its treatment. For, except in the first division of the work, where he deals with Cicero's competitors, and in which the author was able to find many precedents in the *suasoria*, there is very little allusion to historical events. In the *suasoria*, where our treatise is at variance with Mommsen (*loc. cit.*, *supra*, p. 8), the *equites* proper and the young *equites*, which is contrary to Cicero's usage, but on the whole the writer is not so far from the truth as to say that he has run little danger of falling into error.

Though the *Commentariolum* is a literary work, its detection from this point of view, yet, it is a literary work, and its use of literary sources subsequent to the *suasoria* is less clearly I think than in accordance with the precepts which we find in Quintilian. It is merely that a person giving advice, and of the view from which the matter is to be treated, and govern the style and tone. Nothing more can have been intended, as

<sup>12</sup> It is with reference to the defence of Q. Gallius, which according to the *Com.*, 19 had already been made. Asconius p. 78, 29, comments: *Q. Gallium, quem postea reum ambitus defendit, significare videtur.* But a conflict of testimony

in a single instance cannot be used for the question of authenticity; for if the *Com.* is a genuine document the evidence of Asconius must yield to a contemporary witness: if it be spurious, credence must be given rather to Asconius.

is shown by the fact that the same considerations were named by the technicians for the composition of letters (*R. L. M.*, p. 589: *in epistolis considerandum est, quis ad quem et qua de re scribat*). It is the index of a naïve intelligence that the authors of the three *suasoriae* which we have considered have carried over into the division of their arguments this general injunction. In the *suasoriae* which the elder Seneca reports it is evident that much stress was laid upon a careful and exhaustive *divisio*;<sup>14</sup> in them there is a distinct fondness for a threefold division, but I have observed no case where it consists of these three topics.

## STYLE

But if the *Commentariolum* is the work of a rhetorical student are there then any features of the style which would seem appropriately to characterize such a source? That the style is "dry and sober and unlovely" (*sicca sobria invenusta*) Bächeler has said, and with this judgment as a whole no one will quarrel. But our question has been answered more directly by Leo who says (*loc. cit.*, 447): "von rhetorischem Stil ist in der Schrift keine Spur." He further points out that the elaborate and painful *distributio* is rather an archaic feature of the style than evidence of later origin in a rhetorical school. He observes also that Quintus was a Stoic and betrays a Stoic's pride in dialectical artifice. If, in fact, as *de Divinatione*, I, 10, would seem to show (*arcem tu quidem Stoicorum, Quinte, defendis*), Quintus was a Stoic, we are in a better position to understand the significance of *de Oratore*, II, 10 and 11, in which playful allusion is made to Quintus's aversion to rhetoric, and we need not hesitate to identify it with the general hostility of Stoicism to practical rhetoric.

As for the painstaking *distributio*, we have seen above that it finds parallels in the school *suasoriae*, though we may grant that it is sufficiently characteristic of the dialectical manner: but to deny that there are any traces of rhetorical style in the treatise is to shut one's eyes to some very obvious examples and to a still larger number which are perhaps somewhat less obvious. Of successful or admirable rhetoric there is, to be sure, none at all, but of forced and puerile striving after rhetorical effects there is an abundance throughout the work. Not to mention the frigid vehemence of the invective directed against Catiline and Antonius (7-12), which contains the principal *lumina dicendi* of the work, we have such trivial antitheses as the following (2): *ita paratus ad dicendum venito quasi in singulis causis iudicium de omni ingenio futurum sit*. (12): *uno suffragio duas . . . sicas destringere*. (35): *ex communibus proprii ex fucosis firmi*. Note especially the effort of sustained antithesis and balance in the following example (48):

id si promittas, et incertum est et in diem et in paucioribus;  
sin autem neges et certe abalienes et statim et pluris.  
. . . . Quare satius est ex his aliquos aliquando in foro  
tibi irasci quam omnis continuo domi.

<sup>14</sup> For the subject in general cf. such expressions as the following 3, 3: *hoc Cestius diligenter divisit*, 5, 7: *Triarius*      *omni dimissa divisione*. Examples of a threefold division: 1, 10; 2, 11; 5, 4; 6, 10.

But the feature of style which I would illustrate here especially is one to which, so far as I am aware, attention has not hitherto been called—the rhythmical structure of the treatise. The forms of rhythmical *clausulae* which it contains are essentially the same ones as are found in the orations of Cicero and in such a letter as the first *ad Quintum fratrem*: the dichoreus (*competitor*), cretic and spondee (*competitores*), double cretic (*competitoribus*). Further variety is afforded by several other forms which are related to these by the resolution of long syllables, or the substitution of long for short syllables. Thus a spondee may take the place of a trochee (— — | — ≠ *num virtute*); a cretic may be constructed with an irrational long in the second place—especially the first of a sequence of two cretics (— — — | — ∼ ≠ *sicas destringere*); either long of the cretic may be resolved (— ∼ ∼ | — ≠ *esse videre*, or ∼ ∼ — | — ≠ *genera cognoscas*) and I have noticed one instance where both are resolved (∼ ∼ ∼ | — ≠ *facere videre* in 25, balanced by *esse videre*). In a few cases even the irrational second syllable of the cretic is resolved (— ∼ — | — ∼ ≠ *promittere non possumus*). In the form — ∼ — | — ≠, the first syllable of the last foot is frequently resolved (— ∼ — | ∼ ∼ ≠ *aut nihil valeat*). Another form which is apparently a recognized clausule is — — ∼ (nullum fore), though concerning its rhythmical interpretation I am in doubt. Of more complex forms note especially the dichoreus preceded by a cretic (— ∼ — | — ∼ — ∼ *liberos constuprari*).

These rhythmical clausules are found with great regularity at the end of periods; they are usually found also at the conclusion of the separate *κῶλα* which make up the periods, and sometimes even in such smaller divisions as may be designated *κόμματα*. They follow the usual rules of Latin verse in respect to *syllaba anceps* and elision. A typical illustration is afforded by the opening sentence of the treatise, which I here transcribe:

Etsi tibi omnia suppetunt ea quae consequi ingenio aut usu homines aut intelligentia possunt (— ∼ — | — —)  
tamen amore nostro non sum alienum arbitratus (— ∼ — — | — — — ∼)  
ad te perscribere ea quae mihi veniebant in mentem  
dies ac noctes de petitione tua cogitanti (— ∼ — — | — — — ∼)  
non ut aliquid ex his novi addisceres (— ∼ — | — — —)  
sed ut ea quae in re dispersa atque infinita viderentur esse (— ∼ — | — — — ∼)  
ratione et distributione sub uno aspectu ponerentur (— — — | — — — ∼).

An example in which the rhythmical clausule is used even in short *κόμματα* is afforded by section 16:

quisquis est enim  
qui ostendat aliquid in te voluntatis (— ∼ — | — ≠)  
qui colat (— ∼ —)  
qui domum ventitet (— ∼ — | — — ≠)  
is in amicorum numero est habendus (— ∼ — ∼).

But my purpose is not so much to show that the author of the *Commentariolum* uses the rhythmic clausule, as to point out certain more striking examples of its use,

in which it is the instrument of a conscious and artificial rhetoric. First a few examples to show the extremes to which the author goes in the employment of rhythmical language. The treatment of the theme proper begins in sec. 2 with the following wholly rhythmical sentence:

*civitas quae sit* (- - - | - x)  
*cogita* (- - -)  
*quid petas qui sis* (- - - | - -)

The same ideas are presented in chiasitic order a moment later in the almost equally rhythmical form:

*novus sum consulatum peto Roma est* (- - - | - - - | - -).

The conclusion of the treatise is marked by a sentence of equally extreme and artificial rhythmical character:

*quare si advigilamus pro rei dignitate* (- - - | - - - -)  
*et si nostros ad summum studium benivolos excitamus* (x - - - | - - - -)  
*et si hominibus studiosis nostri suum cuique munus describimus* (- - - | - - x)  
*et si competitoribus iudicium proponimus* (x - - - | - - x)  
*sequestribus metum inicimus* (- - - | x x)  
*divisores ratione aliqua coercemus* (- - - | - x)  
*perfici potest ut largitio nulla sit* (- - - | - - x)  
*aut nihil valeat* (- - - | x x).

In view of these examples I suspect that one or two other passages were written to attain a conscious rhythmical effect, as, for instance, 26:

*modo ut intellegat . . . fore*  
*ex eo non brevem et suffragatoriam* (- - - | - - - | - - - | - - -)  
*sed firmam et perpetuam amicitiam* (- - | - - | x - - | x -).

Is it too fanciful to see in the rapid movement of the cretics the fleeting character of a campaign friendship, and in the slow movement of the spondees the stable friendship which is urged? Observe also the vivid rhetoric of the following (10):

*quid ego nunc tibi de Africa* (- - - | - - -)  
*quid de testium dictis scribam?* (- - | - x)  
*nota sunt et ea tu saepius legito* (- - - | x - - | - - - | x -).

Of balanced clauses with or without assonance and with identical rhythmical clause there are many examples. Some of the most noteworthy are these (8):

*in petitione autem consulatus Cappadoces homines compilare* (- - - -)  
*per turpissimam legationem maluit quam adesse et populo Romano supplicare* (- - - -).  
 (10): *qui ex curia Curios et Annios, ab atriis Sapalas et Carvilius, ex equestri ordine Pompi-  
 lios et Vettios sibi amicissimos comparavit* (- - - | - - - -); *qui tantum habet audaciae  
 tantum nequitiae, tantum denique in libidine artis et efficacitatis ut prope in parentum  
 gremiis praetextatos liberos constuprarit* (- - - | - - - -).

(In this passage, as in many of the preceding examples, the clause form, consisting of a dichoreus preceded by a cretic, is noteworthy.) The following example is remarkable for the use of elision to secure assonance between the members of an antithesis (2):

non potest qui  
dignus habetur patronus *consulari* (- - - -)  
um indignus consulatu *putari* (- - - -).

In the following case similar rhythm enforces the effect of a pointed word-play (12):

non difficile certamen erit cum eis competitoribus qui nequaquam sunt  
*tam genere insignes* (- - - - | - - - -)  
*quam vitiis nobiles* (- - - - | - - - -).

Of simple balance with identical clause, but without assonance or particular rhetorical artifice, there are many examples. In conclusion, a few instances where the natural order of the words is violated, apparently to produce the desired clause (33):

multo enim facilius illa adolescentulorum ad amicitiam *aetas adiungitur* (- - - - | - - - -).

Similarly in 57, for the sake of the cretic before the dichoreus, we have:

si nostros ad summum studium *benivolos excitamus* (- - - - | - - - -)

where Bücheler, partly because of the substantival use of *benivulus* and partly because of the unusual order, brackets *benivolos* as spurious, and is followed by Müller. But see below, p. 22. In many cases, even though the word order is natural enough, it is probable that regard for a certain clause has determined the arrangement. For example 1:

non ut aliquid ex *his novi addisceres* (to produce - - - - | - - - -),

and 17:

omnis sermo . . . . a domesticis emanat *auctoribus* (to yield - - - - | - - - -).

#### TEXT

The oldest and best manuscripts containing the *Commentariolum*, which have thus far been discovered, are two: E (Erfurtensis, now Berolinensis No. 252) of the end of the eleventh or of the early twelfth century (Bücheler, p. 11), and H (Harleianus No. 2682) of the latter part of the eleventh century (E. Maunde Thompson). Both manuscripts contain miscellaneous works of Cicero and, for the question of authenticity, it may be of some significance that in both the *Commentariolum* follows the pseudo-Ciceronian epistle ad Octavianum, at the end of the collection of letters. But that is a question which must be left to the historian of the text of Cicero's letters. For the *Commentariolum* E was first employed as representing the purest source of the text by Bücheler in his edition of 1868. The value of H for this treatise was pointed out by Baehrens, who published a careful collation of the text in his *Miscel-*

*lanea Critica* (Groningen, 1879). The edition of Müller (Leipzig, 1898) was the first to present a text based upon these two sources: it has now been followed by that of Purser (Oxford, 1902). The problem of relationship between the texts offered by these two manuscripts is one which can only be solved by a study of the affinities of the two codices as a whole. Some remarks on this point will be found in *Collations from the Harleian MS. of Cicero 2682*, by A. C. Clark (Oxford, 1892), on pp. xiv-xvi. I have examined both manuscripts myself without, however, finding anything of importance to correct in the collations of Bücheler and Baehrens, except in a single instance, which will be noted below.

Before taking up the passages in which I shall endeavor to emend the text, I would note briefly that in a few instances the readings of our manuscripts are defended against proposed deletions by the rhythmical laws which have been set forth in the preceding section. So, for example, Bücheler edits in

12: *qui nequaquam sunt tam genere [insignes] quam vitiis nobiles*. But the soundness of our text is fully vindicated by the presence of the rhythmical balance which was pointed out above p. 21. Similarly Bücheler (whom Müller and Purser follow) edits in

57: *si nostros ad summum studium [benivolos] excitamus*. But we have seen above (p. 21) that the sequence of clausules in the series of sentences beginning with *si*, demands the (resolved) cretic *benivolos* before the double trochee *excitamus*. In view of these cases I hesitate to follow Bücheler (and Müller) in

1: *etsi . . . suppetunt ea quae consequi ingenio aut usu homines [aut intelligentia] possunt*. For although the clausule - ~ - | - - (*usu homines possunt*) is found, yet of vastly more frequent occurrence is the form - ~ - | - - (*intelligentia possunt*).

The author begins with the resources which will be of assistance to Cicero as a *novus homo*. In sec. 3 he enumerates the classes of men whom Cicero already has, and among them *studio dicendi conciliatos plurimos adolescentulos*. These are to be confirmed in their allegiance. To be won over to his support are *homines nobiles*, especially those of consular rank, and young men of noble family.

6: *praeterea adolescentes nobiles elabora ut habeas vel ut teneas studiosos. quos habes multum dignitatis afferent*. Most editors (and so Müller) omit the period after *studiosos*, and punctuate after *habeas*. The words *vel ut teneas* are, I believe, corrupt, for as an alternative to *ut habeas* they are inept, if not meaningless, since the *adolescentes nobiles* cannot be held (*teneas*) until they are won (*habeas*). But Cicero already has a constituency of young men, *studio dicendi conciliatos* (3). Now the *adolescentes nobiles* are to be won to the same allegiance as those whom he already has. I read, therefore: *praeterea adolescentes nobiles elabora ut habeas, VELUT TENES studiosos quos habes*.

In this connection I would take up a very difficult and corrupt passage in 33. To understand it aright it is necessary to go back to 29, in which the necessity of

Cicero's strengthening his position by varied friendships is set forth. The matter is taken up in a *partitio* as follows: *primum* (29), *deinde* (30), *postea* (30); whereupon follows the passage in question in

33: *iam equitum centuriae multo facilius mihi diligentia posse teneri videntur. primum cognosce equites, pauci enim sunt. deinde appete . . . deinde habes tecum ex iuventute optimum quemque et studiosissimum humanitatis; tum autem quod equester ordo tuus est, sequentur illi auctoritatem ordinis, si abs te adhibebitur ea diligentia, ut non ordinis solum voluntate sed etiam singulorum amicitias eas centurias confirmatas habeas.* Accepting the corrections which H affords, incorporated in Müller's text as here given, the remaining difficulties of this passage consist, first, in the apparent absence of a concluding member to the *partitio* and, secondly, in the obscurity of reference in *illi*. This word would seem to refer to the young men mentioned just before (*optimum quemque, etc.*). But if that is the meaning, it is remarkable that at one moment Cicero is said to hold the allegiance of a certain class, and in the next that the same class should be referred to as one that will follow the authority of the *equites* in support of him, provided sufficient care is exercised. The *equites* are already Cicero's friends (*cf.* 3); with care their loyalty is assured (*diligentia posse teneri*). They are therefore disposed of briefly. Now in the enumeration above referred to we had the divisions *primum, deinde, postea, iam*. But last of all and as a class distinguished from the *equites*<sup>15</sup> appear the *adolescentes*. *Deinde* I would therefore change to DENIQUE, introducing the concluding member of the *partitio*. In this class are to be taken up first those *adolescentes* whom Cicero already has, viz., *optimum quemque et studiosissimum humanitatis* (the *studio dicendi conciliatos* of 3). But just as in secs. 3 and 6 the *adolescentes* were, as we saw, of two kinds, so also here. For apart from the young men who are attracted to Cicero by oratorical pursuits, there are *others*, for whom another motive to allegiance must be provided—the authority and example of the *ordo equester*. I would read therefore: DENIQUE *habes tecum ex iuventute optimum quemque et studiosissimum humanitatis. tum autem quod equester ordo tuus est sequentur ALII auctoritatem ordinis, etc.* For the form of expression *optimum quemque . . . alii, cf. de Officiis, I, 99.*

9: *educatus in sororis stupris.* The passage is thus edited in all the texts, and according to Bücheler's apparatus (*ex silentio*) is the reading of E. But E reads without variant *sorum*, which is confirmed by H, reading *sorore*, with correction by the original hand to *sorum*, which should therefore be restored to the text.

18: *hos tu homines quibuscumque poteris rationibus, ut ex animo atque ex illa summa voluntate tui studiosi sint elaborato.* H reads *ex illo*, Meyncke conjectured *ex intima voluntate*. *Illa* is defended rather ingeniously than convincingly by Tyrrell *ad loc.* It would seem that critics have overlooked a very simple correction here, unless the formulary character of *summa voluntate* seemed to forbid change. I would

<sup>15</sup> On this distinction (which is also made in 3 and 6) and the correctness of it, *cf.* MOMMSEN, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, Vol. III, p. 484 and note.



read MAXUMA (spelled *masuma*, thus giving rise to *illa summa*) *voluntate*. Cicero affords at least one example of *maxuma voluntate* (*Verr.*, II, 2, 51), and probably there are others.

23: *Tertium illud genus est studiorum voluntarium*. Bücheler makes a readable text by bracketing *studiorum*, and is followed by Müller and Purser. Eussner (Tyrrell and others) correct to *studiosum voluntariumque*. The passage is the third member of a *partitio* outlined in 21, to which *illud* refers: *tribus rebus homines ducuntur . . . beneficio, spe, adiunctione animi ac voluntate*. These members are then taken up singly—*beneficiis* (21), *spe* (22), and so to the passage in hand. It will be observed that the reason for loyalty in each case is derived from a source named, which fails for the third member. Methodical correction should not, therefore, make the source co-ordinate with the end as in Eussner's reading—*studiosum* (the end) *voluntariumque* (source). We require rather: *tertium illud genus est studiosum VOLUNTATE*, the correctness of which is revealed by the words which follow: *quod . . . significanda erga illos pari voluntate . . . confirmari oportebit*, where *pari* points back to the preceding *voluntate*. Cf. *de Inv.*, II, 166: *amicitia (est) voluntas erga aliquem . . . cum eius pari voluntate*.

24: *Hos ut inter nos calumniatores spe*. The L group restores the thought with *hos ut internoscas videto ne spe*. Bücheler reads *elaborato*. What imperative stood here it is impossible to say with certainty, but from the group of letters—*umni*—in *calumniatores* we may restore confidently OMNIS (cf. *umeris* from *umnis*, the reading of H for *omnis* in 48). We shall not be far from the truth for the whole passage in reading: *Hos ut internoscas OMNIS CURATO ne spe*, etc. *Omnis* is appropriately used in a summary following the enumeration of various classes (cf. 19 *extr.*, and 23 *extr.*).

38: *nec aliud ullum tempus futurumst ut tibi referre gratiam possint*. Bücheler, in the critical apparatus says against the lemma *ut*: "*u cum superscripta t, non ubi vocis compendium*." But according to Baehrens *ubi* is the reading of H, and reference to Prou, *Manuel de Paléographie* (2d ed., 1892), p. 335, will show that the compendium which Bücheler here describes (but the superscribed letter is not of course *t*) stands regularly for *ubi*. The matter has seemed worth mentioning, because here, as in a number of other cases where Müller has followed Bücheler, there is discernible a tendency toward the establishment of a vulgate text. But Purser reads correctly *ubi*.

41: *Dicendum est de illa altera parte petitionis quae in populari ratione versatur. ea desiderat nomenclationem, blanditiam, assiduitatem, benignitatem, rumorem, spem in re publica*. H reads *spem in rem publicam*; l 50, *speciem in re publica*. The interpretation of the phrase *spem in re publica* seems to me difficult. There is but one meaning the words can have—*spem in re publica positam*. But that surely has little to do with the *ratio popularis*, with which the other requisites named are concerned. Each one of these is considered in detail; *nomenclatio* (42) *blanditia* (42) *assiduitas* (43) *benignitas* (44) *rumor* (50). Editors I presume have held that *spem in re publica* is taken up in the *partitio* at 53: *atque etiam in hac petitione maxime*

*videndum est ut spes rei publicae bona de te sit et honesta opinio.* But this is a totally different thing from the *spem in re publica* of 41, which proceeds from Cicero, and can only mean Cicero's hope or confidence in the state, while *spes rei publicae bona de te* proceeds from the people, and refers to their confidence in him. Furthermore, if this passage were the concluding member of the *partitio*, we should expect some transitional word like *denique* or *postremo* to introduce it, and not a formula which points to something new—*atque etiam* (cf. Seyffert, *Schol. Lat.*, Vol. I, p. 22). But in 52 (*init.*) after long consideration of *rumor* the author writes: *postremo tota petitio cura ut pompae plena sit, ut illustris, ut splendida, ut popularis sit, ut habeat summam speciem ac dignitatem.* These words, I am convinced, give us the true conclusion of the *partitio* outlined in 41, as is indicated by *postremo*, and also by the summarizing of the *ratio popularis* which is suggested by the last of the accumulated adjectives *ut popularis sit*. They reveal also that l 50 (from whatever source) has given at least a partially correct reading in 41—*speciem in re publica*; for it is some such word of external demonstration or display that we require to correspond to the others of the group—*nomenclatio, blanditia*, etc. In itself *speciem in re publica* might conceivably stand as a satisfactory reading; but since it occurs in the treatment of the *ratio popularis*, it would seem to me that *in re publica* is too general, if indeed the political connotation of the word would be tolerable here at all. I conjecture, therefore, SPECIEM IN PUBLICO, for which cf. Tacitus, *Dial.*, 6, 12 (where Aper is speaking of the rewards of the orator): *iam vero qui togatorum comitatus et egressus! quae in publico species!*

I would point out, finally, that sec. 53, to which I have alluded above (*videndum est ut spes rei publicae bona de te sit*), does not belong to the division of the work devoted to the *ratio popularis*, but follows it (introduced by *atque etiam*) as a concluding section to the whole of the second main division *consulatum peto*. Accordingly it takes into account not the *populus* only, but all classes of citizens—*senatus, equites et viri boni, multitudo*.



**A SKETCH OF THE LINGUISTIC CONDITIONS OF  
CHICAGO**



## A SKETCH OF THE LINGUISTIC CONDITIONS OF CHICAGO

CARL DARLING BUCK

THE linguistic conditions in some of our largest American cities are unique in the history of the world — an unparalleled babel of foreign tongues, yet undergoing absorption so rapidly and so naturally that the "language question," which looms up so large in the contemporary history of many European states, does not exist for us as a disturbing problem.

I say "unparalleled babel" with all due regard to the claims of Constantinople, Cairo, and other cities of the Orient, past and present. In Constantinople, with the heterogeneous constituency of the army and the harem, augmented by the ranks of European officials and visitors, the number of languages represented may on occasions be as great as in New York or Chicago. But it must be remembered that only a few of these languages are spoken by large bodies of the population, whereas in Chicago there are some fourteen languages, besides English, each of which is spoken by 10,000 or more persons. Newspapers appear regularly in ten languages, and church services may be heard in about twenty languages. Chicago is the second largest Bohemian city of the world, the third Swedish, the third Norwegian, the fourth Polish, the fifth German (New York being the fourth). In all there are some forty foreign languages spoken by numbers ranging from half a dozen to half a million, and aggregating over one million.

A study of the language situation in Chicago, which in a general way is typical of that in our other large cities, has two main points of interest. One is a phase of the general problem of the linguistic consequences of race-mixture. What is the result, as regards language, of the particular conditions of race-mixture that are exemplified here? The other is the constituency of the foreign element. To know what languages and groups of languages are represented here, and in what proportions, is a matter of interest, not only to the philologist, but also to the historian and sociologist, for in most cases linguistic divisions correspond to present racial divisions, and with a few notable exceptions, like the Irish, language is the best available test of nationality.

In an article entitled "Language-Rivalry and Speech-Differentiation in the Case of Race-Mixture,"<sup>1</sup> Professor Hempl has given a classification of the characteristic types of race-mixture known to history, according to numbers, general conditions, and attendant linguistic results. Of necessity the kind of race-mixture going on in this country is put in a class by itself. The foreigners come in vast numbers, roughly speaking half a million a year. In many cities they form with their descendants in the first generation the majority of the population. Moreover, the different nationalities in the cities are to a large degree locally segregated, and many of them marry

<sup>1</sup> *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 31 ff.

almost exclusively within their own limits.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless the social and economic conditions are such that all this has not the slightest effect on the supremacy of the English language. Nor is it possible to produce tangible evidence of any permanent effect on the character of the English. This easy victory of the established language is doubtless assisted by the fact that the competition is divided. But even if all the immigrants were of the same nationality, the absorption of their language would take place no less certainly, only somewhat less rapidly.

Observation and inquiries among representatives of the different nationalities show that the process of absorption is substantially the same everywhere. The immigrants themselves must and do learn more or less English, but it remains to them a foreign tongue, acquired with all degrees of proficiency according to the individual's age at arrival, length of residence, occupation, and general intelligence.

The second generation is bilingual. The children learn first their parents' mother-tongue; but as soon as they are out on the street and in school they learn English, and it is not long before they speak it by preference. Children the world over are contemptuous of foreigners, and a boy does not care to add to his schoolmates' capacity for teasing by inviting epithets like "Dutchy," "Canuck," "Dago," or "Polak," which are hurled about with no less freedom by those who are themselves of foreign parentage, and not always with any nice discrimination between them. From this period on English is the language most used, and it is a question of how far they also retain a familiarity with their parents' mother-tongue. Some remain truly bilingual, others speak their parents' language, but with some effort, and occasionally it happens that grown-up sons and daughters cannot converse with their parents except in English. The third generation, even of unmixed foreign descent, generally knows only English. This is true of the nationalities already represented in three generations, for example the German, Polish, and Bohemian, and the result cannot be otherwise in the case of the more recent classes of immigrants. If the stream of immigration were to cease, it would only be a question of time when church services and newspapers in foreign languages would be unknown.

There are of course exceptions to the general course of development as stated. Some of the more well-to-do and intelligent families retain and hand down an interest in the language and literature of the country of their origin through several generations. Or, again, if we look outside the cities, we find isolated colonies in various parts of the country where a foreign tongue has been kept through several generations and English but little used. Such, for example, are some of the Swedish farming communities in the Northwest. There is said to be an old Polish colony in Texas where the language has been spoken for generations and where even the negroes speak Polish. The same conservatism may be looked for in some of the Finnish mining villages of Michigan, the recent Russian colonies in the Dakotas, etc. But even for these condi-

<sup>1</sup>For example, according to the school census of 1898, of Bohemian parents on both sides, while only 799 had but there were in Chicago 47,965 children born in this country one parent Bohemian.

tions it is unsafe to generalize. For example, while some of the older Norwegian settlements have kept their language for several generations, the recent colonists in North Dakota are "progressive;" that is, they are Americanized with the same rapidity as in the cities.

It is possible that, aside from conditions of environment, the rapidity of absorption differs somewhat among different nationalities, some having a greater tenacity than others in the retention of their language. But on this point it is difficult to secure any tangible evidence.

The absorption of the various languages does not appear to be accompanied by any permanent effects on the character of the English spoken. Except in isolated communities, the speech of the second generation seldom betrays any foreign influence either in pronunciation or in vocabulary. It is often a vulgar form of English, but not differing from that of persons of native descent in the same social position.

There is, however, a marked influence exerted by the dominant English upon the other languages as spoken here.<sup>3</sup> The German of the German-American is full of English words either unchanged or provided with German endings or prefixes, and of English idioms clothed in German words, an interesting phase of which is the use of German words in meanings adopted from the corresponding English words, as in the well-known *ich gleiche* "I like," or *ich eigne* "I own." The Frenchman makes *groceur* of grocer, *couque* of "cook," etc. In the Lithuanian quarter one sees painted in huge letters on a blank wall the advertisement of *didziausias departmentinis sztoras pietinej dalij*, in which, equipped with antique endings and surrounded by formations which are the pride and joy of philologists, we recognize the highly modern *department store*.

An exhaustive study of this phenomenon, interesting as it is, is not possible for any one person. It demands a separate investigator for each language and one entirely at home in the idioms of this language as well as in English.<sup>4</sup> But inquiries upon this point among representatives of many nationalities leave no doubt in my mind that substantially the same sort of mixture which is best known in the case of our German-American exists in the other languages spoken here.

We turn now to the question of the constituency of the foreign speech-element in Chicago, and in mentioning the various languages and peoples I shall add some remarks on their representation in the country at large. Although some of these facts are so easily accessible as perhaps scarcely to deserve repetition, others, for some of the less-known nationalities, have been gained, incidentally to my inquiries regarding local conditions, from private sources and will not be unwelcome additions.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> With the fact that the foreign languages spoken here are influenced by English, but not English by them, compare the remarks of Windisch, "Zur Theorie der Mischsprachen und Lehnwörter," *Sitzungsberichte der sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft, phil.-hist. Classe*, 1897, pp. 101 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Some of the forms of mixture have already been investigated in detail, e. g., the language of the Pennsylvania Germans, of the Portuguese in New England, etc.

<sup>5</sup> I have not touched upon the history of the immigration from the various countries. For the older elements, German, Irish, Swedish, Norwegian, etc., the subject has been fully treated, but there is ample opportunity for further work along similar lines. A history of Slavic immigration would be of great value, and I am glad to learn that Professor Wiener has it in mind to gather materials for such a work.



It may be thought that the *Census Reports*, with their elaborate statistics of foreign population, covering, for the Census of 1900, 174 pages, render any further investigation superfluous. This, however, is not the case. And, while acknowledging my indebtedness to them in certain respects, I shall not hesitate to point out their limitations. The most serious defect, and one which is fatal to the full realization of the purposes of such statistics, is the lack of any adequate system of classification. In general, the classification is according to political divisions, but concessions are made to certain nationalities which have no independent political existence at present. For example, not to mention Ireland, Wales, Bohemia, etc., the Poles keep their identity in the *Reports*, and even the Finns, relatively small as their numbers are, are given a place. No one can question the propriety of such a recognition of nationalities not politically distinct, only it must be carried much farther in order to give any proper idea of the constituency of our foreign population, particularly of those elements which form such an important part of the most recent immigration. The truth seems to be that a system of classification which was once reasonably satisfactory has not been sufficiently enlarged to meet the present conditions.

To give some examples. The Lithuanians, who in language and sentiment form a distinct people, and are represented by thousands of immigrants, are nowhere mentioned.<sup>6</sup> In Chicago they were told by the enumerators that, there being no provision for Lithuanians, they might be either Poles or Russians. Whether in other places they were classified under Poland or Russia, or both, it is impossible to say. For the enumerators are not always so impartial in such cases, as may be illustrated by the procedure reported to me by a Slovakian. There being no special provision for Slovakians, of whom there are some ten thousand here in Chicago, not to speak of the immense numbers in the Pennsylvania mining regions, one would naturally expect them to be put under Hungary, to which they have belonged politically for more than a thousand years. But in the case referred to, the enumerator, a German, was not disposed to augment the number of Hungarians and so entered the Slovakian under Austria. A Bohemian enumerator—and there may well have been such—would undoubtedly have entered him as a Bohemian, and such a classification, though eminently unsatisfactory to the Slovakian, would at least have more justification, since the Slovakians and Bohemians are most closely related.

The Croatians, of whom there are over one hundred thousand in the country, are likewise unknown in the *Reports*, being entered under Austria. The same is true of the less numerous Slovenians.<sup>7</sup> And, in general, it is clear that the figures given under Austria and under Hungary have no real significance as they stand, though they are used constantly in articles on labor and immigration problems.

<sup>6</sup> For the school census of 1896, the innovation was made of classifying the Lithuanians separately, and several Lithuanian enumerators were appointed. In 1898 the separate classification was retained, but no Lithuanian enumerators appointed, and the number dropped from 2,897 to 1,411, although, as a matter of fact, the Lithuanians had been pouring in constantly, as they have since then.

<sup>7</sup> A Slovenian priest told me that, finding he could only be entered as an Austrian, he refused to make any return as to nationality. If this is not an exaggerated statement of his attitude, he was one of those necessitating the heading "Europe (not otherwise specified)."

There are now considerable numbers of Armenian and of Syrian immigrants, but it is only by comparing outside information as to their location in different parts of the country with certain figures given in the Census under the heads of "Asia, except China, Japan and India," and "Turkey," that one discovers that they form the chief components of these classes. Judging from the figures of Chicago and some other cities, the Armenians seem to have been put under Turkey and the Syrians under Asia, though it is not clear how consistently this distinction, the grounds for which are not obvious, was maintained.

That many other nationalities, represented by very small numbers, such as the Icelanders, Letts, Bulgarians, etc., should not be given a separate place in the classification, is less surprising, and perhaps unavoidable so long as only the roughest picture of the foreign element is aimed at.<sup>4</sup>

For those nationalities which are properly provided for in the classification the figures are, of course, of great value, though far from infallible. In all the statistics on foreign population there is inevitably a greater proportion of error than in the Census as a whole. The newly arrived foreigner, ignorant and knowing yet but little English, vaguely suspects the enumerator of being a constable or a spy, and thinks his safest course is to give false answers. To get at the actual truth would require more time, and, generally speaking, more intelligence, than the enumerators have at their disposal. In the case of the statistics of foreign parentage one has to reckon also with the deliberate falsehood of many who are so thoroughly Americanized as to regard even foreign parentage as a taint which must be concealed. That there is a vast amount of this misrepresentation is beyond any question.

For these reasons the independent estimates of intelligent representatives of the different nationalities may often be nearer the truth than the Census figures, and for the many nationalities about which, as explained above, the Census furnishes no information, they are our only source. It is true that the disposition to exaggerate the numbers of one's countrymen is often apparent, but this may be largely counteracted by securing several estimates and by inquiring somewhat closely into the basis of them. And in general it may be said that, through various sources, such as the voting lists, the membership of their churches, the subscription lists of their newspapers, and the enrolment in their societies, which flourish in astounding numbers among the foreign population, the leading men of the various nationalities have a pretty accurate

<sup>4</sup> But there is no reason why the machinery of the Census should not be employed to secure the necessary linguistic data for a fairly complete representation of the foreign element and its distribution—such data as are collected by various European governments, e. g., in Austro-Hungary, where the statistics for the various elements in the population are based entirely on the linguistic test, or in Great Britain, where statistics are gathered for the linguistic conditions in Ireland, Wales, etc. In India, where matters are infinitely more complicated than here (the names of languages returned numbered many hundreds and even after sifting and classification were not reduced

to less than one hundred and fifty items), the language census, forming part of the general Census, has more than succeeded in its modest object of getting "a photograph, as it were, of the existing distribution of language in India, from the popular standpoint, which might to some extent guide the more leisurely and comprehensive researches of competent specialists" (BAINES, "The Language Census of India," *Transactions of the Ninth Oriental Congress*). Only experience will show in just what form the best results are to be obtained, but it is hoped that with the recent establishment of the Census Bureau some progress will be made along this line.

idea of the numbers of their countrymen.<sup>9</sup> I have taken, as fairly indicative of the linguistic representation, the figures which include the second generation of unmixed foreign parentage, that is, in the case of the *Census Reports*, Tables 54, 55, 59, and 60, which cover "persons having both parents born in a specified country."<sup>10</sup> For it may be assumed that the number of those of the second generation not speaking (in addition to English) the language of their parents is offset by the number of those of the third generation who do speak the language of their parents and grandparents. At best, the figures given are only approximate and intended merely to give a picture of the relative strength of the various elements.

In the following survey, the language-families, their principal subdivisions, and the languages in each are given in the order of their relative numerical strength in Chicago. I have not thought it worth while to differentiate further and to attempt to show the representation of the dialects of each language. In the case of languages spoken by large numbers, such as German, Swedish, Polish, etc., one may be reasonably certain that all the dialects are represented.<sup>11</sup>

There is, however, as every student of language knows, no objective, purely linguistic, criterion of language versus dialect, some languages differing from one another far less than many dialects; and our choice of terms depends upon considerations geographical and historical as well as linguistic. I have intended simply to follow ordinary usage in this matter, though in some few cases the procedure will need some comment.

That the picture of the linguistic elements of Chicago's population is complete I should not venture to hope. It is highly probable that there are several languages, spoken by a few individuals, which have escaped my notice. And of the languages mentioned, the part played by each could be described with greater elaboration. But even this *sketch* will, it is hoped, prove of sufficient interest and value to repay the very considerable expenditure of time involved in gathering the materials.

## INDO-EUROPEAN

### GERMANIC

#### WEST GERMANIC

*English.*—English is of course spoken by nearly the whole population.

*German.*—German is spoken, it is safe to say, by more than half a million. The Census figures of Table 60 for Germany are 363,319, while the school census of 1898

<sup>9</sup>The sources of my information are far too numerous to mention in detail. I have talked with consular officials, priests, newspaper editors, and business men, and can acknowledge their assistance only in this general way. I am, however, under special obligation to a former pupil, Mr. Marienburger, for assistance in securing information upon the linguistic conditions of the Jewish population. In noting the extent to which the different languages are represented in the press I have derived much information from the *Lord and Thomas Pocket Directory of the American Press*, but in nearly all cases have corrected and augmented this from private sources.

<sup>10</sup>The table usually quoted is 60, which gives the numbers of "white persons having both parents born in specified country" for cities of over 25,000.

<sup>11</sup>To illustrate Chicago's possibilities as a linguistic laboratory I may mention the fact that of the eleven Lithuanian dialects spoken in the Russian province of Kovno, according to the minute classification of Baranowski (see *LESKIEN, Idg. Forsch. Anz.*, Vol. XIII, pp. 79 ff.), every one is represented here.

gave 469,014. To these figures would have to be added a portion of those tabulated under Austria, Hungary, Belgium, and Switzerland. Many leading Germans think 600,000 nearer the truth. Even at the conservative estimate of 500,000 German-speaking persons, Chicago ranks as the fifth German city of the world, New York being the fourth.

More than twenty German newspapers and periodicals are published here, including such important dailies as the *Staats-Zeitung*, *Freie Presse*, and *Abendpost*.

As is well known, the German forms by far the largest element of our foreign population, and is distributed over every state, though strongest in New York and Illinois. The German papers in the country number between two and three hundred.

*Yiddish*<sup>12</sup>.—Yiddish is spoken by upward of 50,000 persons.

There are two Yiddish dailies, the *Daily Jewish Call* and the *Daily Jewish Courier*, and a Yiddish theater in which performances are given nightly.

New York is the great Yiddish center, containing over 200,000 Yiddish-speaking Jews, and it is there that the leading Yiddish papers are published.

*Dutch*.—Dutch is spoken by about 35,000. The Census figures for those born in Holland (Table 35) are 18,555. No statistics for Holland are given under Table 60, but to include the second generation it would be fair to double this number. And, without knowledge of the Census returns, the Dutch estimate has been between thirty and forty thousand.

There are two Dutch weeklies, *De Nederlander* and *Onze Toekomst*.

Chicago is the first city of the country in the number of its Dutch, Grand Rapids, Mich., being second, and Paterson, N. J., third. Of the states, the Dutch element is strongest in Michigan, where, besides the large numbers in Grand Rapids, there are several towns almost purely Dutch, including one called "Holland," the seat of Hope College. Of the fifteen Dutch papers in the country, nine are published in Michigan.

*Flemish*<sup>13</sup>.—Flemish is spoken by upward of 1,000, possibly by 2,000 persons.

The largest Flemish population is in Wisconsin, and two Flemish weeklies appear in DePere, Wis., *De Volksstem* and *Onze Standaard*.

*Frisian*<sup>14</sup>.—Frisian is spoken by some 2,000 persons from the Dutch province of Friesland.

<sup>12</sup> I mention Yiddish at this point for the reason that its principal component is a form of High German which for several centuries has been isolated from the literary language of Germany and pursued its own development. That I do not ignore it like other German dialects (see p. 8), but treat it as a distinct language, is due not merely to the strong admixture of Slavic and Hebrew words (together, according to Wiener, about 30 per cent.), but also to the fact that it has come to be regarded by the Jews in Slavic countries as their own distinctive language, and boasts a literature of no mean value.

<sup>13</sup> The dialects of the Germanic-speaking portion of Belgium are closely related to and co-ordinate with the Dutch dialects of Holland, and the literary language, which since the "Flemish movement" has gradually displaced French, is the same as the Dutch literary language.

But this is called Flemish, not Dutch, and for convenience we have kept the distinction, meaningless as it is from the purely linguistic point of view. The two papers mentioned are classed as Flemish simply because they are Catholic and appeal mainly to the Flemish population.

<sup>14</sup> Of all the Germanic languages and dialects of the continent Frisian is the one most closely related to English, and forms with it the Anglo-Frisian branch of West-Germanic, in contrast to German (High and Low) and Dutch. Its distinction from Dutch is then, unlike that between Flemish and Dutch, fundamental. Frisian is used to a limited extent as a literary language and Frisian newspapers are published in Leeuwarden. This is properly West-Frisian. It is probable that among the immigrants from Germany there are some from the coast of Holstein, where North-Frisian is spoken.

In general, Frisians are found wherever there are other immigrants from Holland in large numbers, so that their centers are the same as those of the Dutch. There is no Frisian paper published in this country.

#### NORTH GERMANIC OR SCANDINAVIAN

*Swedish.*—Swedish is spoken by upward of 100,000. The Census figures of Table 60 are 95,878, while the school census of 1898 gave 109,755. The Swedish estimate is 115,000. Ten Swedish papers are published here, the most important being the *Svenska Kuriren* and the *Svenska Tribunen*, both weeklies.

Chicago is the third Swedish city of the world and has more than twice as many Swedes as any other city in the country, New York being second and Minneapolis third. Of the states Minnesota has the largest Swedish population.

There are over fifty Swedish papers in the country.

*Norwegian.*—Norwegian<sup>15</sup> is spoken by some 50,000 persons. The Census figures of Table 60 are 37,886, while the school census of 1898 gave 44,980. The Norwegians regard 50,000 as a conservative estimate.

Seven Norwegian papers are published in the city, the *Skandinaven*, daily and semi-weekly, being the leading Norwegian paper of the country.

Chicago is the third Norwegian city in the world and the first in this country, Minneapolis being second, and New York third. Of the states, Minnesota contains the greatest number of Norwegians, though North Dakota has the largest percentage of Norwegians to the total population.

There are over sixty Norwegian and Danish papers in the country.

*Danish.*<sup>16</sup>—Danish is spoken by some 20,000 persons. The Census figures of Table 60 are 15,185, those of the school census of 1898, 21,261.

There are two Danish papers, the *Chicago-Posten* and the *Revyen*, both weeklies.

Chicago is the first Danish city of the country, New York being second, Racine, Wis., third, and Omaha, Neb., fourth. Of the states Iowa has the greatest number of Danes.

*Icelandic.*—Icelandic is spoken by some 100 persons.

The principal Icelandic settlements in the United States are in North Dakota, mostly in Pembina county, and in Minnesota, mostly in Lyon and Lincoln counties. In these states there are several thousand Icelanders. There is also a colony of about 200 on Washington Island, Wisconsin, and a few Icelandic settlers are found in some other states.

<sup>15</sup> The Norwegian literary language and cultivated speech differs but slightly from the Danish, and in fact is, historically considered, nothing but the imported Danish which has prevailed since the Reformation, more or less colored by the Norwegian dialects. But even in this literary language the Norwegian coloring is sufficient to make it seem to the Norwegians themselves a language distinct from the Danish. And, while some churches and some newspapers published in this country are known as Danish-Norwegian,

the important Norwegian papers, though read to some extent by Danes also, preserve their specific Norwegian character. Moreover, the real Norwegian of the dialects is radically different from Danish, belonging with Icelandic to the West-Scandinavian branch, while Danish belongs with Swedish to the eastern group. So that it is justifiable to keep the Norwegian and Danish elements apart even from a linguistic standpoint.

<sup>16</sup> See preceding footnote.

A weekly paper, the *Vinland*, is published at Minneota, Minn.

The Icelanders are more numerous in Manitoba, and there are four Icelandic papers,<sup>17</sup> three published at Winnipeg and one at Gimli, in a district known as New Iceland.

#### BALTO-SLAVIC

##### SLAVIC

*Polish.*—Polish is spoken by more than 100,000, possibly by 150,000 persons. The Census figures of Table 60 are 107,669, while the school census of 1898 gave 96,463. But the opportunities for wrong classification are great in the case of the Poles, and a conservative Polish estimate puts the number at 150,000.

There are about a dozen Polish papers in the city, including two dailies, the *Dziennik Chicagoski* and the *Dziennik Naradowy*.

Chicago is probably the fourth Polish city of the world,<sup>18</sup> and contains more than twice as many Poles as any other city of the country, New York being second, followed by Milwaukee and Buffalo. Of the states Illinois is first in its Polish population, owing mainly to the numbers in Chicago, Pennsylvania coming second with its large body of Poles throughout the mining regions.

There are between thirty and forty Polish papers in the country.

*Bohemian.*—Bohemian is spoken by about 90,000 persons. The Census, Table 60, gives 72,862, the school census of 1898, 88,581.

There are fifteen Bohemian papers in the city, including four dailies, the *Svor-nost*, the *Denni Hlasatel*, the *Narod*, and the *Lidove Noviny*.

Chicago is undoubtedly the second Bohemian city in the world, since Brunn is about half German. It contains nearly three times as many Bohemians as any other city in the country, Cleveland, O., being second and New York third. Of the states Illinois is first, followed by Nebraska, where there is a large Bohemian farming population.

There are more than forty Bohemian papers in the country.

*Slovakian.*<sup>19</sup>—Slovakian is spoken by about 10,000.

The Slovakian population is most numerous in Pennsylvania, particularly in Pittsburgh and Allegheny. The states next in order, in the strength of their Slovakian population, are Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.

Eight Slovakian papers are published in the country, six of them in Pennsylvania, one of the most important being the *Amerikano Slovenske Noviny*, a weekly published in Pittsburgh.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> At Winnipeg the *Lögberg*, *Heimskringla*, and *Sæmningin* (this last a religious monthly); at Gimli the *Dagskra*.

<sup>18</sup> There is little doubt, I think, that it outranks Posen with a population of 117,017. According to some Polish estimates it would outrank Vilna (154,532) and so be the third Polish city of the world.

<sup>19</sup> Slovakian is very closely related to Bohemian, in fact represents a dialect, or set of dialects, co-ordinate with those of Bohemia and Moravia. But the Slovaks have been separated politically from the Bohemians and Mora-

vians since the beginning of the tenth century, when they were conquered by the Hungarians. Consequently they feel themselves a distinct people, do not wish to be identified with the Bohemians, and since the early part of the nineteenth century have used their own dialect as their literary language, instead of the Bohemian.

<sup>20</sup> The others are *Slovensky Dennik* (daily), Pittsburgh; *Slovak V Amerika*, New York; *Bratstvo*, Wilkesbarre, Pa.; *Slovenska Pravda*, Freeland, Pa.; *Jednota*, Scranton, Pa.; *Viera*, Cleveland, O.; *Slovenske Noviny*, Hazleton, Pa.

*Serbo-Croatian.*<sup>21</sup>—Croatian is spoken by some 10,000, from Croatia and the Dalmatian coast.

There are two Croatian papers, the *Chicago Sloboda* and the *Branik*.

While no other city contains a larger number of Croats (Pittsburg and Allegheny together have about the same number), the great mass of the Croatian population is in Pennsylvania, where there are about 38,000. The states next in order are Illinois, California, Ohio, Montana.<sup>22</sup>

There are in all seven Croatian papers, including two dailies, the *Narodni List* in New York and the *Hrvatska* in Allegheny.<sup>23</sup>

Of "Servians"<sup>24</sup> there are perhaps 100, of whom only about half a dozen are from the kingdom of Serbia, two or three from Montenegro, four or five from Bosnia, and the rest from Herzegovina or Dalmatia.

So far as I have learned, there is nowhere in the country any considerable number of immigrants from Serbia proper, yet the Servian element is strong enough to make possible the existence of five weekly newspapers calling themselves Servian.<sup>25</sup> Each of these is printed partly in the Cyrillic and partly in the Latin alphabet. There are said to be several hundred Montenegrins in California.

*Russian.*—Russian is spoken by some 7,000, possibly as many as 10,000, nearly all Jews. The Census figures for Russia, whether accurate or not, are of no value for linguistic purposes; for they represent in large part Jews, only a small proportion of whom speak Russian as well as Yiddish. The American-born children even of those who are bilingual learn only Yiddish, so that the proportion of Russian to Yiddish-speaking is much less than among the Jews of Russia.

There are probably not 100 genuine Russians, that is, Great Russians, in the city. There are, however, several hundred Ruthenians, perhaps about 500, who speak a Little Russian dialect. The Russian church of Chicago is made up largely of Ruthenians, and service was for a time held in Little Russian, now, however, in Great Russian.

<sup>21</sup> This embraces the speech of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Austrian province of Dalmatia, and the Hungarian provinces of Croatia and Slavonia. Throughout this territory is spoken a series of closely related dialects, the divisions between which do not coincide with any political divisions. All these dialects are now represented by what is essentially the same literary language, though appearing in two forms—the Servian in the east, written in the Cyrillic alphabet, and the Croatian in the west, with Agram as the center of literary activity, written in the Latin alphabet. But a divergent political history and religious differences (the Servians belong to the Greek Church, the Croats to the Roman) have prevented any genuine feeling of unity, and, in spite of the dicta of their scholars and literary leaders, the Croats and Servians regard themselves as distinct peoples, each with its own language. The Dalmatians for the most part are to be grouped with the Croats, but in the extreme south there is a mixture of Croatian and Servian elements, further complicated by the Italian influence which has been strong in Dalmatia from the earliest period. The resulting conditions have been elaborately treated in works

on South Slavic literary and political movements, but can hardly be illustrated more picturesquely than by an incident related to me of three brothers from Ragusa, now living in South Chicago, who "threw knives at each other because one said he was a Croatian, the other that he was a Servian, the third that he was a Dago."

In Bosnia, too, there is a Croatian as well as a Servian "party," and the Austrian officials, to avoid offending either, call the language neither Servian nor Croatian, but "the vernacular" or "Bosnian."

<sup>22</sup> A Croatian census, *Popis Hrvata u Americi*, published in Allegheny, furnishes carefully collected statistics for all the Croatian settlements in the country. It represents an undertaking which might well be imitated by other nationalities.

<sup>23</sup> Besides these two and the two Chicago papers, they are: *Napredak*, Allegheny; *Osa*, New York; *Hrvati u Americi*, Rankin, Pa.

<sup>24</sup> See footnote 21.

<sup>25</sup> The *Šilo* and the *Srbina*, Pittsburg, Pa.; *Serbska Straza*, New York city; *Sloboda*, San Francisco; *The Owl*, Pueblo, Col.

In other parts of the country, too, the Russian language is represented mainly by the Russian Jews, so that New York, which contains by far the largest number of these, is the largest Russian-speaking city of the country.

Aside from the Jews, the only considerable Russian colony is that of the Doukhobors in North Dakota.

*Slovenian.*—Slovenian, the Slavic language of the Austrian province of Carniola and parts of Carinthia, Styria, and the coast land, is spoken by about 1,500 persons, most of them from Carniola.

The principal Slovenian colonies are in Cleveland, Ohio, Joliet, Ill., Pueblo, Col., Red Jacket, Mich., in each of which there are several thousand. There are also considerable numbers in Pittsburg, Leadville, Col., and in several towns in Minnesota.

There are six Slovenian papers.<sup>26</sup>

*Bulgarian.*—Bulgarian is spoken by between 50 and 60 persons, about four-fifths of whom are from Macedonia.

The next largest numbers are in Pittsburg and Philadelphia, there being about 35 in each, and about 100 in the whole state of Pennsylvania. There are also between 30 and 40 in Ohio and Massachusetts, about 25 in New York, about 15 in Maryland, New Jersey, Maine, Michigan, 10 in California, and still smaller numbers in several other states. In all there are in the country between 500 and 600, about four-fifths of whom are Macedonians, chiefly from the district of Monastir, who have come here within the last three or four years. Up to 1892 there were less than 100 Bulgarians in the country, and nearly all these were students or professional men from Bulgaria proper.<sup>27</sup>

A small Bulgarian bi-monthly is published in Chicago, and has some 200 subscribers.

*Wendish.*—It is almost certain that among the immigrants from Germany there are at least some individuals from the Wendish region about Cottbus and Bautzen, but they are so thoroughly Germanized as to pass everywhere for Germans, and I have not been able to learn definitely of any Wendish-speaking persons.

There is a colony in Serbin, Tex., where church service is still held in Wendish.

#### BALTIC

*Lithuanian.*—Lithuanian is spoken by over 10,000 persons.<sup>28</sup> The vast majority of them are from Russian territory, though there are also a few Prussian Lithuanians.

There are two Lithuanian weeklies, the *Lietuva* and the *Katalikas*.

<sup>26</sup> *Nova Damovina*, Cleveland; *Amerikanski Slovenec*, Joliet; *Glas Naroda*, New York; *Glasnik*, Red Jacket; *Mir*, Pueblo; *Moskito*, Cleveland.

<sup>27</sup> Dr. Stanoff, a Bulgarian physician of South Chicago, has taken unusual pains to furnish me with full and accurate information about the Bulgarians throughout the country.

<sup>28</sup> The editor of the *Lietuva* estimates 14,000, and I am not sure that this is at all exaggerated. The figures of the

school census were of little value at the time (see footnote 6) and the number has been rapidly increasing since then. There are two very large Lithuanian Catholic congregations, not to speak of a small one in South Chicago, and the Lutherans, for whom a service is held in a German Lutheran church. During the past year one thousand tickets for transportation to Chicago, to be sent to relatives and friends in Lithuania, were sold in one office—that of the aforesaid editor, who to his editorial duties adds those of steamship agent and United States district postmaster.



Pennsylvania has the largest Lithuanian population, followed by Illinois, New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. There are in all six Lithuanian papers.<sup>29</sup>

*Lettic*.—There are about 300 Letts in the city, and also perhaps 200 Jews from Lettic territory who can speak Lettic.

The number of Letts is about the same for Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, while there are some 250 in San Francisco, 100 in Cleveland, Ohio, 100 in Lincoln county, Wis., and smaller settlements in other places, making in all approximately 2,000 in the country.

A Lettic religious weekly, *Amerikas Westnesis*, is published in Boston.<sup>30</sup>

#### ROMANCE

*Italian*.—Italian is spoken by over 25,000 persons. The Census figures, Table 60, are 26,043, those of the school census of 1898, 22,933.

Three Italian papers, two weeklies and one monthly, are published here, *L'Italia*, *La Tribuna Italiana*, and *L'America*.

By far the largest Italian colony in the country is in New York city, where there are over 200,000, and where ten of the thirty-five Italian papers in the country are published.

*French*.—French is spoken by from 15,000 to 20,000 persons. The Census figures, Table 60, are 4,498 French, 8,206 French Canadians, to which would be added a portion of those enumerated under Belgium and Switzerland. On the basis of these figures one would judge the French-speaking population to be about 17,000.<sup>31</sup>

One French weekly is published here, *Le Courier de l'Ouest*.

The largest number of immigrants from France is in New York city, but the French Canadians are most numerous in the New England manufacturing cities, Fall River, Lowell, Manchester, etc. Of some thirty-five French papers nearly half are published in the New England states (eight in Massachusetts), but there are five in California and five in Louisiana.

*Spanish*.—Spanish is spoken by perhaps 1,000 persons—Spaniards, Mexicans, Central Americans, South Americans, and West Indians in about equal proportions. The Census figures for persons born in these countries (Table 35), and not including Cubans and Porto Ricans, amount to 641.

By far the largest Spanish-speaking population is in Texas. The Mexican element is strong also in Arizona, New Mexico and California, while in Florida there

<sup>29</sup> Besides the two Chicago papers mentioned there are: *Saule*, Mahoney City, Pa.; *Vienybe Lietuwniku*, Plymouth, Pa.; *Žvaigždė*, Brooklyn, N. Y.; *Dirva*, a quarterly publication, Shenandoah, Pa.

<sup>30</sup> The editor, Rev. H. Rebane, is a Lutheran pastor who resides in Boston, but pays regular visits to the Lettic communities elsewhere. To him I am indebted for the information given above.

<sup>31</sup> My colleague, Professor Ingres, tells me that the

church officials on the basis of their parish lists estimate the French-speaking population at about 60,000, made up largely of French Canadians. I have already alluded to the well-known fact that many persons deny their foreign parentage and are enrolled as of native parentage. But it is difficult to believe that the French Canadians recorded in the Census represent less than one-fifth of the true number. The discrepancy is so great that I have not ventured to accept these higher figures, though not denying the possibility of their correctness.

are large numbers from the West Indies. Apart from the Mexicans, New York has the largest number of Spanish-speaking persons. All of the fifty-odd Spanish papers of the country appear in the states named, there being twelve in New York city.

*Roumanian.*—Roumanian is spoken by perhaps 2,000 Roumanian Jews. The Census gives only 287 as born in Roumania, but they have been arriving in larger numbers within the last two years. Estimates of the number vary widely, some running as high as 4,000. The number given is hardly more than a guess.

A large proportion of all the Roumanian Jews in the country is in New York city. Aside from the Jews, I have not learned of any considerable number of Roumanians anywhere,<sup>22</sup> and the Roumanian language seems to be represented almost wholly by the Jews from Roumania, with some Gypsies who speak Roumanian.

*Portuguese.*—Portuguese is spoken by only a few dozen persons. The Census gives 21 as born in Portugal.

Most of the Portuguese population of the country is in Massachusetts and California, in each of which there are over 12,000 born in Portugal. The five Portuguese papers of the country appear in these states.

#### CELTIC

*Irish.*—Irish is spoken by upwards of 10,000 persons certainly, and probably by as many as 15,000. The first number would be within the  $14\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the 73,912 born in Ireland (Census, Table 35),  $14\frac{1}{2}$  being the percentage of the population of Ireland which can speak Irish. But immigration is especially strong from those counties in which Irish is most spoken, so that the percentage of Irish speakers among the Irish-born of Chicago (and in general in this country) is without doubt somewhat larger. Moreover, the revival of interest in the Irish language, fostered by the Gaelic League, has had the result, unique<sup>23</sup> in the history of our foreign population, that not a few adults have learned their native tongue for the first time in this country. There are also some of the second generation who learn Irish at home or in the classes of the Gaelic League. But this enthusiasm for the language, after all, affects but a small proportion of the Irish population, and it would not be safe to assume any very large additions to the number of those who spoke Irish when they came here.

Neither here nor elsewhere, even in Ireland, so far as I am aware, is there any newspaper published entirely in Irish. But most of the papers devoted to Irish interests print, occasionally at least, addresses, poems, stories, etc., in the native language.

The number of Irish-speaking persons is, of course, everywhere proportionate to the total number of Irish, which is greatest in New York city, followed by Philadelphia, Chicago, and Boston. In the whole country there are probably about one-quar-

<sup>22</sup> A young Roumanian from Bessarabia whom I met in Chicago did not know of any other Roumanians in the city.

<sup>23</sup> Or almost unique. Professor Wiener tells me he has met some Lithuanians and some Slovaks who spoke only Polish or Hungarian before coming to this country, but, joining their respective societies, have learned Lithu-

anian or Slovakian here. And I now recall that one of the Lithuanian priests in Chicago, who preaches regularly in Lithuanian, told me he learned it in this country. His father had spoken Lithuanian, but he himself only Polish and Russian.

ter of a million of Irish-speaking persons, which is more than a third of the number in Ireland.

*Welsh.*—Welsh is probably spoken by about 2,000 persons, the total Welsh population here being 4,000 or 5,000.

More than a third of all the Welsh in the country are in the mining regions of Pennsylvania, the states next in order being Ohio and New York. There are three Welsh papers, the most important being *Y Drych*, a weekly published at Utica, N. Y.

*Scotch Gaelic.*—The Scotch Gaelic, closely allied to the Irish, is spoken by perhaps 500 persons. There are nearly 20,000 Scotch in the city, but, of course, only a small number from the parts of Scotland where Gaelic is still spoken.

In Canada there are some pure Gaelic settlements, where church services are still held in Gaelic. One of these is in Gananoque, Ontario.

*Manx.*—Manx, also closely related to Irish, is spoken by perhaps 100 persons. This is on the assumption that of the 400 or 500 Manxmen in the city, the proportion of Manx-speaking persons is about the same as on the Isle of Man. But it may be less, and a Manx informant has the idea that there are only a few dozen who can speak Manx.

The principal Manx center is Cleveland, Ohio. Settlements in the neighborhood of the city were made as early as 1827, and there are said to be now in the suburbs and immediate vicinity as many as 8,000 of Manx birth or descent.<sup>24</sup> There are also considerable numbers of Manxmen in New Orleans, San Francisco, Rochester, and Albany.

*Breton.*—The Breton or Armorican, spoken in Brittany and allied more closely with the Welsh and the extinct Cornish than with the Irish, is represented by a few dozen of the immigrants from France.

I have not learned of any distinctly Breton settlements in this country, and doubt if there are any. But wherever there are French immigrants in large numbers, there are certain to be some from Brittany, and it is safe to conclude, in the absence of more specific evidence, that the largest number of Breton-speaking persons is in New York city.

#### GREEK

*Modern Greek.*—Modern Greek is spoken by about 4,000, possibly by 5,000. The Census, Table 35, gives only 1,493, and the school census of 1898 only 1,644 of Greek birth. But the school census of 1896 gave 3,711, and since then the number is known to have increased.<sup>25</sup>

Chicago has the largest Greek population of any city in the country, followed by

<sup>24</sup> A Cleveland lawyer of Manx descent, who has kindly given me the above information, has the impression that most of the generation born in this country are, like himself, bilingual, having learned Manx as the language of the household. If this is true, it indicates that the proportion of those able to speak Manx has not diminished in our

earlier Manx settlements with anything like such rapidity as in the Isle of Man itself.

<sup>25</sup> The discrepancy is probably to be accounted for by the fact that at certain times a large proportion of the Greeks are at work out of the city.

New York, Lowell, Boston, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Savannah, Pittsburg, Charleston, New Orleans, in the order named.

There are two Greek newspapers, both published in New York, the *'Ατλαντίς* and the *Θερμοπύλαι*.

#### ALBANIAN

*Albanian*.—Albanian, representing an independent branch of Indo-European of which no other languages are extant, is spoken by perhaps one or two hundred of the immigrants from Greece.

A large proportion of the Greeks come from the southern part of the Peloponnesus, where there are very few Albanians, while from Attica, Bœotia, and other parts where the Albanian element is strongest, the number of immigrants is much smaller.

From Albania proper there are probably no representatives, nor, as far as I know, from the Albanian towns of southern Italy.

In other parts of the country the distribution of the Albanian element will correspond roughly to that of the Greek element.

#### ARMENIAN

*Armenian*.—Armenian, which, like Albanian, is the sole representative of an independent branch of the Indo-European family, is spoken by some 125 persons.

Except for New York city, with 2,500, most of the Armenians are in the New England cities. Worcester has 1,500, Boston 800, Providence 800, Lawrence 350, Lynn 300, etc.

There are five Armenian papers, three of which are published in Boston, one in Cambridge, and one in Fresno, Calif.\*

#### INDO-IRANIAN

Neither Persian nor any of the other modern Iranian languages is represented here, as far as I have been able to learn. Nor do I know of any Hindus living here at the present time.

*Gypsy*.—The Indic branch, however, is not entirely unrepresented, since there are nearly always some Gypsies in the outskirts of the city or in the immediate vicinity. And, as is well known, the Gypsy language still retains a large element, which, in spite of the accretions from other languages, clearly betrays its origin in India. In the summer of 1901 there was here a large number of Gypsies recently arrived from Roumania and Bessarabia, who spoke Roumanian and Russian as well as Gypsy. But most of the Gypsies who frequent the city from year to year belong to a family which came to this country, after living for some time in Bavaria, from Croatia, and call themselves Hungarian Gypsies.

\*The *Hayrenik*, the *Gotschnag*, and the *Tsain Haireniats*, Boston; the *Loyce*, Cambridge; *The Citizen*, Fresno, California.

## FINNO-HUNGARIAN "

*Hungarian.*—The number of Hungarian-speaking persons is difficult to estimate even roughly. There are about 1,000 Magyars in South Chicago, Pullman, and the other manufacturing districts in the southern outskirts of the city. These, of course, are entirely Hungarian in speech. Nearly all the Hungarians in the city proper, of whom there are many thousands, are Jews, there being two Hungarian-Jewish churches. Some of these are as thoroughly Hungarian in speech and in sentiment as the Magyars themselves, but many, on the other hand, belong to our earliest class of immigrants from Hungary and left at a time when German influence was predominant, so that German rather than Hungarian is their mother-tongue, and their children, so far as they learned anything but English, acquired German, not Hungarian. As to the actual numbers of the Jews from Hungary, and their descendants, and the proportion which speak Hungarian, I have received the most divergent opinions. It is safe to say that Hungarian is spoken by 5,000, while some would place the number at several times this.

Of the cities, New York has the largest Hungarian population, with Cleveland, O., second. Of the states, Pennsylvania stands first, followed by New York and Ohio. There are five Hungarian papers, three in New York and two in Cleveland.<sup>37</sup>

*Finnish.*—Finnish is spoken by about 500 persons. The center of the Finnish population is in the Calumet mining regions of Michigan. Next to Michigan, with 18,910 Finnish born, according to the Census, comes Minnesota, with about 10,000, followed by Massachusetts with about 5,000.

There are fourteen Finnish papers, seven of them appearing in Michigan.<sup>38</sup>

*Esthonian.*—There are said to be three Esthonian families in Chicago. New York and San Francisco have each about 150 Esths, and altogether in the country there are about 400.<sup>39</sup> An Esthonian religious paper, *Amerika Eesti Postimees*, is published in Boston by the same editor as the Lettic paper.

## SEMITIC

*Arabic.*—Arabic is spoken by the Syrians, numbering between 300 and 500. In New York, which has the greatest number of Syrians, there are four papers published in Arabic. No account is taken of Hebrew, which, however familiar in Jewish services, is not actually a spoken language anywhere.

For Yiddish see above, p. 9.

<sup>37</sup> While this is as definite a language family as Indo-European or Semitic, its relationship with other families often grouped with it under the head of "Ural-Altaic" is of a less decisive character. Owing to this, and also to the fact that outside of Finno-Hungarian the Turkish is the only representative here of the Ural-Altaic, I have ignored this more general grouping, and simply mentioned Turkish below, under "other languages."

<sup>38</sup> *Szabadseg* and *Magyar Hirmondó*, Cleveland; *Nepesava*, *Amerikai Nemzetor*, and *Pitty-Palatty*, New York.

<sup>39</sup> The *Kristillisia Sanomia*, *Mahatma*, *Siirtolainen*, *Heligtens Vag*, Brooklyn; *Naisten Lehti*, *Suometar*, *Uutiset*, *Toditusten Joukko*, Calumet, Mich.; *Faimen Sanomat*, *Rahtiuslehti*, Hancock, Mich.; *Kalava*, Manistee, Mich.; *Uusi Kotimaa*, New York Mills, Minn.; *Amerikan Sanomat*, Astorville Harbor, Ohio; *Totuus*, Fitchburg, Mass.

<sup>40</sup> Even the Livonians of the northern extremity of Courland, relics of another Finnish people from which Livonia takes its name and numbering in 1881 only 3,652 in all, are represented by a few families in New York city.

## OTHER LANGUAGES

*Chinese.*—Chinese is spoken by between one and two thousand persons.

As is well known, the Chinese element is strongest in California and the other Pacific states. In the East the greatest number is in New York.

There are two Chinese papers, one in New York, the other in San Francisco.

*Japanese.*—Japanese is spoken by less than a hundred persons. The Census gives 80 as born in Japan.

The Japanese are most numerous in California, Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho in the order named.

*Turkish.*—As far as I can learn, there are no Turks in the city at present, though one or two remained stranded here for some years after the exposition of 1893. But the Turkish language is not unrepresented, for the reason that nearly all the Armenians, that is, all the male adults, speak Turkish in addition to their own language.

There are probably very few Turks anywhere in the country, the language being represented mainly by the Armenian population, which is almost exclusively from Turkish Armenia.

*Basque.*—Basque is represented by a few individuals only. I have not learned of any considerable number of Basques anywhere in the country.<sup>41</sup>

The native Indian languages are almost wholly unrepresented. There is a resident physician who is a full-blooded Sioux, and occasionally a party of Indians is brought here for a few months for commercial purposes. But practically the Indian languages play no part in the linguistic conditions of the city.

I have not learned of any representations of the Malay-Polynesian group of languages, though it is quite possible that there are a few Hawaiians or Samoans engaged in business. The Census gives 46 as born in the Pacific Islands, but these are probably of American parentage.

## SUMMARY

The most notable characteristic of Chicago's foreign population is the strength of the Scandinavian and Slavic elements. No other city in the country contains anything like as many representatives of these groups. The Slavs number over a quarter of a million, and of the large divisions which we have made above, Slavic comes next to Germanic, a place which would be occupied by Romance in New York, Philadelphia, or Boston. Taking the languages without regard to the classification previously followed, the following are those of which Chicago furnishes the largest representation of any city in the country: Polish, Swedish, Bohemian, Norwegian, Dutch, Danish, Croatian, Slovakian, Lithuanian, and Greek.

<sup>41</sup> I have talked with a Basque in Boston who came to this country some forty years ago with five others from the same town, all now dead. He has no knowledge of Basques

elsewhere in the country, from which I infer that there are no Basque colonies of any size, though there are probably a few individuals of this race in most of the larger cities.

In the following table the languages are given in the order of their numerical strength in Chicago, so far as this can be determined. As explained before, the numbers are only approximate. The asterisks indicate those languages, already named, which are spoken by greater numbers in Chicago than in other cities of this country:

	about		about
German - - - - -	500,000	Chinese - - - - -	} 1,000
* Polish - - - - -	125,000	Spanish - - - - -	
* Swedish - - - - -	100,000	Finnish - - - - -	} 500
* Bohemian - - - - -	90,000	Scotch Gaelic - - - - -	
* Norwegian - - - - -	50,000	Lettic - - - - -	} 250
Yiddish - - - - -	50,000	Arabic - - - - -	
* Dutch - - - - -	35,000	Armenian - - - - -	} 100
Italian - - - - -	25,000	Manx - - - - -	
* Danish - - - - -	20,000	Icelandic - - - - -	
French - - - - -	15,000	Albanian - - - - -	
Irish - - - - -	10,000	Bulgarian - - - - -	} less than 100
* Croatian and Servian - - - - -	10,000	Turkish - - - - -	
* Slovakian - - - - -	10,000	Japanese - - - - -	
* Lithuanian - - - - -	10,000	Portuguese - - - - -	
Russian - - - - -	7,000	Breton - - - - -	
Hungarian - - - - -	5,000	Esthonian - - - - -	
* Greek - - - - -	4,000	Basque - - - - -	
Frisian - - - - -	} 1,000 to 2,000	Gypsy - - - - -	
Roumanian - - - - -			
Welsh - - - - -			
Slovenian - - - - -			
Flemish - - - - -			

## **TWO TWICE-TOLD TALES**





## TWO TWICE-TOLD TALES

J. J. MEYER

BENFEY, in his *Pañcatantra*, Vol. I, p. 442, mentions the story of Kinnarā as a parallel to a certain far-spread Hindu "Tale of the Faithless Wife."<sup>1</sup> The magnificent collection of the *Pāli Jātaka* was not accessible to the great pioneer. We have it now—six beautiful volumes, edited by the master hand of Fausböll. When I read these stories for the first time some years ago I gladly hailed as an old acquaintance also the tale of Queen Kinnarā in the *Kunāljātaka*. For this is the oldest form known at present of Ariosto's excellent *novella* of Astollo and Giocondo (*Orlando Furioso*, canto 28). After a second perusal of the *Jātaka* book some time later, I concluded to call the attention of others to the matter. But just when I wanted to publish the following translation and notes I saw in the *Rassegna bibliografica della letteratura italiana* of February, 1899, a notice to the effect that Professor P. E. Pavolini had shown in the eleventh volume of the *Giornale della Società Asiatica* a striking similarity between Ariosto's *novella* and the *Kunāljātaka*. I see now that Professor Pavolini only gives a brief abstract of the *Jātaka*, and that the remarks he offers are different from mine. So there seems to be room for the following pages.

The tale of Kinnarā is embodied in the *Kunāljātaka* (*The Jātaka*, ed. Fausböll, Vol. V, pp. 437 ff.). Thus we are told:

In times gone by there was in Benares a king by the name of Kaṇḍari, who was most handsome in face and form. Daily his ministers brought a thousand boxes of perfumes to him, anointed his palace with them, split the perfume boxes, and with this scented wood cooked his meals. His wife was very beautiful and named Kinnarā. His domestic chaplain, Pancalacaṇḍa by name, was endowed with wisdom and of the same age with the king. Now, at the king's castle, inside the wall, there had grown up a jambu tree [rose apple tree], the branches of which hung over the top of the wall, and in the shade of this tree there dwelt a cripple loathsome and ugly of figure.

One day when Queen Kinnarā was looking through the window she saw him and fell in love with him. After she had bestowed her favors on the king the next night, and he had fallen asleep, she softly rose, put most delicious food of different kinds into a golden vessel, and, conveying this in the folds of her dress, she descended by means of a rope made of cloth<sup>2</sup> down through the window [evidently first alighting upon the top of the wall], and mounted the rose apple tree. Then she descended by means of the branches, fed the cripple, sinned (with him), and then again ascended to the palace in the way she had come. With perfumes she shampooed her body and laid herself down with the king. In this manner she continually sinned with that man and the king knew it not.

One day he passed around the city in solemn procession. Entering his palace he saw the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the article of F. L. PULLÉ in the fourth volume of the *Giornale della Società Asiatica italiana* (1890, pp. 129-64), and P. E. PAVOLINI in the eleventh volume of that journal

(1896, pp. 165-73); also J. J. MEYER, *Dandina Daçakumara-caritam* (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 87-96.

<sup>2</sup> Or perhaps rather: "of her outer garment."

cripple, who presented a most pitiful appearance,<sup>3</sup> lying in the shade of the rose apple tree, and he said to his domestic chaplain: "See this specter of a man?" "Yes, my Lord." "Now, I wonder, friend, whether a woman would approach such a disgusting fellow in amorous passion?" When the cripple heard these words he was filled with vanity and thought: "What says this king? He is not aware, it seems, that his own queen comes to me." Saluting the tree respectfully by raising his joined hands to his forehead, he said: "Hear thou, O lordly deity who wast born in this rose apple tree; save thee nobody knows this matter."

When the domestic chaplain saw him do this he reflected: "Surely the king's queen consort comes by way of the rose apple tree and sins with him." [Should this miraculous insight surprise anybody, let him remember that this domestic chaplain was the Buddha himself in one of his anterior births.] And he asked the king: "O, great king, how is the touch of the queen's body in the night time?"

"I observed nothing else, friend; but in the middle watch of the night her body is cold."

"Then, my lord, to say nothing of other women—your consort, Queen Kinnarā, sins with him."

"What are you talking about, friend? How should such a lady, endowed with the highest charms, amuse herself with such a most hideous fellow?"

"Try her then, my lord."

"All right," he said, and the following night, having supped, he retired with the queen and thinking, "I will try her," he feigned to have fallen asleep when the time came that he usually fell asleep. She rose and did as she was wont. The king followed her and stood still below the rose apple tree.

The cripple was angry with the queen and he boxed her ears,<sup>4</sup> saying: "You loitered too long in coming." Then she pleaded: "Do not be angry, my lord; I watched for the king to fall asleep." And she was like a wife in his house.

But when he struck her one of her ear-rings, shaped like a lion's face (or mouth), bounded away from her ear and dropped at the feet of the king. The king thought, "This is enough to serve my purpose," took the ring, and returned. After having transgressed with the cripple, she also returned in her former manner and commenced to lie with the king. He pushed her back and on the next day commanded: "The Queen Kinnarā shall come to me bedecked with all the ornaments I gave her." She said, "My lion-ring is at the goldsmith's," and did not come. When she had been sent for again she came with one ring. The king asked: "Where is your ring?" "At the goldsmith's." He called the goldsmith. "Why do you not give her her ring?" he said. "I did not receive it, my lord." The king got angry and said: "You wicked pariah woman, your goldsmith must look like me." And throwing the ring down before her he said to the domestic chaplain: "You spoke the truth, friend; go and have her head cut off."

He (the chaplain) put her away somewhere in the king's house, drew near the king and said: "My lord, be not angry with Queen Kinnarā; all women are that way. And if you wish to see the bad nature of women, I will show you their wickedness and many wiles. Come, we will travel incognito through the land."

The king assented, intrusted the kingdom to his mother, and set forth with him upon their journey. When they came to a cross-road [or, after they had traveled twelve miles],<sup>5</sup> they sat down at the highway.

<sup>3</sup> The dictionaries, both Sanskrit and Pāli, give only "compassion" for *kāruṇya* (*kāruṇā*). But we can hardly translate "who roused the deepest compassion."

<sup>4</sup> Literally "struck her on the orifice of her ears with his hand"—*hatthena kaṇṇasakkhaliyaṃ pahari*; cf. *Sumangala-vilasini*, p. 311, last line, and p. 312, first line: *bhikkhuṃ kaṇṇasakkhaliyaṃ paharitvā*. *Kaṇṇasakkhali* is the Skt. *karnaśaṅkuli*.

<sup>5</sup> The Pāli text has here the reading *tesaṃ yojanamaggam gantvā mahāmagge nisinnānam*, which is clearly wrong. Two emendations easily suggest themselves. We might read *tesaṃ saṃyojanamaggam gantvā*, etc., i. e., "when they had come to a cross-way." One of the two *sam* immediately following each other would very naturally have dropped out through the negligence of the scribe. But *gantvā* (instead of *patvā*) would then be a little

A landed proprietor who was celebrating his son's wedding came along with great pomp and retinue and the girl (the bride) seated in a palankin. When the domestic chaplain saw this he said: "If you wish, it is possible to make this girl sin with you."

"How can you say so? Her retinue is too great for that, friend."

"See then, my lord," said the chaplain.

He stepped forward, made a tent not far from the road, and put the king into the tent, he himself sitting down at the wayside weeping. Then the landed proprietor, seeing him, inquired: "Why do you weep, my good sir?"

"My wife is very big with child; I started upon the way to take her to the home of her kin. But on the highway her throes came upon her; she is laboring within the tent, no woman is at her side and I cannot go there. I do not know what will become of it."

"You must get a woman. Don't weep; there are many women; one will go."

"Then this girl here shall go, and it will be a lucky omen also for her."

The man thought: "He speaks the truth; it will be an omen betokening luck to her too; she will increase in sons and daughters;" and he sent her. She entered there, saw the king, fell in love with him, and sinned with him. The king gave her the seal-ring from his finger. When she had finished and returned from out of the tent, they asked her: "What has she borne?" She answered: "A son of golden hue." The landed proprietor took her and journeyed on with his train.

The chaplain also went to the king and said: "You see, my lord, even a young girl is so wicked, far more the other women. But have you given her anything?"

"Yes, the seal-ring from my finger."

"I will not allow her that."

He rapidly strode on, caught up with the palankin,<sup>6</sup> and when they asked: "What is the matter?" he answered: "She took the seal-ring with her that had been placed under my wife's pillow. Give me the seal-ring, my good lady." She wounded the brahman's hand with her finger-nails when she gave him the ring and said: "Take it, you rascal."

Thus by various stratagems the brahman brought it about that the king could see (with his

strange. Or we might read *tesam yojanamaggam gantva*, etc., i. e., "after they had gone a *yojana's* way." An objection to that reading would be this that twelve miles was too long a journey to find the first pliant woman. That were not in keeping with the spirit of the fairy tale, especially as the king was "very fair of form and figure." But although Childers gives a *yojana* as twelve miles, that does not seem to be so very correct. The statements regarding the *yojana* differ greatly. OESTERLEY, *Baital Pacchisi*, p. 48, says a *yojana* = about nine miles; STEIN, *Rajatarangini* (transl.), Vol. VII, p. 393, about six miles; CROOKE, *Popular Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, p. 232, ten miles; MONIER WILLIAMS, *sub voce*, informs us: "Sometimes regarded as equal to four or five English miles, but more correctly = four *kroças* or about nine miles; according to other calculations = two and one-half English miles, and according to some = eight *kroças*." Professor Lanman writes me: "It is 60 *yojanas* from Kapilavasthu to Rajagaha (Jät. I, p. 85, l. 31), that is about 150 miles, perhaps—that gives only 2 or 3 miles for a *yojanana*." Cunningham takes the *yojana* as seven miles. *Mahāvagga*, VII, 1, mentions six *yojanas* as the distance between Sāketa and Sāvattthi; according to the Fa-Hian, it was eight *yojanas*. Counting the *yojana* as seven miles, the Chinese traveler's statement would give us fifty-six miles, which is correct according to CUNNINGHAM (*Ancient Geography of India*, Vol. I, p. 400), who accepts the common

identification of Sāketa with Ayodhya, adducing conclusive proofs for this view, and identifies Sāvattthi with Sewet and the modern Sahet-Mahet. Whatever explanation we may adopt to reconcile the *Mahāvagga* with these statements, it is clear that the *yojana* of the *Mahāvagga* amounts to vastly more than two or three miles, unless we reject Cunningham's identification, which seems to rest on a very solid basis, or assume that another Sāketa is meant, a very improbable expedient. On the other hand, in *Sutta* 89 of the *Majjhima-Nikāya* King Pasenadi looks at the park of Nangaraka. There the thought of visiting Buddha enters his mind. But the Master is sojourning in Metulumpa. The king is told that the distance between the two places is not great, only three *yojanas*, and that one could ride to Metulumpa during the rest of the day (*divasadvasesena*). The king's charioteer actually takes his lord there in time. Such a thing would have been impossible, it seems, if a *yojana* were between twelve and seven miles. A distance of about eight miles in all appears to be quite enough for the "rest of the day," the roads in ancient India not being of the ideal kind. Perhaps the *yojana* (literally "a distance traversed in one harnessing or without unyoking") was just as indefinite in old India as now is the term "mile" which has to be qualified by "English," "German," "geographical," etc., in order to be correctly understood.

<sup>6</sup> Perhaps, rather, "stopped the palankin."

own eyes) many other licentious women, and he said: "This is enough for this place, let us go elsewhere, my lord."

The king roamed through all Jambudvīpa [lit., "the island of the rose apple tree," i. e., India], and then he declared: "All women (outside of Jambudvīpa) will be the same way. What of them! Let us return." So they went back to Benares.

The chaplain pleaded with the king: "Such, O great king, are all women, of such a bad quality is their nature; pardon Queen Kinnarā." He pardoned her and expelled her from his court; and as he had deprived her of her station he chose another queen consort. And the cripple he caused to be driven away, and the branch of the rose apple tree (that hung over the top of the wall) he had cut down.

It will be seen at a glance that this old Buddhist version of the story is very interesting in many respects. A careful comparison with the Arabian and Italian tales points to several things. I mention only a few.

The story of Shah Zaman (Shahseman) or of Giocondo being cured of his heart-ache by seeing the king's wife doing the same thing as his own spouse is here missing. But that is of no importance at all. The story of "The Lady in the Box," which forms a separate *Jātaka* in the *Pāli* collection, we see in the *Arabian Nights* woven into the introductory story, with which originally it had no connection at all. A multitude of similar cases might be pointed out. These productions of the people's fancy grow not only from within, but also from without. The different versions drop the one incident and add another, either by spontaneous growth or more frequently by appropriating another story or part of another story. This story of "The Lady in the Box" must serve, in the *Arabian Nights*, the same purpose as the king's salutary ramble through various countries in the Buddhistic tale and in the *Orlando Furioso*.

The Arab story-teller could not use this portion. The old Hindu looks upon the frailty of the fair sex rather with the sadly smiling eye of the philosopher. And the numerous angry invectives against women in Hindu literature notwithstanding, we even meet a multitude of stories where the tricks which amorous women play their relatives, and especially their husbands, are described with the same inward chuckle as in the "laughing tales" of Boccaccio, Bandello, and others. The Muhammedan spirit is severer and fiercer. Shahryar (Sheherban) puts to death his wife and a host of other women (1,095, if there was no leap year among those three years); the king of Benares spares his guilty spouse upon the intercession of his chaplain. And then, just think of a Muhammedan ruler roving through the land and introducing himself by stealth into as many harems as possible in order to learn by experience that no woman is true and chaste if she can help it!

Another consideration is this: Adhering to the original version, the Arabian collection could hardly have introduced Sheherezade, who is so pre-eminently necessary. The Arabian adaptations of these old tales are often better than the more original forms, but the otherwise excellent story of "The Lady in the Box" seems to me here a rather inferior substitute for the way in which the king is made to see the depravity of all womankind in our *Pāli Jātaka* and in Ariosto's novella. We must concede that

this king Shahryar is drawn with a masterhand, and the spirit of the fairy-tale, especially the Arabian fairy-tale, is manifested in a sparkling manner. This poor lady has been cruelly torn away from her bridegroom by the Jinni; ladies do not like to be put into boxes of this kind, not even in the countries of the harem; such treatment would be sufficient to raise the spirit of deviltry in a Penelope; still our sultan Shahryar, like a true eastern despot, infers from this exceptional case that all women act like the one now before him, which is a flat contradiction of his previous attitude toward the question. He is the type of the stupid, cruel prince so common in eastern tales.

By the way, this peculiarity of the *Nights* that they usually—Harun ar Rashid, of course, excepted—depict princes as rather dull, hasty, bloody, etc., whereas their ministers are models of insight, prudence, energy, and other good qualities, is doubtless in a great measure due to the fact that the *Nights* go back to the *Jātaka* as their principal fountain-head. In the *Jātaka* Boddhisatta (the later Buddha) is again and again born as a king's minister, and as such restrains and instructs his impetuous and often weak-minded lord. Now, we know that in the Orient ministers of state are, as a rule, no better, and even worse, than their masters, or slaves, *i. e.*, the princes. So the *Nights* can in this respect hardly have copied life. Still, the noble family of the Barmecides, for instance, may have contributed colors to this bright, ideal picture of the vezir. But, in spite of many excellent traits in the Arabian tale, the best, most essential, and most extraordinary part of the whole story, *i. e.*, the king's peculiar exploratory tour, together with a few other things in our *Jātaka*, go to make up a better narrative than the Muhammedan adaptation.

That the story when it became known to the Muhammedans contained this journey of the king through various countries and his amorous adventures with a multitude of women is also clearly shown by the manner in which the substitute for this portion is introduced. When Shahryar with his own eyes had seen his queen in the loving embrace of the negro Said, he said, according to Burton's literal translation of the *Arabian Nights*:

"Let us up as we are and depart forthright hence, for we have no concern with kingship, and let us overwander Allah's earth, worshiping the Almighty till we find some one to whom the like calamity hath happened; and if we find none then will death be more welcome to us than life." So the two brothers issued from a second private postern of the palace; and they never stinted wayfaring by day and by night, until they reached a tree a-middle of a meadow—hard by a spring of sweet water on the shore of the sea.

Then happens the story of "The Lady in the Box" and their immediate return home. The words quoted seem to indicate beyond doubt that the tale when the Muhammedans borrowed it described a far more extensive and very different journey of the two. Why should they make so much ado, give up the kingdom, set out upon the way to "overwander Allah's earth" simply and exclusively in order to find a single and solitary woman who would not be loyal to her husband or lover? It is true, our king Shahryar is no miracle of intelligence, and the way in which he is stupefied by his wife's colored liaison renders him very naïve and amusing. Still he has just now

seen eleven women follow their lewd desires; his brother's wife added makes twelve; he is an oriental, a Muhammedan, and as such cannot help but have imbibed a somewhat realistic philosophy in *puncto foeminarum*. So this whole portion is simply ridiculous, and the words quoted above and the things that came to pass thereupon can be explained only by the fact that the Muhammedans found these words, although quite different in some respects, in the story and transplanted them into their own version, the final development of which renders them so utterly incongruous, to say nothing of other blemishes.

So the outcome seems to be this: The theory that Ariosto has taken over the introductory story from the *Arabian Nights* is untenable. But we see everywhere how very tenacious certain incidents and even phrases are in these tales of the people, their marked pliability and even Proteus-like transformations in some respects notwithstanding. It were possible, therefore, that Ariosto nevertheless got the story through the instrumentality of the Arabs. A version conforming more to the original tale and independent of the introduction to the *Nights* might still have been current among the Arabs at that time. But this is not very probable. We know that the manuscripts of the celebrated Arabian collection differ in a most astonishing manner. But the introduction—together with a number of other tales—is the same everywhere, as far as matter is concerned, and even the wording varies here not essentially. "The Introduction (with a single incidental story 'The Bull and the Ass') . . . may be placed in our tenth century," says Burton in his translation (Vol. X, p. 93). His opinion is certainly entitled to respect. All Arabists, I think, agree that the introduction is one of the oldest parts. Now, it seems not very plausible that another version should have survived among the Arabs down to Ariosto's time side by side with its all-powerful rival in the *Nights*. I would rather incline to the opinion that the story was brought to Italy from Russia. We know that intercourse between these two countries was quite lively at that time. But as I cannot show up the Slavic link, I must give this as a mere, though very probable, supposition.

Like the other stories of the introduction to the *Arabian Nights*, the one most important of them all for the collection is of Hindu origin; the Sheherezade, most famous and typical of Arabian girls, is found in the tales of the Jainas, an old religious sect of India. Jacobi, in his well-known book *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Māhārāshṭrī* (1886) has published the Prākṛit text of the story, and many a reader of this valuable volume must have recognized the identity. But, so far as I know, nobody has yet considered it worth while to speak about the matter. So I subjoin an almost literal translation. The story is found pp. 49 ff. It is taken from a commentary of Devendra which was finished in 1073 A. D.<sup>1</sup> Devendra himself calls his work an epitome of a book of Āntyācārya.<sup>2</sup> The tale runs thus:

<sup>1</sup> JACOBI gives Samvat 1179, i. e., 1122-23 A. D. But this mistake has been corrected by LEUMANN, "Die Legende von Citta und Sambhūta," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Vol. V, p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> Of him PAVOLINI (in his article, "Vicende del tipo di Mūladeva," *Giornale della Società Asiatica italiana*, Vol. IX, p. 178) says: "verosimilmente di poco posteriore alla redazione definitiva del canone dei jaina (484 d. C.)."

There is here in India a city named Khipaitthiyam. Jiyasattū was king there. Once the king commenced a picture-gallery and handed it over to the guild of painters in equal portions [*i. e.*, assigned the head of every family — professions being hereditary in India — an equal share of the work to be done]. Many painters painted. Also an old painter, Cittangaa by name, painted. A long time passed. And his young daughter, Kaṇayamañjarī by name, brought him his meals. One day she was on her way to her father with his dinner in her hands, when a horseman came along the king's highway, that was crowded with people, on his horse, making it run at full speed. And she fled in fear. Then after he had rushed by she went to her father. When Cittangaa saw that his meal had come, he went to ease nature. To while away time Kaṇayamañjarī painted there in colors, on the paved floor, a peacock's feather entirely true to nature.

In the meanwhile King Jiyasattū came to the picture-gallery. Looking at the paintings he saw the peacock's feather on the paved floor, and thinking, "It's beautiful," he stretched out his hand to pick it up. He broke his nails, which were like pearl-oyster shells. Abashed he looked into space.

Kaṇayamañjarī said with a laugh: "While I reflected, 'A chair doesn't stand on three legs,' and sought the fourth foolish man, I have now found you as the fourth leg."

The king said: "How is that? Tell me the whole matter as it is."

She said laughing: "While I brought my father his meal a man rode a horse in hot haste on the king's highway. He had not a bit of pity, for old people, children, women, and all other weak people that passed along were trampled down. Therefore this horseman, being an arrant fool, is the chair's first leg. The second leg is the king, by whom the picture-gallery has been assigned to the painters in equal shares. In the individual families there are many painters. My father is, firstly, without a son; secondly, an old man; thirdly, poor. But although he is such, an equal portion (of the work) has been set down for him (which he cannot do under the circumstances). The third leg is my father here, because while painting at this picture-gallery he has spent what he had earned before; now I bring him any food I get, and when it has come — he goes to ease nature! What a dull man he is!"<sup>9</sup>

The king said: "Why am I the fourth leg?"

The other said: "Now, anyone knows at once: 'How should a peacock's feather come here indeed!' If it [the feather] had been brought here in some way or other, even then one would perceive it by the eye at once."<sup>10</sup>

The king said: "I am really a fool and as such the fourth leg of the chair." Hearing how (cleverly) she put her words together and seeing the loveliness of her body, he became enamored of her. But when Kaṇayamañjarī had given her father to eat she went home.

By mouth of Sugutta, his prime minister, the king asked Cittangaa for Kaṇayamañjarī. He said: "We are poor. How could we celebrate the marriage and pay the king due honor!"

This was told the king. He had Cittangaa's house filled with money, grain, and gold. On an auspicious lunar-day, in an auspicious hour, Kaṇayamañjarī was married (by the king) in great splendor. A palace and a great multitude of female slaves were bestowed on her.

Now the king had many queens; every one (of them) entered the king's sleeping apartment on the night when her turn came. And on that day the order was given that it was

<sup>9</sup> *Siyala*, Sanskrit, *çitāla*, "cold," seems to be used just as *jada* for "cold, torpid, senseless, stupid," in Sanskrit.

<sup>10</sup> Or "by his intelligence." The literal translation would be: "It might have been brought here in some way or other [so one might object]. Even then one would perceive it," etc. The sense may be: Even if a man of sense

had thought for a moment that the feather had been there, he would have rectified the mistake right away (*i. e.*, perceived that it was no real feather). Or: Even if the feather had been brought there, one (*i. e.*, people) would have seen it right away (and picked it up, of course, not leaving it till the king came).



Kaṇayamanjarī's turn. Bedecked and adorned she went, together with her slave-girl Mayanīyā, and sat down upon a seat.

In the meanwhile the king came. She rose to greet him and performed the other acts of politeness and modesty. The king lay down on the bed.

Before this time already Kaṇayamanjarī had said to Mayanīyā: "When the king has lain down you must ask me for a story in a way that the king hears it." Therefore Mayanīyā said at this appropriate moment: "Mistress, tell me a story while the king tarries (with us here)." The other said: "The king must first sleep soundly, then I will tell one."

The king thought: "Now, what kind of a story will she tell? I too will hear it." So he pretended to be asleep. Mayanīyā said: "Mistress, the king is asleep; tell the story."

The other said: "Listen! There was in a city Vasantaura a merchant Varuṇa. He had a chapel built of one hand in size that was made all of one block. Into this he put a certain idol of four hands." Mayanīyā said: "Mistress, how could there be room for an idol of four hands in a chapel of one hand in size?" The other said: "I am sleepy now; tomorrow I shall tell." "Thus let it be," said Mayanīyā, who went out and went home. The king's curiosity was roused and he thought: "What kind of thing is this?" She (Kaṇayamanjarī) also lay down to sleep.

When on the second day again the order was given that it was her turn, she was addressed in the same way by Mayanīyā: "Mistress, tell that half-told tale (to the end)." The other said: "Friend, that god is the Four-Armed One," but this is not the size of his body [i. e., what I said does not refer to the size of his body]. Thus far goes the story.

Mayanīyā said: "Tell me another."

Kaṇayamanjarī said: "Friend, there is a great forest. In it there stands a great red asoka tree with outspread boughs and branches. And it has no shade."

Mayanīyā said: "How could such an excellent tree have no shade?"

She said: "Tomorrow I'll tell; now I am overcome by sleep."

The third day again, out of curiosity, she was summoned. In the same manner she was questioned by Mayanīyā. She explained: "That tree's shade is below it."<sup>12</sup>

Asked for another story, she narrated: "In a certain place there was a village magistrate. He had a camel. And this roamed about at will. One day when it roamed about it saw a babbūla tree abounding in leaves, blossoms, and fruit. And toward that it stretched out its neck and could not reach it. And for the tree's sake it harassed itself a very long time. Then it stretched out its neck still a great deal more in all four directions. When it could not reach (the tree) in any way, it was seized by anger. Therefore it discharged its urine and dung on the tree."

Mayanīyā said: "How could it discharge its urine and dung on the tree which it could not even reach with its mouth?"

The other said: "Tomorrow I'll tell."

In the same manner she declared on the following day: "That babbūla tree was down in a 'blind' well,"<sup>13</sup> therefore the camel could not eat of it."<sup>14</sup>

In this way Kaṇayamanjarī befooled the king with such interesting stories for six months.

<sup>11</sup> Vishnu, who is represented with four arms and hands.

<sup>12</sup> Therefore it has no shade, is not protected by shade; whereas Mayanīyā (and the king) took the painter's daughter to mean that the tree cast no shade.

<sup>13</sup> Literally, "in the middle of a blind well-pit." A well dried up, overgrown with plants, and not used is meant. The metaphor may be the same as in the German, *blinder Fenster*, *blinde Thüre*; or the term may refer to the fact that such a well is hidden from view; or the word may

be taken more literally. The shining water in the well is its pupil of the eye (*Augenstern*). Cf. the interesting, oft-recurring passage, *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Vol. I, p. 80, where we have *udakatārakā*, *Wasserstern* = *Wasserspiegel* (of a well).

<sup>14</sup> The Sanskrit version here adds six other stories, all of a similar nature. Three of them are well-known tales (Nos. 5, 6, 7). As they are neither in the *Māhārāṣṭrī* text nor affect the matter in hand, I pass them by.

Then he had become exceedingly enamored of her. Exclusively devoted to the pleasure of love with her alone, he passed the time.

Then her fellow-wives became enraged against her, sought for weak points in her, and conferred together: "She has bewitched the king by witchcraft, so that he has abandoned even his queens who were born in the highest families; in his passion for this artisan's daughter he considers neither excellences nor faults, pays no attention to the affairs of the kingdom; cares not that his wealth is being ruined by her juggler's tricks."

But<sup>15</sup> Kanayamanjari, day by day, entered one of the chambers in her palace at noon-time, all alone, cast off the garments and the finery that belonged to the king [*i. e.*, that the king had given her], and put on the ragged dress and the finery made of tin and lead that she had got from her father. And she admonished her own soul: "Do not be proud, O soul, of (this) wealth, do not become conceited, forget not thyself! The king's is this wealth, thine are these clothes all beaten to pieces with the stick<sup>16</sup> and this finery. So be of a calm mind, because for a long time thou didst not enjoy such splendor. Else the king might take thee by the neck and put thee out."

Observing these her doings day by day, her fellow-wives said to the king: "Although you are destitute of love for us, nevertheless we will ward off misfortune from you; for: Woman's deity is her husband. This woman here, who is your sweetheart, pronounces some incantation or evil spell. Being bewitched by her, you do not notice this mischief."

The king said: "How is that?"

They said: "At noon-time she goes into a chamber, shuts the door, and stands there mumbling something by herself, day by day, for some time. If you don't believe it, watch her" yourself or (have it done) by a number of others."

And, having heard this, the king went himself. Standing at the door in order to watch Kanayamanjari, who had entered the room, he saw the doings described already and how she instructed her own self. His heart was filled with joy. "O what prudence of hers! O what freedom from pride! O what discrimination! Therefore she is in every respect a treasure of all excellences; and these [her fellow-wives] are envious by reason of their being fellow-wives. For even excellence they deem a fault."

And full of joy the king made her mistress of the whole kingdom and invested her with the turban.<sup>17</sup>

The king was right. Her conduct in prosperity proved her to be a rare jewel among women; and though this story, which clearly is an abridgment anyhow, in many respects ranks below that of the *Arabian Nights*, Kanayamanjari showed such eminent qualities in all her dealings that Sheherezade need not be ashamed of her Hindu mother.

<sup>15</sup> Literally "from that time," the time when the king had shown her his favor.

<sup>16</sup> In the process of washing numberless times.

<sup>17</sup> Or: "investigate the matter."

<sup>18</sup> *I. e.*, he had her crowned as *pattarajisi*—as his principal wife or queen consort.



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**THE UNITY OF PLATO'S THOUGHT**

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# THE UNITY OF PLATO'S THOUGHT

PAUL SHORRY

## PART I

### INTRODUCTION

DURING the past twenty years Platonic *Forschung* has come to mean the investigation of the relative dates of the dialogues by the statistical study of vocabulary and idiom. The general trend of modern philology and the reaction against mystical and metaphysical Platonism favored this tendency, and the work would perhaps not have been done at all if the workmen had not cherished illusions as to its value. To combat these illusions or to test in detail the logic of *Sprachstatistik* is not the purpose of this paper. A merely negative attitude toward any harmless form of human endeavor is unfruitful. But granted, since life is short, all that is claimed by the enumerators of *καθάρτερ* and *τί μῆν*, the essential quality of Plato's thought remains for some Platonists<sup>1</sup> a more interesting topic of discussion than the conjectural chronology of his writings. It has become the fashion to assert that the one depends upon the other, that we cannot interpret Plato's philosophy until we have determined the historic sequence of the dialogues, and with it the true order of development of his thought. But we have always known that the *Laws* and *Timæus* are late, that the *Republic* belongs to Plato's full maturity, and that the minor Socratic dialogues are as a whole presumably early. To affirm that more is necessary is to beg the question; it is to assume the very point in controversy that the philosophy set forth in the dialogues did develop in the sense required by the argument. The question is partly verbal. Every man's thought is developed out of nothing somewhere between infancy and maturity. Any author whose literary activity, like that of Plato, extends over half a century undergoes many minor changes of opinion, and reflects many varying moods of himself and his contemporaries. But it is not true of all, or of a majority, of the world's great thinkers that their first tentative gropings toward a philosophy and a criticism of life are depicted as in a votive tablet in their earliest published writings, or that the works of their riper years present a succession of shifting and dissolving views. Yet something like this is the assumption made by the increasing number of investigators who, in emulation of the triumphs of the statistical method, are endeavoring to confirm, refute, or correct its results by a study of alleged inconsistencies, contradictions, or developments in Platonic doctrine. Abstractly the followers of this method would probably repudiate the principle here attributed to them. In their practice the desire for striking arguments and definite results leads them to assume that Plato was capable of producing a masterpiece like the *Protagoras* before his most characteristic philosophical and ethical conceptions had taken shape in his mind, and

<sup>1</sup> Notably for BONITZ; see the judicious observations in *Platonische Studien*, 3d ed., pp. 270 ff. and *passim*.

that throughout the period of his maturest writings his leading ideas were in a state of Heraclitean flux, or were being casually developed from year to year. This method misleads scholars of great acumen and erudition to make false points, to labor fantastic analogies, and to cite irrelevant parallels. It betrays them into misplaced emphasis, disregard of the context, and positive mistranslation. In short, it necessitates the systematic violation of all the canons of the simple, sane, and natural interpretation of literature.<sup>2</sup> Plato avoided rather than sought a rigid technical terminology, and prodigally varied the language and imagery in which he clothed his most familiar thoughts. Every variation of phrase and imagery is pressed to yield significant contradictions or developments. The most far-reaching conclusions are drawn from the different shades of meaning attached to such words as "opinion," "dialectic," "philosophy," "sensation," "reminiscence," "participation," "presence," "communion," freely and untechnically employed by Plato to suit the theme and context.<sup>3</sup> The absence in any work of explicit insistence on a thought is supposed to prove the absence of the thought from Plato's mind at the time, and as a consequence, we are expected to believe in the most incredible combinations of maturity and naïveté within the same writing. Or we are taught that Plato's development, like some Sophoclean sentences, proceeds in the order *aba*, and consisted in the acceptance, the rejection, and the re-acceptance of the same idea. The most reckless assertions are made that certain elementary thoughts appear for the first time in certain dialogues. The emphatic introduction of a term or idea is, according to the exigencies of the theory, now taken as proof that it is a novelty, and now explained away as a mere dramatic artifice. The rapid outline of an argument is alternately regarded, according to the requirements of the "chronology," as an anticipatory germ or a later résumé of the fuller treatment found elsewhere. Fantastic conceits or bare possibilities as to Plato's literary motives and polemical intentions are treated as absolute psychological and historical certainties and made the basis of serious arguments.<sup>4</sup>

May there not be some *πρώτον ψεύδος* involved in a conception that thus betrays its advocates? It is of course *a priori* conceivable that Plato's thought did unfold itself in this tentative and fumbling fashion. Examples of such mutations and nutations can be found among the Fichtes and Schellings of modern philosophy. They are still more frequent, as Professor Gildersleeve has wittily shown, in the history of modern philology, and, as I may add, in the interpretation of Plato. But it is at least equally probable that Plato's philosophy and his conception of life had taken shape at the age of thirty or thirty-five, and that his extant works, though not of course a pre-determined systematic exposition, are the naturally varied reflection of a homogeneous body of opinion, and of a consistent attitude in the interpretation and criticism of

<sup>2</sup> Examples throughout the paper.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra*, and LUTOSLAWSKI, *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> To this category belong nearly all conjectures as to the particular philosophers referred to in Plato's gener-

alized statements and criticisms of tendencies in the thought of the time, and especially the hypothesis that he satirized contemporaries under the names of earlier Sophists. Such hypotheses will be wholly disregarded in the following study, as a mere hindrance to the apprehension of Plato's own meanings.

contemporary life. And if this were the fact, it would be a far more important fact for the interpretation of his writings than the determination of the relative dates of the *Phædo* and *Symposium* or even than the demonstration that the *Sophist*, *Statesman* and *Philebus* follow rather than precede the *Republic*. I am not arguing against such a dating of the dialectical dialogues. I do not deny the value of the more vivid conception that we gain of Plato's later mood and manner by combining and comparing the traits of these dialogues with those of the *Laws* and *Timæus*. This is no *ἀργὸς λόγος* directed against all sober critical investigation of the difficult problem of Plato's chronology. But the attempt to base such a chronology on the variations and developments of Plato's doctrine has led to an exaggeration of Plato's inconstancy that violates all sound principles of literary interpretation and is fatal to all genuine intelligence of his meaning. The implicit canon of this method is that variation in literary machinery and expression must be assumed to imply divergence or contradiction in thought. To this I wish to oppose an interpretation based on the opposite canon: that we are to assume contradiction or serious alteration in Plato's thought only in default of a rational literary or psychological explanation of the variation in the form of its expression. As Professor Maguire says in his forgotten but very acute essays on the Platonic ethics: "If we are anxious to find out inconsistencies in appearance, we shall find them in abundance. But the student of Plato will perhaps discover that it is more fruitful, because more philosophical to commence with the points of agreement." The ultimate test of the two methods must lie in the appeal to specific texts and contexts, and there will be no lack of this in the following pages. But by way of preparation it is first advisable to enumerate some of the general features of Plato's writings that make the sane and simple literary interpretation of his meaning so difficult and so rare.

1. Plato is not only a thinker, but also a dramatic artist and an impassioned moral and religious teacher. Although, as Schopenhauer says, he is really the most severe and consistent of logicians, and holds the threads of his design in an iron hand, his *dramatis personae* affect to follow whither the argument blows,<sup>5</sup> and he often seems more concerned to edify or entertain than to demonstrate and conclude. Wherever his æsthetic or moral preferences are involved he cavils on terminology and breaks into seemingly irrelevant eloquent digressions in a Ruskinian fashion sorely puzzling to those not in sympathy with his mood. If forced to accept the substance of a repugnant theory, he translates it into language more consonant with his feelings. This peculiar mixture of rhetoric and logic, of edification and science, misleads both the sentimentalist and the scientific puritan. The one often mistakes the ornament for the substance, the other distrusts perfectly sound reasoning because of his distaste for its emotional accompaniment.

Again, Plato stimulates our own speculation in so many ways that we are apt to mistake the drift of his meanings not because it is not clearly defined, but because we abandon

<sup>5</sup> Not only in the earlier dialogues, but in *Rep.*, 304 D; *Theætet.*, 172 D; *Laws*, 667 A.



it to pursue our own. The clever essayist tells us what he himself thought *à propos* of this or that brilliant suggestion. The investigator too often begins by selecting a few detached notions and formulas as adequately representative of each dialogue, and then proceeds to juggle with ingenious combinations of these and the interpretations put upon them by his predecessors. Neither interprets Plato's real thoughts as they lie open to any competent reader who will patiently study him to the end and report the things on which he lays most stress.<sup>6</sup>

2. In the second place, Plato's dramatic quality affects not only the artistic setting and the personages, but the ideas which he brings upon the stage. Plato's serious meaning detaches itself with perfect distinctness for the faithful student. But the hasty reader is more likely than not to receive as Platonic ideas that have a purely dramatic significance; or that are falsified by isolation from their context.<sup>7</sup> And the investigator in pursuit of a thesis too often attributes specifically to Protagoras, Antisthenes, Euclid, or Isocrates ideas that Plato has generalized and decked out beyond all recognition, as representatives of the spirit of the age.

Again, arguing for victory, the maintenance of a thesis in jest to test an opponent's metal or display one's own ingenuity was a common practice in the world which Plato depicts, and is frequently illustrated in his writings. The Platonic Socrates, under cover of an ironical profession of ignorance, employs a similar method to expose showy pretenders to universal knowledge, to produce a salutary conviction of ignorance, or to stimulate youthful thought, and prepare the way for a more serious analysis by an exposition of the antinomies latent in conventional opinions. It follows that the ostensible failure to conclude an argument, the avowal of bewilderment and perplexity, the admission even of positive fallacies of logic in any given dialogue prove nothing as to the stage of development of Plato's own thought at the time. The hypothesis that the fallacy was intentional, and that the *ἀπορία* was affected for a purpose, has at least an equal claim to be tested by all the probabilities in each case.

3. Expositors of Plato seem strangely oblivious of the limits thus far set to all systems of philosophy. They treat as peculiar defects of Plato the inconsistencies which they detect in his ultimate metaphysics after they have elaborated it into a rigid system which he with sound instinct evaded by poetry and myth. They habitually write as if they themselves and their intelligent readers were in possession of a final philosophy which reconciles all conflicting claims of metaphysical analysis and common sense, and from the heights of which they may study merely as a historical phenomenon Plato's primitive fumbling with such problems as the nature of

<sup>6</sup>Such a reader is Bonitz for the most part in his admirable analyses.

<sup>7</sup>A notable example is Herbert Spencer's inference from *Rep.*, 330 D, that Plato, like Hobbes, makes state enactments the source of right. So President Eliot has been recently misled by Zeller's misuse of *Rep.*, 421 A (*Phil. der Griechen*, 4th ed., Vol. II, No. 1, p. 890), to prove that Plato would not educate the masses. Many scholars still seem to think that the etymologies of the *Cratylus*

were intended seriously, and not a few continue to quote *Theaet.*, 156 ff., as Platonic doctrine. Under this head fall most of the "fallacies" discovered in Plato: those of the *Parmenides*, which, as we shall see, are intentional; those of the *Gorgias*, dramatically justifiable against the extreme thesis maintained by Callicles; those of *Rep.*, I, 333 E, and 349 B, which Zeller (p. 652) thinks Plato did not perceive.

universals, the antinomy of unity and plurality in thought and things,<sup>8</sup> the relation of mind and body, the possibility of a consciousness of self or a knowledge of knowledge, the proof of immortality, the freedom of the will, the difficulty of conceiving or defining good except in relation to evil, the alternative of excepting thoroughgoing relativism and phenomenalism or of positing a *noumenon* that cannot be described or brought into intelligible relation with phenomena. We are told that he has "keine Ableitung des Sinnlichen," as if there were somewhere extant a satisfactory deduction of the sensible world from some higher metaphysical principle. It is objected that the relation of the ideas to the Deity is undefined, and that the personality of God is not investigated, as if any results could follow from an attempt to define the relation of the metaphysical *noumenon* to the Deity, or from an investigation of the personality of God. The absence of a complete table of categories is taken as a defect in Plato's system or as a proof of the immaturity of the *Phædrus*, as if the Aristotelian and Kantian categories were not mere illusions of the metaphysical instinct, and Plato was not far wiser in proposing only such categories and classifications as the argument in hand required.

A chief merit of Plato is that he clearly recognizes and sharply defines the limits of scientific thought in these matters. When the interests of the moral and religious life, as he conceives them, are at stake he resorts to myth to express his hopes and aspirations. Where the epistemological problem compromises the foundations of practical certainty and sound method, he arbitrarily postulates the solution that will best serve his chief purpose — the extrication of a practicable working logic from the hopeless dialectical muddle of his time. But he is always careful to distinguish his necessary practical postulates from his mythical and metaphysical assumptions.<sup>9</sup> The dogmatism of his later works has been as much exaggerated as the Socratic doubt of the minor dialogues.<sup>10</sup>

4. As a fourth cause of misapprehension we may count a certain quaint and curious subtlety in the use of abstraction and antithesis characteristic of all Greek writers, but carried to its farthest extreme in Plato. His reasoning often proceeds by what seem to us excessively minute verbal links. This is generally thought to mean merely that the modern mind has learned to abridge the formal process by taking some things for granted. But it is often due to Plato's anxiety to anticipate the cavils and quibbles of the age before logic; or his wish to bring out neglected shades of meaning.

Again, Plato, like all serious reasoners, employs unreal abstractions to express ideals and test hypotheses by extreme cases.<sup>11</sup> But in addition to this the Platonic Socrates meets a fallacious and fantastic abstraction from the conditions of reality, not

<sup>8</sup> Astonishment is often expressed at the attention bestowed by Plato upon the problem of the one and the many, as if, transferred to psychology, it were not still the crux of all our metaphysics.

<sup>9</sup> *Meno*, 86 B; *Phædr.*, 252 C, 265 C, 274 C; *Rep.*, 416 B C, 517 B, 506 C.

<sup>10</sup> *Tim.*, 72 D, *Laws*, 641 D, 799 D, 812 A. The percentage of

apodictic replies in the "later" works proves nothing that is not already involved in the fact that they are not dramatic disputations. A consenting respondent naturally gives "apodictic" answers.

<sup>11</sup> E. g., the isolation of pleasure and intelligence in *Phileb.*, 21, to which Grote objects.

by exposing the fallacy, but by translating all the real facts into the language of abstraction. There is no real fallacy in such procedure, but a sense of fallacy results for the modern reader.<sup>12</sup> Allied to this is the use or abuse of antithesis. Opposite views are first stated with ruthless consistency in their most abstract and extreme form. And the truth is approached through a series of compromises and mediations.<sup>13</sup> Dramatically, Plato is right. This is the course of discussion among ordinary men in all ages. But the elaborate refutations which Plato thinks fit to give of the crudest form of hostile theories sometimes produces an impression of unfairness upon modern critics.<sup>14</sup> They forget two things: first, that he always goes on to restate the theory and refute its fair meaning; second, that in the case of many doctrines combated by Plato there is no evidence that they ever were formulated with the proper logical qualifications except by himself.<sup>15</sup>

5. In the fifth place, and finally, we may mention the difficulty of confining the infinite variety and suggestiveness of Plato's thoughts in the framework of any system either of philosophy or of exposition. It is possible to present Plato's ethical and social ideals in a fairly systematic résumé. The theory of ideas may be restated in the Platonic terminology, which does not teach us much, or analyzed in relation to the underlying psychological and ontological problems. Special chapters might be written on Plato's attitude toward inchoate physical science, the temper in which he faced the religious problems of an age of transition, his portrayal and criticism of the literary and artistic life of his time. But a complete system of philosophy with principles subordinate, derivative, and interdependent, and a fixed technical terminology, cannot be extracted from the Platonic writings. This will not greatly grieve those who are aware of the perfect futility of all such system-building, even when the architect possesses the genius of a Spinoza, a Kant, or a Schopenhauer. But the expositor of Plato can hardly avoid attempting to cast his exposition into some systematic form, and the recalcitrance of his material is to him a serious problem. No method is quite satisfactory. The atomism of Grote, Jowett, Bonitz, and Horn, that treats each dialogue as an isolated unit, is the renunciation of all method. The clever attempts of a succession of French expositors to deduce all Platonism symmetrically from a few principles are more ingenious than convincing.<sup>16</sup> The exhaustive schematism of Zeller, applied alike to all philosophers from Thales to Plotinus, is philologically a masterly achievement of German erudition. But, though

<sup>12</sup> E. g., in *Rep.*, I, 346, the separation of *μισθωτικὴν*, the wage-earning power, from the other functions of each art and craft.

<sup>13</sup> *Philebus*, *Theaetetus*, *Rep.*, I and II, *Gorgias*.

<sup>14</sup> E. g., in the *Cratylus*, 385 A, the theory that language is a mere convention is first stated in the most extreme form. In the *Gorgias* a long argument is spent to drive Callicles from a position which he affirms was assumed in jest (499 B). In *Rep.*, 338 C., Thrasymachus's definition of justice is taken in a grotesquely unfair sense in order to force him to state it more clearly. Cf. *Laws*, 714 C; *Gorg.*,

451 E, 453 B, 489 D. Similar is the treatment of *Homo Mensura* in the *Protagoras*, and the claim of pleasure to be the chief good in the *Philebus*.

<sup>15</sup> Plato may have found hints and suggestions of the views he brings on the stage in Euripides and the Sophists (DÜMMLER, *Prolegomena zu Platons Staat*). But so far as we know, he is the first thinker who could present a complete logical statement of any philosophical theory in all its bearings.

<sup>16</sup> See my review of HALÉVY, *Théorie platonicienne des sciences*, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. V, p. 522.

rarely admitting gross and palpable errors, Zeller's exposition frequently misses the true proportions, perspective, and emphasis that would be brought out by a more flexible literary and philosophic interpretation.

The present study, though it touches on most topics of the Platonic philosophy, does not attempt a complete historical survey. Some subjects I have discussed elsewhere. There are many details (in the *Laws* and *Timæus*, e. g.) which would be irrelevant to the main purpose of emphasizing the unity of Plato's thought. The order of presentation adopted after many attempts is a compromise between the systematic and the atomistic. The Platonic ethics, the theory of ideas, and an outline of the psychology will first be set forth as a whole. A group of logical and metaphysical problems will be discussed in connection with the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*. Other topics and some repetitions from a different point of view will follow in a survey of the principal dialogues taken one by one.

### I. ETHICS

The chief topics of the Platonic ethics are these: (1) the Socratic paradoxes; (2) the definition of the virtues, and, more particularly, the determination of their relation to a postulated supreme science or art, to happiness, to the political or royal art, to the idea of good; (3) the problem of hedonism; and (4), associated with it, the attempt to demonstrate the inseparability of virtue and happiness.<sup>17</sup>

1. Plato always formally maintained that all wrongdoing is involuntary;<sup>18</sup> that virtue is insight or knowledge, is in its essence one, and can in some sense be taught.<sup>19</sup> Sometimes he merely dramatically illustrates the conflicts that arise between these paradoxes and common-sense. Elsewhere, most explicitly in the *Laws*,<sup>20</sup> but by implication even in the minor dialogues, he reveals his perception that these propositions can be reconciled with experience only by the conscious employment of words in a special sense.<sup>21</sup> Wrongdoing is involuntary (1) because all men will the good or what they deem the good;<sup>22</sup> (2) because no man who knows the right will do the wrong, if we take knowledge in the highest sense, or refuse the term to any cognition that does not control the will;<sup>23</sup> (3) because the conditions that shape conduct lie far more in heredity, education, and environment than in our conscious wills.<sup>24</sup> The contradiction noted by Aristotle between this charitable principle and the edifying proclamation "virtue is free,"<sup>25</sup> is emotional rather than scientific.<sup>26</sup> The modern free-will controversy arises out of two conceptions not connected with this problem by Plato: the

<sup>17</sup> These are, as a matter of fact, the chief topics of the ethical dialogues. If we base Plato's ethics on the idea of good, or on any other metaphysical principle or schematism, we shall distort his meanings.

<sup>18</sup> *XEN.*, *Mem.*, 3, 9, 4; 4, 6, 6; *Apol.*, 26 A; *Protag.*, 345 D, 358 C D; *Meno*, 77, 78; *Gorg.*, 466 E, 467 B = *Rep.*, 577 E = *Laws*, 688 B; *Rep.*, 352 A (7), 413 A (7), 492 E (7), 500 C; *Phileb.*, 22 B; *Soph.*, 228 C, 230 A; *Tim.*, 86 D; *Laws*, 731 C, 734 B, 800 D.

<sup>19</sup> *Euthydem.*, 282 C; *Laws*, 644 A, *ὅς οἱ γε ἰσθὺς περὶ αὐτὸν μάλιστα εὐχόμενός ἐστι γίγνεται*.

<sup>20</sup> 689 D, 696 C, 710 A, *ἥν τις σμερνέων ἂν λόγος, φρόνησιν προαναγκαζέων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν*.

<sup>21</sup> *Laches*, 196 E; *Laches*, 191 E, *ἀνδραῖοι . . . ἐν ἡθροῖς*, cf. *Laws*, 633 D E, and *Rep.*, 429 D; *Rep.*, 443 E, 444 A; *Theaet.*, 176 C; *Polit.*, 306 A.

<sup>22</sup> *Meno*, 77; *Euthydem.*, 279; *Symp.*, 205 A; *Gorg.*, 468.

<sup>23</sup> *Protag.*, 352 B; *Laws*, 689; *Theaet.*, 176 C.

<sup>24</sup> *Tim.*, 86 D.

<sup>25</sup> *Rep.*, 617 E, *ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδίδωται*.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. my note in *A. J. P.*, Vol. X, p. 77.

infinite foreknowledge of God, and the absolute continuity of physical causation. It is, then, unprofitable to inquire whether Plato taught free-will or determinism.<sup>27</sup> But it should be distinctly noted that in the *Laws* he employs precisely the logic of modern determinism to prove that the involuntary character of wrongdoing is compatible with the distinction for legal purposes of voluntary and involuntary acts.<sup>28</sup>

Virtue is knowledge because it must be assumed to be a good, and the only certain good, the only sure guide to the good use of what the world calls good, is knowledge.<sup>29</sup> Opinion and habit may often suffice to regulate action, but persistent right opinion presupposes knowledge in its teachers, and the highest rule of conduct must be deduced from and referred to a rational apprehension of ultimate good.<sup>30</sup> Virtue is one because each of the virtues is a form of knowledge,<sup>31</sup> or because each, when taken in the highest sense, involves all the others.<sup>32</sup> Virtue is teachable in the senses in which knowledge and right opinion may be taught. The capacity for knowledge, the divine faculty, is innate, but teaching and guidance may direct it toward the good.<sup>33</sup> The ordinary virtues of habit and opinion may fairly be said to be taught when they are systematically inculcated by superior wisdom enlisting all the forces of society in its service.<sup>34</sup> This is not the case at Athens,<sup>35</sup> and therefore the Platonic Socrates alternately affirms and denies the possibility of teaching "virtue,"<sup>36</sup> and at the close of the *Meno* declares that under present conditions it comes by a grace divine which is equivalent to chance.<sup>37</sup>

Plato uses, but is not himself confused by, the Socratic analogy between the virtues and the arts and sciences.<sup>38</sup> That comparison, though it ignores the distinctively ethical element, contains a certain measure of truth. In a sense, each of us is good in that which he knows.<sup>39</sup> Knowledge as ordinarily understood is not virtue, but it

<sup>27</sup> ZELLER, p. 353; JOWETT, Vol. III, pp. 405, 425.

<sup>28</sup> 861-864 C. The meaning of the passage, though often misunderstood, is perfectly clear, and Plato warns us, 864 B, not to cavil about the terminology.

<sup>29</sup> *Euthydem.*, 281, 289; *Meno*, 85 C. Cf. from another point of view *Phaedo*, 69 A B; *Protag.*, 356, 357, with *Phileb.*, 41 E.

<sup>30</sup> *Meno*, 97 B; *Meno*, 100 A, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι, etc. Cf. *Euthydem.*, 282 D; *infra*, p. 16; *Laws*, 951 B.

<sup>31</sup> *Laches*; *Protag.*; *Phaedo*, 69 A B. *Meno*, 71 D ff., is logical rather than ethical. The unity of ἀρετή is postulated, like that of any other abstract idea, as a precondition of a definition.

<sup>32</sup> *Gorg.*, 507 A; *Laws*, 696 C. There is a suggestion of this also in the (of course intentional, BONITZ, *Platonic Studies*, p. 235) fallacies of *Protag.*, 330, 331.

<sup>33</sup> *Rep.*, 518 B, 519 A. This apparently contradicts the statement of the *Meno*, 99 A, and *Protag.*, 361 B, that ἀρετή alone can be taught. But the objection is captious. The *Republic* is satirizing the exaggerated claims of the Sophists and is speaking of the faculty, not the content, of knowledge. The whole higher education is a teaching of knowledge in a sense. And, on the other hand, though both Plato and Aristotle limit teaching in the strict sense

to knowledge, opinion is imparted ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ, 429 C, i. e., is virtually taught.

<sup>34</sup> *Rep.*, 500 D, 429 CD; *Polit.*, 309 D; *Laws*, *passim*.

<sup>35</sup> *Rep.*, 492 E; *Tim.*, 87 B; *Meno*, 93 B ff.; *Protag.*, 320; *Rep.*, 520 B; *Euthyphro*, 2 CD; *Gorg.*, 521 D; *Apol.*, 24, 25; *Laches*, 179 CD.

<sup>36</sup> *Protag.*; *Meno*; *Euthydem.*, 282 C (274 E).

<sup>37</sup> For this interpretation of θεῖα μοῖρα see MAGUIRE, p. 63, and ZELLER's full refutation of other views, p. 594, n. 4, *Rep.*, 492, 493. At present good men spring up αἰνέματα (*Rep.*, 520 B; cf. *Protag.*, 320 A; *Euthydem.*, 282 C); even in vicious states, *Laws*, 951 B, αἱ θεοὶ τινες οὐ πολλοὶ . . . φερόμενοι εἰδέν μᾶλλον ἐν εἰνομονίᾳ τῶν πόλεων ἢ καὶ μὴ.

<sup>38</sup> The lesser *Hippias* (certainly by Plato) presents the fallacy in its most paradoxical form (the voluntary lie better than the involuntary) and by its obvious irony (372 D E, 376 C) shows that Plato "already" in the Socratic period does not take it seriously, but merely uses it for dramatic or propædæutic purposes. ZELLER, p. 597, takes this as Plato's real opinion, citing *Rep.*, 535 D and 382, which merely use the paradoxical terminology to emphasize the thought, acceptable to Mill or Huxley, that the mere intellectual love of truth (knowledge) ought to be counted a virtue as well as the ordinary virtue of truthfulness.

<sup>39</sup> *Laches*, 194 D; *Lysis*, 210 D; *Rep.*, 349 E.

does away with many forms of wrongdoing. It is not courage, but the man who knows how is less likely to be afraid.<sup>40</sup> It is not *σωφροσύνη*, but it is incompatible with many forms of *ἀφροσύνη*. The wise man knows his own limits, and will undertake only what he can perform.<sup>41</sup> Partly for these reasons, and partly because he did not or, in ironical assumption that others were even as himself, would not recognize that men know the right and yet the wrong pursue, the Platonic Socrates seems to ignore the chief ethical factor, a virtuous will, and argues that he who knows justice is just.<sup>42</sup> But such "fallacies" are for Plato merely the starting-point of a fuller analysis. All knowledge is good and commendable,<sup>43</sup> but the supreme knowledge that may be identified with "virtue" is plainly something different from the specialties of the arts and sciences.<sup>44</sup> Courage, for example, apart from mere animal and temperamental fearlessness, may be defined as knowledge of what is and is not to be feared. But this involves real knowledge of good and evil, a complete ideal of life, either that of the Sophists and average Athenian opinion, or that unfolded by Plato himself in the *Republic*. The attempt to define courage in the absence of these distinctions merely illustrates the inadequacy of conventional ethical thought.<sup>45</sup>

The effective application to these problems of the obvious distinction between science and right opinion requires the larger canvas of the *Republic*. And even then it remains true that the courage most worthy of the name implies a complete philosophic mastery of the conception of life that educates the masses in such right opinion.<sup>46</sup> Plato tacitly assumes that this supreme knowledge will be inseparable from the virtuous will in his philosophic statesmen as it is in Socrates.<sup>47</sup> And thus on this higher plane the Socratic paradox becomes true again.

It matters little to the consistency and unity of Plato's thought whether we regard this harmony of the intellect and the will as a mere ideal or as a practicable postulate realized in Socrates and to be fulfilled by others in a reformed society. The distinction once drawn, the ideal once affirmed, Plato can afford to make concessions to common-sense. He can admit that in present experience a kind of bravery is

<sup>40</sup> *Laches*, 198; *Protag.*, 350.

<sup>41</sup> *Xen.*, *Mem.*, 2, 2, 24; *Charm.*, 171 D E; *Alc.*, I, 117 D E; *Sophist*, 229 C; *Laws*, 732 A.

<sup>42</sup> *Gorg.*, 460 B. The fallacy, so far as it is one, is intentional. Observe *κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον*, and the explanation in *Rep.*, 438 D E, that the knowledge of health, though differentiated from knowledge in general, is not necessarily healthful. Cf. also the recognition of common-sense in 444 D, *τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἐπείττειν δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖ*. But for the broad purposes of the argument of the *Gorgias* it is true (460 E) that rhetoric, if really the science of the just, could not be the instrument of injustice which Gorgias with unconscious immorality complacently represented it to be. Socrates is *εἰς τὸν ἑμὲν μηδὲν ἄλλω πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ*, *Crito*, 46 B; cf. *Laches*, 188 D E; *Gorg.*, 488 A. Hence, as Aristotle (*Eth. nic.*, 7, 2, 1), quoting *Protag.*, 352 B, says, he thought it monstrous that any other impulse in man should prevail over his better knowledge. And Plato in his latest work refuses the term "knowledge" to any belief that does not control the will, and pronounces discord

between the desires and the ethical convictions the grossest form of "ignorance."

<sup>43</sup> *Protag.*, 318 B; *Laches*, 182 D.

<sup>44</sup> *Charm.*, 165 C; *Euthydem.*, 282 E, 290; *Protag.*, 311, 312, 319 A; *Laws*, 961 E ff.

<sup>45</sup> *Laches*; *Protag.*, 349, 350, 360 D; *Rep.*, 429, 430.

<sup>46</sup> The courage defined in 429 C is only *πολιτικὴ γυ*. Cf. *ἐμπειρία γυ*, *Laws*, 710 A; *Polit.*, 309 E; *Phaedo*, 82 A. There are, strictly speaking, three or four grades; brute animal courage, the courage of soldiers and citizens in ordinary states, the citizen courage of the Platonic state, the philosophic courage.

<sup>47</sup> This harmony is the chief point in the selections and tests applied to them; *Rep.*, 485, 486, 539 D ff. Cf. *Polit.*, 309 A B. The *Laws* emphasize character, as compared with intellect, still more, and preserve the identity of the moral and the intellectual "which are ever dividing, but must ever be reunited" (Jowett), by reserving the word "wise" for the virtuous, 689 D.

found dissociated from the other virtues.<sup>48</sup> He can allow the word *σωφροσύνη* to be used merely for the instinctive temperamental moderation in appetite that is the fortunate endowment of some children and animals.<sup>49</sup> He can recognize that knowledge, or at least quickness and acumen of thought, is not infrequently associated with intemperance and injustice.<sup>50</sup> But he prefers to translate the facts into a more edifying terminology. Conventional virtue is a worthless currency unless redeemable and redeemed by and in the coin of wisdom.<sup>51</sup> And, on the other hand, we will refuse the name of wise to him whose will does not follow his judgment of right; and we will grant it to the man who knows enough to obey his acquired belief in the good rather than the innate promptings of appetite, though he know not how to swim or recite the alphabet.<sup>52</sup>

2. Plato found the suggestion of the cardinal virtues and of the predominance of justice in the poets. He also mentions *δσιότης*<sup>53</sup> and *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, the latter sometimes with irony.<sup>54</sup> But the number four was consecrated by its incorporation in the scheme of the *Republic*. This implies no change of doctrine. Even in the *Republic* other virtues are mentioned.<sup>55</sup> And in the *Euthyphro* it is hinted that piety is a form of justice.<sup>56</sup>

Plato would always recognize piety as one of the chief virtues, or perhaps as a synonym of all virtue,<sup>57</sup> and he would always shrink from giving so problematical a concept a place in a scientific scheme.<sup>58</sup>

Several of the minor dialogues turn on the attempt to define the virtues and allied notions. The *Laches* and *Charmides* are both Socratic quests for definition—of courage in the one case, of temperance in the other. Both involve the antithesis of the quiet and the energetic temperament.<sup>59</sup> Both terminate in perplexity—in the puzzle that, if any one virtue is identified with the supreme knowledge that will make

<sup>48</sup> Protagoras maintains this view, *Protag.*, 350, and is not answered by Socrates, who refutes him only indirectly by the proof that all virtue is one—the science of measuring pleasure and pain. But the obvious fact of experience is presumably as clear to Plato when he allows Protagoras to state it as when it is enunciated more explicitly in the *Politicus*, 306 B, or the *Laws*, 631 C. ZELLER (p. 599) incompressibly affirms that the plurality in unity of virtue is found only in the *Republic*!

<sup>49</sup> *Laws*, 710 A B.

<sup>50</sup> *Rep.*, 519 A; *Laws*, 689 D, *ὅσα πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς; Theaet.*, 176 C.

<sup>51</sup> *Phaedo.*, 89 B.

<sup>52</sup> *Laws*, 689 D, *μήτε γράμματα μήτε νῦν. Cf. Theaet.*, 176 C, *τῷ αὐτῷ ἀδικοῦντι . . . μακρὸν ἔριον' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινὸν ὅτι πανουργίας εἶναι. The whole passage is in the mood and temper of the *Laws*.*

<sup>53</sup> *Protag.*, 329 C; *Meno*, 78 D; *Laches*, 199 D.

<sup>54</sup> *Meno*, 74 A; *Rep.*, 590 E. In *Meno*, 88 A, *εὐμάθεια* and *μνήμη* are included.

<sup>55</sup> 402 C, *ἐλευθεριότης*, *μεγαλοπρέπεια* 536 A.

<sup>56</sup> *Cf. also Protag.*, 331 A.

<sup>57</sup> If it were desirable to produce a Platonic definition

of piety, I should accept that of Bonits as formulated by PROFESSOR HEIDEL (introduction to his edition of *Euthyphro*, p. 24). It is the endeavor to realize the good felt as the service of God, and as a willed co-operation with Him. But this is a mood in relation to, or an emotional synonym of, all virtue. It is not one aspect of virtue which it is necessary to distinguish in relation to a special field of conduct or a particular classification of the faculties of the soul.

<sup>58</sup> The suggestion that the *Euthyphro* "eliminates" piety, and that the *Meno* may be dated by its recognition of *δσιότης* (78 D) is utterly fantastic.

<sup>59</sup> *Cf. Charm.*, 159 B ff., with *Polit.*, 307 A B. Temperament is not virtue, but is the basis of the seeming opposition between bravery and temperance (*Polit.*, 306, 307; *Rep.*, 410 D E, 503 C D; *Laws*, 735 A, 681 B, 773 B, 831 E; *Protag.*, 349 E). Nicias and Laches, for want of this distinction, maintain opposite paradoxes. Socrates calls our attention to this by attributing to Nicias the doctrine *ὁμοίως λόγον καὶ ἁλόν . . . πρὸς ἀνδρείαν—σφικνέσθαι* (196 E). In the *Republic* (430 B), Plato chooses to deny the term "bravery" to mere animal courage. In the *Laws*, 963 E, he attributes a kind of courage to children and animals. But *ὁμοίως σφικνέσθαι* pointedly ignores the distinction of temperament.

us happy, the distinction between the virtues vanishes;<sup>60</sup> or in the tautology that the knowledge that is good is knowledge of the good.<sup>61</sup>

It is often assumed (1) that Plato was serious in these attempts to express by a phrase or a substituted synonym the essence of a virtue and the various and contradictory meanings of its conventional name; (2) that the failure and pretended perplexity of Socrates at the close mark the point reached by Plato's own thought at the time. This is a *a priori* conceivable. But the following considerations make it highly improbable:

a) Plato, in this unlike Xenophon,<sup>62</sup> always proceeds as if he were aware of the true theory and use of the definition and of the multiple meanings of ethical terms. All attempts in his writings to work out absolute and isolated definitions fail.<sup>63</sup> His own definitions, when not mere illustrations,<sup>64</sup> are always working hypotheses<sup>65</sup> or epigrammatic formulas, subordinate to and interpreted by the argument of which they form a part, and recognized as imperfect, but sufficient for the purpose in hand.<sup>66</sup> The definitions of the virtues in *Rep.*, 429 ff. cannot be understood apart from their context, and are never used again. They are declared to be a mere sketch—*υπογραφήν*, 504 D.<sup>67</sup> How shall we explain this on the supposition that he was under any illusion as to the value of absolute and isolated definitions?

b) Plato repeatedly refers in a superior way to eristic, voluntary and involuntary,<sup>68</sup> and more particularly to the confusion, tautology, and logomachy into which the vulgar fall when they attempt to discuss abstract and ethical problems.<sup>69</sup> Some of these allusions touch on the very perplexities and fallacies exemplified in the minor dialogues.<sup>70</sup> They do not imply that Plato himself had ever been so confused.<sup>71</sup> Why should we assume that he deceives us in order to disguise his changes of opinion, or

<sup>60</sup> *Laches*, 190 E.

<sup>61</sup> *Charm.*, 174 B; cf. *Rep.*, 505 B C—a connection generally missed.

<sup>62</sup> The Xenophontic Socrates perceives no difficulties, is never in doubt, and propounds dogmatically such definitions as νόμιμον = δίκαιον, *Mem.*, IV, 4, 12.

<sup>63</sup> Except the not quite serious definitions reached by diechotomy in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. Cf. *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Meno*, *Theaetetus*, *Euthyphro*, *Hippias Major*.

<sup>64</sup> τάχος, *Laches*, 192 B; σχῆμα, *Meno*, 75, 76; πηλός, *Theaet.*, 147 C; ἥλιος, *ibid.*, 208 D.

<sup>65</sup> *Phaedr.*, 237 D, ἀμολογίῃ θέμενοι ὄρον. Cf. 263 D E.

<sup>66</sup> *E. g.*, ῥητορικὴ=πολιτικὴς μορίου εἰδωλον, *Gorg.*, 463 D, but in *Phaedr.*, 261 A, ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων. Cf. the definitions of σωφροσύνη, *Phaedr.*, 237 E.

<sup>67</sup> The *Laws* repeats the substance of the definition of justice, 863 E: τὴν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ . . . καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τυραννίδα . . . πάντως ἀδικίαν προσαγορεύειν. Cf. 690 A B, τὸ γὰρ λυσιπόρευον καὶ ἰσόμενον αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) ὑπερ δὴ μάλιστα καὶ πλεονεξία πλείους ἔστιν. Cf. *Rep.*, 442 A, ὃ δὲ πλείστον τῆς ψυχῆς, etc.

<sup>68</sup> *Rep.*, 454 A; *Phileb.*, 14 C, ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἀκούειν; *Theaet.*, 206 B, ἀκούειν ἢ ἀκούειν αἰσῶν; *Theaet.*, 167 E; *Sophist*, 259 D; already in *Lysis*, 216 A B. Cf. *infra*, p. 19.

<sup>69</sup> *Phaedr.*, 237 C, 263, and, from a slightly different point of view, *Rep.*, 536 D; *Phaedo*, 90 C. This is largely due to a false conceit of knowledge, *Phaedr.*, 237 C, which the Elenchus as described in *Soph.*, 230 B, and practised in the minor

dialogues cures. Cf. *Meno*, 84 A B. So *Soph.*, 232 A B, gives the *raison d'être* of passages (*Gorgias*, *Protag.*, *Ion*) in which a pretender to universal knowledge is pressed for a specific definition of his function which he naturally is unable to give.

<sup>70</sup> *Polit.*, 306 E, especially 306 A, τὸ γὰρ ἀρετῆς μέρος ἀρετῆς εἶδει διάφορον εἶναι τινα τρόπον τοῖς περὶ λόγου ἀμφισβητικοῖς καὶ μάλ' ἐντυπύθεται πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας. Cf. *Laws*, 627 D, εὐσχημοσύνη . . . ῥημάτων πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον. *Repub.*, 348 E, εἴχομεν ἂν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες, with reference to the arguments of *Gorg.*, 474 C ff. Cf. *Laws*, 831 A, with reference to the problem of the *Lysis*; *Laws*, 661 B, 687, 688, 688 B, where the paradox of *Gorg.*, 461, is reaffirmed, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε ὡς παίζων, εἰ δ' ὡς σπουδάζων; *Republic*, 505 B, with *Charm.*, 173 E-174 B; *Rep.*, 505 C, with *Gorg.*, 499 B, where Callicles is forced to admit that some pleasures are bad. ZELLER (p. 604) thinks that *Rep.*, 505 C, refers to the *Philebus*. But the advocates of a late date for the *Philebus* rightly deny any specific parallel.

<sup>71</sup> Even after the *Republic* and *Politicus*, Plato in *Laws*, 963 ff., approaches the problem of the "political art" and the unity of virtue precisely in the manner of the tentative dialogues. There is no reason for taking seriously Socrates' dramatic bewilderment as to the "political art" in *Euthydemus*, 282 D E, that would not apply equally to the avowal of ignorance in *Laws*, 963 B, or in the *Politicus* itself, 292 C. The political art, i.e., ultimate ethical and social "good," was always a problem to Plato, as it must be to any thoughtful, conscientious man (*Rep.*, 451 A). In the *Laws*,



obliterate the traces of his mental growth? Have we not a right to expect dramatic illustration of so prominent a feature in the intellectual life of the time, and do we not find it in the *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, and the corresponding parts of the *Protagoras*? In brief, the *Euthydemus*, 277, 278; *Phaedrus*, 261, 262; the *Theaetetus*, 187 E; the *Republic*, 454, 487 B C; the *Sophist*, 230 B, 251 B, 259 C, and *Philebus*, 20 A, 15 E, show a clear consciousness of dialectic, not merely as a method of truth, but as a game practiced for amusement or eristic, to purge the conceit of ignorance or awaken intellectual curiosity. When we find this game dramatically illustrated why should we assume naïve unconsciousness on Plato's part?

c) The *Republic*, in which Plato explicitly states his solution of these problems, is a marvelous achievement of mature constructive thought. But the ideas and distinctions required for the solution itself are obvious enough, and it is absurd to affirm that they were beyond the reach of a thinker who was capable of composing the *Protagoras*,<sup>72</sup> the subtle *Lysis* and *Charmides*, or the eloquent and ingenious *Gorgias*. That the highest rule of conduct must be based upon complete insight and is the possession of a few; that the action of the multitude is determined by habit and belief<sup>73</sup> shaped under the manifold pressure of tradition and public opinion; that the virtues may be differently defined according as we refer them to knowledge or to opinion and habit; that opinion in the Athens of the Sophists and of the Peloponnesian war was not guided by true philosophy, and therefore was not the "right opinion" which should become the fixed habit of the populace in a reformed society; that the Sophists who professed to teach virtue taught at the best conformity to the desires and opinions of the many-headed beast, and that therefore in the proper sense virtue was not taught at all at Athens;<sup>74</sup> that virtue is one regarded as knowledge, or as the spiritual harmony resulting from perfect self-control (443 E), but many as expressing the opposition of contrasted temperaments and different degrees of education; and that endless logomachies result from the inability of the average disputant to grasp these and similar distinctions<sup>75</sup>—these are reflections that might present themselves to any intelligent young man who had listened to Socrates, and surveyed the intellectual life of the time, though only the genius of Plato could construct a *Republic* from them. They could occur to Plato at the age of thirty or thirty-five as well as at forty or forty-five; and it is extremely naïve to assume that so obvious a distinction as that between science and opinion, familiar to every reader of *Parmenides*, and employed to bring the *Meno* to a plausible dramatic conclusion, was a great scientific discovery, marking an epoch in Plato's thought.<sup>76</sup>

964 ff., as in the *Republic*, he finally limits himself to indicating the kind of training that will prepare the mind to apprehend it best. But as against the ideals of Athenian sophists and politicians, his beliefs were defined "already" in the *Euthyphro*, 2 C, and the *Gorgias*, 463 D ff., 521 D.

<sup>72</sup> "One of the finest specimens of analysis in all his writings."—JOHN STUART MILL, *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. IV, p. 250.

<sup>73</sup> *Phaedo*, 82 A; *Rep.*, 522 A, 619 C; *Laws*, 968 C.

<sup>74</sup> *Rep.*, 492, 493.

<sup>75</sup> *Laws*, 964 A, διαφορὴ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ καὶ ὅτι τέτταρα ὄντα ἐν ἑστί, καὶ ἐπὶ δὲ ἀρίστου, σοὶ δεῖξασθαι ὡς ἐν, πάλιν ὅτι τέτταρα.

<sup>76</sup> Not to dwell on the resemblance of *Meno*, 99 C, and *Apology*, 22 C (cf. also the *Ion*), why, if Plato has no dramatic reserves, is ὁπὲρ δεῖα ignored in the *Euthydemus*? Or is the *Euthydemus*, with its mature logic and its assumption that virtue can be taught, earlier than the *Meno*?

d) Lastly the structure and logic of the minor dialogues are indicative of dramatic design rather than of tentative inquiry. The systematic evolution of the argument and of the antitheses which it involves;<sup>77</sup> the emphasis laid on the very difficulties elucidated by the latter theory;<sup>78</sup> the reserves and qualifications of the argument and the hints of dramatic purpose<sup>79</sup>—all point to Plato's possession of the clue. The argument based on the absence from the "Socratic" dialogues of certain features of the longer works begs the point at issue.

Assuming that Plato undertook to illustrate in brief dramatic discussions the ethical logomachies of the day, he would by hypothesis as a rule abstain from Pythagorean myths, criticism of pre-Socratic thinkers, demonstrations of immortality, psychological or physiological digressions, and dogmatic developments of his own philosophy. It may be argued that such dramatic dialogues form as a whole an earlier group. It cannot be maintained that they mark the stages of Plato's own progress.<sup>80</sup> The definitions of the virtues proposed in the fourth book of the *Republic*, interpreted by their context, meet the dramatic difficulties of the *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Protagoras*, and *Meno*. Courage is not animal fearlessness, neither is it precisely knowledge of things terrible and the reverse. But the courage to be expected of the masses in a reformed state is the conservation by disciplined feeling of the opinion about things terrible or not terrible inculcated by the possessors of such knowledge.<sup>81</sup> *Σωφροσύνη* is not precisely quietness, nor doing one's own business, nor self-knowledge, though each of these definitions emphasizes one of the shades of meaning which Greek usage assigned to this "mixed mode." It is in man and state the willing acceptance by all the psychic faculties and the corresponding classes in the population of a harmonious scale of

<sup>77</sup> In the *Charmides* *σωφροσύνη* is first defined by the quiet temperament, 159 B, then by the associated modesty, *αἰδώς*, 159 E, which is elsewhere its virtual synonym, *Protag.*, 322 CDE; then by *τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν*, 161 B, another rhetorical equivalent, *Tim.*, 72 A, which, however, requires an interpretation that Critias is unable to give, even though assisted by a hint from Socrates (161 E). He cannot generalize minding one's own business, and distinguish (1) the economic, (2) the social and political, (3) the psychic division of labor; *Rep.*, 443 C. The formula is allowed to drop, and the equally ambiguous expression "self-knowledge" is substituted (164), which is found to involve puzzles that Critias can neither untie nor cut (*cf.* 167 A with *Meno*, 80 E; *Theaet.*, 188 A).

In the *Laches*, Laches insists exclusively on the temperamental aspect of bravery which opposes it to other virtues, Nicias on the cognitive element which identifies it with them. Laches's theory tends to show how the virtues are many, that of Nicias how they are one (*Laches*, 183 E ff.). But neither can expound his own view completely, still less reconcile it with the truth of his adversary. They exemplify the logomachy described in *Polit.*, 306, 307. This is the chief object of the dialogue, and not the reduction of all virtue to knowledge (Zeller), nor the unity of virtue (Horn), nor even the establishment of the definition *φρόνιμος κατὰ πάντα* which Bonitz says is the only suggestion not disproved.

In the *Lysis* we begin with purely verbal quibbles, pass to the suggestive antithesis of the attraction of like and unlike in nature and man (214, 215), and conclude with

the problem of good and evil, and the ultimate nature of desire and the good.

<sup>78</sup> Note the repeated demand that it be shown how *σωφροσύνη* is a good, *Charm.*, 159 C, 161 A, 165 D, 172 D, 174 B, with *Rep.*, 50. *Cf. infra*, p. 17. Also *Lysis*, 710, when, even after the *Republic*, it is recognized that *σωφροσύνη* as the mere passive *conditio sine qua non* of the usefulness of the active virtues *ἀλλόγου σιγῆς ἄξιον ἂν εἴη*. Again, *cf.* the association of *τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν* in 161 with the division of labor, and *Rep.*, 370 A, 432 A, 434 C, 443 D. So in the *Laches*, Nicias is driven to admit that the knowledge of things really terrible and the reverse is not the property of any craftsman even in his own field, but is some higher knowledge of final ends which he cannot define—i. e., obviously the "political art" or the idea of good.

<sup>79</sup> *Charm.*, 160 B, *ἡ γὰρ τοῦτον τοῦ λόγου*; the obvious design of humbling Critias, 162 C D; Charmides's disbelief in Socrates's ignorance, 176 B. *Cf. Phaedr.*, 262 D, *ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίξων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοῦτ' ἀκούοντα*, Laches's unfamiliarity with dialectic and the awakening effect of the Elenchus upon him; 194 A B.

<sup>80</sup> As URSKRWING says (*Untersuchungen*, p. 220): "Für das Verständniss des Platonismus ist kaum ein anderer Irrthum gefährlicher, als der, eine Zurückhaltung, die Plato aus methodischen Gründen äbte, mit einem Nichtssein zu verwechseln."

<sup>81</sup> *Rep.*, 429 C D, 442 C.

subordination from higher to lower.<sup>52</sup> It is thus the precondition and obverse aspect of justice which is the fulfilment of its own function by each faculty and class—a higher than the economic division of labor in the soul and in society.<sup>53</sup> These definitions are stated in terms of being rather than of doing, and Plato preferred this form of statement to the end.<sup>54</sup> But he is careful to add that the one includes the other and that the justice within the soul will express itself in just action.<sup>55</sup>

3. These definitions, then, meet the chief difficulties of the minor dialogues and fill their place in the literary economy of the *Republic*. But Plato warns us that they are not the final definitions of a complete philosophy.<sup>56</sup> It is not enough to define the virtues psychologically on the assumption that their sum is good.<sup>57</sup> A final definition must relate virtue to, and deduce its utility from, an ultimate standard or ideal of good.<sup>58</sup> Such a definition is rather a regulative conception than a practical possibility. The Platonic Socrates is always prepared to silence by dialectic or overwhelm by his eloquence those who deny that "virtue" is a real good.<sup>59</sup> But a formal, positive enumeration of the reasons why courage and justice are good and desirable can never be complete, and will always prove unedifying: "Does law so analyzed coerce you much?" Plato wisely attempts nothing of the kind. He merely describes the discipline and education<sup>60</sup> that will enable his philosophic rulers to prove, if required, the coincidence of virtue and happiness, and systematically inculcate efficacious right opinion, thus teaching virtue and molding character and institutions in the light of a reasoned and unified conception of the true scope and good of individual and public

<sup>52</sup> 432 A, 442 D. This definition is adapted to the literary machinery of the *Republic*. It does not estop Plato from employing the word in its normal Greek sense (*Rep.*, 389 D E, ὡς πλεον, etc.), or from recognizing that it is a condition of virtue rather than an active virtue; *supra*, p. 12.

<sup>53</sup> Allowance once made for the literary schematism of the four virtues, the three faculties, and the analogy between the man and the state, and account once taken of *Laws*, 696 C, 710, and *Politicus*, 306 ff., it becomes a little naïve to complain that the distinction intended between *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη* is not clear, and a little pedantic to institute a learned philological inquiry to ascertain it.

<sup>54</sup> *Laws*, 864 A, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν . . . εἰν αὐτῇ κρατοῦσα ἐν ψυχαῖς διακοσμή πάντα ἄνδρα, καὶ σφάλλονται τὴν δίκαιον μὲν πᾶν εἶναι φασίν τὸ ταύτῃ πρᾶξθαι.

<sup>55</sup> 442 E, 443 A.

<sup>56</sup> Grote, followed by many others, denies this. But that is because he persists in attributing to Plato the doctrine that ethical abstractions ("mixed modes") have one meaning only which can be expressed in an absolute definition; *cf. supra*. But, on the contrary, the very cause of the confusion, according to Plato, is that men fail to take notice of the different meanings and sub-species covered by one generic term (*Phædr.*, 161, 162; *Euthydem.*, 277, 278; *Laws*, 857 A; *Phileb.*, 12 E ff.; *Euthyphro*, 7 D. with *Phædr.*, 263 B, and *Polit.*, 285 E; *Polit.*, 306 A). Laches, Nicias, Charmides, Critias, discuss the virtues without distinguishing temperament, convention, habit, systematic discipline, opinion, and complete insight. They are unable to attach any precise meaning to the conventional phrases

"know thyself" and "minding one's own business." There is not one temperance or bravery, but three or four. There is no incompatibility between this view and Plato's insistence on the necessity of the definition and the final unity of virtue. If the word has many meanings, the first step in rational argument is to define the one intended. And the unity of virtue is to be sought, not in a verbal definition, but in the unity of the moral life, the idea of good, the political art, the *σκοπὴ* (*cf. infra*, n. 102). The definition is a hypothesis at the beginning, or a stage in the progress of the argument (*Charm.*, 163 A; *Euthyphro*, 9 D, 11 C; *Phædr.*, 237 D, ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον, 263 D E). It cannot be an end, and for this reason dialogues that seek a definition fail. This dialectical relativity of the definition, of course, does not preclude Plato from arguing that his ideal of the moral and social life is better than that of average Athenian opinion, and that the definitions which embody it are right as against formulas that express some aspect of the traditional belief.

<sup>57</sup> *Rep.*, 427 E, οἶμαι ἤμῃν τὴν πόλιν . . . τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι σοφίᾳ τ' ἰστί καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαίᾳ.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 504 B C D, 505 A, ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα . . . ἡ δίκαια καὶ τ' ἄλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ἀφέλιμα γίνονται.

<sup>59</sup> *Gorgias*; *Rep.*, I.

<sup>60</sup> The "longer way," *Rep.*, 504 C, is for the guardians, not for us who are reading the *Republic*. See *Laws*, 964, 966 C. Neglect of this point has caused much misinterpretation. See *Idea of Good*, in "University of Chicago Classical Studies," Vol. I, p. 190.

life. The attainment of this mastery he poetically describes as the vision of the Idea of Good. But it must never be forgotten that all this mysticism culminates in the precise and purely logical statement of 534 B C, which affirms little more than *Phædrus*, 278 C, or than Mill when he says: "There is no knowledge, and no assurance of right belief, but with him who can both confute the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against confutation."<sup>91</sup> Many secondary suggestions attach themselves to the phrase by association with the goodness of God, the universal cause, in the *Timæus*,<sup>92</sup> the vision of the absolute ideas in the *Phædrus* and *Symposium*, the fantastic enumeration in the *Philebus* (66) of the elements of "good" conceived at once as an ethical and a cosmical principle.<sup>93</sup> Its chief logical and ethical significance for the *Republic* has been hopelessly misunderstood, owing to the failure to connect it rightly with the problem of the "good" as presented in the minor dialogues.<sup>94</sup> In these dialogues Socrates repeatedly tests definitions of the virtues by demanding that they be related to happiness, the political or royal art, or the good. A virtue by hypothesis must be a *καλόν* and *ἀγαθόν*.<sup>95</sup> The definitions proposed repeatedly break down because Socrates is able to instance cases in which the rule prescribed does not conduce to happiness—is not good.<sup>96</sup> Similarly the rhetorician, the sophist, and other pretenders to some supreme knowledge are confounded by Socrates's demand that they shall sharply discriminate their art and science from all merely instrumental and technical specialties which effect good or evil according as they are rightly or wrongly used, and show its identity with the art of arts, the art of final ends, the political art, the good.<sup>97</sup>

In some of the minor dialogues the negative dialectic seems to go too far, and Socrates makes demands that neither Platonism nor any other doctrine can meet. Thus in the *Charmides* the familiar expression "knowing one's self," "knowing one's limits," "knowing what one can or cannot do," is made a puzzle by confounding it with the psychological question of self-knowledge or self-consciousness, and the fallacy or problem about knowing and not knowing the same thing;<sup>98</sup> and, waiving this point, Socrates demands proof that knowing the things one cannot do and intrusting them to experts is a good—a fundamental axiom of Platonism.<sup>99</sup> The explanation is that the phrase, like *τὰ ἐαυτοῦ πράττειν* above, is taken externally of adminicular and

<sup>91</sup> *Dissertations and Discussions*, Vol. IV, p. 283.

<sup>92</sup> 29 E, ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεός. On the identification of the good with God see *Idea of Good*, pp. 188, 189.

<sup>93</sup> Fantastic because due (1) to the wish to depress *θεορία* to the fifth place; (2) to the neo-Platonic device of extending the intelligible hierarchy by the interpolation of new members between the highest and the lowest. It belongs to rhetoric or religious emotion, then, not to Plato's scientific ethics.

<sup>94</sup> *E. g.*, one hundred and fifty pages separate ZELLER's treatment of the idea of good (p. 707) from his discussion of the ethical good (p. 867). In elucidation of the former he quotes little or nothing from the ethical dialogues and cites neither *Phædo*, 99 A, nor any other passage in which

the "opinion of the best" is treated as a potent cause. Finally he identifies the idea of good with God by a sophistical interpretation of *παραλήψεις ἐαυτοῦ* (*Tim.*, 29 E) and a false construction of (92 B) *εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ* (*sc. ζῴον* not *θεοῦ*, *cf.* 38 C D).

<sup>95</sup> *Meno*, 87 D; *Laches*, 192 C, 193 D; *Protag.*, 349 E; *Hipp. Maj.*, 284 D; *Rep.*, 332, 333.

<sup>96</sup> See *Idea of Good*, pp. 200-204.

<sup>97</sup> *Euthyd.*, 282 E, 290, 291 C; *Charm.*, 170 B; *Protag.*, 319 A; *Gorg.*, 501 A B, 503 D; *Polit.*, 289 C, 293 D, 300 C; *Rep.*, 428 D.

<sup>98</sup> *Cf.* *Meno*, 80 E; *Euthydem.*, 286 D., *Theatet.*, 191 B, 196 C.

<sup>99</sup> *Cf.* *XEN.*, *Men.*, 4, 2, 24; *Alc.*, I, 117 D E; *Laws*, 732 A.

mechanical arts and sciences, not as in the *Republic*, with reference to the division of labor or function in the soul and the supreme arts of life and government. To ask why Critias is allowed to be baffled for lack of this distinction is to ask why Plato wrote short dramatic dialogues at all—why he did not incorporate the fourth book of the *Republic* in the *Charmides*. So in *Euthydemus*, 292 E, the suggestion that the good achieved by the possessors of the political art will be the training up of successors to know it is treated as a vicious circle or an infinite regress, although, when accompanied by the fuller explanations of the *Republic*, it is evidently in part the true Platonic doctrine.<sup>100</sup> And similarly in the *Lysis* the theory, virtually repeated in the *Symposium*, that that which is intermediate between good and evil desires the good as a remedy against evil, is rejected because it makes the good a mere means to an end.<sup>101</sup> But the general meaning that emerges from the *ἀποπλαι* of the minor dialogues, and the answer to them given in the *Republic*, is as simple as it is sound. A philosophic ethics must systematically relate its definitions and prescriptions to some consistent conception of final ends and good—be it the realization of spiritual health and order in a reformed society, the development of personality, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the fulfilment of the will of God, the renunciation of the will to live, or the survival of the fittest. The statesman rises above the politician, the thinker and artist above the rhetorician, the true teacher above the charlatan, by his possession of an aim and a standard, his apprehension of a type of perfection toward which all his thoughts, and words, and acts converge.<sup>102</sup>

Plato's own ethical and social conceptions were thus co-ordinated and unified. Those of the brilliant sophists and rhetoricians who figure in his pages were not. They may have been very estimable and ingenious men. They could not in Plato's judgment be true philosophers, statesmen, or teachers of statesmen, because they lacked both the "idea of good" and the synoptic and unifying dialectic required for its systematic application in ethics and politics, and in the education of the masses to "virtue." This recognition of the logical significance of the idea of good for the *Republic* and the Socratic dialogues does not commit us to an acceptance of all Plato's social ideals. It does not even require us to admit that the doctrine of the *Republic* really solves all the difficulties suggested by Plato's "negative dialectic." But it creates the strongest presumption that it was present to his mind when he wrote the *Laches*, *Charmides*, and *Euthydemus*.

Parallel to the quest for the definition of the cardinal virtues leading to the idea of good is the study of friendship, love, passion, culminating in the apprehension of the idea of beauty at the point where it is hardly to be distinguished from the good.<sup>103</sup> No complete philosophy can ignore these things. Plato's reflections upon them have

<sup>100</sup> Cf. *Meno*, 100 A, οἷος καὶ ἄλλων ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν, etc. Cf. *Rep.*, 412 A B, 497 C D; *Laws*, 950 B ff.; *Polit.*, 309 D, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν . . . προσέκει . . . τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μύσῃ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ὁρθῶς μεταλαβούσι παιδείας, which, however, refers partly to the lower education as well.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. *Lysis*, 218 A, with *Symp.*, 203 E.

<sup>102</sup> *Gorg.*, 503 E, 501 C, 517, 518; *Rep.*, 484 C, 500 D E, 520 C; *Laws*, 625 E, 630 C, 688 B, 693 B, 708 A, 717 A, 733 C D, 962 A.

<sup>103</sup> *Lysis*, 219, 220; *Symp.*, 205 D, 210, 211; *Phædr.*, 250 D ff.; *Phileb.*, 64 E. οὐδὲν δὲ καταπέφυγεν ἡμῖν ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν.

become the commonplaces of the philosophy and poetry of modern Europe: the strange antinomy between the love of like for like and the attraction of dissimilars in man and nature; the exaltation of character and mood in passionate love and friendship; the transfiguration of the passion in the love of æsthetic, moral, and intellectual beauty;<sup>104</sup> the overloading of the instinct to achieve the ends of nature—the immortality of the species.<sup>105</sup> The student of the *Lysis*, *Phædrus*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Laws* will find it impossible to fix a date at which these ideas first presented themselves to Plato's mind.<sup>106</sup> The mood, the treatment, the emphasis varies. Some of the thoughts are omitted in each dialogue, none are treated in all, and contradictions and developments may be "proved" by uncritically pressing the language and the imagery. But the differences between the *Symposium* and *Phædrus*, both presumably works of the middle period, are as noticeable as those found in any other works that touch on the theme. The *Symposium* mentions one idea, the *Phædrus* several; the former ignores immortality and ἀνάμνησις, the latter is one of the chief sources for both.<sup>107</sup> The *Phædrus* ignores the thought that love is the yearning of the mortal for immortality, the *Symposium* virtually omits the doctrine of μανία and enthusiasm. In the *Symposium* love is not a god, but a demon; in the *Phædrus* he is θεός or (to escape explicit contradiction) τι θεῖον. These and other differences present no difficulties to a rational literary interpretation. On no reasonable theory of Plato's development can they signify real changes in Plato's beliefs in the interval between the composition of the two dialogues.

The *Lysis*, though a slight Socratic dialogue, displays extreme subtlety of dialectic,<sup>108</sup> and implies some of the most characteristic thoughts of the *Symposium*.<sup>109</sup> The failure to establish a formal definition, and the Socratic avowal of ignorance at the end prove nothing. There is a plain hint that Menexenus is an "eristic," and Socrates's treatment of him, so different in tone from the edifying little conversation with Lysis, is a mere dramatic illustration of the πλάνη or ἀπορία that results from failure to discriminate the different meanings of an ambiguous term. Love, as the *Phædrus* tells us, is such a term—including subordinate and contradictory species.<sup>110</sup> For, as the *Laws* say, 837 A, δύο γὰρ ὄντα αὐτὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τρίτον ἄλλο εἶδος ἐν ὀνομα

<sup>104</sup> Zeller's theory that Eros is *der philosophische Trieb* is a somewhat rigid and matter-of-fact interpretation of this poetry.

<sup>105</sup> *Symp.*, 207 D; *Laws*, 721, 773 E.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. *Rep.*, 402, 403, with *Symp.*, 210 C; *Rep.*, 490 A B; *Laws*, 688 B, φρόνησις . . . καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ' ἑραυτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας; *Rep.*, 490 C, with *Laws*, 711 D, ὅταν ἔρωις θεῖος τῶν συμφέρων τε καὶ δικαίων ἐπιτηδεύματων ἐγγίνεσθαι. *Laws*, 841 D, 636 C, παρὰ φύσιν, with *Phædr.*, 251 A; *Laws*, 837; *Gorg.*, 474 D E, generalization of καλόν as in *Symp.*

<sup>107</sup> LUTOSLAWSKI (p. 242) fails to tell us where ἀνάμνησις is "alluded to in the speech of Aristophanes."

<sup>108</sup> The conception of eristic, 216 A B, arguing to the word, not the meaning, is as clear as it is in *Rep.*, 454 A, or *Euthydem.*, 295 B C, and the fallacy by which it is illus-

trated, the identity of opposites as such, recurs in substance in *Parmen.*, 148 A B, and belongs to the same class as the quibble on ἔρπον, *Euthydem.*, 301 B; *Theætet.*, 190 C; *Parmen.*, 147 E. Cf. also ἀνομοιότατον, *Philob.*, 13 D; *Parmen.*, 127 E, 148 B C.

<sup>109</sup> E. g., οὐκ οὐδὲν φιλοσοφεῖ, etc., *Symp.*, 203 E, which LUTOSLAWSKI (p. 239) thinks an important new point, in advance even of the *Cratylus*, is "already" in *Lysis*, 218 A. Zeller, who is "unable to suppose" that Plato had "already" attained the guiding thoughts of his later system (p. 614), argues that in the *Lysis* the psychological analysis is carried as far as is possible on a Socratic basis, but that the metaphysical explanation was revealed later. If Plato must tell all he knows in every dialogue, why is ἀνάμνησις not associated with ἔρως in the *Symposium* and *Republic*?

<sup>110</sup> 263 C, 285 E.

περιλαβὸν πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν καὶ σκότον ἀπεργάζεται. How familiar the two εἶδη were to Plato appears from the almost technical use of the phrase δι' ὁμοιότητα φιλίαν in *Phædr.*, 240 C. Menexenus's bewilderment is precisely on a par with that of Kleinias over the two meanings of μανθάνω in the *Euthydemus*.<sup>111</sup> Plato is no more confused in the one case than in the other. The mood of the *Symposium* and *Phædrus* is compatible with youth or maturity, hardly with old age. The thoughts are naturally not repeated in their entirety, but many of them appear in the *Republic*, or are suggested elsewhere. They are nowhere contradicted,<sup>112</sup> and there is no reason to doubt that they were essential permanent elements of Plato's criticism of life. But he was not always in the mood to dwell upon them.

4. In another aspect the Platonic ethics is a polemic against hedonism. This must not be confounded with the modern utilitarian controversy. The modern opponent of utilitarianism is chiefly concerned to prove that the moral law cannot be deduced from experiences of utility, but has an *a priori* origin and requires a supernatural sanction. Plato does not directly discuss the origin of morality, but he explicitly disclaims the necessity of the sanction derived from the hope of immortality,<sup>113</sup> affirms with great emphasis that the useful is the right,<sup>114</sup> and bases all virtue on the supremacy of the λογιστικόν or calculating reason.<sup>115</sup> In the *Protagoras* Socrates is represented as maintaining against Protagoras by purely Benthamite arguments the identity of pleasure and the good.<sup>116</sup>

The seeming contradiction between this and the anti-hedonism of the *Gorgias* and *Philebus* demands explanation. It has sometimes been argued that Plato's own opinions on this point were reversed between the composition of the *Protagoras* and that of the *Gorgias*. Another explanation is that Socrates merely develops a paradox for the bewilderment of the Sophist. And it is true that in some parts of the dialogue Socrates is obviously jesting,<sup>117</sup> and that we are warned against accepting the result too seriously by the reminder that both Socrates and Protagoras have maintained

<sup>111</sup> 277 E.

<sup>112</sup> Grote says that in the *Theætetus* the spectacle of a beautiful youth is not required as the indispensable initiatory stimulus to philosophy. But the *Symp.*, 210 C, καὶ σμικρὸν ἄθος ἔχει, and the *Rep.*, 402 D, emphasize the unimportance of the beauty of the body as compared with that of the mind. And in the same vein Socrates says, καλὸς γὰρ εἰ ὁ Θεαίτητος . . . ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός, etc., 186 E. The Platonic Socrates is still the ἐρωτικὸς as he was in the *Lysis*, nor can we suppose that he would ever have found the beautiful *Meno* as helpful an "initiatory stimulus to philosophy" as the snub-nosed *Theætetus*.

<sup>113</sup> *Rep.*, 363 B C D, 367 E, 612 B C. The *Gorgias* does not differ herein from the *Republic*, as Ritchie (p. 156) seems to think. The argument is complete without the myth, and the phrases at the end about living justly in order to prepare for the judgment of Minos prove no more than the *ira* of *Rep.*, 621 C.

<sup>114</sup> καλόν, *Rep.*, 457 B.

<sup>115</sup> *Rep.*, 440 E, 571 C, 605 B.

<sup>116</sup> *Protag.*, 353-8.

<sup>117</sup> 340 ff. In 341 D, Protagoras, anticipating *Philebus*, 12 E, and in language suggesting the protest against eristic in *Sophist*, 259 D, points out that (generic) resemblance is compatible with difference and even contrariety (cf. also *Meno*, 74 D). He does not explain himself fully, however, and Socrates, ignoring the point, proceeds to trip him up by a fallacious use of the principle that one thing can have only one opposite. Whatever the date of the *Euthydemus*, its author was aware that a word used in two senses may have two opposites, quite as early as he was capable of writing the *Protagoras*. The passage is merely a dramatic illustration of Socrates's superiority in the game of question and answer. Again in 350 B-351 A, when it is argued that bravery is knowledge because knowledge imparts confidence, Protagoras points out that we cannot convert the universal affirmative proposition, "all bravery is confidence," and distinguishes as bravery the confidence that arises from nature and training. Though not a match for Socrates, Protagoras is a far better reasoner than Laches or Nicias, and again Socrates refutes him only by taking

theses incompatible with the positions from which they started.<sup>118</sup> But the full explanation lies deeper. In the *Republic* Plato undertakes to demonstrate the intrinsic desirability of virtue against two forms of disbelief—the explicit skepticism of the cynic, who affirms that natural justice is the advantage of the stronger and human justice an artificial convention, and the unfaith of the ordinary man, who virtually admits this theory by commending justice solely on external and prudential grounds.<sup>119</sup> The Callicles of the *Gorgias* represents the former view, Gorgias himself and (less obviously) Protagoras the latter. Like other Sophists, he is the embodiment of average public opinion which his teaching reproduces.<sup>120</sup> He himself says that all men teach virtue. He modestly claims at the most only to teach it a little more effectively and persuasively than the layman.<sup>121</sup> Plato would admit both assertions, with the reservation that the virtue so taught hardly deserves the name, and that the teaching is neither systematic nor philosophical.

The molding power of public opinion, operating through countless social and educative agencies, is admirably depicted in the myth attributed to Protagoras, the main thought of which is repeated in the *Republic*.<sup>122</sup> There, however, the philosophic rulers are to employ this irresistible force for the inculcation, not of average Greek opinion, but of Platonic virtue. The *Protagoras* dramatically illustrates the dialectic incapacity and philosophic superficiality of the great popular teacher. His ethical teaching is spiritually and logically on a level with the precepts of the worthy sires and guardians satirized by Adeimantus.<sup>123</sup> However unlike in temper and practical effect, it is philosophically akin to the individual hedonism of Callicles and Thrasymachus who reject all morality as an unreal convention. Protagoras is naturally unaware of this. Like the populace, he recoils from the naked exposition of the principles implied in his preaching and practice. He accepts the terminology of individual hedonism only under compulsion of Socrates's superior dialectic. But Socrates's explicit challenge to him and the assembled Sophists to name any other final good than ἡδονή is a proof that one of Plato's objects was to identify the Sophistic ethics with hedonism.<sup>124</sup> But neither this nor the demonstration of Protagoras's inability to cope with Socrates in dialectic exhausts the significance of the dialogue.

Plato, however reluctantly, always recognized a certain measure of truth in the Benthamite analysis here attributed to Socrates. He knew that "act we must in pursuance of that which (we think) will give us most pleasure." Even the *Gorgias* contains phrases of utilitarian, if not hedonistic, implication.<sup>125</sup> The Eudæmonism of

up a new line of argument—the identity of pleasure and good, and the consequent unity of the virtues in the "measuring art." Plato of course was aware here, and in the *Euthyphro* (12), and everywhere, that a universal affirmative cannot be directly converted. But it is a part of the scheme of the dialogue that Protagoras should make some good points, though defeated in the end. And Socrates is baffled in or fails to complete other proofs of the unity of virtue, and so is driven to rely on the proof from hedonism, which is the chief feature of the dialogue.

<sup>118</sup> *Protag.*, 351.

<sup>119</sup> *Rep.*, 362 E ff. Cf. ZELLER, p. 603, n. 1.

<sup>120</sup> *Rep.*, 492 ff.

<sup>121</sup> *Protag.*, 328 B.

<sup>122</sup> RITCHIE (p. 156) says: "The argument of the Sophist Protagoras . . . is now fully accepted by Plato," etc., as if Plato was not the author of the *Protagoras*.

<sup>123</sup> *Rep.*, 362 E.

<sup>124</sup> 354 D, 356 A.

<sup>125</sup> 499 D. RITCHIE (p. 155) strangely says that in the *Republic* Plato recognizes, in marked advance upon the position of the *Gorgias*, that there are good pleasures as well as bad!



the *Republic* has often been pointed out,<sup>126</sup> and in the *Laws* Plato explicitly declares, in language recalling that of the *Protagoras*, that it is not in human nature to pursue any course of action that does not promise a favorable balance of pleasure.<sup>127</sup> But the inference which he draws is not that it is safe or desirable to proclaim that pleasure is the good, but that it is necessary to demonstrate that the good—the virtuous life—is the most pleasurable.

To a Benthamite this will seem a purely verbal or rhetorical distinction. And Aristotle himself hints that Plato's aversion to the name of pleasure cast a suspicion of unreality over his ethical teaching.<sup>128</sup> But Plato is not alone in his aversion to the word. Matthew Arnold acknowledges a similar feeling. And Jowett, in his admirable introduction to the *Philebus*, has once for all set forth the considerations by which many clear-headed modern thinkers, who perfectly understand the utilitarian logic and accept whatever is true in its psychology, are nevertheless moved to reject its language. The Greek word *ἡδονή* is much more closely associated with a low view of happiness than the English word "pleasure;" and Plato had, or thought that he had, much stronger reasons than the moderns have, for identifying hedonism with the negation of all moral principle.

The *Gorgias* and *Philebus* nowhere explicitly contradict the thesis of the *Protagoras* that a preponderance of pleasure, rightly estimated and abstracted from all evil consequences, is good.<sup>129</sup> The doctrine which they combat is the unqualified identification of pleasure and good, coupled with the affirmation that true happiness is to be sought by developing and gratifying the appetite for the pleasures of sense and ambition.<sup>130</sup> Plato represents Callicles and Philebus as unable or unwilling to limit these propositions even by the qualifications of the *Protagoras*.<sup>131</sup> It is he, not they, who introduces the distinction of pure and impure,<sup>132</sup> true and illusive,<sup>133</sup> wholesome and unwholesome,<sup>134</sup> necessary and unnecessary pleasures.<sup>135</sup> The modern critic may object that Plato was not justified in attributing to any contemporaries either this dialectical incapacity or this cynical effrontery. Plato thought otherwise. It is a question of historical evidence. But it is not legitimate to attribute to the Callicles and the Philebus of the dialogues the utilitarianism of Grote or John Stuart Mill, or even that of the *Protagoras*, and so convict Plato of self-contradiction.<sup>136</sup>

With these remarks we may dismiss so much of the *Gorgias* and *Philebus* as is merely dialectical, dramatic, or rhetorical, directed against the crudest form of hedonism which Plato chooses to bring upon the stage before grappling with the problem in

<sup>126</sup> 357 B, *ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἐβλαβεῖς* goods per se; 457 B, 458 E, 581 E (with *Laws*, 732 E), *μὴ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἰσχρὸν ζῆν* *μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἀμεινον*, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἡδίων καὶ ἀνυπό-  
στον.

<sup>127</sup> *Laws*, 733, 734; cf. 663 A. <sup>128</sup> *Eth. nic.*, X, 1.

<sup>129</sup> *Phileb.*, 60 A B, is verbally a direct contradiction of *Protag.*, 355 B.

<sup>130</sup> *Gorg.*, 495 A, 492 D E; *Phileb.*, 12 A, 12 D, 27 E.

<sup>131</sup> The verbal identification of *ἡδονή* and *ἀγαθόν* in 355 has been preceded by such phrases as κατ' ὃ ἡδὲν ἔστιν, 351 C,

and the explanation that some painful goods are medicinal (354 A = *Rep.*, 357 C), and is checked by the calculus of all consequences, all of which is ignored by Callicles and Philebus.

<sup>132</sup> *Phileb.*, 51, 52.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 36 C ff.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 41 A; *Gorg.*, 499 D E.

<sup>135</sup> *Rep.*, 558 D.

<sup>136</sup> Plato, as Jowett says, is "playing both sides of the game . . . but it is not necessary in order to understand him that we should discuss the fairness of his modes of proceeding."

earnest.<sup>137</sup> The real arguments which he employs, not so much to refute the thesis of the *Protagoras* as to limit its practicable application and justify his repudiation of its terminology, may be summed up as follows: The distinction between good and bad pleasures once admitted, the statement that pleasure as such is the good, becomes an unreal abstraction.<sup>138</sup> The reality is specific kinds of pleasure and the principle of distinction, whether intelligence, measure, or the will to obey the "opinion of the best,"<sup>139</sup> becomes more important than the bare name of pleasure, and more nearly allied to the good.<sup>140</sup> The "measuring art" postulated in the *Protagoras* is impracticable. Pleasure and pain are, like confidence and fear, foolish counselors;<sup>141</sup> either deprives the mind of the sanity required for a just estimate.<sup>142</sup> No scale of human judgment can be trusted to weigh the present against the future, and make allowance for all the illusions of memory, hope, and contrast.<sup>143</sup> The most intense pleasures and pains are associated with a diseased condition of mind and body.<sup>144</sup> And the habit of pursuing pleasure, of thinking and speaking of it as the good, tends to make the world of sense seem more real than that of thought and spirit.<sup>145</sup> The contrary is the truth. The world of sense is a pale reflex of the world of ideas,<sup>146</sup> and the pleasures of sense are inherently unreal, illusory, and deceptive, and may in sound logic be termed false, as fairly as the erroneous opinions that accompany them.<sup>147</sup> They are false because composed of hopes and imaginations not destined to be fulfilled;<sup>148</sup> false, because exaggerated by the illusions of distance in time or contrast;<sup>149</sup> false, because

<sup>137</sup> *Phileb.*, 55 A B, and *Gorg.*, 495 C, 499 B, show that the arguments of *Gorg.*, 495 C-499 B, are, in the main, a conscious dialectical sport. I recur to this point so often because the *Gorgias* and the first book of the *Republic* are the chief source of the opinion, widely spread by Grote, Mill, and Sidgwick, that Plato is a magnificent preacher, but often a weak reasoner. Cf. MILL, *Diss. and Discuss.*, IV, 291: "This great dialogue, full of just thoughts and fine observations on human nature, is, in mere argument, one of the weakest of Plato's works." Cf. *Idea of Good*, pp. 213-15.

<sup>138</sup> *Phileb.*, 12 D E. In answer to the question, πῶς γὰρ ἴδοντες γε ἴδοντες μὴ οὐκ ὁμοῦνται ἐν εἰς; Socrates shows that generic (verbal) identity is compatible with specific difference or even opposition, a logical principle "already" glanced at in the *Protag.*, 331 D, with the same illustration of μέλαν and λευκόν. LUTOWSKI, p. 467, misunderstands 13 A, τοῦτε γὰρ λόγῳ μὴ πιστεύετε, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἐν ποιῶντι—"we need not attempt a reconciliation of all contradictions!"

<sup>139</sup> *Phaedr.*, 237 D. ἐμφυτοὶ . . . ἐπιθυμία ἴδοντων . . . ἐπικτητοὶ δόξα, ἐφιμενὴ τοῦ ἀρίστου. Cf. *Laws*, 644 D, 645 A. *Phaedr.*, 99 A, ὑπὸ δόξῃ φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου.

<sup>140</sup> *Phileb.*, 64 C, τί . . . μάλιστα αἰτίον εἶναι δόξαι ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; with the context.

<sup>141</sup> Cf. *Tim.*, 69 D, with *Laws*, 644 C.

<sup>142</sup> *Rep.*, 402 E; *Phileb.*, 63 D; *Phaedr.*, 96 B.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. *Phileb.*, 41 E ff., with *Protag.*, 356, 357; *Gorgias*, 500 A, ἂν οὐδὲν πάντες ἀνθρώποι ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι, etc. *Laws*, 663 B.

σκοπεδονῶν δὲ τὸ πᾶρθεον ὁράμενον πᾶσι τοῖς ἔσθαι εἶναι . . . παύεται, and the rhetorical repudiation of the whole hedonistic calculus, *Phaedr.*, 69 A B.

<sup>144</sup> *Phileb.*, 45 B-E, ἐν τῇ περὶ φύξης καὶ τοῦ σώματος . . . μέγισται μὲν ἴδονται, etc.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.*, 83 D, with JAMES's *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 305: "Among all sensations, the most belief-compelling are those productive of pleasure or pain."

<sup>146</sup> *Rep.*, 509, 510, 514 ff., the allegory of the cave.

<sup>147</sup> *Phileb.*, 35 C ff. As Berkeley and Huxley argue from the subjectivity of pain to that of sensations and ideas; as Epicurus proceeds from the reality of pain to that of the other secondary qualities; so, reversing the order, Plato infers the falsity of pleasures and pains from that of the associated perceptions and beliefs. Grote, Jowett, Horn, and others pronounce the whole train of reasoning fallacious. But it is to be observed: (1) that their objections as usual are anticipated by Plato (*Phileb.*, 38 A), who has a right to use his own terminology provided his meaning is unambiguous (*Charmides*, 163 D); (2) that the epithet "false" is used either with reference to a postulated objective judgment of life as a whole, or as a mere rhetorical expression of the disdain or pity felt by an onlooker. In the first sense it is justified by the argument, in the second by the usage of the poets—*falsa licet cupidus deponat gaudia livor* (*Propert.*, 1, 8, 29); (3) having demonstrated against Sophistic negations that φαντάζει applies to δόξα, Plato was naturally tempted to extend it to ἴδοντες.

<sup>148</sup> *Phileb.*, 39 E, 40 C. Cf. "we are all imaginative, for images are the brood of desire" (George Eliot).

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 41, 42 B; *Laws*, 663 B.

what we mistake for positive pleasure is usually the neutral state, the absence of uneasiness, the cessation of pain.<sup>150</sup>

This doctrine of the negativity of what men call pleasure is the fundamental basis of Plato's ethics, as it is of Schopenhauer's. On this, in the last instance, rests his refutation of hedonism, and, as we shall see, his demonstration that virtue and happiness are one.<sup>151</sup> Sensuous pleasures are in their nature impure and illusory. They are preconditioned by, and mixed with, desire, want, pain. "Surgit amari aliquid" is ever true of them. They are the relief of an uneasiness, the scratching of an itch, the filling of a vacuum.<sup>152</sup> To treat them as real, or to make them one's aim (except so far as our human estate requires), is to seek happiness in a process rather than a state,<sup>153</sup> in becoming rather than in being. It is to bind one's self to the wheel of Ixion and pour water into the bottomless jar of the Danaids.<sup>154</sup> Far happier, far more pleasurable, is the life that consistently aims at few and calm pleasures, to which the sensualist would hardly give the name, a life which he would regard as torpor or death.<sup>155</sup>

Both the physiology and the psychology of this doctrine have been impugned. It has been argued that, up to the point of fatigue, the action of healthy nerves involves no pain, and must yield a surplus of positive sensuous pleasure. It is urged that the present uneasiness of appetite is normally more than counterbalanced by the anticipation of immediate satisfaction. Such arguments will carry no weight with those who accept Plato's main contention, that the satisfactions of sense and ambition, however inevitable, have no real worth, and that to seek our true life in them is to weave and unweave the futile web of Penelope. Whatever qualifications modern psychology may attach to the doctrine, it is the logical basis of Plato's ethics. The unfeigned recognition of the inherent worthlessness of the lower pleasures removes at once the motive and lures to evil.<sup>156</sup> It is the chief link in the proof that virtue is happiness. It insures the domination of reason over feeling and appetite. It molds man into that likeness to the divine pattern which is Plato's favorite expression for the ethical ideal,<sup>157</sup> for the divine life knows neither pleasure nor pain.<sup>158</sup> It is the serious argument that

<sup>150</sup> *Phileb.*, 42 C ff.; *Rep.*, 583 D.

<sup>151</sup> The argument that pleasure is *γένεσις*, not *εστία*, is not, as ZELLER says (p. 604), the nerve of the proof. It is obviously, as the language of 58 C implies, one of those half-serious metaphysical and rhetorical confirmations used to make a strong case where Plato's feelings are enlisted. It does not occur explicitly in the *Republic* which speaks, however, of pleasure as *κίνησις*, 583 E.

<sup>152</sup> "Already" in the *Gorgias*, 493 E, 494 C, and the *Phaedrus*, 258 E, *ἀν' ἀπολαύσεσθαι δεῖ ἢ μὴδὲ φεθῆναι*, etc.; *Rep.*, 584 A B. It has even been argued that the *Phaedrus* passage takes for granted the fuller discussion of the *Philebus* (W. H. THOMPSON, *Phaedrus*, ad loc.). And why not? Anything may be argued if the dialogues are supposed to grow out of one another and not out of Plato's mind.

<sup>153</sup> *Phileb.*, 53 C ff.; 54 E virtually = *Gorg.*, 493 E. The literal-minded objection of ARISTOTLE, *Eth. Nic.*, I, 4, and

some moderns, that pleasure is not strictly = *κίνησις* is beside the point.

<sup>154</sup> *Gorg.*, 493 B, *τετραμήρους πύθες*, etc.; *Phædo*, 84 A, *ἀνέφροντον ἔργον* . . . *Πηνελόπεια* — *ιστόν*, *Gorg.*, 507 E; *Phileb.*, 54 E.

<sup>155</sup> *Phædo*, 84 B; *Gorg.*, 492 E; *Phileb.*, 54 E, *καὶ φασὶ ζῆν οἷα ἂν δέξασθαι*, etc. In *Laws*, 733, 734 B, the hedonistic calculus of the *Protagoras* is retained, but is applied not directly to the individual acts, but to types of life. The life of moderate pleasures is *a priori* the more pleasurable because it necessarily yields a more favorable balance than the life of intense pleasures.

<sup>156</sup> *Phædo*, 66 C; *Rep.*, 586 A B, 588.

<sup>157</sup> *Theætet.*, 176 B ff.; *Laws*, 716 D, 728 A B; *Rep.*, 352 B, 612 E; *Phileb.*, 501 E.

<sup>158</sup> *Phileb.*, 53 B.

explains Plato's repudiation of the hedonistic formulas of the *Protagoras*, and justifies the noble anti-hedonistic rhetoric of the *Gorgias*, the *Phædo*, and the *Philebus*.<sup>150</sup>

4. Plato's insistence on the necessity of proving the coincidence of virtue and happiness marks another difference between him and modern writers. The question is rarely put in the forefront of modern ethical discussion, except for the polemical purpose of proving that an opponent's philosophy supplies no basis or sanction for morality. The majority of modern ethical writers relegate the problem to a digression or a footnote. They are content to establish a "general tendency" or "strong probability." Or they frankly admit that while everybody would be glad if the proposition could be proved, it is not susceptible of mathematical demonstration. But this was not enough for Plato. His own faith was adamant. He was as certain that happiness is inseparable from virtue as of the existence<sup>151</sup> of the Island of Crete. Even if it were only a probability, he would not permit it to be impugned in a well-ordered state.<sup>152</sup> Just how much positively immoral and cynical philosophy was current in Plato's day is, as we have seen, a disputed historical question. But Plato himself was haunted by the thought of the unscrupulous skeptic who sought to justify his own practice by appeals to the law of nature or theories of the origin of justice in a conspiracy of the weak against the strong.<sup>153</sup> His imagination was beset by the picture of some brilliant young Alcibiades standing at the crossways of life and debating in his mind whether his best chance of happiness lay in accepting the conventional moral law that serves to police the vulgar or in giving rein to the instincts and appetites of his own stronger nature.<sup>154</sup> To confute the one, to convince the other, became to him the main problem of moral philosophy. It is a chief duty of the rulers in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, and the Socrates of the dialogues is at all times ready and equipped to undertake it.

Plato is not always overnice in the arguments by which the skeptic is refuted. It is enough that the "wicked" should not have the best of the argument.<sup>155</sup> Socrates in the first instance puts forth just enough dialectical strength to baffle a Callicles or a Thrasymachus.<sup>156</sup> This, as we have seen, is the quality of much of the argument of the *Gorgias*,<sup>157</sup> though it is intermingled with hints of deeper things, and supplemented

<sup>150</sup> *Gorg.*, 507, 512, 513; *Phædo*, 69; *Phileb.*, 65 A; *Rep.*, 580 B.

<sup>151</sup> *Gorgias*, 509 A; *Rep.*, 380 B, 618 A.

<sup>152</sup> *Laws*, 662 B.

<sup>153</sup> *Rep.*, 392 A B; *Laws*, 663 B, πικρὸν γ', εἰ μὴδὲν ἕτερον, πρὸς τὸ τινα ἐθέλειν ζῆν τὸν ὅσιον καὶ δίκαιον βίον.

<sup>154</sup> *Rep.*, 358, 359, 365; *Gorg.*, 483 ff. Cf. *Rep.*, 353 C, διατεθρολημένος τὰ ὅσα; *Protag.*, 333 C, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γὰρ φασί; *Euthydem.*, 279 B, ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τις ἦν ἐμφωβηθήσει; *Phileb.*, 65 E; *Gorg.*, 511 B; *Laws*, 889 D E, with *Theætet.*, 171 C D.

<sup>155</sup> *Rep.*, 365 B; *Gorg.*, 510 D; *Laws*, 662 E.

<sup>156</sup> *Theætet.*, 176 C D; 177 B, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πᾶσι ἀπομαρτάνεται. The whole passage is a description of the *Gorgias*. Cf., 527 A, νῦν δὲ ἄρ' εἰ, ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἷον σοφώτατοι ὅσοι τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων . . . οὐκ ἔχοντε ἀποδείξαι, ὅσα. *Laws*, 907 C, μή ποτε λόγους ἡγῶνται κρατοῦντες, ὅσα.

<sup>157</sup> *E. g.*, the argument in *Rep.*, 349, 350, is a mere illus-

tration of the game of question and answer. Thrasymachus sets up the thesis, εἰ δίκαιον φέρνεται καὶ ἀγαθόν, and Socrates forces him to contradict himself. Zeller (p. 752) lists it among Plato's fallacies.

<sup>158</sup> Strictly speaking, Socrates's dialectic is employed merely to force from Callicles the admission that some pleasures are bad (449 B C; cf. *Rep.*, 505 C). From this point the argument, abandoning ethical theory, discusses social and political ideals at Athens. "Good" is treated as distinct from "pleasure," as it is in *Phædr.*, 229 C. But the question whether it may not ultimately prove to be the favorable balance of pleasure (*Protag.*) is not raised. The crude identification of the terms is rejected for reasons still held valid in the *Philebus*. Cf. *Phileb.*, 55 B, with *Gorg.*, 496 C. There is no contradiction. The three dialogues, differing in mood, are logically consistent and supplement one another.

by noble eloquence. In the *Republic*, however, Plato undertakes not only to confute and silence, but to convince.<sup>168</sup> The real ground of conviction is the total underlying conception of the true nature, harmony, health, and consequent happiness of the soul.

But the formal proof is summed up in the ninth book in three arguments which, as Plato repeatedly tells us, constitute the framework of the whole design.<sup>169</sup> To these, in form at least, all other interests of the book are subordinate—the construction of the ideal state, the higher philosophical education, the idea of good, the character-sketches of degenerate types. The first argument is based on the comparison of the individual and the state which runs through the entire work from the second to the ninth book. It takes two forms: (1) That of a mere external analogy. As the happiness of the ideal state is to the misery of the ochlocracy or the tyranny, so is the happiness of the well-governed just soul to the wretchedness of the man whose soul is the prey of a mob of appetites, or the slave of a ruling passion.<sup>170</sup> (2) The force of this external analogy is derived wholly from the psychological truth that it embodies. Unity or factious division, the sovereignty of reason, or the usurpations of passion and appetite, harmony or discord, health or disease, as used of the soul, are more than mere figures of speech; they are the exact expression of inevitable alternatives resting on indisputable psychological facts. The dominance of the higher reason over disciplined emotion and controlled appetite is the sole and effective condition at once of the unity, harmony, and health of spiritual life which is happiness, and of the unswerving fulfilment of obligation which is the external manifestation of justice and virtue.<sup>171</sup> To ask whether happiness is compatible with a diseased soul is still more absurd than to expect it to dwell in a diseased body.<sup>172</sup>

The second argument is very brief, and Plato is probably aware that at the best it commands assent rather than inspires conviction.<sup>173</sup> The three faculties of the soul, taken abstractly, yield three types of pleasure—the pleasures of pure intelligence, of ambition, and of appetite. Plato assumes that the pleasures of intelligence belong to the man in whom the intellect directed toward the good controls the other faculties. In other words, he takes for granted the coincidence on the highest plane of intellect and virtue which he found in Socrates and which the education of the *Republic* secures in the guardians.<sup>174</sup> Now, the advocate of the intellectual and virtuous life has necessarily had some experience of the pleasures associated with gratified ambition and appetite. The ambitious man and the sensuous man know little or nothing of the higher order of pleasure. The preference of the "intellectual" for his own type of pleasure must be ratified as based on a completer experience. It would be a waste of time to cavil on minor fallacies or rhetorical exaggerations with which Plato burdens the argument in his eagerness to make a strong case.<sup>175</sup> The argument itself is familiar

<sup>168</sup> *Rep.*, 357 A B, 358 B, 367 A B, 367 E.

<sup>169</sup> 359 A B, 362 A B, 427 D, 445 A, 544 A.

<sup>170</sup> 576 C ff.

<sup>171</sup> 442 E.

<sup>172</sup> 445 A, 501 B, 589 E; *Gorg.*, 512 A, 479 B; "already" in *Orto*, 47 D E.

<sup>173</sup> *Rep.*, 580 D ff.

<sup>174</sup> *Cf. supra*, p. 11.

<sup>175</sup> Grote and Mill object that this argument, even if conclusive, is addressed to the wrong point, because the life supposed is not that of the simple, just man, but that of the philosopher. But the case of the simple just man is met by the main arguments drawn from the order, har-

enough through its acceptance in substance by John Stuart Mill; who, however, seems to think Plato's use of it fallacious. It has been rejected as a fallacy on the ground that pleasure is not an objective measurable entity, but a relative individual feeling. Again at the limits of human thought we are confronted by an alternative the terms of which it is impossible to realize distinctly. Is it better to be a completely contented pig than a man? But if we waive the claim that the argument is an absolute proof, and turn from these unreal abstractions to the facts of life, what Plato affirms is simply that it is more pleasurable in the end to develop and foster the capacity for the "higher" pleasures than that for the lower, as is shown by the judgment of those who have experienced both. In this less absolute form the argument leans for support on that which precedes, and still more on that which follows it.

In the third place, the lower pleasures as compared with the higher are illusory, unreal, and impermanent, and they tend to destroy the healthy balance of faculties which is the condition of all true pleasure.<sup>176</sup> This is a repetition or anticipation<sup>177</sup> of the theory of the negativity of pleasure which we have already met in the polemic against hedonism.

This completes our sketch of the Platonic ethics. The rest is exhortation, inspiration, myth, things *οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν*, but not within the scope of the present study, nor indeed reproducible in any study. For the ethical and religious spirit that informs every page of Plato we must go to the master himself.

## II. THEORY OF IDEAS

Plato's theory of ideas is (1) primarily a realistic way of speaking of the universal; (2) a poetic and mythical extension of this realistic language, by which the universal is treated, not only as a thing, but as a thing of beauty and object of desire and aspiration; (3) in relation to metaphysics, it is the definite and positive assertion that the substantive essences, or rather the objective correlates, of general notions constitute the ultimate ontological units of reality to which psychological and logical analysis refer us as the only escape from a Heraclitean or Protagorean philosophy of pure relativity. In the first sense the ideas occur throughout the dialogues. It is irrational to look for the other forms of the doctrine except when the argument naturally leads up to them. A Kantian does not expatiate upon the *Ding-an-sich* in an

mony, and health of the soul, and from the analysis of pleasure. Here Plato is renewing the debate between the "philosopher," the sensualist, and the politician begun in the *Gorgias*. He is indulging his feelings in a demonstration that in the Athens of his day the "philosophic" life is a higher and happier type than the life of the politician or the sensualist; and he holds that no real reform is possible until men can be found who approach political life as a necessary, not a desirable, thing, condescending to it from a life which they feel to be higher and more pleasurable (*cf. Rep.*, 521 B). The form of the argument of the *Republic* is determined by the purpose of contrasting the extreme types of the virtuous philosopher and the finished tyrant. But it applies to other men in proportion as they ap-

proximate to these types. And the statement of the argument in the *Lysis* applies to the simple just man, 663 C, *τὰ δῖκα . . . ἐκ μὲν δίκων καὶ κακοῦ ταυτοῦ θεωρούμενα ἴδια, etc., . . . τὴν δ' ἐλπίσαν τῆς κρίσεως ποτὶ τὰς ἀντιθέτων διὰ φῶμεν; πότρεα τὴν τῆς χειροῦς ψυχῆς ἢ τὴν τῆς βελτίους.*

<sup>176</sup> *Rep.*, 583 B-586 C.

<sup>177</sup> Zeller thinks it a résumé of the fuller treatment of the *Philebus*. Those who put the *Philebus* late regard it as a preliminary sketch. The *Philebus* is probably late, as Mill affirmed before *Sprachstatistik* was conceived. But the psychology of pleasure in the two dialogues supplies no evidence. *Cf. infra*, "Plato's Psychology," and Part II.

essay on universal peace. Plato discussed many topics that did not require embellishment by the mythical description of the idea as type, or the explicit reaffirmation of the idea as *noumenon*. And the apparent absence of either from a given dialogue proves nothing.

Plato's fearless and consistent realism is so repugnant to "common sense" that modern critics either take it as proof of the naïveté, not to say childishness, of his thought, or extenuate the paradox by arguing that he could not have meant it seriously and must have abandoned or modified the doctrine in his maturer works. All such interpretations spring from a failure to grasp the real character of the metaphysical problem and the historical conditions that made Plato adopt and cling to this solution. From Heraclitus to John Stuart Mill human thought has always faced the alternative of positing an inexplicable and paradoxical *noumenon*, or accepting the "flowing philosophy." No system can escape the dilemma. Plato from his youth up was alternately fascinated and repelled by the philosophy of Heraclitus. No other writer has described so vividly as he the reign of relativity and change in the world of phenomena.<sup>178</sup> Only by affirming a *noumenon* could he escape Heracliteanism as the ultimate account of (1) being, and (2) cognition.<sup>179</sup> He chose or found this *noumenon* in the hypostatized concepts of the human mind, the objects of Socratic inquiry, the postulates of the logic he was trying to evolve from the muddle of contemporary dialectic, the realities of the world of thought so much more vivid to him than the world of sense.<sup>180</sup> This is the account of the matter given by Aristotle<sup>181</sup> and confirmed by the dialogues. Except in purely mythical passages, Plato does not attempt to describe the ideas any more than Kant describes the *Ding-an-sich* or Spencer the "Unknowable." He does not tell us what they are, but that they are. And the difficulties, clearly recognized by Plato, which attach to the doctrine thus rightly limited, are precisely those that confront any philosophy that assumes an absolute.

Plato's particular selection of the hypostatized concept for his absolute seems more paradoxical only because, from the common-sense point of view of a convenient but inconsistent conceptualism, we ignore the real philosophical alternative of consistent nominalism or consistent realism, and forget the historical conditions that forced Plato to make his choice. Realism was for Plato not merely the only metaphysical alternative to Protagorean relativity; it was the only practicable way of affirming the validity of universals and abstract thought. The psychology and logic of modern nominalism as gradually worked out by Locke, Berkeley, John Stuart Mill, and Taine, did not exist. The modern flowing philosopher can give a plausible account of

<sup>178</sup> *Symp.*, 207 D E; *Tim.*, 43 B C, 44 A B, 52 E, 69 C D; *Theatet.*, 156 ff.

<sup>179</sup> *Cratyl.*, 439, 440; *Theatet.*, 179 ff., 185, 186; *Tim.*, 27 D, 28 A, 49 D ff., 51 B C. Less directly pertinent are *Soph.*, 249 B; *Cratyl.*, 386; *Phileb.*, 58 E, with *Rep.*, 533 B.

<sup>180</sup> I do not mean that Plato said: "Go to, I need a *noumenon*, I will hypostatize the Socratic concepts," which a malicious critic might infer from APÉLT's argument (*Beiträge*, pp. 81-3), that Plato would have made all

concepts ideas (which he did!) if his starting-point had been the hypostatization of the concept, and (which is partly true) that he would not have put forth the paradox at all if he had not felt the necessity of positing some reality beyond the world of sense. This last Apelt confirms by *Met.*, 1040b, 27, which, however, proves nothing for Plato, as it merely states a favorite thought of Aristotle.

<sup>181</sup> *Met.*, 1, 6, 987a, 29 ff., 1086b.

the universal, recognizes the general term as a convenient algebraic symbol, and so accepts the old logic as a practical working instrument of thought. But in Plato's time the old logic was still to be created, and the cruder forms of nominalism and relativity which he combated blocked the way by captious objections to the normal and necessary use of general terms.<sup>122</sup> The theory of ideas, then, often appears to be mainly, if not merely, an affirmation of the concept apart from explicit insistence on any theory of its psychological or ontological nature.<sup>123</sup> But the main issue is unaffected by this fact. Even if he had been acquainted with the analysis of Mill and Taine,<sup>124</sup> Plato would have continued to ask: Are the good and the beautiful and similar essences something or nothing?<sup>125</sup> Can everything in the idea be explained as the natural product of remembered and associated sensations?<sup>126</sup> Is not man's power of abstraction something different in kind from any faculty possessed by the brute?<sup>127</sup> Not all the refinements of the new psychology can disguise the fact that the one alternative commits us to the "flowing philosophers," the other to some form of Platonism. For the answer that the "good" and the "beautiful" are only concepts of the mind is an evasion which commends itself to common-sense, but which will satisfy no serious thinker. If these concepts are the subjective correlates of objective realities, we return to the Platonic idea—for Plato, it must be remembered, does not say what the ideas are, but only that they are in some sense objective and real.<sup>128</sup> If the concepts are the natural products of casual associations, accidental eddies in the stream of sense, the "flowing philosophy" receives us again.<sup>129</sup> Moreover, though this

<sup>122</sup> *Philob.*, 14 D, σφέτερα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια; 15 A, 13 DE; *Parmen.*, 135 C; *Soph.*, 251 BC; *Theaet.*, 157 AB, 167 A, 180 D; *Euthydem.*, 301 A and *passim*.

<sup>123</sup> *Rep.*, 506 A; *Phaedr.*, 249 B, though immediately followed by ἀνάμνησις; *Philob.*, 16 D, and all passages that describe the true method of generalization and division—*Phaedr.*, 265, 266, 270 D; *Soph.*, 226 C, 235 C, 253; *Polit.*, 285 A; *Cratyl.*, 424 C; *Laws*, 804 A, 955 C.

<sup>124</sup> To MILL (*Dis. and Discuss.*, IV, p. 300) the Platonic ideas "are only interesting as the first efforts of original and inventive minds to let in light on a dark subject." They belong to the "theories which have arisen in ingenious minds from an imperfect conception of the processes of abstraction and generalization." But it is not really thinkable that the author of the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Phaedrus* (249 B) did not "understand" the common-sense explanation of the universal through abstraction and generalization. He rejected it, on the contrary, precisely because he foresaw that, if consistently carried out and accepted as the final account of the matter, it leads straight to Mill's ultimate philosophy, which he would not have on any terms.

<sup>125</sup> *Protag.*, 330 C, ἡ δικαιοσύνη πᾶν τι ἐστὶν ἢ οὐδὲν πᾶν τι; *Phaedo*, 65 D, φαίνεται τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδὲν; 76 E, 77 A, καλὸν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, 100 B, καλὸν αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθόν. *Theaet.*, 157 D, εἰ σοὶ ἀρᾶται τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθόν καὶ καλόν. *Cratyl.*, 440 B, εἰ δὲ . . . ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν. *Sophist*, 247 A-B, τὸ γὰρ δυνατόν τῃ παραγίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι πάντως εἶναι τι φέρονται . . . οὕτως οὖν δικαιοσύνης, etc. *Philob.*, 55 B, οὐκ ἔλογόν ἐστι

μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ καλόν . . . πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ. *Parmen.*, 130 B, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, etc.

<sup>126</sup> *Phaedo*, 96 B; *Theaet.*, 156, 157, 184 D, εἰ πολλοὶ τινες ἐν ἡμῖν ὥστε ἐν δουρείοις ἰπποῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθονται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὃ τι δεῖ καλεῖν πάντα ταῦτα συντείνειν. *Tim.*, 51 C, ἡ ταῦτα ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν (cf. ἅπερ ἄρην, *Rep.*, 515 B; *Parmen.*, 130 D), ὅσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, μόνα ἐστὶ τοιαύτην ἔχοντα ἀλφειαν.

<sup>127</sup> *Phaedr.*, 249 B, δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνίεναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰδὲ αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις, etc. *Cratyl.*, 399 C, μόνον τῶν θηρίων ὁρθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ὠνομάσθη, ἀναθρώπων δ' ὄνομα. *Phaedo*, 75 B, ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἔκείνου τε ὁρίζεται τοῦ ὃ ἐστὶν ἴσον, etc.

<sup>128</sup> *Parmen.*, 132, νόημα δὲ οὐδένος; . . . ὅντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; . . . εἴτα οὐκ εἶδος ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; LUTOSLAWSKI, p. 403, misquotes and misinterprets this passage. PROFESSOR RITCHIE, *Plato*, pp. 91, 112, 113, recognizes that it is conclusive against conceptualism. Cf. ZELLER, p. 668. The further objection that if the ideas are thoughts and things partake of them, things must think, is generally treated as a verbal equivocation. Cf. *Euthydem.*, 287 D E. But, for the underlying metaphysical problem, see my discussion of Aristotle *de Anima*, 429 b 26 in *A. J. P.*, Vol. XXII, pp. 161 ff.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. the characterization of positivism or phenomenalism in *Rep.*, 516 CD, καθορῶντι τὰ παρόντα καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα, ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰσὶ καὶ ἅμα παρεῖσθαι. Cf. also *Phaedo*, 96 BC; *Gorg.*, 501 A B.



point is not explicitly made by Plato, a concept of the mind, even apart from objective reference, either is or is not an entity of another than the natural or sensuous order. If it is, we are driven back upon Platonism. For, though the Platonic ideas are more than thoughts if thoughts are only decaying sense, thoughts, if radically different from sensations, become entities that may assume the rôle of Platonic ideas, as they do in the ultimate philosophy of Aristotle, and in the interpretation of those Platonists, ancient and modern, who conceive the ideas as thoughts of God. This is not Plato's doctrine, but only a plausible development of it by those who cannot acquiesce in his wise renunciation of systematic dogmatism.<sup>100</sup> In these matters Plato affirms no more than is necessary for his fixed faiths and purposes.<sup>101</sup> The objective reality in some sense of ideas (but no more) was so necessary. That it was a hard saying is as well known to him as it is to his critics.<sup>102</sup> And he has anticipated their objections. But this doctrine, or something equally and similarly paradoxical, was and is the sole alternative to a philosophy which he and the majority of his modern critics cannot and will not accept. The burden of proof rests heavily, then, on those who affirm that at any time he did or could abandon or seriously modify it. A survey of the dialogues discovers no evidence in support of such a contention.

For this purpose the dialogues fall into three (or four) groups: (1) Those that are supposed to precede the doctrine; or (2) to lead up to it; (3) those in which it is most specifically affirmed or mythically embellished; (4) those in which it is criticised or, as some say, abandoned or modified. In the case of the first and fourth group the argument is often made to turn upon the meaning to be assigned to *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, and other terms elsewhere distinctly appropriated to the transcendental idea. We are repeatedly warned that the mere use of the words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* is no evidence of the transcendental doctrine. This is obvious; but it is equally true that the possibility of taking these words in a conceptual sense raises no presumption that they must be taken in that sense exclusively and that the doctrine was absent from Plato's mind at the time. Such an assumption is made by modern critics in the interest of theories of development, or to free as many dialogues as possible from the distasteful paradox. But Plato was always at liberty to use the terminology of the ideas conceptually for the practical logical uses of definition and classification—even in the transcendental *Phædrus*.<sup>103</sup> All Platonic ideas are concepts. It does not follow that they are ever in Plato's intention no more than concepts. And, in any case, the absence of the theory from any given dialogue proves no more than does the virtual absence from the *Laws* of all metaphysics, including the "later" theory of ideas.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. *infra*, Part II, *Philebus*.

<sup>101</sup> *Meno*, 86 B, καὶ τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάντ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διασχυρισάμεν, etc.

<sup>102</sup> *Rep.*, 532 D, 476 A; *Parmen.*, 135 B C; *Phileb.*, 15 A B; *Tim.*, 51 C D; *infra*, p. 36.

<sup>103</sup> 237 C, 249 B, 263 E. Cf. also the loose popular use of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* 237 D, 238 A, 253 C D. NATORP, *Hermes*, Vol. XXXV, p. 408, infers that the *Phædrus*, "must" be earlier

than the *Phædo* and *Republic*; LUTOSLAWSKI (pp. 340, 341), that it must be later, because, if we interpret rightly, we "soon get quit of the riddle of self-existing ideas" and perceive that "*ἰδέα* and *εἶδος* are used in a meaning which is identical with the idea as conceived by Kant, a necessary concept of reason." Of course, Kant's ideas of reason are misapplied here and all Lutoslawski means is "Begriff," "concept."

Premising thus much, we turn to the first group. In the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Menexenus*, first four books of the *Republic*,<sup>194</sup> *Protagoras*,<sup>195</sup> and (some affirm) the *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, and *Euthydemus* there is no distinct mention of the (Platonic) ideas. There was no occasion for it in the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Menexenus*, and little, if any, in the others. The relation of the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, and *Laches* to Plato's mature ethical theories and the subtlety of the *Charmides* and *Lysis*<sup>196</sup> make it improbable that they antedate the main tenet of his philosophy. This is still more obvious in the case of the *Menexenus* (387 (?), *æt.* 40).<sup>197</sup> The realistic language used of the definition in the *Euthyphro* must be presumed to imply what a similar terminology does elsewhere.<sup>198</sup> The joke about *παρουσία* in the *Euthydemus* is a distinct and familiar allusion to the Platonic idea of beauty.<sup>199</sup> Had Plato omitted that jest, the absence of the doctrine would prove no more than it does in the case of the *Protagoras*.

More interesting than this balancing of probabilities is the evidence presented by the *Gorgias*. This magnificent composition may or may not be earlier than the *Meno*, *Phædo*, *Euthydemus*, and *Cratylus*. It is certainly not appreciably less mature. It distinguishes and classifies "ideas" in the manner rather of the "later" dialogues,<sup>200</sup> and although it contains no explicit and obvious mention of the transcendental idea,<sup>201</sup> the doctrine is clearly suggested for all readers who look below the surface. It is worth while to dwell upon the point. In the *Cratylus*, 389 C, employing the terminology of the ideas in the manner of *Republic*, 596 A B, 597 B,<sup>202</sup> Socrates says that the workman who makes a tool puts into the material, the iron, the idea of the tool that exists in nature.<sup>203</sup> Similarly in *Republic*, 500 D, the philosopher statesman puts

<sup>194</sup> 402 C and 457, 458, presumably imply the ideas, but could be taken merely of concepts, classes or species. Not so 585 in Book IX. Pfeiderer therefore, in order to eliminate the ideas from Books VIII and IX, pronounces 580 B-588 A a later addition.

<sup>195</sup> But cf. 330 C, ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμα τι ἐστὶν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα; 349 B, ἡ ἰσότης τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἰδέας οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἑκάστην; 350 E, αὐτὴ ἡ δαιμόνιος.

<sup>196</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 108.

<sup>197</sup> Willamowitz has somewhere denied the Platonic authorship of the *Menexenus*, but he may have a "pecuni" in reserve. Life is short to debate such paradoxes; but if any atheist will stake his reputation on the point, μαχοίμεν ἂν πάντων ἥδιστα ἐν τούτων.

<sup>198</sup> 5 D, ταῦτόν . . . αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, etc.; 6 D E, τῶν πολλῶν ὁρίων (cf. *Phædo*, 78 D, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν; *Rep.*, 596 A, εἶδος . . . ἐν . . . περὶ ἑκάστη τὰ πολλὰ) — αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ, etc. (*Phædo*, 100 D, τῷ καλῷ; *Meno*, 72 C, ἐν γὰρ τι εἶδος . . . δι' ὃ, ἀποβλέπων . . . παραδείγματι).

<sup>199</sup> 301 A. It is not the word *πᾶρεστι* that proves this, but the entire context *ἐνταυ αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ καλοῦ*, etc. LUTON-LAWSKI (p. 212) affirms that Plato "would have said later *πᾶρεστι τὸ κάλλος* (αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτό)." He never did say, nor could he have said, anything of the kind. *Πᾶρεστι* . . . αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ he would have felt as a contradiction in terms. (On the correct and incorrect use of *αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ*,

etc., see my remarks in *A. J. P.*, Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 287.) Moreover, Plato never affirmed the presence absolutely of the idea with or in the particular (*Parmen.*, 131 A B; *Phileb.*, 15 B), but only its presence or communication somehow. The *τι* of *κάλλος τι* expresses this and Socrates's embarrassment very well. Cf. *Phædo*, 100 D, εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπη ὅη καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη. So *Symp.*, 211 B, μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιούτων, etc.

<sup>200</sup> JOWETT, Vol. IV, p. 436: "The same love of divisions is apparent in the *Gorgias*." Cf. 454 E, 455 A, in manner of the *Sophist*. Cf. 464, 465. It could be plausibly argued that the definition of rhetoric πολιτικῆς μορίου εἶδωλον (463 D) as explained in 464, 465, is a fuller and more explicit statement of the doctrine of *Politics*, 291 B and 303 E-304 A, as to the difficulty of distinguishing the statesman from his imitators and the true relation of *ῥητορεία* to *δικαστική* and *βασιλική*.

<sup>201</sup> But cf. 474 D, ἀποβλέπων; 488 D, τὰ τῶν πολλῶν νόμιμα, with *Rep.*, 479 D, τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα, etc.; *Gorg.*, 497 E, παρουσίᾳ . . . ὅς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ.

<sup>202</sup> ὁ δημιουργὸς . . . πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων . . . ἢ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα (κλίση).

<sup>203</sup> On this passage as the chief Platonic source of the Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form see my remarks in *A. J. P.*, Vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 158. Campbell, overlooking this passage, finds in *Polit.*, 288 D, the earliest approach to the distinction of matter and form.

into the plastic stuff of human nature the forms or ideas of justice and temperance which he contemplates as existing in the transcendental world (*ἐκεῖ*), and so becomes an artisan of political and popular virtue.<sup>304</sup> Expressed in slightly different imagery, this is the function of the statesman in the *Politicus*, 309 C (cf. 308 C D). He is to implant in those rightly prepared by education, fixed, true opinions concerning the honorable, the just, and the good.<sup>305</sup> The thought and the imagery belong to Plato's permanent stock. We find them in the *Gorgias*, 503 E–504 D.<sup>306</sup> Here, too, Plato conceives the true teacher, artist, or statesman as contemplating ideas or forms, which he strives to embody in the material with which he works, even as the Demiurgus of the *Timæus* stamps the ideas upon the matter of generation.

The origin, first suggestion, exposition, or proof of the theory of ideas is variously sought by different critics in the *Meno*, the *Cratylus*, the *Theætetus*, or even in the *Phædrus*, *Parmenides*, and *Symposium*. Obviously Plato could at any time argue indirectly in support of the ideas as necessary postulates of ontology and epistemology. Our chief concern is with the hypothesis that the exposition of some particular dialogue marks a date in the development of his own thought. The doctrine of reminiscence is introduced in the *Meno* to meet an eristic use of a puzzle allied to the psychological problem of "recognition."<sup>307</sup> How, if we do not already know, shall we recognize a truth or a definition when we have found it?<sup>308</sup> Socrates replies that the soul has seen all things in its voyagings through eternity, and that all our learning here is but recollection.<sup>309</sup> This theory is confirmed in the case of mathematical ideas by Socrates's success in eliciting by prudent questions a demonstration of the Pythagorean proposition from Meno's ignorant slave.<sup>310</sup> The *Phædo* distinctly refers to this argument as a proof of the reality of ideas,<sup>311</sup> and the myth in the *Phædrus* describes the ante-natal vision of the pure, colorless, formless, essences of true being.<sup>312</sup> It follows that, though the ideas are not there explicitly mentioned, the reminiscence spoken of in the *Meno* must refer to them.<sup>313</sup> But it is extremely improbable that this represents Plato's first apprehension of the doctrine. Psychologically and historically the origin of the theory is to be looked for in the hypostatization of the Socratic concept and the reaction against Heracliteanism.<sup>314</sup> Its association with Pythagoreanism and

<sup>304</sup> ἡ δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἥθη . . . τίθεναι . . . δημιουργόν . . . σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης. Cf. 501 B, πικρὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωστε ἀποβλέποιεν . . . καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο αὐτὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιεῖεν. Cf. *Polit.*, 300 D, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν.

<sup>305</sup> This does not refer exclusively to the higher education, as Zeller affirms.

<sup>306</sup> ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι . . . ὥπως ἂν εἰδὲς τι αὐτῷ σχῆμα τοῦτο εἰργάζεται. This is applied first to the body, then to the soul. The τάξις and κόσμος of the soul is δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη. . . . πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων, etc. The ῥήτωρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ τεχνικὸς here = the true πολιτικός. And we may note in passing that the *Gorgias* "already" recognizes that rhetoric might be an art. The popular rhetoric is none because it ignores the ideas (1) as ethical ideals (*Gorgias*), (2) as the basis of scientific dialectic (*Phædrus*).

<sup>307</sup> *Meno*, 80 D ff. Cf. my dissertation *De Platonis idearum doctrina*, pp. 15 ff.

<sup>308</sup> οὐτε ζητεῖν οὐτε ἀπορεῖν ἄνευ προλήψεως, *Secl. Empir. Math.*, 1, 57.

<sup>309</sup> "L'univers peut dire comme le Dieu de Pascal: 'Tu ne me chercherais pas, si tu ne m'avais déjà trouvé.'" — FOUILLE. Cf. *Polit.*, 278 D; *Tim.*, 41 E, τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἰδεῖν. Cf. *infra*, p. 43.

<sup>310</sup> 82 ff.

<sup>311</sup> 73 A.

<sup>312</sup> 247 ff., 249 C, τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, etc.

<sup>313</sup> The realistic terminology of the definition would justify the same inference. Cf. 74, 75.

<sup>314</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 28.

the ante-natal life of the soul is mythical embellishment; and its application to the problem of the *a priori* element in human knowledge is a secondary confirmation of its truth.<sup>215</sup> Nevertheless the *Meno*, which John Stuart Mill pronounces "a little gem," is admirably adapted to serve as an introduction to the Platonic philosophy. It exemplifies in brief compass the Socratic method and the logic of the definition in terminology that suggests the ideas, touches on higher things in the theory of recollection and the problem of *a priori* knowledge, and clearly resumes the dramatic, ethical, and political puzzles that prepare for the teaching of the *Republic*. Socrates's mention of the ideas at the close of the *Cratylus* as something of which he dreams as an alternative to Heracliteanism is taken by some critics to indicate that we have here an introduction to or a first presentment of the doctrine.<sup>216</sup> They overlook two considerations: (1) the theory is taken for granted at the beginning of the dialogue, as we have already seen;<sup>217</sup> (2) there are no traces of immaturity in the thought of the *Cratylus*. The polemic against the flowing philosophers and the forms of eristic associated with them is, in a jesting form, as sharp, and the apprehension of the real issues as distinct as it is in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*.<sup>218</sup>

Some scholars look upon the *Theaetetus* as a propædæutic introduction to the ideas,<sup>219</sup> while others take it as marking the transition to the later theory. Strictly speaking, neither view can be correct, since, though the ideas are not often or very explicitly mentioned, there is enough to show the presence of the doctrine in its normal form. The *ἀγαθόν* and *καλόν*, claimed for being as against becoming in 157 D, is almost technical for the affirmation of the ideas.<sup>220</sup> The *παραδείγματα* of 176 E can hardly refer to anything else. And the close parallel between 186 A B and *Republic*, 523, 524, admits no other interpretation. Among the *νοητά* which the soul grasps by

<sup>215</sup> PROFESSOR RITCHIE's suggestion (*Plato*, pp. 36, 37) that the Platonic idea is a generalization of the Pythagorean treatment of mathematics is unsupported by evidence. See, however, ZELLER, pp. 654-6, for suggestions of other pre-Socratic influences on the theory.

<sup>216</sup> So once SUMMERS in his *Genetische Entwicklung*, Vol. I, p. 161. LUTOSLAWSKI, pp. 224, 225, thinks the ideas are not formulated even here, but only a something which in later dialogues proves to be the ideas! The terminology is complete—*εἶδος*, *αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι*, *τὸ φύσει*, *καὶ βλάπτει* 389, *εἰ δὲ . . . ὅτι δὲ τὸ καλόν*, *ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν*, *ὅτι δὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῶν ὄντων* (440 B). All these phrases might conceivably be used of notions, conceptual ideas. But this proves too much. For, according to L., it holds of all dialogues except the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and parts of the *Republic*, and he is not quite sure of them. His real object is to eliminate the self-existent idea altogether.

<sup>217</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 31. The doctrine of *Cratyl.*, 389, is furthermore identical with that of *Rep.*, 526 A ff.

<sup>218</sup> 386, 439, 440. On the *μή ἐν* and *φρονέει* fallacy, 429 ff., cf. *infra*, p. 53. On the *ῥέοντες* cf. 411 B C with *Phaedo*, 90 C; *Phileb.*, 43 A. LUTOSLAWSKI affirms (pp. 306, 367) that the subdivision of *κίνησις* into *φωρά* and *ἀλλοίωσις* is a new and important discovery of the *Theaetetus*, 181, C. He fails to note that the argument of *Cratylus*, 339, 340, dis-

tingly implies that *πάντα βίβι* includes qualitative change. Cf. 439 D, *ὅτι τοιοῦτον*, 440 A, *ἀλλο καὶ ἀλλοίωσις γίγνεται . . . ὁμοίον γὰρ ὅ ἐστιν*. 439 E, *μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενον τῆς αὐτοῦ ἰδέας* (cf. *Tim.*, 50 B, and *Rep.*, 330 D). Cf. the whole context of the argument and the use of *ὑπερέχοντα*, *Cratyl.*, 439 D; *Theaet.*, 182 D. In fact, the association of motion and qualitative change was always a commonplace with Plato. Both "before" and "after" the *Theaetetus* *μεταβολή* and *βίβι*, etc., are used freely in both meanings. Cf. *Rep.*, 380 E ff., which alone refutes L.'s "discovery." *ὁμοῦν ὁπὸ μὴν ἄλλων τὰ ἴδια ἔχοντα ἴκιστα ἀλλοιοῦνται τε καὶ κινεῖται*. The fact that the *Theaetetus* is slightly more explicit in formal classification proves nothing. The whole argument of the *Cratylus* passage hinges on the distinction precisely as does the argument of the *Theaetetus*. It appears explicitly again only in the *Parmenides*, and not in the "late" *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. It is not included in the ten kinds of motion in the *Laws*, 803, 804, and L. finds it only by implication in 804 E, *ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινῆσθαι ἕτερον ἀλλοίωσιν* which is no more explicit than the *Cratylus* or *Republic*.

<sup>219</sup> W. J. ALEXANDER in *Studies Dedicated to Gilder-Sleeve*, p. 179, thinks its teaching to be: knowledge is of the ideas, error arises from imperfect *ἀνέμνησις*.

<sup>220</sup> *Supra*, n. 185.

herself,<sup>221</sup> and whose essence is apprehended through their relation of opposition,<sup>222</sup> are mentioned, after οὐσία, the *δμοιον* and *ἀνόμοιον*, the *ταὐτόν* and the *ἕτερον* of the *Sophist*. But also, as in the *Parmenides*, the ethical ideas, *καλόν*, *αἰσχρόν*, *ἀγαθόν*, and *κακόν*;<sup>223</sup> and lastly, as in the *Republic*, the qualities of sense, *σκληρόν* and *μαλακόν*.<sup>224</sup> The actual sensation of these opposites comes of course through sense. But the οὐσία and the *ὅ τι ἐστί*, as in the *Republic*, is apprehended by the mind as an idea. There is no argument for holding these ideas to be mere concepts that would not prove the same for the *Republic*, which of course is impossible.<sup>225</sup> This point established, we may concede that the *Theaetetus* may be, not an introduction to the ideas, but an indirect argument in support of the familiar doctrine. The polemic against Heraclitus is always that.<sup>226</sup> And, though Plato himself may not be aware of it, the statement that the syllable is not the sum of its elements, but *μία ἰδέα ἀμέριστος*, embodies the principle and justification of a realistic logic.<sup>227</sup> The conceptual whole is not the sum of its parts, but a new entity and unity.<sup>228</sup>

What has been said of the *Theaetetus* applies to Zeller's theory<sup>229</sup> that the second part of the *Parmenides* is an indirect argument for the ideas. That this is not the main purpose of the *Parmenides* will appear in the sequel. And Zeller was mistaken in stating that only relative contradictions followed from the being of the one, while absolute contradictions resulted from its not being. But the Platonic idea is always suggested by the antithesis of the one and the many. And in the eighth hypothesis, 164 B ff., the "one" and "others" are no longer treated with dialectical impartiality, but there is a hint that the one may be regarded as the symbol of the idea. Symmetry leads us to expect the argument that, if the one is not (relative *μὴ ὄν*), other things both are and are not all contradictory predicates. Instead of "are" we find "appear" or "seem." Other things are indefinite bulks that break up under inspection and only seem to partake of unity and other predicates that derive from unity. These *ὄγκοι* certainly suggest the world of matter uninformed by ideas, the "being" of the materialists which the friends of ideas in the *Sophist* call "becoming" and break up into little bits.<sup>230</sup> And the statement that, as they cannot be other than the (non-existent) one, they are the other of one another, reminds us of *ἀλλήλοις . . . συν-*

<sup>221</sup> αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ 186 B. Cf. 187 A; *Phaedo*, 65 C; *Rep.*, 524 BC, 526 B.

<sup>222</sup> τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλων. Cf. *Rep.*, 524 D, ἡ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἰσθησὶν ὅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει. Mr. Henry Jackson and others confound this special use of πρὸς ἀλλήλους with τὰ πρὸς τι, relative terms generally, by the aid of *Parmen.*, 133 C. The *Theaetetus* passage is the source of Hermodorus's distinction of πρὸς ἑτερα into πρὸς ἐναντία and πρὸς τι, which ZELLER (p. 706) says is not found in Plato.

<sup>223</sup> 130 B after ὁμοιότης.

<sup>224</sup> 186 B with *Rep.*, 524 A.

<sup>225</sup> THOMPSON on *Meno*, 74 D, says that problems which in *Phileb.*, 14 D, are *διδμενόμενα* are made the bases of a dialectical course in *Rep.*, 523-6. This is a misapprehension. The *Republic* mentions (525 A) that the same object is perceived as one and many. It does not sport with the

paradox, but passes on to show how mathematics leads the mind to the apprehension of abstract and ideal unity. *Philebus*, 14 D ff., is concerned with logical method; *Rep.*, 523-6, with psychology and education. But the thought of the *Republic* is not less mature, and is, indeed, repeated in *Phileb.*, 56 E = *Rep.*, 525 D E.

<sup>226</sup> οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, etc. 157 A is the diametrical opposite of the ideas—εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, *Phaedo*, 100 B.

<sup>227</sup> 205 C, 208 E.

<sup>228</sup> Cf. *Parmen.*, 157 D, οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μέριον μέρος, ἀλλὰ μίᾳς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἑνὸς τινος ὃ καλούμεν ὅλον. See also A. J. P., Vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 158.

<sup>229</sup> Set forth in his *Platonic Studies* and the earlier editions of his *History*, but now virtually withdrawn.

<sup>230</sup> *Soph.*, 246 B.C.

δεδέρθαι in the theory of pure relativity in *Theaetetus*, 160 B. Similar hints occur in the fourth hypothesis, 157 B, which deals with ἄλλα on the supposition that the one is.<sup>231</sup> The main conclusion that ἄλλα, then, admit all contradictory predicates is indicated very briefly (159 A). What is emphasized is the fact that ἄλλα *per se* are πλήθη . . . ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔν, that they are ἄπειρα (cf. *Phileb.*); that it is the one which introduces πέρας πρὸς ἄλληλα; and that, having parts, these parts must relate to μᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἐνός τινος, ὃ καλοῦμεν ὄλον.<sup>232</sup> While the main object of the *Parmenides*, then, is to illustrate the communion of ideas and the doctrine of relative ὄν and μὴ ὄν set forth in the *Sophist*, there is a suggestion of polemic here and there directed against the infinite and indefinite world without unity of the materialists, relativists, and deniers of the ideas. But obviously the first origin and exposition of the ideas is not to be sought in a work that deals with problems and difficulties arising from the doctrine.<sup>233</sup>

The *Phædo*, *Phædrus*, *Republic*, and *Symposium*, the dialogues that are fullest in explicit affirmation or mythical embellishment of the transcendental idea, need not here detain us long. In his exaltation of pure thought and the dialectical method Plato clothes the ideas in all the contradictory attributes of a sensuous, æsthetic type, an ethical ideal, and a metaphysical *noumenon*. He is perfectly aware of this, and the inconsistency is common to all philosophies of the absolute.<sup>234</sup> In the *Phædrus* as elsewhere he warns us not to take the myth too seriously.<sup>235</sup> In the *Phædo* he describes the doctrine as familiar,<sup>236</sup> and reminds us that he does not insist upon the precise terminology, but only on the central fact.<sup>237</sup> In the *Republic* every terminology is employed from the most naïve to the most severely logical or the most transcendental.<sup>238</sup> Despite these facts, attempts have been made to extract evidences of contradiction or development from the varying imagery and terminology of these dialogues. The unity of the *Republic* has been broken up and its books variously dated according to the absence of the theory, or its presence in an "earlier" or "later" form. It has even been gravely argued in defiance of all psychological and historical probability that the *Symposium*, which in consonance with its theme mentions the idea of beauty only, represents a stage of development in which the Platonic

<sup>231</sup> Relative ὄν admitting κοινωρία.

<sup>232</sup> *Theaet.*, 203, 204.

<sup>233</sup> Cf. *infra*, Part II.

<sup>234</sup> JOWETT's common-sense and literary tact have answered literal-minded objectors once for all: "When the charioteers and their steeds stand upon the dome of heaven they behold the intangible, invisible essences which are not objects of sight. This is because the force of language can no further go."—Vol. I, p. 412.

<sup>235</sup> 265 C, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεποιθῆναι.

<sup>236</sup> Those who think that the ideas have been mentioned in only one preceding dialogue, as the *Meno* or *Symposium*, are much exercised by the θαυμά λέγειν of 72 E, the ἀθροισμέναι δέ of 76 D, and the συνθροίσματα of 100 B. LUTOWSKI's statement (p. 292) that these terms may refer to

Socratic ethical concepts, not Platonic ideas, is refuted by the context (ὡς τοιαύτη οὐσία . . . ἀναφέρειν τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, etc.). The suggestion that the reference is to conversations abandons the whole case, unless they are limited to the interval between the *Meno* and the *Phædo*! The simple truth is that Plato may at any time refer to any part of his permanent beliefs as familiar doctrine. On the theory of development, to what discussions is reference made in *Cratylus*, 46 D, and 49 A B? To the *Gorgias* and *Republic* I? Where has Plato often said that τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν is δικαιοσύνη? (*Rep.*, 433 A). Where has Glaucon heard οὐκ ἐλιγάνει that the idea of good is the μέγιστος μάθημα? (*Rep.*, 504 E).

<sup>237</sup> 100 D.

<sup>238</sup> 506, 507, 508, 534, 535, 514-17, 505-11, 500 D-501 B, 490 B, 485 B, 476-80.

philosophy contained but one transcendental idea, as if the problems of psychology and ontology which the theory of ideas sought to meet or evade could have been in any wise advanced by the hypostatization of one concept! We have glanced at such methods of reasoning already, and shall meet them again. At present we pass on to the hypothesis that the *Parmenides* contains a criticism of the ideas which leads to the abandonment or transformation of the theory in the fourth and latest group of dialogues. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that the criticism of the *Parmenides* is new, that Plato was bound either to answer it or give up the ideas, and that, as a matter of fact, the transcendental idea is not found in the later dialogues. These assumptions will not bear critical examination.

The objections brought forth against the ideas in the *Parmenides* are obvious enough, and, as Jowett says, are unanswerable by anybody who separates the phenomenal from the real. How can we bring the absolute into intelligible relation with the relative? How can the absolute ("the Gods") take cognizance of us or we apprehend what is adapted to their thought?<sup>239</sup> How can we without self-contradiction apply to it unity or plurality, or any other predicate of human knowledge?<sup>240</sup> More specifically, if the ideas are transcendental unities, how can we predicate multiplicity or parts of them as we must to connect them with one another and with phenomena?<sup>241</sup> How shall we interpret the figurative expressions that the ideas are present in things, or that things participate in or imitate the ideas?<sup>242</sup> If the idea is the postulated correlate of every *idem in multis*, why should we not assume an idea to explain the likeness of the idea and the particular, and so on in infinite regression?<sup>243</sup> To what extent the form of these objections is due to contemporary critics, or the misunderstanding of students, or the precocity of Aristotle, is an unprofitable inquiry. Their substance is in the *Republic*, not to speak of the *Phædo*, the *Euthydemus*, the *Timæus*, and *Philebus*.<sup>244</sup> Their presentation in the *Parmenides*, then, does not mark a crisis in Plato's thought calling for a review of his chief article of philosophic faith. Plato does not and cannot answer them, but he evidently does not take them very seriously,<sup>245</sup> though he admits that it would require a marvelous man to sift and analyze them all.<sup>246</sup> They arise from the limitations of our finite minds.<sup>247</sup> Here as in the *Philebus* he bids us disregard them, and proceed on the assumption of ideas to find the one idea

<sup>239</sup> *Parmen.*, 134.

<sup>240</sup> *Soph.*, 244, 245; *Parmen.*, 142 A; *Tim.*, 37 E, 38 A.

<sup>241</sup> *Parmen.*, 131; *Phileb.*, 15 B.

<sup>242</sup> *Parmen.*, 131 A, 132 D.

<sup>243</sup> 132 A, 132 E.

<sup>244</sup> *Rep.*, 476 A, ἀντὶ μὲν ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ συμμέτρων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ . . . πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκάστον. Cf. *Phileb.*, 15 B; *Parmen.*, 144 E. Some ignore this passage. Others wantonly emend it, as BADHAM, who reads ἄλλῃ ἄλλων, and BYWATER, who reads ἄλλ' ἄλλων (*Journal of Phil.*, Vol. V, p. 122). RITCHIE (*Plato*, 96) takes it in a Pickwickian sense in order to avoid "anticipating the *Sophist*." FRYLICKER uses it to prove that the fifth book of the *Republic* is later than the tenth. Anything rather than admit the obvious fact that Plato always recognized the "communion" of ideas, and argued it at length in the

*Sophist*, only because pedants were obstructing the way of logic by denying it. Similarly the εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους is distinctly implied in *Republic*, 597 C, and *Tim.*, 31 A, as the difficulty of giving a precise meaning to *σπουδαία* is in *Euthydemus*, 301 A, and *Phædo*, 100 D.

<sup>245</sup> *Phileb.*, 15 D E. In *Sophist* 251 B C, the reference is to the one and many in things, but the application to the communion of ideas immediately follows.

<sup>246</sup> *Parmen.*, 135 A B.

<sup>247</sup> *Tim.*, 52 B C, 34 C; *Phileb.*, 15 D, τῶν λόγων . . . τάς τε ἐν ἡμῖν. The *Sophist* does not really contradict *Tim.*, 38 A B. Absolutely *ἐν* and *μὴ ἐν* remain a mystery (251 A, 251 D, 254 C). The *Sophist* merely fixes the practically necessary conventions of logical discourse about them — τῶν λόγων, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἡμῶν λόγοις, etc., 251 A, 251 D.

and enumerate all its species.<sup>248</sup> The hypothesis must be judged by its total consequences.<sup>249</sup>

The text of the *Parmenides* does not bear out the assertion that the objections apply to any special form of the theory or can be met by a change of terminology. The suggestion that there may be some classes of concepts to which no idea corresponds is repudiated for good Platonic reasons.<sup>250</sup> The interpretation that the ideas are to be henceforth merely concepts is distinctly rejected, was *a priori* impossible for Plato, and is refuted by the positive affirmation of their objectivity in the *Timæus*.<sup>251</sup> Socrates's explanation that the ideas are *παράδειγματα*, patterns of which phenomena are likenesses, is nothing new. The terminology of pattern, copy, and artist looking off to his model is familiar throughout the "early" dialogues, whether used of the definition or the idea. There is no hint in the corresponding passages of the *Philebus* that such a variation of terminology could in any way affect the problem. It is not proposed in the *Parmenides* as a new doctrine, but merely as a different metaphor to evade the difficulty found in the literal interpretation of *μετέχειν*—it is a mere gloss upon the meaning of *μετέχειν*. But equally formidable difficulties confront this way of putting it.<sup>252</sup> And there is no systematic change of terminology in the "later" dialogues, which, like the earlier, employ in a purely natural and non-technical way the various synonyms and metaphors which Plato used to express the inexpressible.<sup>253</sup>

The challenge to find the ideas in dialogues "later" than the *Parmenides* is easily met. Nothing can be more explicit than the *Timæus*.<sup>254</sup> The alternative is distinctly proposed: are the objects of sense the only realities and is the supposition of ideas mere talk?<sup>255</sup> And it is affirmed that their reality is as certain as the distinction between opinion and science. They are *νοούμενα* and exist *καθ' αὐτά*.<sup>256</sup> There is no hint that

<sup>248</sup> 135 BC, *Phileb.*, 16 D. Cf. *Phædr.*, 270 D, *ἐάν δὲ πλείον εἶδη ἔχῃ ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον*. Laws, 894 A, *ἐν εἰδει λαβεῖν μετ' ἀριθμοῦ*.

<sup>249</sup> *Parmen.*, 136; *Phædo*, 101 D.

<sup>250</sup> 130 D. See ZELLER, 700, 701, for lists of ideas. But, as we have seen, to admit that there is any conceptual unity not referable to an idea is to make the theory a mere play of fancy, and deprive it of all psychological and ontological meaning.

<sup>251</sup> 51 C. Cf. *supra*, n. 133.

<sup>252</sup> The *επίτες ἀνθρώπων* is repeated in 132 DE. Other difficulties follow, and the final summing up, 135 A, is couched in the most general terminology: *εἰ εἰς αὐτὰς αἰδέας τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμείναι τις αὐτὴν τι ἑκαστὸν εἶδος*. There is no suggestion that a new form or terminology makes any difference. The much misunderstood passage, 133 CD, is merely a special application of the general difficulty to relative terms. Ideal slavery is related only to ideal ownership, the slavery in us only to the ownership in us. There is no discrimination here of a class of *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά* εἶδη. (Cf. *A. J. P.*, Vol. IX, p. 287). Nor are there, as JOWETT and CAMPBELL affirm (*Republic*, Vol. II, p. 313, n. 1) two stages (1) *ἀμείνωσις* and (2) *μέθεξις τοῦ ἀμεινώματος* in the descent from the ideas to the individuals. *ἀμεινώματα* and *μετέχοντες* are merely two sides of the same fact—the participation somehow (*εἴνε ὅργθ' ὅς τις αὐτὰ νοῦται*) of the particu-

lar in the idea. The *ἀμεινώματα* are no more separable as an intermediate stage than are *τὰ εἰσόντα καὶ ἐξόντα τῶν ὄντων* *ἀεὶ μὴ μείναι* of *Timæus*, 50 C. In both cases we have only the idea and the particular and the metaphorical expression of their relation.

<sup>253</sup> See my note in *A. J. P.*, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 66. ZELLER, *Sitzungsber. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1887, No. 13.

<sup>254</sup> 51, 52.

<sup>255</sup> 51 C, *τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος*. For the impossibility of taking *λόγος* as "Socratic concept" see my note in *A. J. P.*, Vol. X, p. 65.

<sup>256</sup> Mr. ARCHER-HIND's attempt (*Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 49 ff.) to "circumvent" this passage is based on a misinterpretation of 30 E. Since an idea of fire is not mentioned in the exhaustive enumeration there given of the ideas contained in the supreme idea, an idea of fire he argues, cannot be meant seriously here. But 30 E does not speak of the "supreme idea," which is a figment of modern Platonists. The *ζῷον* is simply the universal of animal or living thing, and as such the paradigm of the world which is a living thing. (Cf. *A. J. P.*, Vol. IX, p. 294.) It includes all subordinate *μετὰ ζῷα*. There is no reason to look for other ideas in it. J. HOMOWITZ (*Das Platonische νοῦν ζῷον und der Philonische κοσμός νοῦν*, Marburg, 1900) fails to prove his assertion that the *νοῦν ζῷον* is "die Welt-Idee." Mr. Archer-Hind's further arguments merely pre-



they are mere concepts, or thoughts of God. On the contrary, God uses them as patterns, and as elements in the creation of the soul.<sup>257</sup> They are characterized in terms applicable only to pure absolute Being, and the familiar terminology is freely employed.<sup>258</sup> Three things, Plato repeats, must have existed from all eternity: the pure Being of the ideas, the generated copies, and space, the medium or receptacle.<sup>259</sup> The attempts of modern scholars to eliminate these elements or identify them with other categories found in other dialogues contradict Plato's explicit statements. We are often told that space is the *θάτερον* or *μὴ ὄν*.<sup>260</sup> For this there is not a scintilla of evidence.<sup>261</sup> Plato even says of space: *ταὐτὸν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον* (50 B), and calls it a *τρίτον αὐ γένος ὃν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεὶ*. The "same" and the "other" appear in a wholly different connection in the creation of the soul, and are obviously the categories of the *Sophist* attributed to the soul to explain its cognition of sameness and difference.<sup>262</sup> The occurrence of these categories in a dialogue that reaffirms the transcendental idea proves that to Plato's mind the two points of view were not incompatible, which, for the rest, is obvious enough from the *Phaedrus*. We must interpret the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* in the light of this presumption, and treat the terminology of the ideas as *prima facie* evidence of the doctrine. The *Republic* (476) "already" states that the transcendental unity of the ideas is somehow compatible with their communion. The *Sophist* formulates all the concessions which a "working logic" must demand from all philosophies of the absolute, be it absolute relativity, absolute Being, or absolute Platonic ideas. Plato minimized the inevitable inconsistency, and a sound interpretation will not exaggerate it. A working logic does not emphasize the transcendental character of the idea. But the language of 248 A, 247 A B, distinctly implies it.<sup>263</sup> The statement that *δικαιοσύνη* and *φρόνησις* are engendered in the soul (*ἐγγίγνεται*) obviously does not mean that they are *per se* concepts of the mind. Nor can we infer that the ideas are mere concepts from passages in

sent the usual objections of common-sense conceptualism—which are not competent to anyone who himself believes in any metaphysics or attributes metaphysics to Plato.

<sup>257</sup> 28 A, 29 A, 30 B C, 35 A. ZELLER, p. 665, n. 2, adds *Phædr.*, 247, which is irrelevant, and *Rep.*, 596 A ff., where God is the maker of the ideas. Lutoławski's argument from *νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν* (27 E, 29 A, pp. 474, 477) interpreted as "included in thought" is a simple mistranslation.

<sup>258</sup> 52 A, 27 D, 28 A B, 29 B, 30 C. Cf. 39 E, ὃ ὄντι; 37 B, τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα ἀεὶ; 48 E, παραδείγματα, to which correspond 50 C, μιμήματα, and 52 A, ὁμῶνυμον ὁμοιον; 31 A, the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος.

<sup>259</sup> 52 D.

<sup>260</sup> *E. g.*, by RITCHIE, p. 116.

<sup>261</sup> ZELLER, pp. 719 ff., 733, produces none. Aristotle's obscure allusions prove nothing. The identification of the *εἰρησος* of the *Philebus* with *μὴ ὄν* and matter breaks down. There remains the argument that, since in the *Republic* the ideas are *ὄν* and *phænomena* are *μετὰ ὄντος*—*ὄντος* and *μὴ ὄντος*, matter must be *μὴ ὄν* apprehended neither by *νοεῖν* nor

*αἰσθάνειν*, but *λογισμῷ* τινὶ νόθῳ (52 B). But Plato's terminology cannot be used out of its context in this way. The *μὴ ὄν* problem belongs to logic. *Phænomena* are intermediate between *ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν* because they change, and are and are not the same predicates, not because they are the offspring of ideas and matter. In physics Plato was forced, however reluctantly, to assign a kind of eternity to matter or space. (Cf. BERKELEY, *Principles*, sec. 117: "either that real space is God, or that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated.") So far is it from being true that space or matter imparts *μὴ ὄν* to *phænomena* that, on the contrary, Plato explicitly says that *phænomena*, being unreal images, cling to essence (*οὐσίας*) somehow through their existence in space. *Tim.*, 52 C.

<sup>262</sup> 37 A B C is plainly a psychological myth or allegory expressing the results of the analysis of the *Sophist*. Cf. also *Theætet.*, 194 B.

<sup>263</sup> διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντος οὐσίαν, ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὁραδέναι ἔχειν φερέ. . . . οὕτως οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως . . . πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν (cf. *Tim.*, 28 B) εἶναι φερεται αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα.

which we are required to apprehend them in thought or in the soul.<sup>264</sup> It is often said that souls take the place of ideas in Plato's later period. This is a complete misconception of Plato's thought and style. It is quite true that he could not confine the predicates of true or absolute Being to the ideas. God is, of course, true Being, and in religious and metaphysical passages need not always be distinguished from the ideas taken collectively. Both are invisible, eternal, intelligible. In the *Timæus* space also is reluctantly treated as a kind of eternal being. The *Sophist* tries to show that "being" is amenable to human logic and cognizable by finite minds. This involves a contradiction for all except consistent relativists who renounce pure Being altogether. This Plato could not do, for, not only in the *Parmenides*, but in the late *Timæus*, he retains absolute Being for metaphysics and religion. In the *Sophist* he shows that for human logic it is as impracticable as absolute not-Being. To be known and talked about it must come out of its isolation and enter into relations—act and be acted upon. Being is therefore temporarily defined against the extremists of all schools as the power and potentiality<sup>265</sup> of action or passion, and the contradiction is smoothed over by the equivocal use of "true being" to denote both the metaphysical and the religious *noumenon*—the ideas and God. True Being as God obviously possesses life, thought, motion, soul, and true Being as the ideas borrows so much life and motion as will explain their intercommunion in finite thought.<sup>266</sup> But the definition, its purpose served, is never repeated, and pure transcendental being reappears in the *Timæus*. That the ideas still take precedence of souls appears distinctly from *Polit.*, 309 C, where it is said that fixed opinions in souls are a divine thing in a dæmonic thing. The same follows from the creation of the soul in the *Timæus*, and the hierarchy of elements in the good (*Phileb.*, 66) where pure ideas precede *voûs*.<sup>267</sup> *Politicus*, 269 D, presumably implies the ideas;<sup>268</sup> 285 E ff. unmistakably affirms them. What other possible interpretation can be put upon the statement *ὅτι τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὄντων ῥάδιους καταμαθεῖν αἰσθητά τινες ὁμοιότητες πεφύκασιν*? These *ὄντα* are plainly ideas of material things, of which material things are likenesses. But *τὰ τιμώμενα* (justice, good, etc., *Phædr.*,

<sup>264</sup> *Sophist*, 250 B, *εἴτερον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῖς*. Cf. 243 C, *οὐχ ἔστιν κατὰ τὸ ἐν ταῦτον τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*. Cf. *ὁμολογήματα* . . . ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ ψυχῇ, *Theaet.*, 155 A, from which LUTOSLAWSKI, p. 353, infers that the ideas are subjective notions!

<sup>265</sup> 247 E, *δύναμις* probably includes both.

<sup>266</sup> The entire passage betrays embarrassment. To adapt "Being" to the necessities of logic, Plato is obliged to deny of it (243 D E) what in *Tim.*, 38 A B, his feelings require him to affirm. He treats *γινώσκουσιν* as a *πρόχειον* which ZELLER (p. 652), as a true Aristotelian, thinks a verbal fallacy. In the crucial passage, 249 A, he uses *αὐτὸ* (*μὴδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ*) which draws our attention away from the ideas. And having attributed soul and mind to "it," he merely infers that, since these involve *αἰσθησις*, *αἰσθησις* must be included among *ὄντα* (which Campbell, *ad loc.*, regards as a formal fallacy). Plainly, whatever implications we force upon Plato's words, his purpose here is not to attribute soul to the ideas, but to remove from the path of logic the

*ἐν ὁρώς* of Parmenides (or his followers at Megara or in the school—*οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτῃ διαφέρει*) as well as the *πάντα βῆ* of Heraclitus for which he felt less sympathy. Cf. *Theaet.*, 180, 181, 183 E, 184 A.

<sup>267</sup> See ZELLER, pp. 659, 660, who seems to deny the contradiction altogether, and pp. 656-8, where he argues that the *Sophist* is early because life and causality are never again attributed to the ideas, and do not belong to them in Aristotle's representation. Space fails to enumerate all points of agreement with or difference from ARNOLD's subtle study of the *Sophist* (*Beiträge*). He points out that the definition of *ἐν* is directed mainly against the materialists, and calls attention to *ἵσως εἰς ὑστερον ἔρεπον ἐν φανείῃ*. He is right in denying that Plato's views changed, and in minimizing the significance of the apparent attribution of life to the ideas. But he errs when he seeks an explicit statement of it in other dialogues and for this purpose presses *ἀνθρώπων φύσιν*, *Tim.*, 52 B.

<sup>268</sup> *τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀσάφους ἔχειν*, etc.

250 B, *ὅσα ἄλλα τι(μα ψυχαῖς)*, have no copies in the world of sense, and must be apprehended by reason. This is precisely the doctrine of *Phædrus*, 250 B C D and 263 A B, and ought to end controversy.<sup>369</sup> We have already seen that the *Philebus* bids us assume ideas and disregard the difficulties of the *Parmenides*.<sup>370</sup> There is no hint that they are only concepts.<sup>371</sup> We may assume, then, that the language of 58 A, 59 C, and 61 E implies the ideas.<sup>372</sup>

### III. PSYCHOLOGY

Supposed variations in Plato's psychology have been used to determine the evolution of his thought and the relative dates of the dialogues. The chief topics are: (1) the immortality of the soul; (2) the unity of the soul, or its subdivision into faculties; (3) the general argument that the psychology of the "later" dialogues is richer and more precise than that of the earlier.

1. The immortality of the individual soul is for Plato a pious hope,<sup>373</sup> and an ethical postulate,<sup>374</sup> rather than a demonstrable certainty.<sup>375</sup> He essays various demonstrations, but nearly always in connection with a myth, and of all the proofs attempted but one is repeated. In the *Apology* Socrates, addressing his judges, affects to leave the question open.<sup>376</sup> But we cannot infer from this that the *Apology* antedates Plato's belief in immortality. For, to say nothing of Pythagorean sources of inspiration, he had presumably read Pindar's second Olympian with approval; and Socrates's language in *Crito*, 54 B, is precisely in the tone of the *Gorgias* and the *Phædo*.<sup>377</sup> The *Meno*<sup>378</sup> assumes the immortality and the prior existence of the soul to account for a *priori* knowledge. The *Phædo* presents a complicated proof or series of proofs. The *Symposium* seems to recognize only the subjective immortality of fame, and the racial immortality of offspring.<sup>379</sup> The "early" *Phædrus* and the late *Laws* alone agree in a proof based on the conception of the soul as the self-moving.<sup>380</sup> It is easy to foresee the hypotheses which an ingenious philology will construct from these facts. Krohn, Pfeiderer, and Rohde gravely argue that Book I of the *Republic* must be very early because the aged Cephalus neglects the opportunity to supplement his citation from Pindar with a scientific proof of immortality. Horn tells us that the *Phædrus* represents the first

<sup>369</sup> For *ἀνέμνησις* in the *Politicus* cf. *infra*, p. 44.

<sup>370</sup> See A. J. P., Vol. IX, p. 279.

<sup>371</sup> LUTOSLAWSKI, p. 467, mistranslates, or, if he prefers, misinterprets, 15 D: "the nature of thought requires the union of notions into higher units, and this constitutes an eternal necessity of the human mind." Cf. *supra*, p. 36.

<sup>372</sup> τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἐστι πεφυκὸς . . . μακρὴ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνώσιν.—περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα.—ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε γινόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεὶ. Cf. 62 A, αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὃ τι ἐστὶ. 65 A, τὴν αἰδίον . . . φύσιν.

For the ideas in relation to the method κατ' εἶδη τέμνειν, and a fuller discussion of the μὴ ἐν fallacy, see *infra*, Part II.

<sup>373</sup> *Phædo*, 114 D, χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥστερ' ἐνέθελαι ἑαυτοῖς.

<sup>374</sup> *Rep.*, 608 C ff.; *Laws*, 881 A, 967 D E, 969 A B; with τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὅπως ἀθάνατον [εἶναι] ψυχῆν, cf.

*Phædo*, 115 D E; and with the idea, 959 B, that the only βούλησις at the bar of Hades is a just life in this world, cf. *Gorg.*, 522 C D, 526 E; *Crito*, 54 B.

<sup>375</sup> *Phædo*, 85 C, τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῇ οὐν βίῃ ἢ ἀθάνατον εἶναι ἢ παγκρατεῖν τι. Cf. 107 A B; *Tim.*, 72 D; *Meno*, 86 A B; *Phædr.*, 265 C.

<sup>376</sup> 40 C. Cf. also *Phædo*, 91 B.

<sup>377</sup> *Cratylus*, 403 D E, implies the doctrine of *Phædo*, 67, 68.

<sup>378</sup> 81 C.

<sup>379</sup> 207 D, 208 B. Too much is made of this, for the same inference could be drawn from *Laws*, 721 and 773 B. The popular belief in Hades is implied, 192 E, and there is even a hint, 212 A, that the philosopher may be immortal: εἴπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτω καὶ ἐκείνῃ.

<sup>380</sup> *Phædr.*, 245 C; *Laws*, 894, 895.

youthful enthusiastic apprehension of immortality, the *Symposium* expresses the mood of sober manhood content with this life, while in the *Phædo* old age, waiting for death, craves a real immortality. According to Thompson, the *Meno* reserves the proof of what it merely asserts; the *Phædrus* outlines a general proof, the *Republic* later attempts another; the *Symposium*, dissatisfied with all so far achieved, ignores the subject; and finally the problem is taken up seriously in the *Phædo*. Zeller, on the other hand, while holding that all the proofs are substantially identical, thinks, as we have seen, that the *Republic* refers to the *Phædo*, and is also later than the *Phædrus*. But to Lutoslawski it is evident that the proof given in the *Phædrus* and repeated in the *Laws* is the latest. And he also can discern that the *Symposium*, in the first flush of idealism, could dispense with the personal immortality of the *Gorgias*, but that later, when the theory of ideas had grown familiar, Plato undertook in the *Phædo* to affiliate upon it the old doctrine of immortality.

Hardly more profitable than these arbitrary speculations is the analysis of the separate arguments. Broadly speaking, Zeller is right in saying that they all amount to this, that it is the nature or essence of the soul to live. But this general truth becomes a fallacy when employed to identify absolutely the distinct arguments of the *Phædo*, the *Republic*, and the *Phædrus*. The gist of the argument in the tenth book of the *Republic* is a fallacy employed also in the first book (353 D E), the equivocal use of the *ἀπερή* or specific excellence of the soul in relation to its *ἔργον*, its function and essence. In both cases the *ἔργον* is defined in terms of mere life-vitality, while the *ἀπερή* is referred to the moral life. But in so far as the *ἔργον* or essence of the soul is mere life, its *ἀπερή* is intensity and persistency of life—not justice.<sup>251</sup> Similarly the *Phædrus* and *Laws*, identifying life with self-movement, prove the eternity of the principle of motion, and assume it to include moral and intellectual qualities.<sup>252</sup> But there is a certain pedantry in thus scrutinizing these arguments. Plato's belief in immortality was a conviction of the psychological and moral impossibility of sheer materialism,<sup>253</sup> and a broad faith in the unseen, the spiritual, the ideal. The logical obstacles to a positive demonstration of personal immortality were as obvious to him as they are to his critics. If we must analyze the arguments of the *Phædo*, the analysis of Bonitz is, on the whole, the most plausible.<sup>254</sup> They prove, at the most,

<sup>251</sup> Cf. the equivocal use of *ἀρμονία* in *Phædo*, 93, 94, to denote the composition of physical elements that, on the hypothesis under examination, is life, and the harmony of spiritual qualities that is virtue.

<sup>252</sup> *Laws*, 896 C D.

<sup>253</sup> *Laws*, 891 C, *κινδυνεύει γὰρ ὁ λέγων ταῦτα πῶρ καὶ ὕμω καὶ γῆν καὶ ἄλλα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι*. Cf. *Phileb.*, 30 A; *Theaet.*, 155 E, 184 D; *Sophist.*, 246 A; *Tim.*, 51 C, ἢ ταῦτα, ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν . . . μόνον ἐστὶ τοιαύτην ἔχοντα ἀλήθειαν.

<sup>254</sup> I. e., the argument *ἐκ τῶν ἐκαστῶν τὸ ἐκαστὸν*, 70 E ff., proves merely that the state of the soul after death is the same as that before birth. The argument from *ἀνάμνησις*, 73 ff., supplements this by the proof that before birth the soul possessed intelligence. The final argument meets all

objections by establishing the inherent immortality of the soul as a form that always involves the idea of life. I may add that the fallacy in this ingenious argument may be analyzed in various ways. In 103 B it is said that *αὐτὸ τὸ ἐκαστὸν*, as distinguished from *τὰ ἑκαστα* τὸ ἐκαστὸν could never admit its opposite. *Αὐτὸ τὸ ἐκαστὸν* is then subdivided into *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν* and *τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει*. This seems to yield three things: the idea *per se*, the idea in the particular, and the particular as affected by the idea. (Cf. *supra*, n. 252.) But there are really only two things: the idea, and the particular affected by the "presence" of or "participation" in the idea. How the idea can be at once in itself and in the particular may be, as we have seen, a mystery. But it does not justify the duplication of the idea, which is a device employed here only, and presumably with full consciousness, for the purpose of the argument. For by its

the immortality of soul, not of the individual. This Plato presumably knew, but we cannot expect him to say so by the death-bed of Socrates or in the ethical myths, which obviously assume individual immortality.<sup>295</sup> But neither this unavoidable fundamental ambiguity nor the fanciful variations of the eschatological myths convict Plato of serious inconsistency, or supply any evidence for the dating of the dialogues.

2. In the *Republic* Plato bases the definitions of the virtues and the three classes of the population on a tripartite division of the soul, which he warns us is not demonstrated absolutely, but sufficiently for the purpose in hand.<sup>296</sup> A poetical passage of the tenth book hints that in its true nature the soul is one and simple, but that we cannot perceive this so long as, like the sea-god Glaucus, it is disguised by the accretions of its earthly life.<sup>297</sup> The tripartite division is embodied in the myth of the *Phædrus*, which, if we pedantically press the poetical imagery,<sup>298</sup> implies the pre-existence even of the appetites.<sup>299</sup> In the *Timæus* the immortal soul is created by the Demiurgus, the mortal, which falls into two parts, spirit and appetite, by his ministers.<sup>300</sup> Here the tripartite division is subordinated to a bipartite, as Aristotle would have it.<sup>301</sup> But we are explicitly warned that the revelation of a god would be required to affirm the absolute scientific truth of this division, and to distinguish precisely the mortal from the immortal part.<sup>302</sup> In the *Laws* the question whether the *θυμός* is an affection or a distinct part of the soul is left open.<sup>303</sup> As Aristotle says, it makes no difference for ethical and political theory.<sup>304</sup> The *Phædo*, attempting to prove immortality, naturally dwells rather upon the unity of the soul, as does the tenth book of the *Republic*. But it distinguishes, quite in the manner of the *Republic*, the three types of character, the *φιλόσοφος* or *φιλομαθής*, the *φίλαρχος* or *φιλότιμος*, and the *φιλοσώματος* or *φιλοχρήματος*.<sup>305</sup> *Phædo*, 79 B C E, does not affirm that the soul is absolutely simple and uncompounded, but that the body is more akin to the composite, and the soul to the simple and unchanging. The contradictions found by Krohn and Pfeleiderer in the psychology of the *Republic*, or between the *Republic* and *Phædo*, on this point, are sufficiently explained by Hirmer.<sup>306</sup> From all this it appears (1) that Plato affirmed nothing dogmatically with regard to the ultimate psychological problem. (2) That his primary classification was the distinction between the pure reason and the lower faculties subordinate to reason and dependent on the body. (3) That for ethical and political theory he found most helpful the tripartite classification—reason, spirit,

aid the life in the individual is posited as an intermediate entity between life *per se* and the living individual, and pronounced immortal because, like life *per se*, it will not admit its opposite. Another way of putting it is to say that, in 106 E ff., *ἀθάνατον* is equivocally used for (1) that which does not admit death (while life is present), (2) that which does not admit death at all.

<sup>295</sup> *Gorg.*, 524 ff.; *Rep.*, 614 ff. Cf. *Laws*, 904 B C; *Tim.*, 41 D, *ψυχὰς ἰσαριθμοῦναι τοῖς ἀστροῖς*, etc.

<sup>296</sup> 435 C D ff.

<sup>297</sup> 611 C—612 A.

<sup>298</sup> 246 A ff.

<sup>299</sup> NATORP, *Hermes*, Vol. XXXV, p. 430, objects that the souls of the gods are tripartite and that the horses, though in the procession, do not see the ideas! SUSSEMIHL, *Neue*

*Plat. Forsch.*, p. 33, says that *Rep.*, X, must be later than *Phædrus*, for in the *Phædrus* immortality belongs to all three parts of the soul!

<sup>300</sup> 34 B C, 69 C ff.

<sup>301</sup> *Eth. Nic.*, I, 13, 9, *οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον*.

<sup>302</sup> 72 D; cf. *Phædr.*, 246 A.

<sup>303</sup> 863 B, *εἴτε τι πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος ὦν ὁ θυμός*.

<sup>304</sup> *Eth. Nic.*, I, 13, 10, *οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν*.

<sup>305</sup> 68 C, 82 C.

<sup>306</sup> "Entstehung und Komposition der Plat. Politika," *Jahrbücher für Phil.*, Suppl., N. F., Vol. XXIII, pp. 642, 643.

appetite—which he also embodied in the myths of the *Phædrus* and the *Timæus*. (4) That, while this classification may be profitably compared with the modern intelligence, feeling, will, it is beside the mark to criticise it as if it were meant to be psychologically exact and exhaustive.<sup>297</sup> We cannot establish any fixed relation between the tripartite soul and the hierarchy of the cognitive faculties—*νοῦς* (*νόησις*, *ἐπιστήμη*), *διάνοια*, *δόξα*, *πίστις*, *εἰκασία*, etc.<sup>298</sup> Plato sometimes treats the inerrant reason as a distinct part of the soul from the fallible faculties of sense and opinion.<sup>299</sup> He sometimes associates sense-perception with sensuous appetite in common antithesis to the reason.<sup>300</sup> But he also, when it suits his purpose, virtually identifies (true) opinion with reason, in opposition to the impulses of instinct and appetite.<sup>301</sup> The *θυμός*, though associated with opinion,<sup>302</sup> cannot be assigned with it to a distinct part of the soul.<sup>303</sup> Nor can it be identified with the “feeling” of the modern psychologist. The will as a faculty distinct from the impulses of appetite and the judgments of the reason has no place in Plato’s system. (5) That we cannot fix the time at which the notion of the tripartite soul first occurred to Plato, nor may we use apparent variations in the mythological dress of the doctrine in order to date the *Phædo* and *Phædrus* relatively to each other or to the *Republic*.

3. The chief changes alleged in Plato’s “later” psychology are: (a) the abandonment of *ἀνάμνησις*; (b) a different conception of the relation of mind and body, more particularly as concerns the nature and seat of pleasure and pain; (c) a fuller and more precise terminology of the cognitive faculties and the degrees of knowledge. This later psychology must be sought chiefly in the *Philebus*. It is not enough to point out that the *Philebus* is especially rich in psychological detail. The subject called for it, and we cannot expect all the dialogues to be equally full in every topic. What is required is contradictions of earlier dialogues, or new thoughts not hinted at in them. And these are not to be found.

a) The explanation of the ordinary psychological meaning of *ἀνάμνησις* in *Philebus*, 34 B, no more proves the abandonment of the peculiar Platonic doctrine than does the occurrence of the word in that sense in the *Republic*, 604 D. The *Phædo* itself treats the *ἀνάμνησις* of the ideas as a special case of recollection and association of ideas generally, and employs the consecrated phrase *τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις* of an example that fits the definition of the *Philebus*.<sup>304</sup> Plainly all recollection of the ideas is *ἀνάμνησις*, but all *ἀνάμνησις* need not be recollection of the ideas. Moreover, as the word occurs without the doctrine in the *Philebus*, so we find the doctrine without the word in the *Politicus*. As the point has been overlooked, it is worth while to dwell upon it. Every

<sup>297</sup> See JOWETT, Vol. I, p. 410; ZELLER, p. 346; LUTOSLAWSKI, p. 273.

<sup>298</sup> The imagery and terminology of *Rep.*, 511 D, 534 A, belong to the literary machinery of the *Republic*, and are not to be pressed.

<sup>299</sup> *Rep.*, 478 A B, 602 E–603 A, τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῇ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτάς.

<sup>300</sup> *Phædo*, 65, 66.

<sup>301</sup> *Phileb.*, 60 D; *Phædr.*, 237 D; *infra*, p. 48, n. 357.

<sup>302</sup> This is probably the meaning of ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἰσχυροί, *Phædr.*, 253 D, despite the antithesis ἀλυσενίας ἰσχυροί. ἀληθινῆς is used of δόξα = opinion in *Theætet.*, 187 C; *Phileb.*, 37 B.

<sup>303</sup> In *Tim.*, 37 B C, δόξαι and πίστεως belong to the circle of the θάτερον in the immortal soul.

<sup>304</sup> 73 D.

man, we are told, knows all things as in a dream, though he fails of waking knowledge.<sup>306</sup> This at once recalls the *μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα* of the *locus classicus* on *ἀνδμνησις*, *Meno*, 81 D. In the *Meno*, too, it is said that this knowledge is at first dreamlike, but is converted by the elenchus into true science.<sup>307</sup> The *Politicus* goes on to show, by the use of Plato's favorite illustration of letters or "elements,"<sup>308</sup> how it is that, despite this antecedent knowledge, we go astray, and how in the study of complex and difficult things the right use of example and comparison will enable us to recognize the identity of the same form or idea everywhere, so that we shall have a waking and not a dreamlike knowledge.<sup>309</sup> Children, knowing their letters in some sort, distinguish them rightly in easy combinations, but blunder in long hard syllables, until by comparison with the easy they learn to recognize the same letter everywhere. So our soul, similarly affected by nature toward the elements of all things (the ideas), sometimes and in some things is settled and fixed by truth concerning each one, but at other times and in other things is driven to and fro among them all, and of some it somehow forms right opinions among the combinations, but fails to apprehend these same things when transferred to the long and difficult syllables of facts. Not only the general drift, but the language and imagery of this passage must be understood of the recollections of the ideas. The phrase *ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχῆ φύσει περὶ τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα πεπονθυῖα* does not refer mainly or solely to our liability to error, as might be supposed from Campbell's "is naturally liable to the same infirmity," or from Jowett's "has the same uncertainty." It refers to the whole preceding comparison of which the starting-point is that the soul knows all things in a sense, even as the children know all their letters imperfectly. That this is the meaning of *φύσει . . . πεπονθυῖα* appears further by comparison with *Phædrus*, 249 E, *πάντα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ φύσει τεθέσται τὰ ὄντα*. The doctrine of *ἀνδμνησις*, then, repeated in the *Politicus*, is not abandoned in the *Philebus*. This conclusion might have been affirmed *a priori*. For "recollection," once indissolubly associated with the ideas and the pre-existence of the soul, would not be given up while they were retained. But pre-existence is assumed in the *Laws*,<sup>310</sup> and the ideas, as we have seen, occur in the *Politicus*<sup>311</sup> and are reaffirmed in the *Timæus*, which also implies the soul's prior knowledge of all things, in language recalling the *Phædrus* and *Politicus*.<sup>312</sup>

b) The general problem of the relation of mind and body is involved in that of immortality and the parts of the soul. As we have seen, the *Timæus*, though it assigns separate seats to the mortal and immortal soul, declines to dogmatize without the assur-

<sup>306</sup> 277 D, *κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος ὅλον ὅρα εἶδὲς ἅπαντα αὐτὸ πάλιν ὥστερ ὅρα ἀγνοεῖν*. RITCHIE, p. 143, misapprehends this passage when he associates it with the "lie of approximation." We must use examples, not because in difficult matters it is permissible to fall back upon "picture-thinking and symbolism," but because only by beginning with easy examples can we learn how to convert our dreamlike knowledge into real knowledge. The γὰρ introduces the whole parallel, of which the dreamlike knowledge of all things is only the first point.

<sup>307</sup> *Meno*, 85 C, ὥστερ ὅρα ἀπὸ καλῶνται αἱ διδασκάλου.

<sup>308</sup> *Repub.*, 402 A B; cf. *Soph.*, 253 A; *Phileb.*, 18 C; *Theætet.*, 201 E; *Tim.*, 48 B, etc.

<sup>309</sup> 278 E, *εὐχρη γινώσκω, ἵνα ὅρα ἀπὸ διεικαστὸς ἡμῶν γίνωται*.

<sup>310</sup> 904, 905.

<sup>311</sup> *Supra*, p. 39.

<sup>312</sup> 41 E, *τὴν τοῦ πᾶντος φύσιν ἰδεῖν*.

ance of a god, and the *Laws* leaves it an open question whether the parts of the soul are real parts or functions.<sup>313</sup> Of the dependence of our cognitive faculties on bodily organs Plato knew as much or as little as we know.<sup>314</sup> In the images of the wax tablet and aviary he anticipates all psychologies that explain memory, association, and recollection, and the distinction between latent and actual knowledge, by material analogies.<sup>315</sup> But sheer materialism and sensationalism he rejects, for many other reasons<sup>316</sup> and because it fails to account for the synthetic unity of thought.<sup>317</sup> The senses are the organs through which, not the faculties by which, we know.<sup>318</sup> Sometimes and for some purposes he exalts pure thought freed from all contaminations of sense.<sup>319</sup> In other moods, he recognizes that human thought takes its start from *αἰσθησις* or immediate perception.<sup>320</sup> He points out that the contradictions of sense give the first awakening stimulus to the generalizing activities of mind.<sup>321</sup> He admits that our minds are too weak to attain to knowledge without experience,<sup>322</sup> and require the aid of concrete examples in order to apprehend difficult abstractions.<sup>323</sup> We can recover the prenatal vision of the ideas only by association with their sensuous "copies," or by strenuous logical discipline.<sup>324</sup> And, though knowledge is not sense-perception, sense-perception is the best evidence that we have of some things.<sup>325</sup> Only a very literal-minded criticism will treat these concessions as a contradiction of the apotheosis of pure thought in the *Phædo*.

Slightly more plausible is the claim that Plato contradicts himself in regard to the nature and seat of desire, pleasure, and pain.<sup>326</sup> The "early" *Gorgias* and the "late" *Philebus* explicitly affirm that the soul, not the body, is the seat of desire.<sup>327</sup> The *Philebus* adds the psychological reason that desire is dependent on memory.<sup>328</sup> The *Philebus* further explains pleasure and pain as mental states arising from changes in the body sudden enough or violent enough to affect the mind and pass the threshold of consciousness, in modern phrase.<sup>329</sup> Pain results from movements unfavorable to the "natural" condition of the body, pleasure from those that preserve or restore the natural

<sup>313</sup> *Supra*, n. 293; cf. also *Rep.*, 612 A, εἰς πολυαἰδὴς εἰς μονοαἰδὴς, *Phædr.*, 271 A.

<sup>314</sup> *Phædo*, 96 BC, πότερον τὸ αἰμὰ ἔστιν ᾧ φρονεῖμεν, ἢ τὸ αἷρ ἢ τὸ σῶρ, etc. Note the irony of the whole passage.

<sup>315</sup> *Theaet.*, 191 D ff. (cf. *Phædr.*, 275 A, τύπων), 197 D, 197 B-200 B.

<sup>316</sup> *Phædo*, 80 B, 96; *Phileb.*, 30; *Tim.*, 51 C; *Laws*, 889.

<sup>317</sup> *Theaet.*, 184 D.

<sup>318</sup> *Theaet.*, 184 C; *Phædo*, 65 D, 79 C; *Tim.*, 67 B.

<sup>319</sup> *Phædo*, 65 C (cf. *Theaet.*, 187 A), 66 A, εὐκταρυνεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ; 67 C, τὸ χωρίζειν ἐκ τοῦ μέγιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν.

<sup>320</sup> *Theaet.*, 179 C, τὸ παρὸν ἐκείνη πάθος ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι. *Charm.*, 159 A, αἰσθῆσιν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἐν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη. *Phileb.*, 249 B, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰδὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον.

<sup>321</sup> *Rep.*, 524 BC; *Theaet.*, 186 AB.

<sup>322</sup> *Theaet.*, 149 C, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἀπειρος.

<sup>323</sup> *Polit.*, 271 D. Cf. *Phædr.*, 262 C, ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα.

<sup>324</sup> *Phædo*, 75 A; *Polit.*, 286 A; *Rep.*, 583 A, καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἐν φάνειαν ἐμπεῖρα ὅτι ἐν νῦν διὰ διέφθαρτον. *Tim.*, 47 A, τῶν νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ παυτοῦ λεγομένων οὐδεὶς ἐν ποτὶ ἐρρήθη μῆτε δόξα μῆτε ἥλιον μῆτε σόφραν ἰδόντων.

<sup>325</sup> *Theaet.*, 201 B, ἐν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἶδέναι ἄλλως δὲ μὴ. *Sophist.*, 234 D, καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἐπαρῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων. The whole passage is in seeming contradiction with the thought of *Phædo*, 100 A, and *Rep.*, 473 A, that words (thought) come nearer to truth than deeds. See also *Meno*, 97 B.

<sup>326</sup> Grote, Jowett, Mr. Henry Jackson, and others. Horn, who rejects the *Philebus*, says (p. 380) that it assigns desire to the soul, but pain and pleasure to the body.

<sup>327</sup> *Gorg.*, 493 A, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμία εἰσι. So *Tim.*, 69 C.

<sup>328</sup> 35;

<sup>329</sup> 33, 34, 43 BC. Cf. *Rep.*, 462 C, 584 C, αἱ γὰρ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ταῖνται καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί. Cf. *Laws*, 673 A, μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς; *Tim.*, 45 D (of sensations).



state.<sup>329</sup> This is also the doctrine of the *Timæus*, and it is not contradicted anywhere. In ethical and religious discussion, however, it is natural to identify the "soul" with the higher intelligence, *νοῦς* or immortal soul, and to speak of the pleasures of the mortal soul which come through the body and are necessitated by the body as pleasures of the body. And Plato, though usually scrupulously precise,<sup>330</sup> occasionally permits himself this inexact way of speaking. The *Philebus* enumerates three kinds of mixed pleasures and pains: (1) merely mental, as in the pleasurable-painful emotions; (2) merely bodily; (3) those that arise when pleasure of mind accompanies pain of body, or the reverse.<sup>331</sup> In a few cases the "bodily" pleasures are spoken of as if they were literally in or of the body.<sup>332</sup> But Plato was justified in assuming that only a careless or captious reader would misunderstand him. For hardly three pages back he had explained that bodily states produce pleasure and pain only when they cross the threshold of consciousness.<sup>333</sup> There are also two or three cases in the *Phædo*. In the first the phrase "appetites of the body" is used in a highly wrought, ethical passage precisely as it might be employed by a modern preacher, with no implication of psychological doctrine.<sup>334</sup> The second occurs in the refutation of the hypothesis that the soul may be a "harmony" of material states or elements. To refute this objection Socrates employs the very argument used in the *Republic* to distinguish *νοῦς* from *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*.<sup>335</sup> The soul cannot be identical with that which it rebukes and controls as a superior. The soul, instead of being controlled, *ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν*, is master of them. Therefore it cannot be a "harmony" composed of them. The appetites are treated as material *παθήματα* in order to refute, in its own terminology, the hypothesis that the soul is a composition of material *παθήματα*. The argument would lose its force if stated in the terminology of the *Republic*. If the tripartite soul were explicitly recognized, it would be necessary, first, to decide which parts are to be immortal; secondly, to prove directly, and not by the equivocal substitution of "bodily" appetites for states of matter, that the *νοῦς* or soul cannot be a harmony of material elements. For these reasons, in the *Phædo*, soul, tacitly identified with *νοῦς*, is opposed to body as a whole, including the appetites. But the literary and æsthetic necessity of this way of speaking having once been perceived, we cannot treat it as a contradiction of the psychological truth clearly stated in the "earlier"

<sup>329</sup> *Phileb.*, 31 D ff., 42 D; *Tim.*, 64 CD, 86 C, 88 A. Implied perhaps "already" in *Cratyl.*, 419 C, ἡ τε λύπη ἀπὸ τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, 10, 3, 6, controverting the doctrine that pleasure is a *γένεσις*, says: εἰ δὲ ἔστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονῆς, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδονή· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ, where οὐ δοκεῖ expresses as often Plato's opinion.

<sup>330</sup> *Phileb.*, 39 D, τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν. So 45 B, *Phædo*, 65 A; *Tim.*, 64 A; *Rep.*, 584 C, 485 D; *Phileb.*, 45 A, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα. So *Phædr.*, 258 E. Cf., *Cratyl.*, 404 A; *Rep.*, 442 A; *Tim.*, 64 A; *Phileb.*, 41 C, τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον; *Rep.*, 584 A, τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον; 442 A.

<sup>331</sup> 47 E-50 D, 46 C, 47 C D.

<sup>332</sup> 46 BC, 50 D. So Prodicus in *Protag.*, 337 C. The statement, *Phileb.*, 31 B, that pleasure and pain originate

ἐν τῷ κοινῷ . . . γένει is merely preparatory to the explanation that they are the psychic correlates of beneficial or harmful changes in the body. It is obviously no contradiction of the reference of ἡδονῆς to the ἀπειρον in 31 B. Cf. *A. J. P.*, Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 284.

<sup>333</sup> 43 BC. Cf. 33 D, θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα . . . παθόντων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεσθέντων πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελεῖσθαι. This is the doctrine of *Tim.*, 64 ABC, and it is "already" implied in *Theætet.*, 186 C, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείναι. *Phileb.*, 55 B, explicitly affirms that pleasure is in the soul only: πῶς οὐκ ἀλογόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι . . . πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον.

<sup>334</sup> 66 C, καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι.

<sup>335</sup> *Phædo*, 94 B ff.; *Rep.*, 441 B, 360 D.

*Gorgias* and "later" *Philebus*. One might as well argue that the tenth book of the *Republic* antedates or abandons the tripartite soul because the doctrine is ignored in the proof of immortality attempted there.

c) Lastly it is sometimes affirmed that the later dialogues show an increased precision in the use of psychological terminology. In fact, however, Plato's psychological vocabulary is nowhere technical. He is content to make his meaning plain by the context. Nor can we find in Spinoza or Kant or in any modern text-book the consistent precision that is sometimes demanded of Plato. There is no modern terminology which sharply discriminates mental states that are or are not supposed to involve the element of judgment and belief. There is none that shows independently of the context the precise line intended to be drawn between sensation and perception, or distinguishes revived and compounded "images" from "images" regarded as immediate impressions. We cannot, then, expect Plato to emphasize distinctions not needed for his immediate purpose, but if we bear this in mind, we shall find no serious inconsistencies or significant variations in his use of such terms as *αἴσθησις*, *δόξα* and *φαντασία*.

*Αἴσθησις* is any immediate sensation or perception or consciousness including pleasure and pain and Locke's inner sense.<sup>336</sup> As sense-perception it is rightly said to involve judgment,<sup>337</sup> and so issues in *δόξα*, opinion or belief.<sup>338</sup> The word *δόξα* may be used in this neutral, psychological sense; it may be taken unfavorably to denote mere opinion as opposed to knowledge, or favorably when true opinions and beliefs are set in antithesis to the appetites and instincts.<sup>339</sup> These shades of meaning arise naturally out of Greek usage, and would call for no comment if they had not been cited to convict Plato of inconsistency or change. The mental process that terminates in the affirmation or negation that constitutes *δόξα* may be expressed in words, *λόγος*,<sup>340</sup> or take place in silent thought. In the second case it is *διάνοια*—a discourse in the soul.<sup>341</sup> *Διάνοια*, then, mere or silent thought, may be opposed to speech<sup>342</sup> or to thought accompanied or interrupted by sensation.<sup>343</sup> It is thus often a synonym of pure thought.<sup>344</sup> But the *Republic*, in default of a better term,<sup>345</sup> employs it to denote

<sup>336</sup> *Theaet.*, 156 B, 186 DE, 152 BC; *Phileb.*, 34 A; *Charm.*, 159 A.

<sup>337</sup> *Rep.*, 523 B, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κινούμενα. *Phileb.*, 38 C, πολλάκις ἰδόντι . . . βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθ' ἂπερ ὁρῶ. This is not quite the modern psychologist's recognition of the judgment involved in perception, but it leads up to Aristotle's characterization of sensation as *δύναμις συμφύτων κριτικῆν*. *Analyt. Post.*, in *fine*.

<sup>338</sup> *Phileb.*, 38 B, ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα. *Phaedo*, ἐκ τούτων (sc. the senses) δὲ γίνονται μνήμη καὶ δόξα. *Charm.*, 159 A, αἰσθῆσιν . . . ἐξ ἧς δόξα. In *Theaet.*, 170 B, ἀληθὴ διάνοιαν . . . ψευδὴ δόξαν, *διάνοια* and *δόξα* are virtually synonyms.

<sup>339</sup> *Phileb.*, 60 D, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος. *Phaedr.*, 237 D, ἡμῶντος ἐπιθυμία . . . ἐπικτητος δόξα. *Tim.*, 77 B. In *Theaet.*, 187 A, δοξάζειν is almost the pure thought of *Phaedo*, 65 C.

<sup>340</sup> *Phileb.*, 38 E, καὶ λόγος δὲ γέγονεν οὕτως δὲ τότε δόξαν ἐκταλούμεν.

<sup>341</sup> *Phileb.*, 38 D; *Theaet.*, 189 E, 190 A. *Soph.*, 263 E, διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταῦτόν ἐστιν ὃ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος, etc.

<sup>342</sup> *Soph.*, 238 B, 234 A.

<sup>343</sup> *Theaet.*, 195 CD; *Rep.*, 511 C, διανοίᾳ μὲν . . . ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσειν. In *Phaedo*, 73 D, it is the (memory) imagination of modern psychology: καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός; in *Rep.*, 603 C, it is the mind, including higher and lower faculties.

<sup>344</sup> *Phaedo*, 66 A, εὐλακμεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ; 65 E, αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν διανοηθῆναι. In *Theaet.*, 195 DE, we pass from an image of a man, ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρώμεν δ' οὐ, to abstractions as τὰ ἰδεῖσθαι ἢ μὴδὲν ἄλλοδ' ἀνασείταί τις; cf. *Rep.*, 526 A, ὃν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχευεῖ.

<sup>345</sup> 533 D, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις.

the processes of mathematics and the sciences, which are inferior to the pure thought, *νοῦς*, of dialectic, in that they depend on sensuous imagery and hypotheses.<sup>346</sup>

Plato describes memory images,<sup>347</sup> and images of "imagination."<sup>348</sup> But he has no term for imagination as a faculty intermediate between abstract or verbal thought, on the one hand, and sense-perception, on the other. For *φαντασία* takes its color from *φαίνεται* and *φαντάζεται*, which include all forms of opinion and illusion, and it is often merely a disparaging synonym of *δόξα*.<sup>349</sup> But *φαίνεται*, though applicable to any notion that appears true, is most naturally used of the appearances of sense, and so *φαντασία* is preferably the form of *δόξα* that accompanies sense-perception,<sup>350</sup> and may be defined as *σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξας*.<sup>351</sup> Pure infallible knowledge as an ideal must be sharply distinguished even from true opinion.<sup>352</sup> Strictly speaking, it cannot be defined,<sup>353</sup> and is unattainable in this life.<sup>354</sup> Poetically it may be described as the vision of the ideas, and we may be said to approximate to it in proportion as we "recollect" the ideas by severe dialectic.<sup>355</sup> Practically knowledge is true opinion, sifted and tested by dialectic, and fixed by causal reasoning.<sup>356</sup> "True opinion" may be disparaged in contrast with the ideal, or praised as a necessary stage toward its attainment.<sup>357</sup> It is a very mechanical criticism that finds contradiction or inconsistency here.

There is no limit to the contradictions or developments that a false subtlety can discover in Plato's psychology. Most of them are by implication explained away in the foregoing summary. I will close with two or three further examples which must stand for all.

Susemihl<sup>358</sup> argues that the *Theaetetus* marks an advance on the psychology of the *Phaedrus* because it includes *Wahrnehmungsurtheile* in *δοκεῖν* or *δόξα*.<sup>359</sup> But the *Theaetetus* itself elsewhere attributes them to *αἰσθήσις*, for only so could it identify Protagoras's theory with the definition *αἰσθήσις* = *ἐπιστήμη*. As we have seen, the distinction is futile, for *αἰσθήσις* may at any time be the modern sense-perception,

<sup>346</sup> *Rep.*, 511 D, 584 A. See *Idea of Good*, pp. 230 ff.

<sup>347</sup> *Phileb.*, 30 C; *Phaedo*, 73 D; *Theaet.*, 191 D, *ὅτι ἂν ἐν τῷ εἶδεναι αὐτοῦ, ἔτα*.

<sup>348</sup> *Phileb.*, 30 C, *περὶ . . . τῶν μελλόντων*; 40 A B, and the fantastic account of the functions of the liver, *Tim.*, 71 A B. Grote, expecting the modern atomistic order: sensation, image, idea, judgment, is surprised that in *Phileb.*, 30, memory and sensation first write *λόγος* in the soul, and that, secondly, a painter supervenes who paints images of these *λόγος* and the corresponding *δόξας*. But it is characteristic of Plato to put the image after the idea, the word, and the judgment everywhere. Moreover, the images here are not the primary images of perception, which are included in Plato's *αἰσθήσις*, but imaginative visualisations of beliefs and hopes. In the mature human mind this is probably the real order: (1) sensation (perception), (2) faint verbal judgments, (3) vivifying of specially interesting judgments by imaginative visualisation.

<sup>349</sup> *Theaet.*, 191 E, *ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας*.

<sup>350</sup> *Theaet.*, 152 C, *φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθήσις ταῦτ' ἐν τε θερμαίῃ καὶ ψύχει τοῖς τοιοῦτοις*. *Soph.*, 264 A, *ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ δι' αἰσθήσεως παρὰ τινὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰς πάθος*; i. e. it is here not a memory image, but a percept accompanied by belief.

<sup>351</sup> *Soph.*, 264 B. Hence here 263 D, *φαντασία*, and *Phileb.*, 40 A, *φαντάσματα* (= imaginations or imaged expectations) are said to admit truth and falsehood. Modern atomistic psychology sometimes conceives "images" as mere pictures involving no affirmation or belief. Aristotle seems to express this view in *De Anima*, 432a, 10, *ὅτι δ' ἡ φαντασία ἔτερον φάσις καὶ ἀποφάσις*. But in 428a, 12, thinking of *Philebus*, 40 A B, he says, *αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἰ πλείους ψευδεῖς*.

<sup>352</sup> *Tim.*, 51 D E.

<sup>353</sup> *Theaetetus*, *infra*; *supra*, p. 43.

<sup>354</sup> *Phaedo*, 66, 67; *Law*, 397 D, *ὅτι οὐδὲν ποτὶ θεητοῖς ἐμμεσιν ἐφύμηναι*.

<sup>355</sup> *Supra*, n. 323.

<sup>356</sup> *Infra*, on the *Theaetetus*.

<sup>357</sup> *Supra*, n. 301.

<sup>358</sup> *New Plat. Forsch.*, p. 53.

<sup>359</sup> 209 ff.

including judgment, and *δόξα* may always be used either of the belief that accompanies *αἴσθησις*, or of the operation of the mind as opposed to sensation.

Campbell thinks the rejection in *Politicus*, 281 C D, of *καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην πασῶν* as a satisfactory definition is an advance on *Theætet.*, 207 D, where the sun is defined as the brightest luminary, etc. But the point is simply that made "already" against Gorgias's *μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων* as a definition of the matter of rhetoric.<sup>300</sup> Again, Campbell thinks the mention of *δόξαν* and *φαντασίαν* in *Sophist*, 260 E, as distinct faculties implies an advance on the *Theætetus*. But the *Theætetus* does not identify the words by using them once or twice as virtual synonyms. The *Sophist*, 264 A, temporarily distinguishes *φαντασία* as a judgment present to the mind, *δι' αἰσθήσεως*,<sup>301</sup> while *δόξα* is a judgment, *ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν . . . μετὰ συγῆς*. But to press this would prove too much by distinguishing the *Sophist* from the late *Philebus* also.

Lastly, Lutoslawski argues<sup>302</sup> that the *Phædrus* and *Theætetus* are later than the *Republic*, because they familiarly employ *δύναμις* in a sense first explained in *Republic*, 477 C. He overlooks *Protag.*, 330 A, and the five occurrences of the word in *Charmides*, 168, in a passage fully as metaphysical and abstract as that cited from the *Republic*. Indeed, the case cited from the *Phædrus*, 246 D, *πτεροῦ δύναμις*, is a mere periphrasis like *ἡ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις*, 248 C, and of the two cases from the *Theætetus*, 158 E closely resembles the *Charmides*, using the word in the vague general sense of power or potentiality, and 185 C, *ἡ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις*, uses it of the senses, as do the *Charmides*, 168 D (*ἀκοή, ὄψις*), the *Republic*, 477 C (*ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοήν*), and the *Protagoras*, 330 A (*ὀφθαλμός ὅρα*). Of equal value are the developments which Lutoslawski finds in the use of *διαλεκτική, φιλοσοφία μέθοδος, ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη*, etc.<sup>303</sup>

## PART II

The dialogues were composed in some order, and a study of their parallels, coincidences, or variations in thought will often seem to indicate the plausible, possibly the real, historic sequence. That is not the purpose of this paper. I wish to show (1) that our conception of Plato's philosophy is not appreciably affected by placing the dialectical dialogues—the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, and possibly the *Parmenides* and *Theætetus*—after, rather than before, the *Republic*; (2) that the evidence is at present insufficient to date the dialogues of the "earlier" and "middle" Platonism, and that, again, from the point of view of the interpretation of the content, it does not greatly matter. The chief value of such negative results is that the way to them lies through a further positive interpretation of Plato's true meanings.

There are certain perennial puzzles of language or thought that present them-

<sup>300</sup> *Gorg.*, 451 D E.

<sup>301</sup> Cf. *Theætet.*, 158 C; *supra*, p. 48, n. 350.

<sup>302</sup> Pp. 331, 396.

<sup>303</sup> Cf. the statement, p. 373, *à propos* of the innocent phrase, *Theætet.*, 184 C, *εἰτε ψυχὴν εἰτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν* that:

"In earlier works Plato used the term soul as free from every ambiguity. Here we see already a trace of doubts about the existence of the soul." He might as well say that the existence of the soul is called in question by *Crito*, 48 A, *ἀεὶρε δ' τι ποτ' ἴσθι*, etc., or by *Symp.*, 218 A, *τὴν καρδίαν ἢ ψυχὴν γὰρ ἢ ὅτι δεῖ ὀνομάσθαι*.

selves to Plato in three forms: as mere eristic sophisms; as hindrances to a sound logical method; as serious problems of epistemology and metaphysics. They may be roughly enumerated as the problem of Being and not-Being, or the true nature of predication and negation; the antithesis in thought and things of the one and the many, the whole and the part, permanency and change, rest and motion; the nature and possibility of real knowledge, and the meaning of consciousness of self. They are all directly or indirectly involved in the theory of ideas, but we may also study them in the group of dialogues in which they are most prominent.

The *Euthydemus* presents a broad burlesque of all the chief sophisms of eristic. The *Parmenides* systematically exposes all the antinomies concerning the one and the many, the whole and the part, rest and motion, that can be deduced from the abuse of the ambiguity of the copula. The *Theætetus* covers with persiflage the forms of eristic associated with one-sided theories of knowledge, especially materialism and extreme Heracliteanism, and makes a serious effort to solve the epistemological problem. Here perhaps, and here only, does the Socratic avowal of perplexity express Plato's own state of mind. The *Sophist* makes explicit the lessons implied in the *Parmenides* and *Theætetus*, and finally disposes of fourth-century eristic so far as it affects the presuppositions of practical logic and sound method. The *Politicus* applies the method of the *Sophist* to the definition of the true statesman, reaffirming from a different point of view, and perhaps with less confidence in the ideal, the chief doctrines of the *Republic*. The *Philebus* restates the true logical method that emerges from eristic or metaphysical debate and applies it to the ethical problem of the *summum bonum*.

We will begin with the *Sophist*, which contains the fullest exposition of method and the most explicit analysis of the fundamental eristic sophism. For our purpose there are three topics; (1) the method of definition by dichotomy; (2) the problem of Being and not-Being; (3) the logical and grammatical analysis of the sentence.

1. The formal dichotomies of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* lend these dialogues a very un-Platonic aspect. They may be said to be characteristic of Plato's "later" style, so far as this can be true of a feature that is less prominent in the *Laws* than it is in the *Gorgias* or *Phædrus*. Their significance for Plato's later thought is very slight. To understand this we must distinguish the elaboration of a definition by successive dichotomies from the more general logical use of distinction, division, and classification. Aristotle is at great pains to prove that the method of dichotomy assumes and does not establish the definition.<sup>264</sup> His criticism may have been needed against literal-minded pupils of the Academy. Plato obviously is amusing himself by playing with the method.<sup>265</sup> He clearly recognizes that formally correct dichotomies may lead to half-a-dozen definitions of the same object.<sup>266</sup> All depends upon the tact with which the original "one," the concept to be divided, is chosen,<sup>267</sup> and the

<sup>264</sup> *Anal. Pr.*, 31; *Anal. Post.*, II, 5; *Part. An.*, 1, 2 ff.

<sup>265</sup> See BONITZ, pp. 180 ff.

<sup>266</sup> *Soph.*, 231.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, 232 B, ἀλλ' ἀναλαμβάνειν ἐν πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. ἐν γὰρ τί μοι μέλιστα καταφέρει αὐτὸν μὴνόν.

insight that selects at each turn<sup>368</sup> the most significant principle of subdivision. The process of dichotomy is only a mechanical aid to exhaustive search and the discovery of all relevant distinctions.<sup>369</sup> The elaboration of it as a method of definition in the *Sophist* and *Politicus* is a mere episode. It is not followed up in the *Philebus*, *Timæus*, or *Laws*, and is therefore of no importance for Plato's "later" thought.

A very different thing is the broader use of the method for the avoidance of eristic equivocation and the correction of hasty generalization or inarticulate empiricism. To distinguish and divide for these purposes is still the only way of clear thought and accurate speech, and Plato's insistence upon it as the one principle of logical salvation is worthy of the keenest dialectician that ever lived. But in this larger use the method *κατ' εἶδη τέμνειν* is by no means confined to the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. There are hints of it in the *Symposium*.<sup>370</sup> The *Gorgias* employs it with some ostentation.<sup>371</sup> It is found in the *Phædo*,<sup>372</sup> the *Cratylus*,<sup>373</sup> and the *Theætetus*.<sup>374</sup> Its terminology and use are familiar to the *Republic*.<sup>375</sup> Most explicit is the *Phædrus*, which not only makes an ostentatious display of divisions and subdivisions,<sup>376</sup> but describes the entire procedure of true method in language that closely resembles the summing up of the whole matter found in the *Philebus*.<sup>377</sup> But side by side with

<sup>368</sup> Note *κατεῖναι*, *Soph.*, 232 A; *Polit.*, 266 E, etc.

<sup>369</sup> The imagery of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* implies this throughout. Cf. *Soph.*, 235 C; *Polit.*, 258 C, 260 E, 262 A, τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοις τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι; *Soph.*, 229 D, εἰ ἀτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν, ἢ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας; *Phædr.*, 271 B, κατ' εἶδη μέγα τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν; *Phileb.*, 13, 14 B, τὴν τοῖνυν διαφορότητα; etc.

<sup>370</sup> *Symp.*, 205 B C D, ἀφελόντες . . . τι εἶδος . . . ἐν μόριον ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ . . . οἱ μὲν ἄλλη τρεπόμενοι . . . οἱ δὲ κατὰ ἐν τι εἶδος ἰόντες. Cf. *Polit.*, 262 D, τὸ μὲν . . . ὡς ἐν . . . ἀφαιρούντες . . . καὶ γένος ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι. *Soph.*, 222 A, ἐκτρέψουσιν; *Polit.*, 258 C; *Tim.*, 60 B, γένος ἐκ πάντων ἀφορισθέν; *Soph.*, 229 C, 257 C, 268 D.

<sup>371</sup> 454 E, δύο εἶδη θῶμεν. The two εἶδη are denoted, as in the *Sophist*, by adjectives in -κής, 455 A, frequent also in pp. 464, 465. Socrates's humorous definition of rhetoric, pp. 462 ff., is in the vein of the *Sophist*. It starts from the alternative art (science) or not-art, 462 B C, like *Soph.*, 219 A; *Polit.*, 258 B. It is found to be a branch of the pseudo-art *κολακηντική*, which is divided *τέτραχα*, corresponding to a four-fold division of art obtained by two successive sub-divisions. Similarly Sophistic is finally found to be a part, *μόριον*, *Soph.*, 268 D, of the quadripartite *φανταστικόν*.

<sup>372</sup> 79 A, θῶμεν . . . δύο εἶδη, etc.; 90 B, ἀνευ τῆς περὶ τοῦ λόγου τέχνης; 75 D, οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τοῦτο ὅ ἐστι. Cf. *Phileb.*, 26 D; *Polit.*, 258 C.

<sup>373</sup> In 424 C D, the division of letters *κατὰ εἶδη* and the subdivision of these εἶδη is the method of *Philebus*, 18 B C. We are further required to examine the things to be named by letters and see εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεστὶν εἶδη, and then apply one set of εἶδη to the other, precisely as in *Phædrus*, 271 B.

<sup>374</sup> 147 D, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειροὶ τὸ πλῆθος . . . ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν (cf. *Phileb.*, 18 B, ὅταν τις τὸ ἀπειρον ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, etc.); 147 E, τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα διχα διελθόμενον, etc.

<sup>375</sup> 397 B, τὰ δύο εἶδη; 440 E, 445 C. In 454 A, eristic arises διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, precisely as in *Polit.*, 285 A. Cf. *Phileb.*, 17 A; *Soph.*, 253 D. Again, cf. *Rep.*, 470 B, δύο ταῦτα τὰ ὁνόματα . . . ὅντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινοῖν διαφοραῖν; 532 E, κατὰ ποῖα δὲ εἶδη διέστηκεν; with which cf. 504 A; *Phileb.*, 23 D, and *Polit.*, 260 C, τὴν . . . τέχνην . . . θεαρίον εἰ περ διέστηκεν with context. Compare further 544 C D, ἢ τις καὶ ἐν εἰδει διαφανεῖ τι καί τινος; with *Polit.*, 285 B, διαφορὰς . . . ὁπόσαι περ ἐν εἰδοσὶ κεῖνται; 580 D, δὲρρηται κατὰ τρία εἶδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ . . . τριχῆ.

<sup>376</sup> 244 E, 253 C, 270 B, 271 D.

<sup>377</sup> It is often affirmed (Jowett, Natorp, Jackson, Bury, etc.) that the method of the *Philebus*, *Politicus*, and *Sophist* is more advanced than that of the *Phædrus*, in which "the complementary methods of generalization and division are applied merely to the discovery of Socratic definitions with a view to consistency in the use of debatable terms." Well, the subject of the *Phædrus* being the necessity of basing rhetoric upon definitions and dialectic, that point is naturally emphasized there (265 D, ἵν' ἕκαστον ὀρίζομενος δῆλον ποιῇ, περὶ οὗ ἂν αἰεὶ διδάσκω ἐθέλῃ). But all theories of a sharp distinction between the method of the *Phædrus* and that of the "later" dialogues will only injure the scholarship of their propounders. The *Phædrus* requires τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων διεῖναι (262 A; cf. *Soph.*, 231 A, δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακὴν; *Phileb.*, 13 A B). To do this we must know ὅ ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων (262 B). The method is twice described (265, 266, and 270 D). We must first reduce to unity τὰ πολλαχῇ διασπαρμένα (265 D; cf. *Phileb.*, 16 D, αἰεὶ μίαν ἰδίαν περὶ παντὸς ἕκαστου θεμίνους ζητεῖν; cf. 26 D). This unity we are to divide κατ' ἄρθρα ἢ πέφυκε (265 E; cf. *Polit.*, 262, and with *καταγνύναι* cf. *Polit.*, 287 C, 285 D, *καταθρᾶναι*) and subdivide (266 A, τέμνων οὐκ ἐναντήκε), distinguishing and following up separately the right- and left-hand paths (266 A, δεξιὰ . . . ἀριστερὰ; cf. *Soph.*, 264 E, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦτοι δεξιὰ αἰεὶ μέρος τοῦ τηθέντος), till the object of our search and of our praise

what seems to us the purely logical treatment of the ideas as conceptual genera and species, the *Phaedrus* pictures the prenatal vision of them; the *Republic* announces the most naïve realism with regard to any and every universal; and the *Timæus* solemnly reaffirms their objectivity.<sup>378</sup> In the face of these facts, it is impossible to maintain that the dichotomies of the *Sophist* are evidence of a later doctrine in which the transcendental or naïvely realistic idea is discarded for the genera and species of conceptual logic. The emphasis and center of interest may shift from dialogue to dialogue—the doctrine remains the same.

But the opposition between the two points of view cannot be denied or disguised. The noumenal idea is one. But not only as reflected in things, but as subdivided by logic, it is many. By a natural and inevitable metaphor both Plato and Aristotle speak of particulars and lower species as parts of the higher conceptual whole to which they are subordinated. By the theory of ideas, as we have said, each of these parts, every subordinate concept, is an idea, not only the *summum genus* and the lowest species, as animal and dog, but the intermediate groups, mammal and quadruped, etc. The Aristotelian objection that the one dog will thus embody a whole series of ideas we have dismissed with the metaphysics of the subject. The relation of the particular to the idea is a mystery. And once we have accepted the metaphors "presence," "participation," "pattern," a number of ideas can be reflected by or present in one thing as easily as can one idea.

But the elaboration of logical and scientific classification brings up the difficulty in a new and more specific form less easily evaded. For the theory of ideas any and every subordinate group apprehended as a conceptual unit by the mind is an idea.<sup>379</sup> For sound logical and scientific classification only true genera and species are ideas—not necessarily "true species" in the sense of the modern naturalist, but in the sense of the Platonic logic; that is, classes and groups based on significant and relevant distinctions. From the one point of view we expect every part to be an idea; from the other, Plato explicitly warns us against mistaking for true ideas what are mere fragments or parts.<sup>380</sup> His embarrassment shows that he felt the difficulty. Sound

and blame is found (266 A; cf. *Soph.*, 235 C, *ἐνακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαιρουντας . . . ὥσπερ ἂν ληθῇ*). He who can thus look *εἰς τὸν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ* is a dialectician (266 BC; cf. *Par-men.*, 132 A, *μία τις ἰσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι*; *Soph.*, 235 C, *τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετεῖναι καθ' ἑκάστὰ τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον*). Again, looking at it from the point of view of science rather than of rhetoric and dialectic (270), the object of investigation is either simple or manifold. If it has many *εἶδη*, we must enumerate them (270 D, *ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενοι*; cf. *Phileb.*, 16 D, *πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατὰ τὴν τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός*), and treat each subordinate *ἐν* (cf. *Phileb.*, 16 D, *καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἑκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως*) as we do the original unity—i. e., study its potentialities (*δύναμις*, active or passive; cf. *Soph.*, 247 D E) in relation to other things. Rhetoric is a special psychological application of this general scientific method. It is one method which is described in *Phaedr.*, 265, 266, 270 D; *Phileb.*, 16-18; *Cratyl.*, 424 C; *Soph.*, 226 C, 235 C, 253,

etc.; *Polit.*, 285 A, etc.; *Laws*, 894 A A, 963 D, 965 C. Each dialogue brings out some aspect of it less emphasized in the others. We cannot expect Plato to repeat himself verbatim. But these variations have little or no significance for the evolution of his thought.

<sup>378</sup> *Supra*, p. 35, n. 238; p. 37, n. 256.

<sup>379</sup> *Rep.*, 596 A., 479 D; *Soph.*, 225 C, *ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος, ἐπειπερ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ἐν ὃ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἰσχυρομίας . . . οὐτε νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἀξίων*. *Phileb.*, 18 C D, the *δεσμός* of association in our minds makes a unity, and hence an idea of *γραμματική*.

<sup>380</sup> *Polit.*, 287 C, implied "already" in *Phaedr.*, 265 E; cf. *Polit.*, 282 B, *ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἔχεται*. We are more likely to "meet with ideas" if we bisect the universal (*μεσοτομεῖν*) and proceed by successive dichotomies, than if we attempt to separate the ultimate species at once. Cf. the insistence on *τὰ μέσα* in *Phileb.*, 17 A.

method required him to emphasize the distinction. But he was quite unable to define its nature.<sup>381</sup> The nominalistic logic of the modern "flowing philosophy" of evolution would meet the problem by making both "true species," and the tentative species of imperfect or erroneous generalization alike relative to the purposes of man—working hypotheses, instruments of greater or less precision and range, employed by thought in the effort to shape in its own image or check for its own ends the ever-flowing stream of change.

Plato would have preferred mystery and self-contradiction to this as an ultimate philosophy. But his logical practice approaches nearer to it than does any intermediate compromise of common-sense from Aristotle to the nineteenth century. Psychologically and ontologically all universals, as opposed to sensations and images, are equally noumenal ideas, whether language provides a name for them or not.<sup>382</sup> In logical and scientific practice the only ideas worth recognizing, whether named or not, are those that embody significant distinctions relevant to the purpose in hand.<sup>383</sup> The recognition that words are mere counters<sup>384</sup> and do not always stand for (relevant) ideas<sup>385</sup> is an apparent, but not real, contradiction of the abbreviated formula of the *Republic* that we assume an idea for every word.<sup>386</sup> Similarly, as we have already seen, the occasional and inevitable use of conceptual language is no derogation from Plato's philosophic realism.<sup>387</sup> Practical logic and psychology must treat ideas as concepts, whatever else or more they may be.

2. The puzzle that false speech and erring opinion are impossible because we cannot say or opine that which is not, is nothing, must be translated into Greek to win even a semblance of seriousness. To appreciate Plato's achievement in disposing of it forever we must have studied it in the poem of Parmenides and in the eristic of the fourth century.<sup>388</sup> Our problem here is the seeming contradiction between the *Republic* and the *Sophist*. The *Republic* distinctly avers that it is impossible even to opine that which is not—thus apparently yielding to the fallacy.<sup>389</sup> The admirable analysis of the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* explains it by pointing out that *is*, in its double function of copula and substantive verb, is ambiguous,<sup>390</sup> and that this ambiguity extends to the convenient Greek idiomatical use of the parti-

<sup>381</sup> *Polit.*, 263 A B, to distinguish genus (or species) and part would require a long discussion. He can only say that, while every species is a part, every part is not a species (εἶδος).

<sup>382</sup> *Supra*, p. 37, n. 250.

<sup>383</sup> *Rep.*, 445 C, 544 A D, ἡ τίνα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἰδὲς διαφανεῖ τινὶ κεῖται; *Tim.*, 83 C, εἰς πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀνόμοια βλέπειν, ὅρῳ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν γένος ἰδὼν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας; *Soph.*, 229 D, ἡ τίνα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἄξιαν ἐπωνυμίας; 223 A, 225 C, 267 D, names for ideas often fail because the ancients were neglectful of τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατ' εἶδη διαίρεσεως. *Polit.*, 260 E, ἀνώνυμον . . . ὄνομα ἑτέρων αὐτοῖς παραχωρήσαντες θίσθαι τινά; 261 E, τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, 263 C.

<sup>384</sup> "Already," *Charm.*, 163 D; *Polit.*, 261 E; *Theaet.*, 163 B, 184 C; *Soph.*, 218 C; *Laus.*, 627 D, and *passim*.

<sup>385</sup> *Soph.*, 217 A; *Polit.*, 263 C, ὅτι πᾶσι ταῦτ' ἐπιορομάζειν ἔσχετ' ὄνομα; *Rep.*, 454 A.

<sup>386</sup> 596 A. The common name of πολλά does imply a conceptual ἐν, which implies an idea, though it may not be relevant or worth while (ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας) for the classification or purpose in hand.

<sup>387</sup> *E. g.*, *Phaedr.*, 263 D E, ἡγάκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν . . . ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων, etc.; *Polit.*, 258 C, δύο εἶδη διανοηθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ποιῆσαι; *Phileb.*, 18 C D, 23 E, νοῆσαι, πῇ ποτὶ ἦν αὐτῶν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἐκότερον. See *supra*, p. 36, n. 264.

<sup>388</sup> See *A. J. P.*, Vol. XII, pp. 349 ff., and Vol. XXI, pp. 205 ff.

<sup>389</sup> 478 B. Cf. *Parmen.*, 132 B C, 142 A, 164 A, 166 A; *Theaet.*, 167 A, 188 D.

<sup>390</sup> *Parmen.*, 142 C, νῦν δὲ οὐκ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν . . . ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν; 163 C, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν . . . ἀρα μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἡ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν; 162 A B, with my interpretation, *A. J. P.*, Vol. XII, pp. 349 ff.; *Sophist.*, 256 D E ff.; *Tim.*, 38 B.



ciple—*ὄν* and *μὴ ὄν*, *ὄντα* and *μὴ ὄντα*; that *μὴ ὄν* is not nonentity, but otherness; not nothing, but some other thing.<sup>391</sup> If we can show that other dialogues, presumably earlier than, or contemporary with, the *Republic*, ridicule the fallacy, or imply the answer to it given in the *Sophist*, we have established a *prima facie* presumption for an interpretation of the *Republic* that will remove the contradiction.<sup>392</sup> This is the case. In the *Euthydemus* the *μὴ ὄν* puzzle is one of the stock fallacies of the eristics. To desire to make Kleinias wise is to wish to make him other than he is, what he is not—not to be. The suggestion enrages Ctesippus, but Socrates bids him *μὴ ὀνόματι διαφέρεισθαι*.<sup>393</sup> And when the quibble is further invoked in support of the paradox that *ψευδὴ λέγειν* and *ψευδὴς δόξα* are impossible, since we cannot opine or say what is not, Socrates observes that this opinion refutes itself as well as all others, and declines to take it seriously.<sup>394</sup> In the *Cratylus* Cratylus argues by a fallacy, elsewhere exemplified in Plato,<sup>395</sup> that a bad law is no law, an unapt name is no name, and a false statement is no statement, because it is *τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν*.<sup>396</sup> Socrates dryly observes that this thesis, though it has many supporters, is too subtle for him,<sup>397</sup> and then proceeds to offer a perfectly sufficient practical explanation of the difficulty by means of an illustration analogous to the image employed in the *Theaetetus*<sup>398</sup> to account for certain forms of mental confusion. As you may wrongly assign A's picture to B and B's to A, so in the use of terms it is possible to apply X to A and Y to B when the opposite distribution would be correct, and, in the case of words, true.<sup>399</sup> This explanation Cratylus is urged to accept in order to avoid (eristic) debate, *ἵνα μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις*.<sup>400</sup> And when he yields, Socrates commends him on the ground that this is not the place to argue the question.<sup>401</sup> There is a further anticipation of the *Sophist* in the suggestion that those who insist on the quibble are *ὀψιμαθείς*.<sup>402</sup>

<sup>391</sup> It is true that Plato nowhere states the ambiguity of the copula with the explicitness of Aristotle and John Stuart Mill. But the passages cited in the preceding note prove that he understood it perfectly. Grote, in his criticism of the *Sophist*, objects (1) that Plato fails to distinguish *ἔστιν* in its function of pure and simple copula; (2) that the (absolute) other of Being is just as meaningless as absolute not-Being; (3) that negation is something different from otherness, and that to define it as otherness is to confuse the distinction between contrary and contradictory. These criticisms ignore the difference between Greek and English idiom, the necessity that Plato felt of meeting the *μὴ ὄν* fallacy in its own terminology, and the religious or ontological associations which half playfully, half seriously, he was resolved to preserve for *εἶναι*. *τὸ μὴ ὄν*, besides its ontological meaning, can be naturally used in Greek idiom as a mere category embracing all particular cases of (a) negative predication, (b) misstatement. Any particular *μὴ ὄν* is something other than the corresponding *ὄν*; and, generalizing, Plato may say that *μὴ ὄν* is the other of the *ὄν* without implying that it is the other of absolute Being. For the same reason, in explaining the nature of error and misstatement, he is justified in substituting for the general category *μὴ ὄν* a concrete (affirmative) misstatement, "Theaetetus flies." It all sounds crude enough, if we think it only through English idiom. But it was the

most effective analysis of the fallacy in the form in which Greek usage presented it. Plato is, for the rest, aware of the distinction between contradictory and contrary opposition (*Symp.*, 201 E; *Parmen.*, 160 B C; *Soph.*, 251 B, *οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγεται σημαίνειν συγχωρησόμεθα*), and he understands the use of *εἶναι* as a copula, though the religious and metaphysical associations of "Being" cause him to stigmatize it as "inexact" (*Tim.*, 38 B).

<sup>392</sup> My task would be much simplified if I could accept NATORP's view (*Hermes*, Vol. XXXV, p. 425), that the relative Being of the *Sophist* is distinctly anticipated in *Phaedo*, 79 A, *δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ αἰδέεσθαι*. But *ὄντων* is not to be pressed here.

<sup>393</sup> *Euthyd.*, 283, 285 A.

<sup>394</sup> 286 C, where, as in the *Theaetetus*, it is attributed to Protagoras with a malicious allusion to *ἀλήθεια*.

<sup>395</sup> 429 B; cf. *Hipp. major*, 284 E; *Minos*, 314 D ff.

<sup>396</sup> 429 D.

<sup>397</sup> *κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατ' ἐμὰ*, etc.; cf. *Soph.*, 239 B.

<sup>398</sup> 194 B.

<sup>399</sup> 430 D, *ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρὸς τῷ ὁρθῷ καὶ ἀληθῇ*.

<sup>400</sup> 430 D.

<sup>401</sup> 431 A.

<sup>402</sup> 433 A, *δόξωμεν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιμαθεῖν τοῦ δόοντος*. Cf. *Soph.*, 251 B, 259 D.

It is obvious (1) that the fallacy is none to Plato; (2) that he feels himself able to carry the analysis farther; (3) that he does not do so because he wishes to write the *Cratylus*, not the *Sophist*.

In the *Theaetetus* the matter is somewhat more complicated. As we shall show more fully below, the object of the *Theaetetus* is not to refute or analyze the logical fallacy that false opinion is impossible, but to explain the psychological nature of error, and with it of cognition: τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.<sup>405</sup> For this the μὴ ὄν quibble would have been wholly unfruitful. But it could not be altogether ignored. Hence it is perfunctorily dismissed in a page with the admission that the method of εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι offers no explanation of error, since ὁ δοξάζων ἐν τι δοξάζει, and ὁ μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.<sup>406</sup> We are thus left free to pursue the psychological analysis κατὰ τὸ εἶδέναι καὶ μὴ. But it is absurd to suppose that Socrates is really baffled in the *Theaetetus* by a fallacy at which he laughs in the *Euthydemus* and *Cratylus*. And his real opinion of it is sufficiently indicated by his attribution of it to Protagoras in this very dialogue.<sup>407</sup>

The final analysis of the fallacy in the *Sophist* is introduced and accompanied by persiflage in the manner of the *Euthydemus* and *Cratylus*, and by hints that it is a mere eristic puzzle.<sup>408</sup> The final common-sense formula that true speech and opinion represent τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔχει or ὡς ἔστι is not new.<sup>409</sup> It evades the psychological problems of the *Theaetetus*, and it is reached by arguments purely logical and practical. If we do not admit that μὴ ὄν normally means otherness rather than non-existence, we shall make all rational speech and thought impossible.<sup>410</sup> The absolute ὄν (and μὴ ὄν) of the *Parmenides* to which no intelligible predicates attach is reserved for ontology and mysticism.<sup>411</sup> But ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν λόγοις (251 D) we must accept a doctrine of mixed and relative Being and not-Being.<sup>412</sup>

The result of the inquiry is that, if Plato in the *Republic* falls into this fallacy, the *Republic* must be earlier and less mature, not only than the *Sophist*, but than the *Euthydemus* and the *Cratylus*. But Plato does not yield to the fallacy in the *Republic*. He merely varies his terminology to suit his theme. He needs the transcendental absolute Being for the world of ideas as opposed to the world of sense, for the symbolism of the idea of Good, the image of the sun, the cave, and the conversion from the shadows to the realities. It would have been singularly tactless to preface these passages with an explanation that ὄν, like μὴ ὄν, is a relative term, and that all ὄντα with which human logic can deal are likewise μὴ ὄντα. There is no occasion for the ὄντα and μὴ ὄντα of practical logic here. Absolute not-Being is consigned to total

<sup>405</sup> 187 D.

<sup>406</sup> 188, 189 A.

<sup>407</sup> In Socrates's ironical defense of ultra-Protagoreanism, 167 A, οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δοξάζειν, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχω. Cf. *Cratyl.*, 286 C.

<sup>408</sup> 236 E, ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συνήχεσθαι, etc.; 237 B C; 239 B, ἐμὲ . . . πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον ἂν εὖροι περὶ τὸν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔλεγχον, etc.; cf. 242 A, 243 A B, 252 C. Note also the close parallelism of this part of the *Sophist* with the intentional fallacies of the *Parmenides*, *infra*, pp. 58, 59.

<sup>409</sup> 263 B, λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἐστὶ περὶ σοῦ. Cf. *Cratyl.*, 385 B, δεῖ ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἐστὶν ἀληθές; *Euthydem.*, 284 C, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα μὲν τρόπον τινὰ λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὡς γὰρ ἔχει.

<sup>410</sup> 238 C, 239 B, 249 B C, 252 C, 259 A, δ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας ἢ μέχρι περ ἂν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτόν καὶ ἐκείνῃ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς, etc., 260 A.

<sup>411</sup> 258 E; cf. *supra*, p. 39.

<sup>412</sup> 251 A, 254 C D, 259 A B.

ignorance as it is in the *Sophist*.<sup>411</sup> Pure Being is reserved for the ideas, as it is in the *Timæus*, which was written at a time when the results of the *Sophist* were certainly familiar to Plato. Its antithesis, the world of phenomena, is described as tumbling about between Being and not-Being—as a mixture of the two; the things of sense are always changing—they are and are not.<sup>412</sup> It is not necessary to dash the spirit of mystic contemplation and enthusiasm by the reminder that the ideas themselves, when drawn down into the process of human thought, move to and fro and partake of both Being and not-Being.<sup>413</sup> We are concerned here only with the broad contrast between the two worlds. To say that the objects of sense and the notions of the vulgar tumble about between Being and not-Being, is merely another way of saying that they belong to the domain of the mixed or relative Being and not-Being described in the *Sophist*.<sup>414</sup> Only a deplorably matter-of-fact criticism can find in this adaptation of the terminology to the immediate literary purpose a concession to a fallacy ridiculed throughout the dialogues. And the arguments that would prove the results of the *Sophist* unknown to the author of the *Republic* would apply almost equally to the *Timæus*; for there, too, Plato calmly reinstates the absolute *ὄν* which the *Sophist* banishes from human speech as no less contradictory than the absolute *μὴ ὄν*, and treats as an inaccuracy the expression *τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν εἶναι*, the practical necessity of which the *Sophist* demonstrates.<sup>415</sup> Yet the treatment of the “same” and the “other” in the *ψυχογονία* (35) proves that the analysis of the *Sophist* was familiar to the author of the *Timæus*.

3. The explicit discrimination of *ὀνόματα* as names of agents and of *ῥήματα* as names of actions is peculiar to *Sophist*, 262. So the special definition of *διάνοια* is confined to the *Republic*,<sup>416</sup> and nearly every dialogue employs some definition or distinction which Plato does not happen to need again. Even if we concede that this greater explicitness of grammatical and logical analysis marks the *Sophist* as late, its significance for the development of Plato's thought is slight. It is not repeated in the *Politicus* or *Laws*,<sup>417</sup> and it is virtually anticipated in the *Cratylus*, where it is twice said that *λόγος* is composed of *ῥήματα* and *ὀνόματα*.<sup>418</sup> It is barely possible, but not necessary, to take *ῥήματα* here in the sense of “expression” or “phrase.” Even then it must include the verb. For *ὄνομα* is plainly used in the sense of “name” or “noun.” Lutoslawski's argument<sup>419</sup> that “it would be unjustifiable to apply to the *Cratylus* a definition given only in the *Sophist*,” obviously begs the question. The expression (425 A), *καὶ συλλαβὰς αὐτῶν συντιθέντες ἐξ ὧν τὰ τε ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα συντίθενται*, seems to put *ὀνόματα* and *ῥήματα* on the same plane and is unfavorable to

<sup>411</sup> 477 A, *μὴ ὄν μηδαμῇ*; 478 D E, *τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος*. Not foreseeing modern philology, Plato did not think it necessary to add *πάντως* or *μηδαμῇ* a third time in 478 B, when he asks *ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν*, which LUTOSLAWSKI, p. 429, thinks would be unaccountable coming after the inquiry of the *Sophist*. Similarly APELT (*Beiträge*).

<sup>412</sup> 479 B C D.

<sup>413</sup> Though it is hinted in the *ἀλλήλων κοινωνία* of 476 A; cf. *supra*, p. 36, n. 244.

<sup>414</sup> Cf. A. J. P., Vol. IX, p. 307.

<sup>415</sup> *Tim.*, 38 A B.

<sup>416</sup> *Supra*, n. 346.

<sup>417</sup> Lutoslawski is mistaken in saying that *ῥῆμα* is used in the distinctive sense of predicate in *Polit.*, 303 C, and *Laws*, 838 B. In both places it means “saying,” “statement.”

<sup>418</sup> 425 A, 431 C, *λόγος γὰρ πᾶσι ἐγγῆμαί, ἡ τούτων ξύμβασίς ἐστιν*.

<sup>419</sup> P. 431.

the notion of a progression from syllables to words, and from words to phrases and sentences. In 431 B, if *ῥήματα* means "verbs" or "predicates," we understand the statement that they as well as *ὀνόματα* may be falsely applied. But what is a false application of phrases? And if we evade this difficulty by taking *ῥήματα* as "sentences," then *λόγοι* must mean, not "sentences," but "discourses," and what is a false attribution of discourses? In fact, it would be easy to argue that the *Cratylus* takes for granted the results of the *Sophist* and is therefore later. Our concern is not with such "arguments," but merely to show that, conceding the utmost that the texts will bear, the difference very slightly affects the relative maturity of the thought in the two dialogues.<sup>420</sup>

#### THE PARMENIDES

A great deal of ink has been spilled over the *Parmenides*, and the profoundest mystical meanings have been discovered in its symmetrical antinomies.<sup>421</sup> To rational criticism nothing can be more certain than that they are in the main a logical exercitation more nearly akin to the *Euthydemus* and the *Sophist* than to the *Timæus*, and that they are not meant to be taken seriously except in so far as they teach by indirection precisely the logic of common-sense expounded in the *Sophist*.<sup>422</sup> In style, however, the *Parmenides* presents few, if any, traces of the elaborate "late" manner of the *Sophist*,<sup>423</sup> and this fact makes the identity of doctrine the more significant. Both the *Theætetus* and the *Sophist* allude to a meeting between Socrates and Parmenides.<sup>424</sup> The method of argumentation employed is characterized in the *Phædrus* as a kind of rhetoric, and in the *Sophist* as mere eristic.<sup>425</sup> Many passages closely resemble arguments and expressions which are ridiculed in the *Theætetus* and *Sophist*, and which are presumably not serious here.<sup>426</sup> The dialogue itself abounds in hints

<sup>420</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 33, n. 218. The further points made by Lutoslawski are nearly all misapprehensions. He says that the admission that philosophic teaching may be given by continuous lecture, as well as by the method of question and answer, is first found in 217 C. But *Theæt.*, 167 D, recognizes the same choice. The meaning of *μέθοδος* in *Soph.*, 227 A, is not more definite than that in *Phædr.*, 270 D, and *Rep.*, 533 C ff., except in so far as the method of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* lays more stress on the mere mechanism of definition by dichotomy. Cf. *supra*, n. 377. The notion of logical exercise is not new here, but is found in *Meno*, 75 A, *ἵνα καὶ γίνῃται σοὶ μελέτη*, etc., and is implied in *Theæt.*, 147 A ff. Dialectic in the *Republic* is as clearly the science of the division of notions as it is in the *Phædrus* and *Sophist*. See 454 A, 535 B, *supra*, n. 365. See also on *δύναμις*, *supra*, p. 49; and on the ideas as souls, *supra*, p. 39.

<sup>421</sup> Bury on "Later Platonism," *Jour. of Phil.*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 161 ff., gives a useful summary of recent discussions.

<sup>422</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 54. *De Plat. idearum doctrina*, pp. 41 ff.; A. J. P., Vol. IX, pp. 185, 290 ff.

<sup>423</sup> Natorp, *Archiv*, Vol. XII.

<sup>424</sup> *Theæt.*, 183 E; *Soph.*, 217 C. Either allusion might precede or follow the actual composition of the *Parmenides*. Natorp, *Archiv*, Vol. XII, pp. 291, 163, supposes that

Plato at the time of *Theæt.*, 183 E, intended to discuss rest and motion, but, writing the *Parmenides* much later, changed his mind and devoted Part I to objections to the ideas, and Part II to metaphysical problems still debated.

<sup>425</sup> *Phædr.*, 261 D, *τον οὖν Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμφόν (Zeno) λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνη ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμοία καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, etc.* *Soph.*, 259. It is equally foolish to deny or to take seriously the antinomies (*ἐναντιώσεσιν*) that arise from the communion of ideas and the relativity of *ὄν*, *μὴ ὄν*, and *θάτερον*. Cf. 259 D, *τὸ δὲ ταῦτόν ἐτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμὴ γὰρ πῃ . . . καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὁμοῖον ἀνόμοιον . . . οὔτε τις ἐλεγχος οὕτως ἀληθινός, etc.* Such contradictions are nothing difficult when one knows the trick. 259 C, *εἴτε ὥς τι χαλεπὸν κατανοηκός*. Cf. *Parmen.*, 159 A, *καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθῃ οὐκέτι χαλεπὸς εὐρίσκειν*, and Socrates's congratulations to the Sophists in the *Euthydemus* on the ease with which Ctesippus picked up their method (303 E).

<sup>426</sup> E. g., the quibble, *Parmen.*, 147 D ff. (of which Allie's "jam every other day" is the only English analogue), that the "other" is the "same" because the word *ἕτερον* in Greek idiom applies to both, and the word must refer to the same essence. This is parodied by Socrates in *Euthydem.*, 301 B, and explained in *Theæt.*, 190 E, *ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταῦτόν ἐστιν*. The extension of this reasoning to the *ἀνομοιότητα* is deprecated as eristic in

to that effect. It is recited by one whose light has gone out more completely than that of Heraclitus's sun, and who now is devoted to horsemanship.<sup>427</sup> Parmenides himself characterizes it as a kind of intellectual gymnastics which it would be unseemly to practice in the presence of the uninitiated,<sup>428</sup> and explicitly terms it a *πραγματειώδη παιδιάν*.<sup>429</sup> He chooses as his respondent the youngest interlocutor, on the ground that he will be least likely *πολυπραγμανεῖν*—that is, to interrupt the flow of plausible ratiocination by distinctions like those with which Socrates checked the stream of fallacy in the *Euthydemus*.<sup>430</sup>

These are probabilities. The proof is that the fallacies are symmetrically deduced by a systematic abuse of the ambiguity of the copula, and that Plato gives us clear warning of this at each turn in the argument. The symmetry is of course not perfect, and there are various minor fallacies that arise from other equivocations. An analysis full enough to show this in detail would defeat its own object by wearying the reader and obscuring the main design, which is not open to debate.<sup>431</sup> The groups of contradictory conclusions deduced from the hypothesis that the One is and that the One is not derive almost wholly from the equivocal meaning of "is"—from taking "is" or "is not" to signify now the absolute uncommunicating Being or not-Being which the *Sophist* dismisses as impracticable, and now the relative Being and not-Being, or otherness, which the *Sophist* establishes as the only tenable use of the terms in human logic. And near the beginning of each hypothesis we are distinctly warned of the sense in which "is" and "is not" must be taken.<sup>432</sup> This is perhaps sufficient; but another way of putting it will bring out the parallelism with the *Sophist* still more clearly. The eristic combated in the *Sophist* may be resumed in two fallacies: (1) The noumenal unity of the idea is incompatible with any suggestion of change, relation, or multiplicity. The ideas will not communicate or mix. Predication is impossible. You cannot say, "Man is good," but only, "Man is man" and "Good is good."<sup>433</sup>

*Phileb.*, 13 D. The *Parmen.*, 148 A, infers that *κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἕκαστι ὁμοῖον ἐν εἴῃ*. Now, it is precisely the function of deceptive rhetoric *τῶν παρρη δμοιοῦν*, *Phædr.*, 261 E; and it is precisely this that the *Sophist*, 259 D, and the *Philebus*, 13 A, stigmatize as eristic. Similarly the antinomies of whole and part in 137 C D, 144 E, 145 E, 157 E, 159 C D, recall *Theætet.*, 204, 205, and *Soph.*, 245. On rest and motion cf. 139 B with *Soph.*, 250 C, 146 A, 156 E, 162 E, with 255 E; *Theætet.*, 181-3. In *Theætet.*, 180 D, the words *ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι . . . παύσονται ἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἵσταναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων*, show Plato's real opinion of these absolute antinomies; cf. *Soph.*, 249 C D. For the negation of all intelligible predicates cf. 142 A, 164 B; *Soph.*, 248 C; *Theætet.*, 157 B. In general the *Parmenides* exemplifies what the *Sophist* terms, 245 E, *τοῦτ' . . . διακριβολουμένους ὅντος τε περὶ καὶ μὴ*.

<sup>427</sup> 128 C.

<sup>428</sup> 135 D, 136 D E. The *Euthydemus* hints that listening to eristic may be a useful discipline. This is the meaning of the intervention of the *δαίμονιον*, 272 E, and of 305 D, often misunderstood.

<sup>429</sup> 137 B.

<sup>430</sup> LUTOSLAWSKI, p. 418, misunderstands this, saying: "It is only in the *Parmenides* that discussion (*πολυπραγμανεῖν*) is declared useless."

<sup>431</sup> See APELT, *Beiträge*.

<sup>432</sup> (1) 137 D, *εἰ ἐν ἴσται τὸ ἐν*; (2) 142 C, *νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὐτῇ ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἰ ἐν ἐν . . . ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἴσται . . .*; (4) 157 C, *οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἐνὸς τᾶλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ . . .*; *contra* (5), 159 B, *Ἀρ' οὐκ οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶναι*; (6) 160 C, *ὅτι ἑτερόν τι λέγει τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν δὲ λέγει* (cf. *Soph.*, 237 B) 160 E, *εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ οἶόν τε . . . μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει*. From this *οὐσίας μετέχειν* and then *εἶναι μὴ ὄν* are deduced; *contra* (7) 163 C, *τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν . . . ἄρα μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν* (cf. *AR.*, *Met.*, 1004a, 15).

<sup>433</sup> 251 E, 259 E, 251 C; *Theætet.*, 201 E-202 A. The *εἰδῶν φίλοι*, 248 A (cf. 246 B, 248 E), represent not so much a particular school as a generalized tendency of thought. They are literal-minded Platonists or Eleatics who introduce into logic Plato's (and Parmenides's) poetical absolutism. Plato's criticism is not a recantation of "earlier" Platonism, for their dogma in *Soph.*, 248 C, is precisely what Plato himself says in *Tim.*, 38 A; cf. *supra*, p. 39.

(2) The negative "is not" denotes absolute non-existence, which is unutterable and unthinkable.<sup>434</sup> Plato answers in substance: (1) We must admit the mixture of ideas, the seeming multiplication of one idea by communion with others, as a condition of intelligible speech. Without it we cannot even predicate existence, identity, and diversity.<sup>435</sup> (2) Absolute not-Being is no more nor less a problem than absolute Being.<sup>436</sup> The only not-Being that finds a place in intelligible speech is otherness—that which is not this, but is some other thing.<sup>437</sup> Now, in the eight or nine<sup>438</sup> hypotheses of the *Parmenides* these two principles are alternately and systematically violated and recognized—the consequences in each case being drawn out in exact parallelism to those indicated in the *Sophist*. In the absolute theses the ideas are taken in self-identity, in isolation, *χωρίς*.<sup>439</sup> The one has no parts, and the exclusion of parts is found to shut out all predicates that imply multiplicity, space, time, or number.<sup>440</sup> And since these are the forms in which Being appears,<sup>441</sup> we cannot even say that it is.<sup>442</sup> There is neither knowledge nor speech of it.<sup>443</sup> In the absolute negative theses *μὴ ὄν* is taken to exclude every sense of *εἶναι*, with a similar result.<sup>444</sup> In the hypotheses concerned with relative Being and not-Being the reasoning is reversed. If we speak of *unum* and *alia*, we imply existence in some sense. The existent one is two (unity and existence), has parts, and so by necessary implications is clothed in all the predicates of space, time, and relation.<sup>445</sup> Instead of abiding in isolation, the one everywhere united with essence, *οὐσία*, is divided up among the indefinite multiplicity of *ὄντα*.<sup>446</sup> And it is explicitly affirmed that this is true of the most abstract and ideal unity that we can conceive.<sup>447</sup> Similarly, starting from the assumption that *μὴ ὄν* (or *μὴ εἶν*) means something, and something different,<sup>448</sup> we deduce first "participation" in various predicates,<sup>449</sup> and finally the defiant paradox of the *Sophist* that *μὴ ὄν ἐστι*.<sup>450</sup> The doctrine of these relative hypotheses is that of the *Sophist*. The reasoning of the absolute hypotheses is that of the preliminary *ἀπορίαι*

<sup>434</sup> 238 C–241 A, etc.

<sup>435</sup> 252 C, 256 A B, 259 E, etc.

<sup>436</sup> 250 D E, 258 E.

<sup>437</sup> 257 ff.

<sup>438</sup> The third *ἐν* δὲ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν, 155 E, stands by itself. It is in some sort a reconciliation of the contradictions of the first two, and, by implication, of all.

<sup>439</sup> 137 C, 139 E, τοῦ δὲ γε ἐνὸς χωρίς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταῦτόν, 140 A, 159 B, Ἄρ οὖν οὐ χωρίς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, etc. Cf. *Euthyd.*, 284 A, ἐν μὴν κάκεινός γ' ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ὃ λέγει χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων. *Theaet.*, 205 C, διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἑκάστον εἰς ἀσύνητον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὁρθῶς ἔχει προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν. Another form of this fallacy, πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς χωρίζειν, appears in the Protagorean doctrine: *Cratyl.*, 385 E, ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν ἢ οὐσία εἶναι ἑκάστη; *Theaet.*, 186 C, ἰδίαι αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστη ἡμῶν γίνονται. Absolutism, whether sensational or verbal and ideal, destroys rational thought, and is refuted by pushing it to the extreme where this is apparent.

<sup>440</sup> 137 C–142 A. Similar results follow for τάλλα from taking *ἐν* χωρίς and without parts 159 B–160 A.

<sup>441</sup> *Tim.*, 52 B.

<sup>442</sup> 141 E, οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἐστὶν ὥστε ἐν εἶναι. Damascius says that Plato does not negate *ἐν* of *ἐν*, but SIMPLICIUS, *Phys.*, 88, 32, contradicts him.

<sup>443</sup> 142 A; cf. *Soph.*, 248 C ff.

<sup>444</sup> 163 C, 164 B, οὕτω δὲ ἐν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ.

<sup>445</sup> 142 C, ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαίνειν τὸ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν . . . τοιοῦτον ὄν τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν οἷον μέρη ἔχειν, etc.; cf. *Soph.*, 244 D ff.

<sup>446</sup> 144 B, ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἢ οὐσία νενέμνται, etc.; 144 C, πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἑκάστη τῇ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρὸςέστι τὸ ἐν. Cf. *Soph.*, 245, 256 D E, 258 D E.

<sup>447</sup> 144 E, οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἐν πολλὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενημενόν; cf. 143 A. *Republic*, 525 E, however, points out that thought must restore the abstract unity as fast as analysis divides it: ἀλλ' ἐὰν σὺ κερματίζῃς αὐτὸ, ἐκείνους πολλαπλασιεύουσιν, εὐλαβούμενοι μὴ ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μέρη. For the use of κερματίζω here and in the *Parmenides*, cf. *Soph.*, 258 D.

<sup>448</sup> 160 C, ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τὸ μὴ ὄν . . . καὶ ἴσμεν δὲ λέγει.

<sup>449</sup> 161 A, 158 A, *Soph.*, 255 A B.

<sup>450</sup> 162 A, δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν. For the indispensable emendation of what follows, see my note in *A. J. P.*, Vol. XII, pp. 349 ff.

in *Sophist*, 237-46, and it is well described in Theaetetus's language there (246 E): *συνάπτεται γὰρ ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μείζω καὶ χαλεπωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἀεὶ ῥηθέντων πλάνην.*

In view of these facts, it is idle to attempt to date the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* by their philosophical content. The substantial identity of doctrine does not, of course, exclude many minor differences in the literary form and the secondary purposes of the two dialogues. One object of the *Parmenides*, for example, is to illustrate exhaustively the "both and neither" of the eristic caricatured in the *Euthydemus*. The absolute hypotheses issue in blank negation. In order to make the "both and neither" plausible, some reasoning from the absolute point of view is introduced into the relative hypotheses.<sup>451</sup> Again, it is not easy to say how much importance Plato attached to the third division of the argument in which the contradictions of the first two hypotheses, and, by implication, of all the others, are resolved. Contradictory predicates (the "both") can be true simultaneously—they belong to different times. The "neither" belongs to the instantaneous moment of transition, the "sudden" which is outside of time altogether.<sup>452</sup> It would be possible to read a plausible psychological meaning into this ingenious solution of the Zenonian problem of change.<sup>453</sup> But it cannot easily be translated into the terminology of the theory of ideas. Pure Being admits of neither of the contradictory predicates, and the ideas as *noumena* are outside of space and time. But the "one" which is here spoken of as out of time, and without predicates at the moment of transition, is apparently not the idea, but any one thing which may participate in the ideas. This consideration, and the fact that the *ἐξαίφνης* is never mentioned again, seem to indicate that it was only a passing fancy.

Lastly, though the main object of the dialogue is the illustration of the ambiguity of the copula, and the fallacy of isolating the ideas, the one is in some passages a representative of the Platonic idea, and in others of the absolute Being which ontology and mysticism recognize even after its banishment from logic. This explains and partly justifies the interpretations of the neo-Platonists and that of Zeller already considered; but does not necessitate any serious qualification of that here proposed.<sup>454</sup>

#### THE POLITICUS

The *Politicus* quotes the *Sophist*,<sup>455</sup> and is closely related to the *Timæus* and the *Laws*. Its style and its tone of "mixed pathos and satire"<sup>456</sup> in the reluctant abandonment of impracticable ideals<sup>457</sup> mark it as probably late. But there is nothing in the thought to necessitate or strongly confirm this view.<sup>458</sup> It cannot be shown that Zeller, Grote, or, more recently, Pöhlman<sup>459</sup> are led into error in the interpretation of the thought by their assumption that it precedes the *Republic*, and the attempts of

<sup>451</sup> E. g., in 149 E-150 the denial of communion between the ideas: οὐδὲ τι ἴσται μικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς μικρότητος.

<sup>452</sup> 156 D, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὐτῇ φύσει ἄποσὲ τις ἐγκαθίσταται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα.

<sup>453</sup> See *De Plat. idearum doc.*, pp. 44-6.

<sup>454</sup> *Supra*, p. 34.

<sup>455</sup> 263 D, 266 BC.

<sup>456</sup> For the theory of ideas and ἀνάμνησις, cf. *supra*, p. 44.

<sup>457</sup> *Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus.*

<sup>458</sup> 257 A, 266 D, 284 B, 286 B.

<sup>459</sup> 272 C, 301, 302.

Lutoslawski and others to show that the doctrine must be late are either fallacious<sup>460</sup> or prove at the most that it is genuinely Platonic.<sup>461</sup> Much of the dialogue is devoted to the illustration and perfection of the method of dichotomy set forth in the *Sophist*.<sup>462</sup> In form it is an attempt to define by this method the true statesman—to discriminate him sharply from other rulers and caretakers, and in particular from the politicians, sophists, rhetoricians, and generals, who usurp the name at Athens.<sup>463</sup>

This logical process is illustrated and its tedium relieved by a myth<sup>464</sup> and by elaborate analogies from the art of weaving which also separates, purifies, and re-combines.<sup>465</sup> Remarks are made on the necessity of thus mingling jest with earnest, and of employing concrete imagery or patterns to illustrate abstract thought.<sup>466</sup> The charge of undue prolixity is anticipated.<sup>467</sup> Our object is the elucidation of sound method and for that no briefer treatment of the theme would suffice.<sup>468</sup> In general, Plato tells us, the clever men who proclaim that all things are subject to number and measure have neglected to observe that there are two distinct types or ideas of measurement:<sup>469</sup> the purely relative mathematical measurement of one thing against another,<sup>470</sup> and the measurement in reference to fixed, absolute standards of the suitable, the just mean or measure in every art and procedure. Long and short as terms of censure applied to a philosophical discussion have no meaning except in the latter sense. That such absolute standards exist Plato cannot delay to prove except by a summary form of argument employed in the same way to cut short discussion in the *Phædo* and *Timæus*.<sup>471</sup> The proposition to be proved is indissolubly bound up with another proposition which the opponent can hardly reject. In this case, as surely as the various arts and sciences exist, so surely is the *μέτριον* or absolute measure of fitness a reality. For all arts and sciences postulate it. This simple thought has often

<sup>460</sup> 309 C, ἀληθὲς δόξαν . . . θεῖαν φημί ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένηται does not mean that truth, etc., is "to be seen only in divine souls," cf. *supra*, p. 39. In 272 C, συναγυρῶν φρονήσεως does not mean "an ideal totality of individual endeavors . . . transmitted from generation to generation." The word is used here not only for the first but for the last time. CAMPBELL's citation of *Sophist*, 259 D, is irrelevant; cf. *supra*, n. 439. The use of δύναμις proves nothing; cf. *supra*, p. 49. 306 C has nothing to do with the modern notion of building up a science by selection, "while useless observations and notions are rejected;" nor with *Cratyl.*, 438 E. The statement, 306 E, that the royal art puts to death, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους κοινωρεῖν, is not an admission of the "impossibility of proof in moral questions," and in any case is virtually identical with *Protag.*, 322 D, τὸν μὴ δυναμένον αἰδοῦν καὶ διακτὴς μετέχειν κτείνεον. "The unity of universal science" is not affirmed in 258 E, or *Sophist*, 257 C, except as the concept or idea (like any other concept) is one "already" in *Rep.*, 438 CD. The question is merely: Shall our dichotomies start from the concept "science" or from some other concept as, e. g., ἐμπειρία? Cf. *Soph.*, 219 A, with *Gorg.*, 462 B C.

<sup>461</sup> The employment of a periphrasis in *Phædo*, 99 B, for the technical term *συναίτιον* used in the *Politicus*, 281 D, 287 C, 281 C E, etc., and in the *Timæus*, 46 C, and nowhere else, proves nothing. A periphrasis is used for the idea in

the "late" *Philebus*, 27 A, τὸ δουλεύον εἰς γίνεσθαι αἰτίη. The word in an allied sense occurs in *Gorgias*, 519 B. It is possible that it did not occur to Plato's mind in writing *Phædo*, 99 B, but more probable that he deliberately preferred the periphrasis which is far more impressive in the context: ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἷτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ἕκαστο ἀνὲν οὗ τὸ αἷτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἷτιον.

<sup>462</sup> See CAMPBELL on 263 D.

<sup>463</sup> In 267 successive dichotomies have distinguished the statesman only as the caretaker of the biped human flock. It remains to define his specific service to this flock, 287 B, 291 B, 303 C ff.

<sup>464</sup> 269 ff.

<sup>465</sup> For the characteristic Platonic generalization of διακριτικὴ cf. 282 BC with *Soph.*, 226 D, and "already" *Cratyl.*, 388 BC. Cf. *Phileb.*, 23 D.

<sup>466</sup> 268 D, 277 ff.

<sup>467</sup> 283 ff.

<sup>468</sup> 285 D, 286.

<sup>469</sup> 283-5. The κομφοί are apparently the Pythagoreans.

<sup>470</sup> πρὸς ἄλλα, 284 B. The parallel with *Rep.*, 531 A, ἀλλήλοισι ἀναμετροῦντες, seems to have been overlooked.

<sup>471</sup> 284 D, ὡς ἄρα ἡγήσιν ὁμοίως, etc. *Phædo*, 77 A, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι, etc. *Tim.*, 51 D.



been misunderstood.<sup>473</sup> It is implied in the doctrine of ideas,<sup>474</sup> in Plato's polemic against mere relativity,<sup>475</sup> and even in the remark attributed to Prodicus in *Phædrus*, 267 B, αὐτὸς . . . ὃν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων. The fact that it is explicitly stated "for the first time" in the *Politicus* proves no more than does the fact that it is never stated again. Plato happened to formulate it only once, but it is clearly involved in *Republic*, 531 A, ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες, etc.

The myth may be profitably compared with the *Timæus*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*, but cannot be pressed to yield developments or contradictions of doctrine. Its service to the argument is merely to distinguish the mythical ideal of a shepherd of the people, who plays providence to his flock, from the modern ruler who leaves other specialists to feed, clothe, and house them, and confines himself to his specific task of government.<sup>476</sup> In other words, it emphasizes the demand often repeated in Plato for a precise definition of the specific function and service of the royal or kingly art; and, as Zeller says, rejects with a touch of irony ideals drawn from a supposed state of nature. This ruler is further discriminated, as in the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias*,<sup>477</sup> from the pretenders or subordinate ministers who usurp his name, the rhetorician,<sup>478</sup> the general,<sup>479</sup> the dicast.<sup>480</sup> Lastly, his special task is defined. As implied in the *Meno* and *Euthydemus*, and stated in the *Republic*, he is to teach virtue and inculcate right opinion.<sup>480</sup> And that his teaching may be effective and the seed fall in good ground, he is, like the rulers of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, to control marriages and the propagation of the race—especially with a view to harmonizing and blending the oppositions of the energetic and sedate temperaments.<sup>481</sup>

The accompanying classification and criticism of forms of government imply no change of opinion unless we assume that Plato was bound to repeat himself verbatim. The classification of the *Republic* is first the ideal state governed by philosophic wisdom, whether βασιλεία or ἀριστοκρατία,<sup>482</sup> and then in progressive decadence timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. The *Politicus* apparently recognizes seven states: one, the right state (302 C), the only Polity deserving the name (293 C), in which the rulers are ἐπιστήμονες. Six others are obtained by distinguishing the good and bad forms of the three types recognized in ordinary Greek usage.<sup>483</sup> We thus get monarchy or royalty, and tyranny, aristocracy, and oligarchy, and democracy, lawful and lawless.<sup>484</sup> The differences are due mainly to the necessity of presenting a continuous

<sup>473</sup> *E. g.*, by SIEBECK, *Untersuchungen zur Phil. d. Griechen*, pp. 92 ff., who over-emphasizes the analogies with the *πίπας* of the *Philebus*.

<sup>474</sup> The *μετρίου γένεσις*, 284 A B, to which every artist looks, is virtually the idea which he tries to realize, *Gorg.*, 503 E.

<sup>475</sup> *Cf.* πρὸς ἄλλα four times in 283, 284 with *Theætet.*, 160 B, 182 B, *Parmen.*, 164 C.

<sup>476</sup> 274, 275.

<sup>477</sup> *Gorg.*, 517 B, 521 D.

<sup>478</sup> 304 D, *Euthydem.*, 289 D E. *Cf. Gorg.*, 464-6, 502 E.

<sup>479</sup> 304 E, *Euthydem.*, 280 B.

<sup>480</sup> 305 B.

<sup>481</sup> 309 C D.

<sup>482</sup> 309, 310. The *Republic* recognizes the control of marriage, 460, and the importance and difficulty of reconciling the two temperaments. 503 C. It does not happen to bring the two ideas together. The *Laws*, 773 A B, does.

<sup>483</sup> 445 D. It cannot be a democracy, because φιλόσοφον . . . πλεῖστος ἀδύνατον εἶναι = *Polit.*, 292 E, μὴν οὐκ ἔστι πλεῖστος γὰρ ἐν πόλει ταυτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην δυνατόν εἶναι κτήσασθαι.

<sup>484</sup> *Rep.*, 338 D. Pindar., *Pyth.*, II, 87.

<sup>485</sup> *Polit.*, 291, 301, 302 C ff.

descending scale in the *Republic*. This leaves no place for a good form of democracy or a good monarchy apart from the ideal kingdom.<sup>485</sup> The fundamental distinction of the scientific state once noted, Plato plays freely with the conventional terminology, and no inferences can be drawn from his "contradictions." There are countless forms of government if one cares to look beyond the conspicuous εἶδη.<sup>486</sup> In the *Republic* the good oligarchy, the aristocracy of the *Politicus*, is a timarchy. In the *Menexenus* the good democracy of Athens is an aristocracy governed by kings!<sup>487</sup> In the *Laws*,<sup>488</sup> from the historical point of view, all governments are regarded as variations of the two mother types, the Persian absolutism and the Athenian democracy. But in respect of the ease with which reform may be effected the tyranny ranks first, the kingdom second, a certain type of democracy third, and oligarchy last.<sup>489</sup> I have already discussed the significance of the opposition of the two temperaments for the definition of the virtues and the antinomies of the minor dialogues.<sup>490</sup> Grote strangely ignores this when he affirms that these difficulties are not touched in the *Politicus*.

#### THE PHILEBUS

The *Philebus* was selected by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as a type of Plato's simpler Socratic style. The majority of recent critics more plausibly see signs of Plato's later manner in the poverty of the dramatic setting, and the curious elaboration of phrasing and logical framework. The introduction presents again the objections to the theory of ideas advanced in the *Parmenides*, and, like the *Parmenides*, but more explicitly, hints that these puzzles are due to the limitations of human reason.<sup>491</sup> It bids us disregard them and, assuming ideas, to deal with them and our subject according to the true dialectical method set forth in the *Phaedrus*.<sup>492</sup> It does not state that these metaphysical problems must be solved before we can so proceed.<sup>493</sup> It merely says that we must come to such an understanding about them as will prevent the puzzle of the one and many from confusing our inquiry.<sup>494</sup> We have no reason to look for a solution of them in the subsequent course of the argument. None is given. There was, as we have seen, none to offer.<sup>495</sup> The attempts of modern scholars to find one are very ingenious.<sup>496</sup> But they are not supported by Plato's words, and they proceed on the erroneous assumption that he thought it possible to give any other than a poetical and mythical account of the absolute, or to say more of the *noumenon* than

<sup>485</sup> The *Politicus* does not describe the development of one form from the other but merely states the order of preference among the lawful and lawless forms of the three types. CAMPBELL, *Intr.*, p. xliv, overlooks all this when he treats as proofs of lateness the addition of βασιλεία as one of the lower forms, and the depression of ἐλευθερία below δημοκρατία.

<sup>486</sup> *Rep.*, 544 D.

<sup>487</sup> 238 D.

<sup>488</sup> 693 D.

<sup>489</sup> 710 E. The paradox, τυραννομένην μοι ἴδμεν τὴν πόλιν, 709 E, is literally incompatible with the associations of τυραννίς in the *Republic*, but the notion of a revolution accomplished by arbitrary power is found in 501 A, 540 E.

<sup>490</sup> *Supra*, pp. 11, 13, 15, n. 50.

<sup>491</sup> *Supra*, pp. 35, 37.

<sup>492</sup> *Supra*, n. 70.

<sup>493</sup> 15 C, 16 A B.

<sup>494</sup> Cf. on this point my criticism of JACKSON, A. J. P., Vol. IX, pp. 279, 280. Even SCHNEIDER (*Plat. Metaphysik*, p. 53), whose interpretation of this part of the *Philebus* is excellent, does not make it clear that the metaphysical problem is merely evaded by the assumption of ideas and the method κατ' εἶδη.

<sup>495</sup> *Supra*, p. 35.

<sup>496</sup> As types of all may be cited: SCHNEIDER, *Platonische Metaphysik*; SIEBECK, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen*, II; *Plato's Lehre von der Materie*; HENRY JACKSON, *Plato's Later Theory of Ideas*. See A. J. P., Vol. IX, p. 282.

that it exists.<sup>497</sup> The elaborate apparatus of classifications and categories employed to decide whether pleasure or intelligence is more nearly akin to the good is due, apart from Plato's interest in dialectical exercise, to his unwillingness to treat the problem of the good in isolation. His imagination and religious feeling require him to associate the ethical good of man with the principles of order, harmony, measure, beauty, and good in the universe. We thus get many interesting analogies with the *Timæus*, but no solution of the problem of ideas. The direct classification and estimate of the different species of pleasure and intelligence, which was all the ethical problem required,<sup>498</sup> is subordinated to a larger classification of all things which, however, deepens and enriches our conception of the psychological and ontological relations of the elements of merely human good and happiness.<sup>499</sup>

The terms of this classification are the *πέρας*, the *ἄπειρον*, the *μικτόν* or mixture of the two, and the *αἰτία* or its cause. These terms represent, for the purposes of the argument, characteristic Platonic generalizations<sup>500</sup> of the ideas naturally associated with these words. Whatever else they may mean is at the most suggestion and analogy. *Πέρας* is a generalization of the idea of limit—whether it be the limitation of matter by form, of chaos by the principle of order and measure, of appetite by reason, or of the indeterminate genus by a definite number of species and sub-species. It is the idea of the *Timæus*, so far as that is conceived as a principle of limit and form stamped upon chaos. But it is not the Platonic idea—the hypostatization of the concept—for the purposes of metaphysical theory.<sup>501</sup>

The *ἄπειρον* denotes among other things (1) the indefinite multiplicity of particulars as opposed to the unity of the idea—a conception found elsewhere in Plato.<sup>502</sup> Plato generalizes the term *σῶμα* for "matter" in 29 D. (2) Indeterminate matter as opposed to the form or limit that shapes it. In this sense it may be "equated" with the space, matter, or mother of all generation in the *Timæus*, 50 D.<sup>503</sup> (3) Indeterminate

<sup>497</sup> Cf. EMERSON, *Representative Men*, "Plato," "No power of genius has ever yet had the smallest success in explaining existence. The perfect enigma remains. But there is an injustice in assuming this ambition for Plato."

<sup>498</sup> The net result of the introduction is (19 B) εἰς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτῆν ἰδούης ἡμᾶς Σακράτης, etc.

<sup>499</sup> 23 C ff.

<sup>500</sup> So Plato generalizes μάχη, *Euthyd.*, 271, 272; κήλησις (ἐμφάνων τέχνη), *ibid.*, 289 E; θρηνητική, *ibid.*, 290 B; *Laws*, 823 B; *Polit.*, 290 D; *Rep.*, 373 B; *Soph.*, 221, 222; πλεονεξία, *Laws*, 906 C, cf. *Symp.*, 186 C; *Gorg.*, 508 A; κιβδηλαία, *Laws*, 916 D; κοίσις, *Symp.*, 205 B; ἔρως, *ibid.*, 205 D, and *passim*; γένεσις, *Polit.*, 261 B, etc.; διακριτική, *Soph.*, 226 C; πιθανουργική, *ibid.*, 222 C; κολακεία, *Gorg.*, 463 B ff.; the comparative degree, τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον, *Phileb.*, 24; and many minor examples, *Polit.*, 279, 280, 280.

<sup>501</sup> SCHNEIDER, p. 133, and SIEBECK, p. 73, make it a mediating principle between the idea and phenomena. But Plato never speaks of the "idea," but only of the ideas or the idea of something. *Πέρας* is itself an idea and is the cause of limit, in any given case, precisely as the idea of whiteness is the cause of white, or the idea of dog the cause of a dog.

<sup>502</sup> *Theaet.*, 147 D, εἰαυτὴ ἄπειρος τὸ πλήθος . . . συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν implies the method of *Phileb.*, 15, 16. Cf. *Rep.*, 525 A; *Polit.*, 282 D; *Soph.*, 256 E; *Parmen.*, 158 C. SCHNEIDER, p. 4, n. 1, notes this meaning, but still insists that the *ἄπειρον* of the *Philebus* primarily means indeterminate matter, which he rightly shows is not = μὴ ὄν, p. 5 (cf. *supra*, n. 261), but wrongly denies to be virtually identical with space. See SIEBECK, p. 84. The *Timæus* does not explicitly identify "matter" and "space" merely because it does not distinctly separate the two ideas. See A. J. P., Vol. IX, p. 416. But whether we call it matter or space, the χώρα, the *παραχέτης*, the mother of generation is one.

<sup>503</sup> SIEBECK compares it as the antithesis of the idea to the μὴ ὄν, the *ἔτερον* of the *Sophist*, the matter or space of the *Timæus*, the principle of necessity or evil, and the μέγα καὶ μικρόν. More precisely (p. 89), the *ἄπειρον* is the mediating link between the *θέρπον* of the *Sophist* and the χώρα of the *Timæus*. Now these terms undoubtedly have this in common, that they are variously opposed to the ideas, but Plato employs them in different connections and we cannot equate them. SIEBECK argues (pp. 58 ff.) that the absolute μὴ ὄν abandoned in the *Sophist* (253 E) must mean something. He finds it in the absolute hypothesis of

physical and chemical "process," as opposed to ideally or mathematically defined "states."<sup>504</sup> (4) The insatiate, limitless character of undisciplined desire and appetite—a conception which we have met in the *Gorgias*.<sup>505</sup>

The *μικτόν* is the mixture or union of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον* in any or all of these senses giving rise to various *γενέσεις*, both in the world of matter and in souls.<sup>506</sup> As the union of matter and form it may be "equated" with the "offspring" of the idea and the "mother" in the *Timæus*.<sup>507</sup> As the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence it obviously may not.<sup>508</sup>

*Αἰτία* is the principle of cause in general, and in particular the cause of the due mixture of pleasure and intelligence in the happy life.<sup>509</sup> In the one sense it may be identified with the Demiurgus who embodies the principle of cause in the *Timæus*.<sup>510</sup> The ultimate cause is conceived by Plato as beneficial intelligence which is virtually synonymous with the good. He intentionally confounds the good in human life with the good in the universe. It is possible, then, to say that God, or the good, or beneficent intelligence is the cause alike of the cosmos or ordered world and of the well ordered life.<sup>511</sup> We may identify the supreme mind (*νοῦς*) with the Demiurgus of the *Timæus* and the Idea of Good in the *Republic*. We may conceive the ideas as thoughts of God, identify God with the sum of his thoughts (*νόησις νοήσεως*) and so bring the ideas under the principle of *αἰτία* as not only formal but efficient causes.<sup>512</sup> But in all this we are mechanically "equating" the terminology and imagery—the literary machinery, so to speak, of three distinct lines of thought in three different dialogues, for the sake of attributing to Plato a rigid and ingenious metaphysical system wholly foreign to his spirit.

We have already discussed the psychology and the main ethical argument of the

the *Parmenides* as the antithesis of the *ἐν* regarded as the symbol of the principle of the ideas. From this it is an easy step to identifying it with matter which is also the antithesis of the idea. But it is not true that the absolute *μὴ ἐν* must mean something. Plato's rejection of it in the *Sophist* is sincere, and is confirmed by the *Parmenides* which makes it unspeakable and unthinkable. The absolute *ἐν*, as we have seen, was reinstated for religious and metaphysical purposes, as it is by many philosophers of every age. There was no such motive for forcing a meaning upon the absolute *μὴ ἐν*, and the identification of it with matter is, as we have seen, quite impossible. (*Supra*, n. 261.)

SCHNECK then proceeds to associate the logical *ἔντερον* and the *ἄπειρον* with space and to attribute to Plato an "intelligible" as well as a phenomenal space by pressing all passages in which the logical relations of concepts are expressed in spatial terms (p. 90). As the human mind naturally thinks logical determinations in spatial imagery, he has no difficulty in finding such passages. But plainly the method is vicious. We cannot infer an intelligible "space" or the identity of *ἄπειρον* and space because the ideas are spoken of as "living apart," or "included" in a larger idea, or because the method of dichotomy proceeds to the right and leaves on the left the other of the particular idea pursued. Still less can we infer it from the *εἰρηστέον*, *τέλεον*, or from the fact that move-

ment and measure are spoken of in connection with the ideas, and movement and measure imply space!

<sup>504</sup> *Phileb.*, 24 B, 25 C, 26 A.

<sup>505</sup> 27 E, 31 A, *Gorg.*, 492-4, *supra*, p. 24.

<sup>506</sup> 27 D, 25 E, 26 B, *καὶ ἐν ψυχῇς αὐτῶν πάμπαν*, which alone refutes the equation, *ἔντερον* = matter.

<sup>507</sup> 50 D.

<sup>508</sup> There is a slight equivocation in the assumption (27 D) that the "mixed" life of pleasure and intelligence belongs to the *μικτόν* of *πέρας* and *ἔντερον*.

<sup>509</sup> 26 E, 23 D, 64 C.

<sup>510</sup> In 30 D the *βασιλικὴν ψυχὴν*, etc., = the soul of the world, and the *αἰτίας δύναμις* = the Demiurgus.

<sup>511</sup> *Cf. Idea of Good*, pp. 188, 189, n. 2.

<sup>512</sup> SCHNECK identifies God not with the Idea of Good, but with the ideas. The ideas, he argues, must be real and they must be thoughts. They are, therefore, thoughts of God. We have already considered this theory, *supra*, p. 38. It is for the modern systematic philosopher the most plausible escape from the difficulty of positing two distinct *noumena*, God and the Ideas. Perhaps Plato would have accepted it, if it had been presented to him. Unlike the majority of its advocates, SCHNECK does not misinterpret particular passages in order to support it. He merely combines and equates lines of thought which Plato left unfinished and distinct.

*Philebus*, and seen that neither contradicts or appreciably modifies the doctrine of the earlier dialogues.<sup>513</sup> There remains only the question whether the demonstration of the unreality of pleasure presupposes, or, as Zeller still maintains, is presupposed by, the shorter proof of the *Republic*. Believing that the *Philebus* is probably late, I am logically committed to the first branch of the alternative. But this opinion is entirely compatible with the view that the differences between the two treatments of the theme are not in themselves sufficient to show which must be the earlier. It is impossible to determine *a priori* whether the slighter treatment is an anticipation or a résumé of the fuller discussion. The main doctrine was always a part of Plato's thought, as appears from the *Gorgias*, the *Phædo*, and the *Phædrus*.<sup>514</sup> The differences between the *Republic* and the *Philebus* have been much exaggerated. The abbreviation of the argument in the *Republic* is sufficiently explained by the subordinate place which it occupies in the scheme of the entire work. It affords no proof of the date, and no presumption even of a change of doctrine.<sup>515</sup>

#### THE THEÆTETUS

The date of the *Theætetus* has been much debated on external grounds.<sup>516</sup> Its wealth of thought and dramatic vivacity of style make it one of the most difficult dialogues to classify. In psychological depth and dialectical acuteness it ranks with the *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Parmenides*, many of the thoughts of which it anticipates or suggests.<sup>517</sup> But it has nothing of their dogmatic finality of manner. Socrates is still the midwife delivering ingenuous youth of opinions which fail to stand the test of the elenchus. And the conclusion is an avowal of Socratic ignorance.<sup>518</sup>

Before losing ourselves in details we must recall why this is so. There are two reasons: (1) The formal quest for an absolute definition always fails in Plato.<sup>519</sup> (2) It is not possible to define knowledge or explain error. We can only describe and classify different stages of cognition and various forms of error. All seemingly intelligible explanation rests on material images, like Plato's figure of the wax tablets and the aviary. But these analogies either commit us to sheer materialism and the flowing philosophy, or they explain nothing. No spatial image can represent the synthetic

<sup>513</sup> *Supra*, pp. 24, 43, 45 ff.

<sup>514</sup> *Supra*, p. 24.

<sup>515</sup> See ZELLER, p. 543. The question whether pleasure or *φρόνησις* is the good (*Rep.*, 505 B) need not be a specific reference to the *Philebus*. It is virtually raised in the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*. Zeller's table of agreements between the *Rep.* and *Phileb.* merely proves the unity of Plato's thought. *Rep.*, 584 D-585 A-E, 586 A-C, which he cites, present, at the most, different imagery. The thoughts are in the *Philebus*. That the *Philebus* does not refer specifically to the Idea of Good is no stranger than is the fact that no other dialogue does. On the other hand LUTOSLAWSKI's objection (p. 470) that the difficulty, *Rep.*, 505 B, that the sought-for *φρόνησις* is *φρόνησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is disposed of by our observation that the reference, if reference there must be, is to the *Charmides*, *supra*, n. 61. JACKSON argues

that the *Republic* is not yet acquainted with the thought that the neutral state implies not absolute quiet in the body, but slight motions which do not cross the threshold of consciousness. But the thought is implied in *Rep.* Cf. *supra*, n. 323.

<sup>516</sup> See ZELLER, p. 406, n. 1; CAMPBELL's Introduction; LUTOSLAWSKI, p. 385. It is on the whole more probable that the battle in which Theætetus was wounded belongs to the Corinthian war, 394-387, than to the year 368.

<sup>517</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 33, 34, 55, nn. 179, 182, 389.

<sup>518</sup> 149 ff., 161 AB, 209 E, 210 C.

<sup>519</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 13, p. 16, n. 86. JOWETT says, Vol. V, p. 119: "We cannot suppose that Plato thought a definition of knowledge to be impossible." But it is impossible, and that for the very reasons suggested by Plato.

unity of consciousness and memory. None can explain the comparison of past and present impressions in an unextended focal point of consciousness. None can represent except in the vaguest poetic figure<sup>520</sup> a psychical mechanism that now operates correctly, yielding right opinion, and now incorrectly, resulting in error.<sup>521</sup> On the other hand, if we invoke the absolute unity of mind behind our imagined mechanism, we are merely moving in a circle. We reaffirm our faith in the immaterial soul, but we can offer no intelligible explanation of degrees in cognition or of the psychological process of error.<sup>522</sup>

The quest for a definition, then, fails, as Plato expected it to do. But the analysis is carried far enough (1) to refute to Plato's satisfaction all psychologies of pure materialism or relativism;<sup>523</sup> (2) to justify a purely logical and practical treatment of the *μη δυν, ψευδὴς δόξα*, and similar fallacies in the *Sophist*.<sup>524</sup> This and the immense wealth of psychological suggestion scattered by the way are the chief positive results of the dialogue.<sup>525</sup>

It has been repeatedly analyzed in detail.<sup>526</sup> As in the *Gorgias* and *Philebus*,<sup>527</sup> much of the argument is purely dramatic, directed only against the cruder forms of the theory combated.<sup>528</sup> The ingenious attempts to reconstruct the doctrines of contemporary thinkers from Plato's polemic are more apt to confuse our understanding of Plato than to add to our knowledge of Protagoras, Aristippus, or Antisthenes.<sup>529</sup> As Professor Campbell says: "Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought of which Heraclitus was the most prominent exponent."

The identification of the *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον*, the *πάντα ῥεῖ*, and the definition that knowledge is sensible perception, is a part of Plato's literary machinery which we must accept untroubled by nice historic scruples. The *ἄνθρωπος μέτρον* is not a scientific or philosophic principle, but a rhetorical paradox or truism embodying a

<sup>520</sup> Cf. *Tim.*, 37 AB, with *Theaet.*, 194 B.

<sup>521</sup> ZELLER, p. 590, thinks that the section on *ψευδὴς δόξα* is an indirect refutation of the definition that knowledge is *ἀληθὴς δόξα*. He says that the difficulty of explaining false opinion arises only from the assumption that knowledge is "right opinion." That is not so, either absolutely or in Plato. The ultimate difficulty is: if the mind *apprehends* as a psychic unit, how is *mis-apprehension*, as distinguished from non-apprehension, possible? BONITZ is undoubtedly right in affirming that the question for Plato is not so much the fact or possibility of error as the psychological explanation. (Pp. 83, 89. Cf. my paper, *De Platonis idearum doctrina*, pp. 17-19.) The length of the "digression" is justified by the interest attached to the problem of *ψευδὴς δόξα* and the psychological analysis that it provokes. It is a "digression" and a negative result only for those who naively assume that Plato himself expected to reach a positive definition.

<sup>522</sup> 184 CD, 200 AB.

<sup>523</sup> *Supra*, p. 34, n. 283. Cf. *Theaet.*, 184 C ff. Up to 183 C the identity of *ἰσχυρῆς* and *αἰσθησις* is refuted only so far as it depends on extreme Protagorean relativity or Heracliteanism, which makes all thought and speech impossible. *κατά γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα αἰσθησθαι μέτρον*.

<sup>524</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 55.

<sup>525</sup> On its relation to the theory of ideas cf. *supra*, p. 33.

<sup>526</sup> By BONITZ, NATORP, CAMPBELL, JOWETT, GROTE, etc.

<sup>527</sup> *Supra*, n. 137.

<sup>528</sup> *Supra*, n. 7. Note especially the tone of 163-6, where avowedly eristic arguments are employed against the literal identification of *ἰσχυρῆς* and *αἰσθησις*. Observe the persiflage of 156, 157, 167 A, 179, 180. NATORP, *Philol.*, Vol. L, p. 263, thinks 161 B-165 E a parody of Antisthenes's attack on Protagoras, 166-8 C being Protagoras's defense. Any allusion to eristic may be in a sense a parody of Antisthenes or of any other eristic contemporary. Protagoras himself is represented as employing the *μη δυν* quibble, 167 A. Cf. *supra*, n. 405, and *Euthydem.*, 286 C.

<sup>529</sup> See NATORP's acute *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Alterthum*, and his "Protagoras und sein Doppelgänger," *Philologus*, Vol. L, pp. 282 ff. NATORP's analyses retain their value, even if we doubt the possibility of reconstructing Protagoras. For Antisthenes and the *Theaetetus* see the phantastic conjectures of JOEL, *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates*, Vol. II, pp. 839 ff.

practical tendency of the age repugnant to Plato's taste and feeling. This seems to be overlooked in the controversy between Natorp (*Philologus*, 50) and Gomperz, as to the meaning of the formula. Plato, as Natorp shows, explicitly affirms the thought to be: things are to (each and every) man as they appear to him. If sugar tastes bitter to the sick man, it is bitter to him—there is no other test. But there is no evidence and no probability that Protagoras had systematically drawn out the consequences of generalizing this proposition in its application to ethical and logical truths. He did not need to ask himself whether he meant by *ἄνθρωπος* this, that and the other man, or human cognitive faculties in general. He took *δντα*, as he found it in Greek idiom, without distinguishing things, qualities, and truths—though his simplest examples would naturally be qualities. By *ὥς* he presumably meant "that," but "that" and "how" are closely associated in Greek idiom and are often confounded in popular not to say in Platonic usage. If he used *φαίνεται* and *φαντασία* he probably did not distinguish the "it seems to me" of actual sensation from the "it seems to me" of any opinion,<sup>530</sup> and Plato avails himself of the ambiguity for the half serious *περιτροπή* that since Protagoras's "truth" does not seem true to the majority, it is admitted by Protagoras himself to be oftener false than true.<sup>531</sup>

*Πάντα ᾗς* Plato himself accepts for the phenomenal world.<sup>532</sup> As a metaphysical dogma it is tantamount to materialism in that all materialists are more or less consciously Heracliteans, though all Heracliteans need not be materialists.<sup>533</sup> As a neo-Heraclitean paradox it is the negation of the ideas, of the universal, of rational logic and speech.<sup>534</sup> As a rhetorical formula it is the symbol of the restless spirit of innovation which Plato detested.<sup>535</sup> Before generalizing and restating for serious refutation what he conceives to be the common psychological presuppositions of these catchwords, Plato covers them with persiflage and assails them with arguments which he admits to be rhetorical and eristic. There is no probability that the representatives of these doctrines could have explained their meaning or defended themselves as well as Plato has done it for them. So far as we know, he is the first thinker who was capable of distinguishing, dividing, classifying, and generalizing ideas, of noting the affinities and differences of philosophic doctrines, and of translating them freely into different terminologies. All other early thinkers, like the majority of thinkers always, are the prisoners of their formulas and can only abound in their own sense. Plato, as Emerson says, "needs no barbaric war paint, for he can define and divide," and he delights to prick with the keen point of his dialectic the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric, and antithesis blown by his predecessors. Heraclitus means well when he says that the one is united by disunion,<sup>536</sup> or that the hands at once draw and repel the bow.<sup>537</sup> But the epigram vanishes under logical analysis. The pre-Socratics discourse, in a

<sup>530</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 48.

<sup>531</sup> 170, 171. Cf. *Euthyd.*, 286 C, καὶ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἀνατρέψων καὶ αὐτοὺς αὐτόν.

<sup>532</sup> *Cratyl.*, 439 D; *Symp.*, 201 D; *Timæus*, *passim*.

<sup>533</sup> *Theætet.*, 155 E, 156 A.

<sup>534</sup> *Cratyl.*, 439, 440; *Theætet.*, 179, 180; *Soph.*, 249 D.

<sup>535</sup> PATER, *Plato and Platonism*, pp. 16-20.

<sup>536</sup> *Symp.*, 187 A.

<sup>537</sup> *Rep.*, 439 B. The saying is Heraclitean in tone.

fine imaged style, about Being, but a plain man can not be sure of their meaning.<sup>538</sup> Absolute formulas, like *πάντα ρεῖ, πᾶν ἐν, πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, have an imposing sound, but if we press for their interpretation, prove to be either truisms or paradoxes, destructive of intelligible speech.<sup>539</sup>

It is an ingenious sport to construct for Protagoras some subtle and nicely guarded modern system of phenomenalism. But we must then pass over the purely dramatic parts of Plato's discussion, and limit ourselves to his final and seriously meant arguments against the psychology of materialism and the logic of relativism. There are two such arguments which neither Plato nor his critics are careful to distinguish sharply: (1) The first is that the senses are organs of mind and that sense perception itself implies the "soul" or some central "synthetic unity."<sup>540</sup> This, if fully understood, is conclusive against the sensationist materialism of Condillac's statue. But Plato's chief interest is in the second argument derived from this. (2) The objects of each sense we can perceive only through the specific organ of that sense.<sup>541</sup> But the general common categories of Being, not-Being, number, likeness, difference, the same, and the other,<sup>542</sup> as also ethical universals, and the abstract definitions of sensuous qualities<sup>543</sup> are apprehended without subsidiary organs solely through the action of the mind, and its reflections on the contradictions of sense. Availing himself of the double meaning of *οὐσία* (1) logical essence, (2) reality, truth, Plato argues, as in the *Phædo*,<sup>544</sup> that truth and reality are attained only by the "pure" thought of the soul acting independently of the body.

A modern Theætetus, of course, might deny that abstract thought has no bodily organ, or that its objects are more "real" than the perceptions of sense. But the absolute identification of *αἴσθησις* and *ἐπιστήμη* is sufficiently refuted, and the suggestiveness of this definition having been exhausted, a fresh start is made with the definition "knowledge is true opinion." But this implies that we understand erroneous opinion, and error proves to be inexplicable. The attempt to explain it calls forth many interesting analogies and distinctions.<sup>545</sup> One large class of errors is accounted for as arising from the wrong reference of present sensations to stored up memory images.<sup>546</sup> The distinction between latent or potential and actual knowledge postpones the final difficulty.<sup>547</sup> But in the end it must be faced: error as a matter of fact occurs in "pure" thought. How can pure thought misapprehend its object? A bodiless intelligence either touches or does not touch the object of thought. We can understand

<sup>538</sup> *Soph.*, 242, 243.

<sup>539</sup> *Cratyl.*, 430, 440; *Theætet.*, 183 A B, 179 D E; *Soph.*, 249 C D.

<sup>540</sup> 184 D, *δεινὸν γὰρ σοῦ, ὃ παῖ, εἰ πολλαὶ τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουραίοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὃ τι θεὸς καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ἑνταῖναι*, etc.

<sup>541</sup> 185 A C. LUTOSLAWSKI, pp. 276, 372, fancies that this is an anticipation of the modern "law of specific energies of the senses," "already" glanced at in *Rep.*, 352 E, but showing progress in the formulation here. The modern law could not be anticipated without knowledge of the

nerves, but Empedocles "already" remarked of the senses, *οὐ δύνασθαι τὰ ἀλλήλων κρίνειν*, *Theophr. sens.*, 7, *Dox.* 500.

<sup>542</sup> 185 C D.

<sup>543</sup> 186 A B. Cf. *supra*, nn. 221 and 222.

<sup>544</sup> *Theætet.*, 187 A; *Phædo*, 65 C.

<sup>545</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 55; n. 520 with text.

<sup>546</sup> 193, 194. The memory image is treated as knowledge, *εἶδέναι*.

<sup>547</sup> 197. This is the distinction invoked in *Euthyd.*, 277, 278, to meet the eristic fallacy of the alternative *εἶδέναι* ἢ μὴ εἶδέναι.



the confusion of one object with another, the misplacement of cognitions, only in terms of spatial imagery which, if accepted literally, is materialism again, and if taken as a symbol implies the synthetic unity of mind behind it, and so renews the puzzle in infinite regress.<sup>548</sup> Modern metaphysicians evade the difficulty by assuming an infinite thought of which our erring thought is a part. Their task then is to preserve the individuality of a consciousness that is part of another mind. This problem disappears in a mist of theistic language enveloping pantheistic doctrine. Plato does not soar to these heights, but having carried the psychological analysis to the limit, he disposes of the equation, *ἐπιστήμη* = *λόγος ἀληθής*, by pointing out a sharp practical distinction between knowledge and right opinion. True opinions may be imparted by persuasion and hearsay about things which we can know only if we have seen them.<sup>549</sup>

The third and final suggestion is that knowledge is right opinion coupled with *λόγος*.<sup>550</sup> This is for practical purposes substantially Plato's own view.<sup>551</sup> Transcendentally knowledge is the apprehension of the idea. In human life it is the dialectician's reasoned mastery of his opinions implying stability, consistency, and the power to render exact account of beliefs. Plato reserves the terms knowledge, intelligence, pure reason, for the man who co-ordinates his opinions, unifies them by systematic reference to higher principles, ideals, and "ideas," and who can defend them in fair argument against all comers.<sup>552</sup> This is not a definition, but it is quite as good a description as the most modern of his critics can produce. This view is set forth in the *Republic* in the context necessary to make it intelligible. It would not have suited Plato's design to repeat or anticipate that description in the *Theaetetus* which is cast in the form of a dialogue of search. Moreover, it is one thing to give a general definition of knowledge and another thing to describe the state of mind to which the term science or knowledge *κατ' ἐξοχήν* is applicable. Sensible perception is not a synonym or definition of knowledge, nor, according to Plato, knowledge in the highest sense. But it is the most certain and the only knowledge we possess of some kinds of objects. And the recognition of this fact in various passages of the *Theaetetus* would in itself make a satisfactory all-inclusive definition of knowledge impossible.<sup>553</sup>

Accordingly Plato brings the dialogue to a plausible conclusion by discussing (and rejecting) various possible meanings of *λόγος*, none of which yields a good defini-

<sup>548</sup> 200 A B. The original *ἀνορία* arose from the unmediated antithesis *εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι* — a conscious fallacy, as the language of 188 A and *Euthyd.*, 277, 278, shows. Psychology is enriched, and the practical fallacy is disposed of, by the distinction of grades and kinds of cognition, but in the end our analysis brings us to an indivisible act of psychic apprehension which either is or is not.

<sup>549</sup> 201 B; Grote triumphs in the admission that sense-perception is, after all, sometimes knowledge; cf. *supra*, n. 324.

<sup>550</sup> 201 C D.

<sup>551</sup> The *Timaeus* (51 D) sharply distinguishes *νοῦς* and *ἀληθὲς δόξα*, but adds *τὸ μὲν αἰετ' ἀληθοῦς λόγον, τὸ δὲ ἔλεγον*. In the *Meno*, 98 A, right opinions became knowledge when bound *αἰτίας λογισμῷ*. In *Symp.*, 202 A, *οὐδὲ δόξαι — ἀνευ τοῦ*

*ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι* is opposed to *ἐπιστήμη*. In ethics fixed, stable, true opinion is virtually a synonym of *φρόνησις*: *Laus*, 653 A, *φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι βεβαίους*. Strictly speaking, there are three grades: (1) casual right opinion; (2) right opinion fixed by judicious education from youth; (3) right opinion fixed and confirmed by the higher education and accompanied by the ability *δοῦναι λόγον*. But Plato is not careful to distinguish the last two. They are both *μόνιμοι* (*Meno*, 98 A; *Rep.*, 430 B, reading *μόνιμον*). In *Polit.*, 309 C, *ἀληθὴ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως* cannot be referred exclusively to the philosophic virtue with ZELLER (p. 596). It includes the virtues of fixed habit guided from above, as appears, e. g., from the reservation *ὥς γε ἐν πολιτείᾳ*, 309 E, which is precisely equivalent to *πολιτικὴν γε* in *Rep.*, 430 E.

<sup>552</sup> *Supra*, p. 17; n. 91 with text.

<sup>553</sup> *Supra*, n. 549.

tion.<sup>554</sup> Socrates has heard a theory that the first elements of things are simple and not objects of knowledge. For knowledge implies giving and taking an account, and no account can be given of elements beyond naming them. They will not admit any other predicate.<sup>555</sup> In this paragraph we may discover allusions to Antisthenes's paradox about predication and definition, to current philosophies of materialism, and to mechanical interpretations of Plato's own formula *δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον*. But whatever Plato's secondary literary intentions, his main purpose is to present a serious psychological and metaphysical problem. Is the whole the sum of its parts except in mathematics? Can the world be explained as a mechanical summation of elements? The problem presents itself to us in psychology and cosmogony.<sup>556</sup> Plato treats it in dialectical abstraction, taking the syllable and its letters ("elements," *στοιχεῖα*) as representatives of elements and compounds. He decides (1) that the syllable is not the mere equivalent of its elements, but a new emergent form and distinct idea; (2) that, whether this be so or not, the elements and the syllable are equally knowable and unknowable. For if the syllable is the sum of the elements it cannot be known if they are not. And if it is a new unity it is as elemental as they and cannot be explained by resolution into its parts.

The second conclusion disposes of the proposed definition. The first, as we have already seen, is a suggestion of the doctrine of ideas as against philosophies of mechanical materialism.<sup>557</sup> But we are not therefore justified in making this episode the chief purpose of the dialogue. Two other possible meanings of *λόγος* are shown to yield no result, and the dialogue closes with the Socratic moral that we are at least wiser for knowing that we do not know.

#### THE PHAEDRUS

The *Phaedrus*, with its profusion of ideas, its rich technical and poetical vocabulary, and its singular coincidences with the *Laws*<sup>558</sup> and *Timæus*,<sup>559</sup> makes the impression of a mature work. This impression is confirmed by *Sprach-Statistik*, and by the fact that it directly parodies a sentence of Isocrates's *Panegyricus* published in 380.<sup>560</sup> It is possible to say that the thoughts are merely sketched in a "program" of future work; that the dithyrambic vocabulary is due to the theme; and that the phrase of Isocrates is taken from an older, common source.<sup>561</sup> Anything may be said in debate.

<sup>554</sup> LUTOSLAWSKI (p. 371) argues that the *Theaetetus* rejecting *λόγος*, etc., contradicts the opinion "provisionally" received in *Meno*, 98 A, *Symp.*, 202 A, and *Phaedo*, 96 B. He fails to note (1) that this "provisional" view recurs in the *Timæus*, (2) that *Phaedo*, 96 B, is an ironical summary of materialism and is irrelevant here, (3) that the omission of *αἰρία* which surprises him (p. 378) is presumably intentional and minimizes the contradiction. Plato does not intend to "define" knowledge, but he is careful not to contradict the practical description of it given in the *Republic*. The phrase *δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον* is mentioned as a *conditio sine qua non* of knowledge (202 C), but only in connection with the rejected theory of elements, and its full dialectical significance is not developed.

<sup>555</sup> 202.

<sup>556</sup> E. g., WUNDER's psychology differs from that of the pure associationists chiefly in that he insists that the whole is not the sum of its parts — *ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑκείνων ἐν τι γηγονός εἶδος ἰδίαν μίαν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ἔχον*, *Theaetetus*, 203 E.

<sup>557</sup> *Supra*, nn. 227, 228 with text.

<sup>558</sup> 245 D, *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*, etc.

<sup>559</sup> In the style of the myths.

<sup>560</sup> 267 A, *τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ . . . καινὰ τε ἀρχαῖα*, etc. *Isoc. Pan.*, 8, *καὶ τὰ τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι, καὶ τὰ τε παλαιὰ καινῶς διαλθεῖν*, etc.

<sup>561</sup> GOMPERZ, *Ueber neuere Plato-Forschung*.

But there is an end to all use of Isocratean parallels if we cannot infer that the *Phædrus* is later than a work which it explicitly parodies.

If we assume Lysias, who died in 378, to be still living, the date may be still more precisely determined to about the year 379. The strongest confirmation of this date is the weakness of the arguments for an earlier date, which it is hard to take seriously. The politician who recently called Lysias a λογογράφος need not have been Archinos, and, if he was, Plato's use of ἐναγγχος may be merely dramatic.<sup>562</sup> The patronizing commendation of Socrates at the end<sup>563</sup> is not incompatible with a sly parody of his Gorgian style, nor even with the sharp rap on the knuckles administered to him (if it is Isocrates) at the close of the *Euthydemus*. Still less can we say that Plato and Isocrates could never have been friends after the declaration at the close of the tract against the Sophists that virtue cannot be taught, or, for that matter, after any other polemical innuendo in their works. Huxley, Matthew Arnold, Frederick Harrison, Herbert Spencer, and other knights of nineteenth-century polemics, combined much sharper thrusts than these with the interchange of courteous or slightly ironical compliments.

Our chief concern, however, is with arguments drawn from the thought. We have already seen that the dialectical method of the *Phædrus* is not appreciably less mature than that of the *Philebus* or the *Sophist*,<sup>564</sup> and that, on the other hand, there is nothing in the psychology or ethics of the *Phædrus* that necessarily fixes its relation to the *Republic*, the *Phædo*, or the *Symposium*.<sup>565</sup> What can be said, then, of the attempts of distinguished scholars to show that the thought of the *Phædrus* dates it *circa* 392, or even ten years earlier? The only one that calls for serious consideration is Natorp's argument<sup>566</sup> that the immaturity of the *Phædrus* is proved by the absence of the notion of a supreme science, or of ultimate categories found in the *Symposium*, *Republic*, *Sophist*, and even in the *Euthydemus*. The answer is that such a notion never appears in Plato except in some special form adapted to a particular argument. Natorp includes very different things under this rubric. The supreme science of the *Symposium* is merely the knowledge of the idea—of the idea of beauty as distinguished from particular beauties. That of the *Republic* is knowledge of the idea—of the idea of good as the σκοπός or aim of true statesmanship. That of the *Euthydemus* is in one place by implication dialectic (290 C), in another the "political art" (291 C). In other passages the unity of science is merely the unity of the concept or idea, ἐπιστήμη.<sup>567</sup> The ontological categories of the *Theætetus*, *Sophist*, and *Parmenides* belong to a different line of thought and have a mainly logical significance. They are connected with the notion of a universal science only in so far as they are apprehended and discriminated by dialectic. Now the subject of the *Phædrus* did not call for the explicit assumption either of supreme categories or a universal science. The chief point in the myth, ignored by Natorp and the majority of commentators, is that

<sup>562</sup> 257 C.

<sup>563</sup> 279 A, τοὺς λόγους οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ may well be the *Panegyricus*, but might be anything.

<sup>564</sup> *Supra*, n. 377.

<sup>565</sup> *Supra*, pp. 19, 43; n. 152.

<sup>566</sup> *HERMES*, Vol. XXXV, pp. 405 ff.

<sup>567</sup> *Supra*, n. 480.

the ecstasy of love is due to a speciality of the idea of beauty. Unlike other ideas, it is represented in this world by a not wholly inadequate copy, the sight of which recalls the beatific vision of the original.<sup>568</sup> The proof of immortality requires only the categories of the self-moved and that moved by another.<sup>569</sup> The absence of other abstract logical categories proves no more here than it does in the *Laws*. The method of dialectic is described in its relation to rhetoric, which is regarded as an art of deceptive dialectic or almost eristic.<sup>570</sup> There is no occasion for going back to ultimate categories or hypothesis beyond hypothesis. The subject about which it is desired to effect persuasion is the starting-point.<sup>571</sup> The rhetorician's art is to bring this under a definition or category from which there is a plausible transition to praise or blame.<sup>572</sup> So even in the *Philebus* the account of the true dialectical method starts from the concrete *ἀρετον* to be investigated, or the idea, the *ἐν*, that it reveals to inspection, and says nothing there of ontological categories, ultimate hypothesis, or a supreme science.<sup>573</sup> The *Philebus* is not for that reason less mature than the *Phædo*.<sup>574</sup> Plato cannot always delay to tabulate ultimate categories or to reaffirm the unity of science, whether it be (1) as dialectic, (2) as the vision of the idea, or (3) as the "political art."

Natorp's other arguments merely confirm our main position by illustrating once more, and typically, the desperate straits to which an acute scholar is reduced in the attempt to date the dialogues by their thought. For example, there is obviously no connection between the remark that those who affirm that *φρόνησις* is the chief good are unable to define what *φρόνησις* (*Rep.*, 505 B), and the enthusiastic declaration that if wisdom (*φρόνησις*) could be seen by mortal eyes (as beauty in some measure can) it would enkindle *δευοῖς* . . . *ἐρωτας* (*Phædr.*, 250 D). Yet Natorp regards the first passage as a distinct criticism of and advance upon the latter. But the *Phædrus* passage merely says that *φρόνησις*, if we could only see it, would be still more lovable than beauty. It does not affirm it to be the chief of goods, and, if it did, need not for that reason precede the *Republic*, unless we are to say the same of *Laws*, 631 C.<sup>575</sup>

Again, in 245 C the unctuous phrase *δευοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή* is said to mark Plato's early, unscientific mood, because mature Platonism ranks knowledge above *πίστις*. But plainly a religious thinker may affirm the superiority of knowledge to belief and yet indulge himself in the ironical declaration that the "clever" will disbelieve, but the wise believe, his proof of immortality. Similarly in 247 C the statement that no poet has ever worthily sung the region above the heavens is taken to prove that the passage is Plato's first exposition of the theory of ideas. But such

<sup>568</sup> 250 B C D.

<sup>569</sup> 245 C.

<sup>570</sup> 261 D with *Sophist*, 259 D. Rhetoric is generalized to include dialectic and eristic, just as in *Sophist*, 222, 223, *ῥητορικὴ* embraces all forms of rhetoric, the higgling of the market, the Lucianic art of the parasite, and the whole teaching and eristic of the Sophists.

<sup>571</sup> 263 D E.

<sup>572</sup> 265, 266 A.

<sup>573</sup> 16 C D E.

<sup>574</sup> The division of all things into *τέρας*, *ἀρετον*, *μικτόν*, and *αἰρία* is given in a different connection, and has nothing

in common with the five categories of the *Sophist*, the supreme science of the *Symposium*, or the *ἰδέσθαι* of the *Phædo* and the *Republic*.

<sup>575</sup> *Phædr.*, 250 D, seems destined to misinterpretation. LUTOSLAWSKI, p. 330, misses the meaning altogether, and HORN, pp. 212, 213, actually takes *δευοῖς ἐρωτας* (understanding *δευοῖς* in a bad sense) as Plato's reason why we have no vivid images of other ideas than beauty, and objects that the passionate love of justice would be a good, since it would not be exposed to sensual excess!

a prelude is a mere commonplace of rhetoric, as in *Phædo*, 108 C; •*Meno*, 239 C; *Polit.*, 269 C.

The argument that dialectic is first introduced as a new term in 266 C will not bear scrutiny. In *Philebus*, 53 E, *ἐνεκά του* is introduced still more circumstantially. The ideas are a dream in *Cratyl.*, 439 C; dialectic is dramatically led up to in *Cratyl.*, 390; and in *Sophist*, 265, 266, an elaborate explanation has to be given of what is taken for granted in the phrase *φαντάσματα θεία*, *Rep.*, 532 C.<sup>576</sup> Natorp says "der Begriff Dialektik ist im *Gorgias* noch nicht geprägt, sondern erst im *Phædrus*." But *διαλέγεσθαι* is contrasted with *ῥητορικῇ* in the *Gorgias*, 448 D, and the term *διαλεκτικός*—ή, if I may trust my memory and Ast, does not happen to occur in the *Symposium*, *Theætetus*, *Timæus*, *Parmenides*, *Phædo*, *Philebus*, or *Laws*. It is begging the question, then, to assume that *διαλέγεσθαι* in the *Gorgias* does not connote true Platonic *διαλεκτική*, but only Socratic conversation. There is not a word about "dämonischen διάλεκτος" in *Symp.*, 202 E, 203 A, and the notion of philosophy as the seeking rather than the attainment of knowledge occurs not only in *Symp.*, 203 D–204 B, "after" the *Phædrus*, but in *Lysis*, 218 A. As for *λόγων τέχνη*, it is any "art of words," whether actual or ideal rhetoric, dialectic, or even eristic.<sup>577</sup> It is uncritical to press the various meanings which different contexts lend to such a general expression. Rhetoric is called the *λόγων τέχνη* in 260 D, but Socrates immediately adds that there is no true *λέγειν τέχνη* *ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἡφθαι*; i. e., without dialectic. There is, then, no inconsistency between this and the use of *τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης* in *Phædo*, 90 B; nor can it be said that the *λόγων μέθοδος* of *Sophist*, 227 A, differs appreciably from the *μέθοδος* of *Phædr.*, 270 D.<sup>578</sup> Lastly, Natorp's argument (pp. 408–10) that the method of *συναγωγή* and *διαίρεσις* described in the *Phædrus* does not go far beyond the suggestions of the *Gorgias* and *Meno* is, of course, merely a further confirmation of our main thesis. But when he adds that *ἰδέα* is used vaguely in 237 D, 238 A, 246 A, 253 B, etc., and not, as in the "later" *Republic* and *Phædo*, in the strict sense of Platonic idea, the reply must be that this vague, untechnical use of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* is always possible in Plato.<sup>579</sup> Omitting *Theætetus*, 184 D, since Natorp thinks that also "early," we find it in *Rep.*, 507 E; *Philebus*, 64 E, and *Cratylus*, 418 E, where *ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα* does not mean "idea of good." Since the transcendental idea is established for the *Phædrus*, of what possible significance is the occasional use of the word *ἰδέα* in a less technical sense?

These illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely. They do not establish a universal negative, but they certainly create a presumption against all arguments of the type which careful scrutiny always shows to be fallacious. And the experience of the untrustworthiness of many such arguments creates in the minds of sober philologists a more justifiable "misology" than that which Plato deprecates in the *Phædo*.

<sup>576</sup> See ADAM, *ad loc.*

<sup>577</sup> *Euthyd.*, 288 A, ὑμετέρας τέχνης . . . οὕτως θανμάστη οὐσης εἰς ἀκριβειαν λόγων.

<sup>578</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 371.

<sup>579</sup> See JOWETT AND CAMPBELL, Vol. II, pp. 294 ff.

## THE CRATYLUS

In vivacity and comic verve the *Cratylus* is "early,"<sup>580</sup> in maturity and subtlety of thought "late." Its most obvious feature, the playful allegorical use of etymologizing, is anticipated or recalled in many other dialogues.<sup>581</sup> Admirable is the art with which etymologies recognized to be little better than puns are made the vehicle of a true philosophy of language, and a profound discussion of the relations of language and thought.

With this we are not concerned. We have already seen that the attempt to assign the dialogue an early place in the development of Plato's own thought breaks down.<sup>582</sup> Plato is "already" in full possession of the theory of ideas and of the essential arguments of his polemic against the flowing philosophers.<sup>583</sup> His repudiation of eristic fallacies is as distinct and as clearly, if not as fully, expressed as it is in the *Euthydemus* and *Sophist*.<sup>584</sup>

It remains merely to enumerate, as a part of our cumulative argument, some of the minor resemblances that link the *Cratylus* to its predecessors or successors, and make it a sort of abbreviated repertory of Platonic thoughts and classifications. In 386 D there is a reference to the doctrine of Euthydemus: *πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἄμα καὶ ἀεί*. In 386 D, *πράξεις* are an *εἶδος τῶν ὄντων*; cf. *Theaet.*, 155 E. In 387 B *λέγειν* is *πράττειν*, cf. *Euthyd.*, 284 C. In 388 C *ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τι ἐστὶν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας*, coupled with the statement, 390 B C, that only the dialectician can use this tool, implies the imagery and doctrine of *Sophist*, 226–31 B, where the *κάθαρσις* of dialectic and Sophistic is a branch of *διακριτικῆς*. In 390 B the statement that the user is the best judge recalls *Euthyd.*, 289 D; *Rep.*, 601 D, and is implied in *Phædr.*, 274 E. In 390 C *ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον* may be compared with *Phædo*, 75 D. In 390 D the dialectician, as *ἐπιστάτης*, suggests *Euthyd.*, 290 C; *Rep.*, 528 B. In 392 C the view of the capacity of women is that of *Rep.*, 455 D. With 394 D cf. *Rep.*, 415 B, on the probability that good men will breed true. With 396 C, *ὁρώσα τὰ ἄνω*, cf. *Rep.*, 509 D. In 398 A–C the image of the golden race, and the identification of good men with *dæmons* recall *Repub.*, 415 A and 540 C. In 398 E the rhetorician is akin to the dialectician (*ἐρωτητικοί ἔργος*, cf. *Symp.*), which makes against Sidgwick's view that in the earlier dialogues the *Sophist* is a rhetorician, in the later an eristic. In 399 C man is distinguished from the brute by conceptual thought, as in *Phædr.*, 249 B. In 400 B the conceit *σῶμα σῆμα* repeats *Gorgias*, 493 A. In 401 B *μετεωρολόγοι καὶ ἀδολεσχαί τινές* is precisely in the tone of *Phædr.*, 270 A., *ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι*. In 401 C *οὐσία ἔστι* recalls *Phædr.*, 247 A. In 403, 404 characteristic doctrines of the *Phædo*, *Gorgias*, and *Symp.* are implied concerning the naked soul, the invisible world, death, *ἐπιθυμία* as *δεσμός*, and the yearning of the soul for pure knowledge. Cf. *Gorg.*, 523 C; *Phædo*, 83 C D, 67 E–68 A. In 408 C the association of *λόγος ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδής* with the

<sup>580</sup> NATORP, however, *Archiv*, Vol. XII, p. 163, thinks the lack of dramatic *mise en scène* a mark of lateness.

<sup>581</sup> See JOWETT's *Index*, s. v. "Etymology."

<sup>582</sup> *Supra*, pp. 54, 56, 51, n. 373.

<sup>583</sup> *Supra*, p. 33, n. 218, n. 539.

<sup>584</sup> *Supra*, p. 54.

movements of the All recalls *Tim.*, 37 B C. The quibble *ἡμέρα, ἡμερα*, 418 D, is repeated in *Tim.*, 45 B. In 418 E *ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα τὸ δέον* is explained by *Rep.*, 336 D. In 419 C *λύπη ἀπὸ τῆς διαλύσεως* implies the doctrine of *Phileb.*, 31 D, and *Tim.*, 64 D. In 422 A *στοιχεῖα* is used for elements, as in *Tim.*, 56 B; *Theætet.*, 201 E. In 423 C D music is "already" *μίμησις*. In 428 C the *ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ* is virtually the "voluntary lie" of *Rep.*, 382 A. In 436 D the emphasis laid on the *ἀρχή* or hypothesis (*ὑπόκειται*) recalls *Phædo*, 101 D, 107 B.

#### THE EUTHYDEMUS

The *Euthydemus* in subtlety of logical analysis, and in its attitude toward eristic, is akin to the *Sophist* and *Theætetus*.<sup>585</sup> The question, Can virtue be taught? the protreptic discourses, and the quest for the political art resume similar discussions in the *Menō*, *Protagoras*, *Charmides*, and *Gorgias*.<sup>586</sup> To the partisans of development the dialogue offers a dilemma. Either this mature logic must be assigned to an early work, or a late work may display comic verve of style and engage in a purely dramatic, apparently unsuccessful, Socratic search for the political art.<sup>587</sup>

A systematic analysis would be superfluous after Bonitz, Grote, and Jowett. But the *Euthydemus*, like the *Cratylus*, is a repertory of Platonic thoughts that link it to "earlier" and "later" dialogues. A few of these may be enumerated: 273 C, *αὐτὸν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις*; cf. *Gorg.*, 509 B; 275 D, the captious question, Are those who learn *οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς*? merely illustrates the doctrine of *Lysis*, 218 A; *Symp.*, 203 E; *Soph.*, 229 C, 276 D ff.; do they learn *ἀ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἀ μὴ*, recalls the method *κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι* of the *Theætetus*,<sup>588</sup> and the distinction between *ἐπιστήμης* *ἐξίς* and *κτῆσις*; cf. 277 C and 278 A with *Theætet.*, 197 B; in 276 E *ἄφικτα* is used as in *Theætet.*, 165 B; 278 B *προσπαλεῖν* is used for eristic, as *παλεῖν* in *Theætet.*, 167 E; 280 E, *τὸ δὲ οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν*; cf. *Lysis*, 216 D; *Gorg.*, 467 E; 282 B, *οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν . . . δουλεῖν . . . ἐραστῇ . . . προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι*, cf. *Symp.*, 184 C; 284 B, *λέγειν* is *πράττειν*, cf. *Cratyl.*, 387 B; 287 A, if there is no error, *τίνας διδάσκαλοι ἤκετε*, cf. *Theætet.*, 161 E, 178 E; 287 D, *πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα*. The quibble suggests the metaphysical problem of *Parmen.*, 132 D, cf. *A. J. P.*, Vol. XXII, p. 161; 289 C, the art of the user and the art of the maker, cf. *Rep.*, 601 D, *Cratyl.*, 390 B, 290 A, cf. *Gorg.*, 454; 290 C D, cf. *Polit.*, 305 A, and *supra*, p. 62; 290 C, the mathematician subordinated to the dialectician, cf. *Rep.*, 528 B; 291 B, *ὥσπερ τὰ παῖδια τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα*, etc., is the germ of the image of the aviary in the *Theætetus*; 291 C, cf. *Polit.*, 259 D; 292 D, cf. *Charm.*, 167 C, *Meno*, 100 A, *Protag.*, 312 D; 301 A, cf. *supra*, n. 199; 301 B, cf. *supra*, n. 426.

<sup>585</sup> *Supra*, pp. 54, 58.

<sup>586</sup> Cf. *Idea of Good*, p. 204; *supra*, n. 97.

<sup>587</sup> 292; cf. *supra*, n. 71. BONITZ, p. 125, protests against the assumption that Plato is really baffled in 292 E, and sensibly adds: "Ich erwähne dies nur, weil diese Art der Folgerung und der Erklärung Platonischer Dialoge weit

verbreitet ist. Man sollte doch in Erwägen ziehen, ob denn jene Ruhe und Sicherheit der Discussion einer Frage als Frage für jemand möglich ist, für den sie eben nur noch Problem ist und eine Möglichkeit der Lösung sich nicht dargeboten hat."

<sup>588</sup> *Supra*, nn. 547, 548.

The significance of the closing conversation with Crito is often missed.<sup>500</sup> Nothing, of course, can be inferred from the casual admission (307 A) that *χρηματιστική* and *ῥητορική* are *ἀγαθόν*; or from the "contradiction" of the *Republic* in the statement that philosophy and *πολιτική πράξις* are both *ἀγαθόν*, but *πρὸς ἄλλο ἑκάτερα*. Socrates is speaking to his worthy friend the business man Crito from the point of view of common-sense. We have also seen that the allusion to Isocrates (?) does not determine the date.<sup>501</sup> Plato is defending himself and Socrates against the criticism that such trivial eristic is unworthy of the attention of a man of sense. The dignified rhetorician to whom the criticism is attributed, like Isocrates, confounds eristic with philosophy and proclaims the futility of both.<sup>502</sup> Plato replies (1) that in philosophy as in other pursuits the majority are bad; (2) even eristic may be a useful logical discipline. The second thought is implied rather than expressed. It is implied by the intervention of the *δαιμόνιον* (272 E) and by the statement that the gentlemen who in Prodicus's phrase<sup>503</sup> hold the borderland of philosophy and politics, and who think the philosophers their only rivals for the first place, are badly mauled in private conversation when they fall into the hands of eristics like Euthydemus.<sup>504</sup> Socrates, on the other hand, though ironically admitting defeat, has shown himself throughout able to do what is postulated of the true dialectician in the *Sophist*, 259 C: *τοῖς λεγομένοις οἷόν τε εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν*.<sup>505</sup> The multitude think such logical exercise unbecoming. But that is because, in the words of the *Parmenides* (136 D), *ἀγνοοῦσι . . . ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν ἔχειν*. But Socrates, regardless of personal dignity, welcomes every occasion for intellectual exercise: *οὕτω τις ἔρωσ δεινὸς ἐνδεδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας* (*Theaet.*, 169 C).

#### PROTAGORAS, GORGIAS, MENO, SYMPOSIUM, PHAEDO, AND REPUBLIC

The leading ideas of these dialogues have already been studied, and it is not necessary to analyze them in detail.<sup>506</sup> We may acquiesce in the presumption that the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Meno* are somewhat earlier in manner and style<sup>507</sup> without

<sup>500</sup> GROTE, *c. g.*, says: "In the epilogue Euthydemus is cited as the representative of true dialectic and philosophy."

<sup>501</sup> *Supra*, p. 72.

<sup>502</sup> 305 A, *καὶ οὗτοι* (Dionysodorus and Euthydemus) *ἐν τοῖς κραιστέτοις εἰσι τῶν νῦν*.

<sup>503</sup> See JOEL, *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates*, Vol. II, p. 634.

<sup>504</sup> 305 D, *ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίαις λόγοις ὅταν ἀπολειφθῶσιν*. Cf. *Theaet.*, 177 B, *ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δεῖν δοῦναι τε καὶ δεῖσθαι*. The rhetorician is helpless in the hands of either the philosopher or the eristic.

<sup>505</sup> Cf. *supra*, nn. 117, 426.

<sup>506</sup> See Index.

<sup>507</sup> SUDHAUS, *Rhein. Mus.*, 44, p. 52, tries to assign the *Gorgias* to the year 376 between the *To Nikokles* and the *Nikokles*. He is refuted by DÜMLER, *Kleine Schriften*, I, pp. 79 ff., who proposes other Isocratean parallels, which are courteously, but sensibly, minimized or rejected by

ADAM (edition of *Republic*, index, s. v. "Isocrates"). Obviously, barely conceivable references in Plato to an Isocratean type of thought or a Gorgian style prove nothing. Nor can anything be inferred from coincidence in commonplaces or in ideas that can be found in *Euripides* and *Thucydides*. It would be easy to "prove" by these methods that the *Busiris* follows the *Republic* and precedes the *Symposium* which contradicts it (cf. *Busiris*, 4, with *Symp.*, 198 D). Strangely enough, the very critics who force a reference to the *Helena* upon *Republic*, 596 C, are apt to reject, in the interest of their chronology, the two almost certain citations of Isocrates by Plato, that in *Phaedr.*, 267 A (*supra*, p. 71), and that in *Gorgias*, 463 A, where Isoc. *κ. σοφ.* 17 *καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δεσπότης ἔργον εἶναι* is wittily parodied by *ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας*. Dümmler calls this a "nicht einmal wörtliche Uebereinstimmung in einem banalen Gemeinplatz." But the very point of the jest lies in the substitution of the lower word, *στοχαστικῆς*, for the term *δεσπότης* intentionally employed by Isocrates to mark the superiority of his *δέφα* to the pretended



admitting that there is any traceable development of doctrine.<sup>597</sup> There is also, as we have seen, no evidence in the thought sufficient to date the *Symposium* and *Phædo* relatively to each other or to the *Republic*, the *Phædrus*, and the *Theætetus*.<sup>598</sup> Pfeiderer thinks the *Symposium* the first dialogue of Plato's "third phase," which includes the *Philebus*, *Timæus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*. He sees in *Symp.*, 209-12, a review of Plato's previous career, with many allusions to the different "phases" of the *Republic* (p. 46). So also Dümmler, *infra*, n. 619. It suffices for our purpose that all these dialogues were written after Plato had attained maturity of years, and presumably of thought—the *Meno* after 395,<sup>599</sup> the *Gorgias* after Isocrates's *Against the Sophists*, the *Symposium* after the year 385,<sup>600</sup> the *Phædrus* probably after Isocrates's *Panegyricus*. That the *Phædo* cites the *Meno* is probable.<sup>601</sup> That the *Republic* alludes to the *Phædo* is possible, but not necessary;<sup>602</sup> and, having other reasons for believing the *Phædrus* to be later than the *Gorgias*, we may assume that *Phædrus*, 260 D, 261 A, alludes to *Gorgias*, 462 B, without, however, admitting the validity of such arguments as Siebeck's suggestion (p. 116) that *θρέμματα γενναία* intentionally characterizes the *λόγοι* as "etwas Herangepflegtes, Ausgearbeitetes."

But it is idle to pursue this *σκιαμαχία* further.

The chief witness to the unity of Plato's thought is the *Republic*, the great work of his maturity and the most complete synthesis of his teaching. It is presumably later than most of the minor Socratic dialogues,<sup>603</sup> but it completes rather than contradicts them, and their methods imply its results.<sup>604</sup> It is earlier than the *Laws* and *Timæus*, and probably than all or most of the dialectical dialogues, but they do not contradict it, and they develop no important idea which it does not distinctly suggest.<sup>605</sup>

It is generally dated somewhere between 380 and 370, and we may say, if we please, that it was published when Plato was about fifty-five years of age, but any date between his fortieth and sixtieth year will serve as well.<sup>606</sup>

*ἐπιστήμη* of the metaphysicians. On the other hand, though the *Phædr.* is in point of fact probably later, nothing can be inferred from its agreement with Isocrates (*Phædr.*, 260 D; Isoc. in *Sophist*, 17) in the commonplace that *ἐπιστήμη*, *μελέτη* and *φύσις* are indispensable to the complete rhetor. They are requisites of the *ἰκανὸς ἀγωνιστής* in any pursuit, as is distinctly stated in *Rep.*, 374 D E. Nor is anything to be learned by pressing too closely the various possible meanings of *ἐπιστήμη*—knowledge of the Isocratean rules of rhetoric, knowledge of dialectic and psychology that might make rhetoric an art in Plato's opinion, knowledge of the subject-matter of the discourse.

<sup>597</sup> ZELLER says, p. 527, that the *Protagoras*, which assumes the identity of the good and the pleasurable, "must" be later than *Gorg.*, 495 ff., and all subsequent dialogues. But cf. *supra*, p. 20. HORN finds in *Protag.*, *Gorg.*, and *Phædo* the following *Denkfortschritt*: (1) Die Lust ist das Gute. (2) Die Lust ist nicht das Gute. (3) Die Lust ist das Böse! In *Phædr.*, *Symp.*, *Phædo* he sees a falling away in middle life from the youthful faith in immortality to which age returns! Lutoslawski thinks that the discussion about the identity of the tragic and comic poet at the end of the *Symposium* is an apology for the comic touches in that dialogue and an announcement

of the *Phædo*. But PFLEIDERER (p. 92) finds that "das Allegro des *Symposion* . . . auf die schwermütigsten Trauerklänge des vorhergehenden Sterbedialogs nunmehr die verklärten Harmonien einer wiedergefundenen Lebensstimmung folgen lässt." It's a poor argument that will not work both ways!

<sup>598</sup> *Supra*, pp. 19, 40 ff., 43.

<sup>599</sup> 90 A.

<sup>600</sup> 193 A. It is, of course, just conceivable that, as WILAMOWITZ affirms (*Hermes*, Vol. XXXII, p. 102), the allusion is to the events of the year 418. But we are still waiting for his proof that Plato commits no intentional anachronisms.

<sup>601</sup> 73 A; *Meno*, 82 ff. It is not necessary, for Plato probably often illustrated *ἀνέμνησις* by geometrical cross-examination in the school.

<sup>602</sup> *Rep.*, 611 B, *οἱ ἄλλοι* (*λόγοι*) need not be the specific proofs of immortality given in the *Phædo*.

<sup>603</sup> SIEBECK, however (p. 126), thinks that the *Laches* is the fuller discussion of courage "promised" in *Rep.*, 430 C, *αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ, τὰν βούλην ἐπὶ ἀλλοίον δίμεν*.

<sup>604</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 14, 15.

<sup>605</sup> *Supra*, nn. 244, 375, pp. 34, 36, 42, 46, 55, 62.

<sup>606</sup> See ZELLER (pp. 551 ff.), who dates it in 375. The coincidences between the *Republic* and the *Ecclesiastousae*

The relations already indicated between the *Republic* and other dialogues force extreme partisans of "development" to break it up into distinct sections which they assign to different periods.<sup>607</sup> Such hypotheses are beyond the scope of serious criticism, which in the total absence of evidence can neither affirm nor deny them. It can only point out the fallacy of the reasoning by which they are supported. The "arguments" of Krohn, Pfeleiderer, and their followers have been refuted in more than sufficient detail by Hirmer, Campbell,<sup>608</sup> Grimmelt, and other defenders of the unity of the *Republic*. They may be reduced, broadly speaking, to a *petitio principii* and a few typical fallacies. The *petitio principii* is the assumption that the numerous connecting links and cross-references that bind together the "parts" of the *Republic* were inserted by Plato as an afterthought. The chief and fundamental fallacy is the application to a great and complex literary masterpiece of canons of consistency and unity drawn from the inner consciousness of professional philologists. The architectural unity of the *Republic* is superior to that of the *Laws*, the *Philebus*, the *Phædrus*, or to that of the parts into which the disintegrators resolve it, many of which plainly could not exist by themselves. Secondary intentions, a prelude, digressions, and a peroration, postlude, afterpiece, or appendix may be expected in so long a work. As Jowett sensibly says:<sup>609</sup> "We may as well speak of many designs as one; nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas and which does not interfere with the general purpose." It is uncritical, then, to assume a central argument and prune off everything that is not indispensable to its development. The argument might conceivably have started from the restatement of the problem by Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of the second book. Plato might have drawn up a sketch of a reformed state, omitting all mention of the higher education, the rule of the philosophers, and the degenerate forms of government. He might have closed the work abruptly with the demonstration of the main thesis at the end of the ninth book. Or, if he wished to add the myth, he might have omitted or found another place for the digression in which the banishment of the poets is justified on deeper grounds. But these bare possibilities do not raise the slightest presumption that the *Republic* was, in fact, pieced together out of detached and disjointed essays. The different topics were closely associated in Plato's thought. And if they were all present to his mind from the beginning, it

of Aristophanes yield at the most a *terminus post quem*. Cf. HIRMER, "Entstehung und Komp. d. Plat. Rep.," *Jahrbücher für Phil.*, Suppl., N. F., Vol. XXIII, p. 655; ADAM, *The Republic of Plato*, Vol. I, pp. 345-55. HIRMER (pp. 660 ff.) disposes of the attempt to date the *Republic* by the allusion to Ismenias (336 A), and to Polydamas (338 C), by the supposed allusion to Eudoxus (530), and by REINHARDT'S reference of 410 BC to Isocrates's *Antidosis*, 181, and of 498 DE to the *Areopagitica*. He himself, with as little proof, thinks that 498 DE alludes to the *Euagoras*. He dates the completion of the *Republic* circa 370: (1) because, after Christ, he believes that the protest against internecine war between Greeks (471 A-C) "must" refer to the destruction of Plataea by the Thebans in 374; (2) because

the picture of the tyrant (577) "must" fall after the first Sicilian journey and before the second when Plato was on friendly terms with Dionysius the younger; (3) because CHRIST has "proved" that the eleventh epistle (circa 364) is genuine, and the eleventh epistle implies the completion of the *Republic* and the beginning of the *Timæus*.

<sup>607</sup> PFELEIDERER, *Zur Lösung d. plat. Frage*, p. 79: "Das Zusammenwerfen ganz verschiedener Phasen in der *Rep.*, wie ich behaupte, musste nothwendig für Jeden, der sonst gerne Phasen und Perioden gesehen hätte, die geahnten Grenzlinien wieder verwischen."

<sup>608</sup> *Republic*, Vol. II, essay III.

<sup>609</sup> Vol. III, p. vii.

would not be easy to suggest a more natural and effective order of presentation than that in which we now read them.

To prove, then, that, as a matter of fact, the "parts" of the *Republic* were composed at different times recourse is had to two other fallacies: (1) it is assumed that what is not explicitly mentioned in any part is not known to the author at the time; and (2) slight variations in phrasing are taken to imply serious differences of doctrine. The application of this method to the theory of ideas and to Plato's psychology has already been considered.<sup>610</sup> A few words may be added here on the second point. Rohde<sup>611</sup> says that the immortality of the soul is ignored in the earliest part, II-V, 471 C; first appears as a paradox in X, 608 D; and is assumed in its sublimest form in VI, VII. But his arguments will not bear scrutiny. "Was nach dem Tode kommen möge, sollen die *φύλακες* nicht beachten" (III, cap. i ff.), is an unwarranted inference from Plato's polemic against Homeric verses that represent death as terrible to all men, even the good—an idea which Plato would always have repudiated. The sneers in 363 C D and 366 A B at future rewards are directed against low ideals—the *μέθην αἰώνιον*—or are intended to emphasize the necessity of first proving that virtue is desirable for its own sake. When that is done, it is *ἤδη ἀνεπιφθονον* (612 B) to add the rewards; and there is no more inconsistency in reintroducing in a nobler form the premiums which the gods bestow upon virtue after death than there is in the withdrawal of the supposition that the just man is to be reputed unjust, and in the affirmation that in fact honesty is the best policy, though that is not the sole or the chief reason for practicing it.<sup>612</sup>

The omission of all reference to immortality in the first nine books would prove nothing. It is equally ignored in the first nine books of the *Laws*, and is first explicitly mentioned in XII, 959. Glaucon's dramatic surprise at Socrates's confident assertion of immortality proves nothing for Plato. The idea is familiar to the *Gorgias* and *Meno*. And even if we deny the reference of 611 B to the *Phædo*, and with Rohde place the *Phædo* after the *Republic*, the tenth book of the *Republic* knows the ideas, and even the *τρίτος ἀνθρώπος*, and cannot therefore be placed before the *Gorgias* by those who make use of arguments from development. In speaking of immortality Plato naturally tries to qualify and limit the doctrine of the tripartite soul.<sup>613</sup> He can only fall back upon poetical imagery and affirm his faith that in its true nature the (immortal part of the) soul must be one and simple. It is a waste of ingenuity to attempt to find a consistent chronological development in this point in the *Phædrus*; *Rep.*, II-V, X; *Phædo*, and *Timæus*. It is perfectly true, as Dümmler argues,<sup>614</sup> that

<sup>610</sup> *Supra*, pp. 36, 40 ff.

<sup>611</sup> *Psyche*, pp. 588 ff.

<sup>612</sup> STEBECK (p. 144) and DÜMMLER (Vol. I, p. 248), it is true, find fault with this too, on the ground that the Socrates of the tenth book does not repeat every point of the hypothesis like a lawyer, and forgets the stipulation that the unjust man was to have the power, if detected, to defy punishment, or the wealth to buy off the gods. Dümmler also objects that "nachdem die Perspektive auf die Ewigkeit als *μέγιστα δόξα* der Tugend bezeichnet war,

kann irgendeine utilitaristische Begründung nicht mehr interessieren." Terrible logic! Are modern believers in immortality wholly indifferent to utilitarian considerations "als Zugabe"? And had Plato no interest in the psychological proofs that the virtuous life is, even in this world, the most pleasurable, given in the *Laws*, the *Philebus*, and the ninth book of the *Republic*?

<sup>613</sup> *Supra*, pp. 42, 46.

<sup>614</sup> Vol. I, pp. 256 ff.

if the soul is really one, the definition of justice as a relation between its parts loses all meaning. But such "inconsistencies" are inherent in human thought, and prove nothing for the relative dates of Book X and Books II-V. Can any modern theologian produce definitions of the virtues that will apply to man in his earthly state and to the disembodied soul?<sup>615</sup>

Lutoslawski, while rejecting the fancies of Krohn and Pfeiderer, holds it possible to show that the first book of the *Republic* falls between the *Gorgias* and the *Phædo*, and that the remaining books follow the *Phædo* and reveal traces of progressive development of doctrine. The following parallel illustrates the force of his arguments:

P. 277: "This sharp and general formulation of the law of contradiction,<sup>616</sup> not only as a law of thought as in *Phædo*,<sup>617</sup> but for the first time as a law of being . . . is a very important step."

P. 318: "Here<sup>618</sup> for the first time occurs a formulation of the law of contradiction as a law of thought, while in the *Phædo* and earlier books of the *Republic* it was a metaphysical law."

Lastly, a word must be said of the attempt to trace a development in Plato's treatment of poetry. The contradictions of those who employ this method might be left to cancel one another.<sup>619</sup> But the whole procedure is uncritical. Plato was always sensitive to poetic genius, and there was no time when he might not have praised Homer without conspicuous irony.<sup>620</sup> But he always regarded the poet as an imitator, whose aim is pleasure rather than the good, whose ethical teaching must be interpreted or controlled by the philosopher, and whose fine sayings are the product of "inspiration" rather than of knowledge. The *Apology*<sup>621</sup> anticipates the *Republic* in the doctrine that the poets do not know whereof they speak, and the *Phædrus* in the theory of poetic inspiration. The *Gorgias*, 502 B C D, deals with the moral influence of poetry upon the masses in the tone of the *Republic* and *Laws*; and like *Republic*, 601 B, strips from the body of the poet's discourse the meretricious adornment of the poetic dress. The doctrine that poetry is *μίμησις* is sufficiently implied in *Cratylus*, 423, where the mimetic value of words is discussed, and where *μουσική* is classified as *μίμησις*. The differences between the tenth and the third books of the *Republic* cannot be pressed. The third book hints that there is more to come;<sup>622</sup> and the tenth book announces itself as a profounder discussion, based on psychological distinctions brought out in the intervening books. But it is begging the question to assume that they were discovered by Plato after the composition of the third book. The fact that

<sup>615</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 6, 7, and HIRMER, p. 641.

<sup>616</sup> 436 B.

<sup>617</sup> 102 E.

<sup>618</sup> 602 E.

<sup>619</sup> LUTOSLAWSKI says that Plato's scorn of poetry developed after the *Symposium*, and that the tenth book of the *Republic* is therefore later than the *Phædo*, which praises Homer without irony, and earlier than *Phædrus* and *Theaetetus*, which take for granted the low estimate of the poet. But NATORP, thinking of other passages of the *Phædrus*, is positive that such a dialogue could not have been written after the rejection of poetry in the *Republic*; while DÜMMER (Vol. I, p. 299) places the *Symposium* after

the *Republic*, and sees in it a return from the bitter mood of the *Gorgias* and *Republic* to a calmer and more generous state of mind: "Da ist er auch gerecht gegen andere; Homer und Hesiod, Lykurg und Solon sieht er unter sich, aber hoch über anderen!"

<sup>620</sup> *Phædo*, 95 A, οὐτε γὰρ ἄν . . . Ὀμήρου θείῃ ποιητῇ ἀμολογοῖμεν οὐτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς; *Laws*, 776 E, ὃ δὲ σοφώτατος ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν — in both passages seriously, as the context shows.

<sup>621</sup> 23 C; cf. the *Ion*. and *Meno*, 90 E.

<sup>622</sup> 304 D, ἵσως δὲ καὶ πλείους ἐτι τούτων.

in emphasizing the distinction between dramatic and narrative poetry Plato carelessly speaks as if the former alone were imitative, proves nothing.<sup>623</sup> A far more important new point made in the tenth book is already distinctly implied in the *Protagoras* — the antithesis between the principle of measure in the soul and ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις,<sup>624</sup> to which poetry makes its appeal.<sup>625</sup> The mood of the *Symposium* differs from that of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. But this does not prove either that the *Symposium* is earlier, or that Plato had been mellowed by success. A banquet at which Agathon was host and Aristophanes a guest was obviously not the place for a polemic against dramatic poetry. But even here the ironical superiority of the dialectician is maintained, and the inability of the poets to interpret or defend their art is revealed.<sup>626</sup>

#### CONCLUSION. IDEAS AND NUMBERS. THE LAWS

The value of Plato's life-work would be very slightly affected even if it were true that in the weakness of extreme old age the noble light of his philosophy did "go out in a fog of mystical Pythagoreanism." It is not in the least true, however, and the prevalence of the notion is due mainly (1) to the uncritical acceptance of the tradition concerning Plato's "latest" doctrine of ideas and numbers; and (2) to the disparaging estimate of the *Laws* expressed by those who care only for dramatic charm of style, or by radicals like Grote, who are offended by the "bigotry" of a few passages. A word must be said on each of these points.

1. Aristotle's account of Plato's later identification of ideas and numbers has been generally accepted since Trendelenburg's dissertation on the subject.<sup>627</sup> Zeller rightly points out that the doctrine is not found in the extant writings, but adds that for Plato numbers are entities intermediate between ideas and things of sense. In my discussion of the subject<sup>628</sup> I tried to establish two points: first, that we need not accept the testimony of Aristotle, who often misunderstood Plato, and was himself not clear as to the relation of mathematical and other ideas; second, that the doctrine of numbers as intermediate entities is not to be found in Plato, but that the passages which misled Zeller may well have been the chief source of the whole tradition about ideas and numbers. The first point is a matter of opinion. I did not deny the testimony of Aristotle, and no one who chooses to accept it can be refuted. The relation of ideas to numbers was doubtless much debated by the scholastics of the Academy. Aristotle's reports of the intolerable logomachy do not make it clear just how much of this nonsense he attributed to Plato. But I do not intend to enter upon the interpretation of the eleventh and twelfth books of the *Metaphysics*. No reader would

<sup>623</sup> 393 C, 394 D.

<sup>624</sup> *Protag.*, 356 D.

<sup>625</sup> *Rep.*, 602, 603.

<sup>626</sup> 201 B, κινδυνεύω, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲν εἶδέναι ἂν τότε εἶπον. Καὶ μὴν καλῶς γε εἶπες, φάναι, ὃ Ἀγάθων. Cf. also 223 D, where Socrates compels Agathon and Aristophanes to admit τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι κωμῆδιαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπιστάσθαι ποιεῖν. This is thought to contradict *Rep.*, 395 A, but the contradiction is removed by pressing τέχνη in what follows. One

man is "inspired" by the tragic muse, another by the comic. If poetry were a matter of science, the poet could use both forms, even as the scientific interpreter of poetry would not, like the "inspired" Ion, be limited to Homer. This we may plausibly conjecture to be the meaning. But it is only conjecture.

<sup>627</sup> *Plat. de id. et numeris doctrina*, 1828.

<sup>628</sup> *De Plat. id. doctrina*, pp. 31 ff.

follow me, and no results could be won. If Aristotle's testimony be accepted, there is an end of controversy. Plato taught in his lectures the doctrine of ideas and numbers.

But the second point is not so elusive. It is possible to test the argument that the extant writings do not recognize an intermediate class of mathematical numbers, and yet might easily suggest the notion to mechanical-minded students. Now Zeller in his fourth edition confounds the two questions. He gives the impression that he is answering me by a *Quellenbelege* from Aristotle and Philoponos. He wholly ignores my interpretation of a number of specific Platonic passages, which he apparently takes for the mere misunderstandings and blunders of a beginner.<sup>629</sup> I have no hope of convincing Zeller, nor do I wish to force myself into a polemic with the honored master of all who study Greek philosophy. But, as Mr. J. Adam, a scholar whose scrupulous candor makes it a pleasure to argue with him, has expressed surprise in his edition of the *Republic* that I still adhere to my opinion in spite of the mass of evidence, I will endeavor to state my meaning more plainly.

The theory of ideas, the hypostatization of all concepts, once granted, numbers do not differ from other ideas. The phrase, *περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν* (*Rep.*, 525 D), denotes ideal numbers or the ideas of numbers, and *ὁρατὰ ἢ ἀπὸ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμούς* are numbered things, things of sense participant in-number.<sup>630</sup> That is all there is of it, and there is no extant Platonic passage that this interpretation will not fit. For educational purposes it is true that mathematical science holds an intermediate place between dialectic and the perceptions of sense. Mathematical abstractions (*ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις*, *Rep.*, 525 A) are the best propædæutic to abstract reasoning generally. But there is no distinction of kind between them and other abstractions, *σκληρὸν μαλακόν* (*Rep.*, 524 A ff.). Mathematical science as *διάνοια* is midway between the pure *νοῦς* of dialectic and the *δόξα* of sense. But that is because of its method—the reliance on diagrams (images) and hypotheses. In themselves its objects are explicitly stated to be pure *νοητά*.<sup>631</sup> The "mathematical" numbers then are plainly the abstract, ideal numbers of the philosopher. The numbers of the vulgar are concrete numbered things. There is no trace of a third kind of number.<sup>632</sup> Those who have not yet learned to apprehend abstractions mockingly ask the mathe-

<sup>629</sup> It may be permissible to add that he seems to have read other parts of the dissertation with more attention, since, to mention only two cases, he adds on p. 745 a reference *à propos* of the *εἰρὸς ἀνθρώπου* to *Republic*, 596, 597, and *Tim.*, 31 A, with the interpretation of their significance given on p. 30; and he omits from p. 547 of the third edition a sentence criticised on p. 49 of the dissertation. Another slight but significant point may be mentioned. Aristotle himself makes a not wholly clear distinction between mathematical ideas (*τὰ ἐν ἀφαίρεσει λεγόμενα*, almost technical) and other ideas. In illustration of this I objected to Zeller's interpretation of *De An.*, 432a2, *ἐν τοῖς εἰδεσὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστὶ . . . τὰ τε ἐν ἀφαίρεσει λεγόμενα* ("die abstrakten Begriffe") *καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔχει καὶ πάθος*. My objection was that both grammar and Aristotelian usage showed that *ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν*, etc., are also *abstrakte Begriffe* (in the German or English sense of the words),

the *νοητά* being divided into two classes by *τε καὶ*. The sentence still stands, and I am quite willing to leave the question of *Flüchtigkeit* to any competent scholar, e. g., to M. Rodier, who translates "les intelligibles, aussi bien les concepts abstraits (ou mathématiques) que (ceux qui ont pour objet) les qualités, etc."

<sup>630</sup> Adam translates *αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν*, "numbers themselves," which is quite right. My point is that "numbers themselves" are proved by the context and by *Philebus*, 56 E, to be ideal numbers. For Adam's further argument *cf. infra*, p. 84.

<sup>631</sup> *Rep.*, 510 D, *τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα . . . καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἦν γράφουσιν*. 511 D, *καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς*.

<sup>632</sup> *Phileb.*, 56 D E.

maticians (*Rep.*, 528 A), *περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε*; and the answer is, *περὶ τούτων ὃν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγγχεῖ*, coupled with an exposition that recalls the *Parmenides* of the pure idea of unity.<sup>623</sup> Simple as all this appears, it might easily be misunderstood by the pupils of the Academy. Mathematics was intermediate from an educational point of view. In cosmogony numbers and geometrical forms are the mediators between chaos and the general idea of harmony and measure.<sup>624</sup> The expression, numbers (arithmetic), of the vulgar and numbers of the philosopher would lead a perverse ingenuity to ask of the mathematicians, in the words of the *Republic*, *περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε*; Plato's use of "dyad" and "triad" as convenient synonyms for the pure idea of two and three would be mistakenly supposed to imply a distinction.<sup>625</sup> The innocent question (*Rep.*, 524 C), *τί οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὐ καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν*,<sup>626</sup> would suggest that it was a *terminus technicus* for some mysterious ultimate philosophical principle, and set students upon hunting it and its supposed synonyms through the dialogues, and, inasmuch as *μέγα* + *σμικρὸν* indubitably = 2, it might well be identified with the indeterminate dyad and its supposed equivalents, or any other "principle" posited in antithesis to the one.<sup>627</sup> The folly once set a-going, there are no limits to its plausible developments. All the unanswerable questions as to the relation of ideas to things may assume special forms for special classes of ideas. Plato himself shows this for ideas of relative terms in a much misunderstood passage of the *Parmenides*.<sup>628</sup> The problem of the relations of numbered things, of the supposed mathematical numbers, and of ideal numbers, offered a rich feast for the quibblers and the *ὀφισμαθεῖς* of the Academy. "Before and after" is essential to number, but there is no "before and after" in the ideas. Multiplicity is inherent in number, but the "idea" even of a million must be one. Other ideas may be imperfectly copied by things, but is not the number five entirely present in five things? Echoes of this pitiful scholasticism are preserved for us in the metaphysics of Aristotle. But what possible reason can there be for attributing it to Plato? Adam himself (Vol. II, p. 160) repeats the disconsolate question: *περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἷον ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦντε ἐστίν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον*; and asks: "Are we then to suppose that there are many ideas of 'one'?" The answer is: "Yes, precisely, to the extent that there are many ideas of anything." We have already seen (*Rep.*, 476 A) that every idea is *per se* one, and yet, not merely as reflected in phenomena, but *τῇ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ* appears many. The contradiction is inherent in the theory of ideas. As against the multiplicity of phenomena, we insist on the indivisible unity of the idea. But when we find the idea involved with other ideas in a number of instances, we are forced to use the plural. Plato does not, however, here

<sup>623</sup> Cf. *Idea of Good*, p. 222; *Phileb.*, 56 E, *εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκαστος τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρειν οὐδὲν τις θήσει*.

<sup>624</sup> *Tim.*, 53 B ff.; *Phileb.*, 66 A.

<sup>625</sup> *Phaedo*, 101 C; *Parmen.*, 149 C; *Phaedo*, 104.

<sup>626</sup> Plato is using the terms precisely as BERKELEY does when he says (*Principles of Human Knowledge*, XI):

"Again, *great* and *small*, *swift* and *slow* are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies."

<sup>627</sup> *De Plat. id.*, p. 37.

<sup>628</sup> 133 C ff.; cf. *A. J. P.*, Vol. IX, p. 288.

in terms pluralize the "one." He says: Of what numbers do you speak in which *the one*, i. e., the idea of one, present in each as a constituent and essential part of the more complex idea, etc.? Of course, this implies a multiplicity of units in each number, and still more in all; but only as any idea is multiplied when it appears in a number of others. The multiplication of the idea τῇ τῶν σωμάτων κοινωνία is more easily evaded than that τῇ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία, because in the first case we may use the imagery of pattern and copy, while, in the second case, the idea is an essential constituent part of that into which it enters. In the special case of numbers, the paradox is still more glaring. But Plato is not one to be frightened from the path of philosophical consistency by a paradox which he rightly regarded as largely verbal. In the *Parmenides* he amuses himself by showing that the idea of "one" itself apprehended τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸ breaks up into many.<sup>639</sup> This does not make it the less necessary for the mathematician to apprehend the pure absolute idea of unity and restore it as fast as it is disintegrated by analysis or the senses.<sup>640</sup>

2. Despite many passages of stately and impressive eloquence, the *Laws* will remain the type of "frigidity" for those who, like Lucian, read Plato mainly for the dramatic vivacity of the *Phædrus* or the artistic beauty of the *Symposium*. Our purpose is not to deny the altered mood and style that mark the masterpiece of Plato's old age, but merely to protest against the notion that it may be safely neglected by the serious student, or that it presents a doctrine essentially different from that of the *Republic*.

If Plato was not to rewrite the *Republic*, it was almost inevitable that his political studies should assume the form of a project of detailed legislation for a possible Greek city. But even here, while recognizing that many of his theoretic postulates will have to be mitigated in practice,<sup>641</sup> he holds fast in principle to the ideals of the earlier work.<sup>642</sup> A harmony of the *Laws* and *Republic*, however, though not a difficult task, would demand more space than can be given to it here. We need not delay to examine the contribution of the *Laws* to our knowledge of Greek institutions, or the very considerable influence which it exercised upon the speculations of Aristotle and later Greek thinkers. One service which it renders to students of the dialogues we have already often noted.

As the years wore on, Plato naturally grew weary of Socratic irony, of the game of question and answer, of the dramatic illustration or the polemical analysis of eristic. Even in the earlier dialogues he sometimes evades or contemptuously explains away an equivocation which elsewhere he dramatically portrays or elaborately refutes.<sup>643</sup> In the *Laws* this is his habitual mood,<sup>644</sup> and in consequence the *Laws* may often be quoted for the true Platonic solution of problems which Socratic irony or dramatic art seems to leave unsolved in the earlier dialogues.<sup>645</sup>

While acknowledging this change of mood, we must be on our guard against the

<sup>639</sup> 143 A, 144 E.    <sup>640</sup> *Rep.*, 525 E; *supra*, n. 647.    <sup>641</sup> 746.    <sup>642</sup> 627 B, 627 D, 644 A, 864 B.  
<sup>643</sup> 739 C ff., 807 B.    <sup>644</sup> *Rep.*, 436 C D E, 437 A, 454 A;    <sup>645</sup> *Supra*, pp. 13, 19, nn. 70, 71, 298.  
*Cratyl.*, 431 A; *Symp.*, 187 A; *Euthyd.*, 277 E.



exaggeration of its significance by Grote, Mill, and Gomperz. Grote had little appreciation of Plato's substantive thought at any stage. He cared only for the dramatic illustration of the *elenchus*. This, which for the author was a means to an end, was for him the real Plato. The exposition of positive doctrine he treats as the work of a totally different person—a dogmatic Plato who has "ceased to be leader of the opposition and passed over to the ministerial benches." This view, which appears even in Grote's treatment of the *Gorgias* and *Theætetus*, is still more prominent in his criticism of the *Republic*. In the case of the *Laws* this feeling is intensified by the deep repugnance aroused in Grote's mind by Plato's whimsical provisions for the conversion or punishment of those who denied the truths of natural religion or traded upon the superstitions of the vulgar.<sup>646</sup> He cannot speak of the *Laws* without alluding to that unfortunate page; and the vision which he conjured up of the aged Plato as the Torquemada of a Pythagorean mysticism makes him totally blind to the real significance of what in wealth of content is Plato's greatest work. This view was accepted by Mill from Grote, and by Gomperz from Mill, and it leads them both to misapprehend the true relation of the *Laws* to the *Republic*. Mill says: "In his second imaginary commonwealth, that of the *Leges*, it [dialectic] is no longer mentioned; it forms no part of the education either of the rulers or of the ruled."<sup>647</sup> Similarly Gomperz:<sup>648</sup> "Plato in his old age grew averse from dialectic. In the *Laws*, the last product of his pen, he actually turned his back upon it and filled its vacant place at the head of the curriculum of education with mathematics and astronomy."<sup>649</sup> These statements, even if we concede that they are true in a sense to the letter, convey a totally false impression, as a slight study of the last pages of the twelfth book of the *Laws* will show. Plato does not care to rewrite the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*. But he defines as clearly as in the earlier work the necessity and function of dialectic and the higher education in the state. Even in the first book we are forewarned that to complete the organization of the state the founder must set over it φύλακας . . . τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας.<sup>650</sup> In the twelfth book we are introduced to these guardians who are to possess knowledge and not merely right opinion. They compose a nocturnal council which is to be the anchor of the state.<sup>651</sup> Recurring to the imagery and the manner of the early dialogues,<sup>652</sup> Plato tells us that as the pilot, the physician, the general represent intelligence (νοῦς) applied to the definite ends of their respective arts, so this highest council is the head, the soul, the mind of the state, possessing knowledge of the political σκοπός or true end of rule.<sup>653</sup>

<sup>646</sup> 906-10. <sup>647</sup> *Diss. and Discuss.*, Vol. IV, p. 289.

<sup>648</sup> *Greek Thinkers*, Translation, p. 466.

<sup>649</sup> To like effect ZELLER, pp. 955, 956.

<sup>650</sup> 632 C. The parallelism with the *Republic* is obvious. There, too (412 A, 497 C D), there is a similar anticipation of the need of guardians who know as distinguished from the assistants. In *Laws*, 818 A, there is another anticipation of the higher education. Mathematics only is mentioned because Plato is explaining that it is not needful for the multitude to study it profoundly. There is no occasion for

mentioning any other element of the higher education. The possessors of φρόνησις will surely be able κατ' εἶδη ξητεῖν (630 E) and will practice the dialectical methods of the "recent" *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Politicus*. ZELLER's attempt to distinguish between φρόνησις and the νοῦς of the *Republic* is a false point. φρόνησις is used in *Phædo*, 69 B.

<sup>651</sup> 961 C.

<sup>652</sup> *Protag.*, 311 B; *Gorg.*, 447, 448, 449 E; *Euthyd.*, 291 C; *Rep.*, 333.

<sup>653</sup> 961, 962.

No state can prosper or be saved unless such knowledge resides in some part of it as a φυλακτήριον.<sup>654</sup> The beginning of such knowledge is τὸ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι πρὸς πολλὰ στοχαζόμενον ἀλλ' εἰς ἓν βλέποντα, etc.<sup>655</sup> Now τὰ τῶν πολέων νόμιμα aim at many things—wealth, power, and τὸν ἐλεύθερον δὴ βίον.<sup>656</sup> Our aim is virtue. But virtue is both four and one. The intelligent physician can define his one aim. Must not the intelligent ruler be able to define his? It is easy to show how the four virtues are many. To exhibit their unity is harder.<sup>657</sup> A man who amounts to anything must know, not only the names, but the λόγος of things. And the true guardians, teachers, and rulers of a state must not merely rebuke vice and inculcate virtue, but they must be able to teach ἣν δύναμιν ἔχει.<sup>658</sup> The state may be likened to the body, the younger guardians to the senses in the head, the elders to the brain.<sup>659</sup> They cannot all be educated alike. Therefore ἰτέον ἄρα ἐπὶ τινι ἀκριβεστέραν παιδεῖαν τῆς ἐμπροσθεν.<sup>660</sup> This is the education already glanced at in our phrases about the unity of purpose. The essence of the more accurate method is our old acquaintance τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνατόν εἶναι βλέπειν.<sup>661</sup> The guardian must be able to do what Meno could not do—ιδεῖν πρῶτον, ὃ τί ποτε διὰ πάντων τῶν τεττάρων ταῦτον τυγχάνει.<sup>662</sup> And similarly περὶ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ and πάντων τῶν σπουδαίων, they must not only know in what sense each is one and many, but they must be able to expound their knowledge—τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνδείκνυσθαι.<sup>663</sup> The thing being so clearly indicated, it would be pitiful quibbling to object that the word διαλεκτικῇ does not happen to occur here. Its omission is possibly due to the fact that the Athenian throughout the *Laws* talks down to the level of his unsophisticated Spartan and Cretan interlocutors. Mathematics and astronomy, then, are not substituted for dialectic, but are added for a special reason among the σπουδαῖα which the guardians must understand with real knowledge. The multitude may follow tradition. The guardians must be able to demonstrate the truths of natural religion, as we have done.<sup>664</sup> Astronomy, the study of the ordered movements of the heavens, is a great aid to this. With astronomy is involved the necessary mathematics, which also in their relation to music and the arts are of use to him who is to shape the characters and laws of men.<sup>665</sup> He who cannot learn these things can never be a ruler, though he may be an assistant.

In the last two pages of the *Laws* Plato evades giving a detailed account of the curriculum of the higher education thus indicated—perhaps he was weary, perhaps he did not care to repeat the *Republic*.<sup>666</sup> In any case, there is no justification for the statement that the *Laws* ignore the higher education of the rulers or substitute in it mathematics and astronomy for dialectic. On the contrary, the unity of Plato's

<sup>654</sup> 963 C; cf. *Rep.*, 424 C.

<sup>655</sup> 962 D.

<sup>656</sup> Cf. *Rep.*, 563 A, ἵνα δὲ ἐλεύθερος ᾖ.

<sup>657</sup> Cf. *Phileb.*, 18 E, πῶς ἔστιν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον.

<sup>658</sup> 964 C; cf. *Rep.*, 366 E, τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἑνόν.

<sup>659</sup> 964 E; cf. *Tim.*, 69, 70.

<sup>660</sup> 965 A.

<sup>661</sup> Cf. *Phaedr.*, 265 D; and with ταύτης οὐκ ἔστι σαφεστέρα μέθοδος, cf. *Phileb.*, 16 B; *Phaedr.*, 266 B.

<sup>662</sup> 965 D. Μενό, 74 A, τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἔστιν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.

<sup>663</sup> 966 B.

<sup>664</sup> In Book X.

<sup>665</sup> 967 E.

<sup>666</sup> 968 D.

thought is strikingly illustrated by his return in the pages just analyzed to some of the favorite ideas of the *Republic* and earlier dialogues.<sup>667</sup>

It is not necessary to prolong this study. The *Timæus*, so far as it affects our argument, has already been considered.<sup>668</sup> The *Timæus* as a whole I have studied elsewhere.<sup>669</sup>

The object of this discussion and the expression "unity of Plato's thought" may easily be misunderstood. I may therefore be permitted, in conclusion, to repeat that I have not meant to sophisticate away the obvious and inevitable variations in Plato's moods, and minor beliefs from youth to old age. Nor in the study of such development would I reject the aid of a sober and critical method of style statistics.<sup>670</sup> My thesis is simply that Plato on the whole belongs rather to the type of thinkers whose philosophy is fixed in early maturity (Schopenhauer, Herbert Spencer), rather than to the class of those who receive a new revelation every decade (Schelling). And I have tried to show that the method which proceeds on the contrary assumption leads to misinterpretation of his writings. The illustrations given are merely typical. There has been no attempt to catalogue exhaustively the opinions of contemporary Platonists. The polemic is, I trust, not discourteous, and is, I am sure, not intentionally disloyal. In any case, it turns generally on the meaning or relevancy of specific passages and can easily be tested. Some excuse for its prominence may be found in Mill's statement that "there are few, if any, ancient authors concerning whose mind and purpose so many demonstrably false opinions are current, as concerning Plato."

<sup>667</sup> GOMPERZ supports his view of the anti-dialectical tendency of Plato's mind in the *Laws* by the hostility of the *Sophist* to every kind of antilogy. But surely eristic is one thing and dialectic another. The true Socratic elenchus is described and the difficulty of distinguishing it from eristic indicated in a *locus classicus* in the *Sophist* (230 B ff.); and both the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* employ the keenest dialectic in order to meet and defeat eristic on its own ground (*Soph.*, 259 CD). In the *Philebus*, which

Gompers thinks late, dialectic is still the highest science of truth (*Phileb.*, 58). But Plato had other interests than dialectic, and it is unreasonable to expect him to fill the *Laws* and *Timæus* with repetitions of what had been said once for all in the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*.

<sup>668</sup> *Supra*, p. 37.

<sup>669</sup> A. J. P., Vol. IX, pp. 395 ff.

<sup>670</sup> As, e. g., that of RITTER, "Die Sprachstatistik in Anwendung auf Platon und Goethe," *Neue Jahrbücher* etc., 1903.

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**THE TOLEDO MANUSCRIPT OF THE GERMANIA  
OF TACITUS**



# THE TOLEDO MANUSCRIPT OF THE GERMANIA OF TACITUS, WITH NOTES ON A PLINY MANUSCRIPT<sup>1</sup>

FRANK FROST ABBOTT

## I

### DESCRIPTION OF THE CODEX TOLETANUS

THE manuscript of which the *Germania* forms a part, 49.2 of the Zelada collection, contains 223 folios, with 30, occasionally 29, lines to the page. The page is 23.1 cm. × 14.5 cm., and the written portion 17.2 cm. × 8.3 cm. It is divided as follows: *Cor. Taciti De Vita Moribus Et Origine Germanorum Opus Elegantissimum*, folio 1 r. to the middle of 15 v.; *Opus Eiusdem De Vita Et Mori<sup>2</sup> L. Agricole*, 16 r. to bottom of 36 v.; *Io. Antonii Campani Oratoris Atque Poetae Celeberrimi Oratio De Laudibus Scientiarum*, 37 r. to 63 v.; fragment of an oration, 64 r. to the middle of 66 r.; a number of Pliny's *Letters* 66 r. to 221 v.; fragment of an oration, 222 r. to 223 v.

On folio 15 v., at the end of the *Germania*, after *relinquam* there is written :∞ τελευσ and just below, the subscription FVLGINIÆ SCRIPTVM GERENTE ME MAGISTRATVM PV · SCRIBE · KAL' · IVN · 1474. The *Agricola* has at the end the word FINIS only. On folio 63 v. following the oration of Antonius stands the title of his oration, followed by these words: Scripta p me M. Angl'm Crullum Tudertem fulgini pu. Scribam Non Decem̄r MccccLxxiiii Deo Laus & honos. The selections from Pliny's *Letters*<sup>3</sup> have, on folio 221 v. and 222 r., the subscription Caii Plinii oratoris atq, Phylosaphi Dissertissimi epistolarum liber octavus et ultimus explicit foeliciter deo grās Finis Perusie in domo Crispoli<sup>toz</sup> 1468 AMHN Τελευσ M. Angelus Tuders. Incidentally it may be noticed that the scribe's name is Crullus, not Trullus as Leuze surmised from Wünsch's report in the *Classical Review*, 1899, p. 274, and that his patronymic in the subscription, both on folio 63 and 221, is given

<sup>1</sup> In the spring of 1899 I planned to visit Toledo for the purpose of collating the Tacitus MS. in the possession of the cathedral library of that city. Reference was made to this plan in the *Classical Review* of the preceding year (Vol. XII, p. 465). The necessity of finishing another piece of work upon which I was engaged forced me, however, to give up the project for a time, and I was unable to carry it out until last spring. In the interval Dr. Leuze, of Tübingen, made an admirable collation of the *Agricola* portion of the MS., and published the results of his examination of it in the eighth *Supplementband* of *Philologus*. In this paper, therefore, I shall confine myself to the *Germania*, which is contained in the same codex, and which Dr. Leuze did not have time to collate. In his article (p. 517) Dr. Leuze expressed the fear that his collation might not be accurate at all points, because he was obliged to make it in a very short time, but my comparison of it with

the codex itself convinced me that it was thoroughly trustworthy. I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Monsignor Merry del Val, the archbishop of Nicaea, whose enlightened interest in classical study is well known. Through his friendly intercession in my behalf I received permission to make a complete copy of the *Germania* text, although such permission had never been granted before, I believe, in the Toledo library. I am indebted also to Dr. Leuze and to Dr. Wünsch, who first made the existence of the Toledo MS. known to students by his note in *Hermes*, Vol. XXXII, p. 59, for the helpful suggestions which they gave to me by letter before I went to Toledo.

<sup>2</sup> A description of this part of the MS., with a collation of a few of the letters contained in it, is published in this paper on pp. 43, 44.

as Tuders, not Tudertinus as Wünsch reports. A more important correction of Wünsch's reading<sup>3</sup> consists in the fact that at the end of Antonius's oration the date is clearly 1474 and not 1471. From the dates previously reported Leuze inferred that the *Agricola* was written between December 5, 1471, and June 1, 1474. This supposition involved a serious difficulty, because, as will be noticed, the oration of Antonius, which follows the *Germania*, seemed to bear the earlier date, 1471. Since, however, the actual reading in both cases is 1474 the difficulty disappears, and furthermore we can say with considerable confidence that the *Agricola*, which stands between the *Germania* and the oration of Antonius, was written between June 1 and December 5, 1474. The date, 1468, given at the end of Pliny's *Letters*, is a little surprising, but it is written in brown ink, while the rest of the subscription is in bright red ink, and may be an incorrect date inserted later. This supposition is in a slight degree confirmed by the fact that the subscription is arranged in lines of approximately equal length, except that in the line where 1468 is written this number stands to the right of the perpendicular, to the left of which the other lines of the subscription fall, but I am not inclined to lay much stress on this last consideration. Since Angelus makes no mention of his title of public scribe in this connection, and since Pliny's *Letters* were copied at Perusia, it may perhaps be assumed with safety that the Pliny MS. was not copied in 1474. That Angelus copied the *Agricola* as well as the *Germania* is not only clear from the close resemblance which the handwriting in the one document bears to that of the other, but is proved beyond a doubt by examining his method of forming certain combinations of letters. To take one illustration only: *fama* so closely resembles *forma* in *Agr.* 10, 12 that Dr. Leuze was in doubt (p. 545) which of the two words was intended. The same word, *fama*, is written in the same peculiar way in *Germ.* 34, 9 and 35, 16 (Müllenhoff's ed.). The signs for abbreviations, the method of making corrections, and the orthography in the two texts are also similar, although perhaps one ought not to lay much stress on the resemblance last mentioned.

The MS. of the *Germania*, like that of the *Agricola*, has a great many variants. These are without exception written on the margin in the hand and ink used in the body of the text. Someone has also added on the margin here and there in bright red ink the nominative form of certain proper names occurring in the text. Thus on folio 1 r. opposite 2, 8 (ed. Müll.) stands *Germania*, opposite 2, 12 (*ibid.*) *Tuisco deus*, opposite 2, 13 (*ibid.*) *Mannus*. These additions are of no importance in discussing the MS., and may, therefore, be left entirely out of consideration.

Corrections of a single letter or syllable are made above the line. In two cases only, where it is necessary to insert one or more words (13, 4 and 13, 18), the words to be added are written on the margin. The corrections are made in ink of three different colors—a dark brownish green (that of the text itself), a reddish brown, and a bright red. It may be stated with confidence that those in green ink are made by the

<sup>3</sup> The errors in Dr. Wünsch's description of the MS. result of course solely from the fact that, as he wrote to Dr. Leuze, he was allowed to note *Aeusserlichkeiten* only.

scribe himself from the copy which he is following. One cannot speak with the same certainty of the other two classes of corrections, but I am strongly inclined to think that those in reddish-brown ink are in the hand of the original copyist. The third corrector, he of the bright red ink, is evidently the scribe who wrote the proper names on the margin to which reference has been made above. The ink is the same as that used in the titles and the paragraph marks. This fact makes it reasonably sure that this third class of corrections may be attributed either to the original copyist or to one of his fellows. His corrections are so slight as to afford us little basis for a comparison of his hand with that of the text. The style which he has used in his notes on the side of the page differs from the writing of the original copyist, but probably the difference is no greater than would naturally exist between the formal and the free hand of the same scribe. We may assume, therefore, with great probability that all three classes of corrections are to be traced to the original copyist. It does not follow, however, that they come from the same source. Those in green ink were undoubtedly made by the copyist as he proceeded with his work. As has been remarked already, they were corrections of errors which he made in following his copy. Those in reddish-brown and in bright red ink must have been added somewhat later. That a considerable interval of time elapsed between the copying of the text and the insertion of these two classes of corrections seems rather probable from the fact that these two inks are used in correcting the *Agricola* also. The reddish-brown ink is used, for instance, in *Agr.* 43, 7 (ed. Halm),<sup>4</sup> and the bright red ink in 3, 6; 29, 9; 31, 2; 31, 19; 33, 6, and 46, 1 (see Lenze, pp. 543-54). It is clear that these changes were made some time after the entire MS. had been finished, and for this second and third correction of the text a MS. other than the archetype of T, or even two such MSS., may have been used. The bearing of these corrections upon the text of the MS. from which T was copied can be ascertained only by discovering their source, and this can be done better when we come to discuss the readings in T.<sup>5</sup>

## II

### T AND THE BC CLASSES OF MANUSCRIPTS<sup>6</sup>

#### COLLATION OF TBbCc WITH MÜLLENHOFF'S EDITION<sup>7</sup>

Cor. Taciti De Vita Moribus Et Origine Germanorum Opus Elegantissimum  
Feliciter Incipit T

<sup>4</sup>At 43, 7 *ausim* was omitted by the original copyist, and added on the margin in brownish-red ink by the corrector.

<sup>5</sup>This point has a like importance for the *Agricola*.

<sup>6</sup>Müllenhoff's nomenclature for the MSS. is followed, and in this table the readings of B b C and c, which make up the BC classes, are given, because the fundamental point in connection with any new *Germania* MS. must be to determine its relation to these four MSS.

<sup>7</sup>The readings of b and c have been taken from the critical apparatus in Müllenhoff's edition. The readings

of B (Vat. 1862) and C (Vat. 1518) are from my own collation of those MSS., and a list of corrections to be made in Müllenhoff's critical apparatus may be found on pp. 42, 43. The hand of the first corrector is indicated by T<sup>1</sup>, that of the second by T<sup>2</sup>, that of the third by T<sup>3</sup>. At the points marked in this table with a star Müllenhoff, in the *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, Vol. IV (Berlin, 1900), expresses a preference for the readings which T (with certain other MSS.) gives. It has seemed best, however, for convenience in reference, to print in the first column the readings of Müllenhoff's text, even where that editor on maturer consideration has expressed a preference for another reading.



Cornelii Taciti De Origine Et Situ Germanorum Liber Incipit B

Cornelii · Taciti · De Origine · Situ · Moribus · Ac Populis · Germanorum Liber ·

Incipit: ∞ b

C · Cornelii Taciti de origine et situ germanorum C

C · Cornelii Taciti De Origine Et Situ Germaniꝑ Liber Incipit c

Editio Muellenhoffii

T B b C c

- |       |                |   |
|-------|----------------|---|
| 1, 1  | Germania       | ermania <i>omissa G quae minio pingi debebat</i> T  |
| 1     | Raetisque      | Rhaetiisq T, Retiisque B, rhetiisque b, rētiisque Cc  |
| 2     | Danuvio        | Dañubio T, danubio B b c  |
| 3     | cetera         | cētera T, coetera <i>et similiter saepius vel cētera</i> b, cētera<br><i>vel caetera</i> Cc <i>ubique</i>   |
| 3     | Oceanus        | occeanus T C <i>ubique</i>  |
| 6     | Raeticarum     | rēticaꝑ T, rheticarum b, rēticarum C, raeticarum c,<br>Reticarum B  |
| 8     | septentrionali | septemtrionali T  |
| 9     | Danuvius       | Dannubius T, danubius B b, Dañuuius C, danuuius <i>in</i><br><i>danubius corr.</i> c <sup>1</sup>   |
| 10    | Abnobaë        | Arnobe (aī Arbone aī none <i>in margine</i> ) T, Arnobē<br>(Arbonae <i>in marg.</i> ) B, arbonē b, arbone C, arnobae<br><i>in arbonae corr.</i> c |
| 11    | septimum       | septimuꝑ · <sup>N</sup> · (septimus <i>in septimum correxit et</i> · N ·<br><i>supra addidit</i> T <sup>a</sup> ) T                               |
| 2, 12 | Tuistonem      | Tuisconē T, Tuistonē C, Tristonē <i>et in marg.</i> Tuisman<br>B, tristonē b, tui <i>supra</i> tri β, Bistonem c                                  |
| 14    | conditoresque  | conditorisq T, conditorisque B b c, conditoris C  |
| 15    | Ingaevones     | Ingeuones T B b C, ingēuones β, ingaeuones c  |
| 16    | Herminones     | hermiꝑones (n <i>supra addidit</i> T <sup>a</sup> ) T, Hermiones B b C,<br>hermiꝑones β, herminones c   |
| 16    | ceteri         | cēteri T  |
| 16    | Istaeuones     | Isteuones T C   |
| 17    | deo            | deos T  |
| 18    | plurisque      | plūēsq T, pluresque B b C c   |
| 18    | Suebos         | Sueuos T B b C c  |
| 20    | Germaniae      | germaniꝑ T  |
| 21    | Rhenum         | rhenjum (i <i>puncto delevit</i> T <sup>1</sup> ) T   |
| 24    | omnes          | omīs T  |
| 24    | victore        | victor~T (cf. arar~ 14, 17)   |
| 25    | etiam          | om. T c, etiam B b, & C   |

<sup>1</sup> *Gentis verbum* (2, 14 ed. M.) fol. 1<sup>r</sup> claudit.

3, 2	proelia	prelia T, plia b, plia C, praelia c
4	barditum	Barditum <i>et in marg.</i> Baritū T, baritum <i>supra</i> barditum c <sup>1</sup>
5	futuraeque	futureq T <i>corr. in</i> futureq T <sup>1</sup>
5	pugnae	pugne T <i>corr. in</i> pugne T <sup>1</sup>
7	vocis	voces TB bCc
7	videtur	videntur TB bCc
10	Ulixen	ulixem T, ulixen Cc, Ulyxen B, Ulyssem ( <i>ss in litura</i> ) b
12	Germaniae	germanie T <i>corr. in</i> germanie T <sup>1</sup>
13	incolitur	colit~T <i>corr. in</i> icolit~T <sup>1</sup>
14	nominatumque . . .	nominatumq ACKITVPΓION aram TB Cc, nominatum-
	. . . aram	que aram ( <i>in marg. deest β</i> ) b
15	Laertae	Laerte T
16	monumentaue	monimenta q TC
17	Graecis	grece T
18	Germaniae	germanie T
18	Raetiaeque	rhetieq T, rhetiaeque b, Rētieque B, rētieque c, retieq; C
18	quae	que T
4, 1	Germaniae	germanie T <i>corr. in</i> germanie T <sup>1</sup>
2	conubiis	conubiis TB bCc
6	caerulei	cerulei Tc, cērulei C, ceruli b, ceruli (f <i>lei supra versum</i> ) B
6	rutilae	rutilē T
7	valida	vallida ( <i>in valida correxit</i> T <sup>1</sup> ) T
9	tolerare	tollerare TC
10	assuerunt *	assueverūt TCc, assuerunt (f <i>int supra versum</i> ) B
5, 1	specie	spei (spem <i>corr. in</i> spei? T <sup>1</sup> ) T, spe~C, spetie c
2	foeda	fedā TB b
7	eaeque	eeq T b, Eeque B, eātq; C, eatque c
7	gratissimae	gratissime T
10	Germaniae	gēmanie T
12	haud	aut TC
15	commerciorum	comertioꝝ T, commertiorum Cc
17	nostrae pecuniae	nre pecunie T
20	quoque magis quam	magisq T
21	affectione	affectatione TB b, affectione Cc

\* Confirmare verbum (S, 19 ed. M.) fol. 10 clauditt.

6, 1	ne ferrum quidem	ne ferrum (q̄ addidit T <sup>10</sup> ) T
5	cominus	cominus T b
10	distinguunt	distingūt T B b C c
11	galea	galeę T B b C c
12	variare	uarietate T b, variare B C c
16	aestimanti	extimanti T, estimāti B, ęstimati b, existimanti C c
17	proeliantur	preliantur T
18	peditum	p <sup>a</sup> ditum (e supra addidit T <sup>11</sup> ) T
25	proeliis	preliis T
28	superstites	supstes T
7, 6	ne verberare	neq, verberare T
7	poenam	penam T B
7	iussu	iuxu T
7	velut	velud T, veluti C
9	effigiesque	Effigies T
9	detracta	de tracta T
11	fortuita	fortuna T corr. in fortuita T <sup>1</sup>
16	illae	ille T C
16	et*	aut T B b, et C c
8, 4	cominus	comin <sup>9</sup> T C b
7	nubiles	nobiles T B C c, nōbiles b
9	consilia	consilio T
9	neglegunt	negligūt T b C c, neglegunt B
11	Albrunam	Auriniā (Albrunam sive Albriniam in marg.) T, auri- niam B b C, fluriniam c, sed B in margine Albriniam, b † Albriniam, c ab altera manu albriniam supra adscriptum habent.
13	tamquam	tanq~ T B c
9, 2	litare	litarē T
3	Martem et Herculem	Herculem & martem T, herculem ac martem C c, et herculem post placant B b
4	Sueborum	suevoz T C c b, Suenorum B
6	liburnae	liburne T
8	speciem	spēm T C, speciē B, spetiē c
8	assimilare	assimilare T
9	caelestium	celestium T

<sup>10</sup> Quidem verbum (6, 1 ed. M.) fol. 3r claudit.<sup>12</sup> Modum verbum (9, 6 ed. M.) fol. 3r claudit.<sup>11</sup> Non verbum (7, 7 ed. M.) fol. 3r claudit.

10, 5	fortuito	fortuitu T
10	eundem	eundem T
12	interrogare	interogare T
13	praesagia	presagia T
22	exploratur*	explorant T C c, exploratur B, <i>corr. ex</i> explorātur b
24	popularium	depopularium T
25	praeiudicio	preiuditio T, <sup>pre</sup> preiuditio C, iudicio B
11, 2	omnes	ōmes T
4	incidit	inciderit T
5	incohatur	inchoatur T b C, incohatur B c
10	nec ut iussi	ne iniussi T
11	coeuntium	cētnum T
12	absumitur	assūmīt~ T
12	turba*	turbe T B, turbē b C c
13	tum	tamen (tantuz <i>in marg.</i> ) T, tum c, cum C, tamen B b
15	aetas	etas T
12, 2	distinctio	Distintio T
7	flagitia	flagia T, flagitia C, flagicia B, supplicia b
7	abscondi	ascondi T
8	poena	penaz T B, poenarum b C c
9	mulctae	mulcte T
11	conciliis	comitiis T
13	ex plebe	explebes T <i>corr. in</i> explebe T
14	assunt	adsūt T B C
13, 1	publicae	p u b ° T, p l u ° ° C
1	privatae	private T
4	tum in	Tum in T (Tum in Cum <i>correxerit et</i> Eum <i>supra addidit</i> T <sup>a</sup> ), tum in C c <i>et supra</i> cum c', cum in B b
4	vel pater vel propinqui	ul ipsi ul propinqui (ipsi <i>punctis delevit et in margine vel p̄t addidit</i> T <sup>a</sup> ) T
7	publicae	p u b ° ° T
9	adolescentulis	adolescentibus T
11	etiam	et~ & T
13	aemulatio	emulatio T
15	haec	hec T B
15	hae	he T B
16	semper	semp & T
16	circumdari	circundari T
18	cuique	om. T <i>sed in margine scripsit</i> T <sup>a</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Committunt verbum (10, 26 ed. M.) fol. 8<sup>o</sup> claudit.<sup>14</sup> Comites verbum (12, 13 ed. M.) fol. 4<sup>o</sup> claudit.

14, 2	vinci	viam T <i>corr. in</i> vinci T <sup>a</sup>
2	virtutem principis	virtute principē T
2	adaequare	adequare T, equare C c
3	ac	<i>om. T sed in marg. scripsit</i> T <sup>a</sup>
3	probosum	probosum T
6	praecipuum	precipuum T
8	otio	ocio T B b
9	adolescentium	adolescentū T
11	ancipitia	ancipiātia T <i>corr. in</i> ancipitia T <sup>1</sup>
13	tuentur	tuere T <i>sed a supra addidit</i> T <sup>a</sup> , tuent <sup>∞</sup> B, tuētur b, tueare C c <i>et reliqui omnes</i>
14	illam	illamq T
17	arare	arar T, ar <sup>∞</sup> are (=arrare) C
18	expectare	expectare T B C c
20	et	<i>om. T sed in marg. &amp; addidit</i> T <sup>a</sup>
20	adquirere	acquirere T B C c
15, 2	otium	ocium T B b
5	feminis	fēminis T
16, 1	populis	pplos T <i>corr. in</i> pplis T <sup>a</sup>
2	ne pati	nepati T
4	locant	locant ( <i>in marg. Longant</i> ) T, longant ( <i>super lineam</i> l locant) B, looant <i>sed supra et infra secundam o litura, ut fuisse videatur</i> lōgant ( <i>teste Muelenhoffio</i> ) b, <i>in margine</i> Locant β
5	conexis	connexis T B b C c
5	et	<i>om. T sed super versum supplevit</i> T <sup>a</sup>
5	cohaerentibus	coherentibus T
6	circumdat	circundat T B c
7	caementorum	cementorū T
9	speciem	spetiem T c, spēm C, spetiē B
12	imitetur	imitent <sup>∞</sup> T c immitet <sup>∞</sup> C
12	supterraneos	sb <sup>2</sup> teraneos T, sb <sup>2</sup> t <sup>2</sup> aneos C, subterraneos c, supter- raneos B b
14	hiemis	hyemi T B C, hiemi b c
16	aperta	aperta T ( <i>ñ super lineam addidit</i> T <sup>a</sup> )
16	populatur	populatio T
17	ignorantur	ignoranter T

<sup>15</sup> Petunt verbum (14, 9 ed. M.) fol. 4<sup>o</sup> claudit.

<sup>16</sup> Phalarae verbum (15, 18 ed. M.) fol. 5<sup>r</sup> claudit.

17, 3	locupletissimi	Locuplectissimi T
3	distinguuntur	distinguntur T B b c, dīxtīgūt~ C
6	neglegenter	negligenter T B b c, neglegenter <i>corr. ex</i> -ūt~ C
7	commercia	comertia T, commertia C c, <i>corr. t in</i> c b
9	beluarum	belluarum T
10	feminis	foeminis T
11	feminae	foemine T
11	amictibus	admictibus T
18, 3	singulis	singlis T
10	in	im T <i>corr. in</i> in T <sup>1</sup>
10	haec	hec T B
12	haec	hec T
16	periculorumque	periculor̃ T
19	denuntiant	renuptiant (?) T, denūciant B
19	vivendum	uiuentes T
19	pereundum	parientes T, pariendum B c, pereundum b, piēdum C
21	rursusque	rursus que T, rursus quae c, rursusq̃ C
19, 1	saepta	septa T, septa <i>cum litura supra lineam</i> b, scepta C
3	feminae	femino T
5	praesens	presens T
9	aetate	etate T
9	invenerit	invenīt (= invenerit) T, invenit C c
11	saeculum	seculum T
16	tamquam	tanq̃ T B
17	finire	finere T <i>corr. in</i> finire T <sup>1</sup>
17	quemquam	quenq̃ T B c, quēq; C
20, 1	ac	atq̃ T
2	quemque	q̃nq̃ T, quēque c
3	aut	ac T C c, aut B b
5	delitiis	delitiis T C c
5	dignoscas	dinoscas T B C
7	inexhausta	in exaucta T
14	tamquam	tanq̃ T
14	animum	in aiūm T B b C c
16	si	sed T <i>corr. in</i> si T <sup>2</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Pellibusque verbum (17, 9 ed. M.) fol. 5v claudit.<sup>18</sup> Animum verbum (20, 14 ed. M.) fol. 8v claudit.<sup>19</sup> Litterarum verbum (19, 8 ed. M.) fol. 6r claudit.

20, 18	quo*	tanto T B C, propīq̄q̄rēs q̄uoꝛ C, quo c <i>et in litura</i> β, quanto <i>Muellerhoffius, D. A., p. 325</i>
19	gratiosior	gratiosior ( <i>gratior in marg.</i> ) T, gratiosior († <i>gratior supra</i> ) β c <sup>1</sup>
21, 2	implacabiles	implacabiles T, iplicabiles C
8	quemcumque	quencunq̄ T B
14	hospitis	hospititis T <i>corr. in hospitis</i> T <sup>1</sup>
17	vinculum	Victus T B b C c
18	comitas	comis T B b C c
22, 1	e somno	· N · somno T, e somno C c β, enim somno B b
2	saepius	sepius T
3	hiems	hyemis T, hyems B C
7	vinulentos	vinulentos T, vi nulētos C
8	conviciis	conuitiis T B C c
8	caede	cedq̄ T
10	asciscendis	adsciscendis T B C
12	tamquam	tanq̄ T B
14	nec	aut T
23, 6	indulseris	in dulseris T
24, 1	coetu	cētu T C, cetu B
2	nudi iuvenes	Nudi iuvenes Nūdi iuuenēs T
4	quaestum	questum T b C c
10	voluntariam	volūptariam T
13	condicionis	conditionis T B C c
13	commercia	comertia T, cōmertia C c, comercia β
15	exolvant	exolvať (=exolvant?) T
25, 1	discriptis*	descriptis T <i>libri</i>
4	et	ut T B b, et C c β
5	officia	offitia T C c
6	verberare	Verberant T
6	vinculis	vingculis T <i>corr. in vinculis</i> T <sup>1</sup>
9	est	om. T
11	dumtaxat	duntaxat T
11	iis	his T
26, 1	fenus	Foenus T b C c
3	in vices	inuices <sup>m</sup> T, in uices B, inuicē b, uices C, uices c

<sup>20</sup> Capiunt verbum (22, 2 ed. M.) fol. 7r claudit.<sup>22</sup> Dignationem verbum (26, 4 ed. M.) fol. 8r claudit.<sup>21</sup> Inter verbum (24, 2 ed. M.) fol. 7v claudit.

26, 6	praebent	prestant ( <i>in marg.</i> prebent) T, prestant (f prebent <i>supra</i> ) B, praebent c, p̄bēt b, p̄stāt C
7	labore	laborare ( <i>in marg.</i> labore) T, labore ( <i>in marg.</i> f labore) B, laborare (f labor <i>supra</i> ) b, labore C c (f rare <i>supra scripsit c</i> <sup>1</sup> )
9	et	ut T B b c, et C β
9	terrae	terre T
11	species	speties T c, spēs B C
11	hiems	Hyems T B C c <sup>1</sup>
11	aestas	estas T
27, 3	odoribus	coloribus T
4	equus	equis T, equus c, eq <sup>2</sup> C
4	adicitur	adiicitur T B b, adjicitur c, adicitur C
5	caespes	cespes T b C c
8	feminis	Foeminis T
10	haec	Hec T
10	commune	comūe T, comuni C
10	origine	orrigine T
13	commigraverint	comigravint T
28, 1	auctor	auctoꝝ T, auctorū C c, autor B b
8	Boii	Boi T
9	Boihaemi	boihemi T, Boihemi (f Boijemionē <i>in marg.</i> ) B, boiemi b, boiemi C, bohemi <i>post</i> nomen c
11	ab Osis	abois T, a boiis B b C c, osis <i>in marg.</i> β
16	Nervii	Neruli T B C c, neruli b
17	tamquam	tanq̄ T B
21	ne Ubii	Nubii T B C c, nubii b, ubij <i>margo</i> β
22	libentius	lbentius T <i>corr. in</i> libentius T <sup>1</sup>
22	Agrippinenses	Aggripinēses T
23	origine	orrigine T
25	collocati	collati T, conlocati B
29, 1	Batavi	Batauii T B C c, batāui b
3	Chattorum	Cathoꝝ T, cattorum b, cattorum B, chattorum C c
3	quondam	condam T
3	populus	populis T C c
6	antiquae	ante T
8	collationibus	collationibus ( <i>in marg.</i> collocationib) T, collocationibus B <i>et supra</i> collationibus c <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Utraque verbum (26, 8 ed. M.) fol. 8v claudit.



29, 8	proeliorum	prelioꝝ T
14	cetera	cetera T <i>sed i supra a posita esse videtur</i> T <sup>1</sup>
14	similes	si miles T <i>corr. in</i> similes T <sup>1</sup>
14	Batavis	Bactauis T
18	Danuviumque	Dannubiumq T, danubiumque B b c, danuuiumque C
19	decumates	Decumathes T B c
20	dubiae	dubie T
22	praesidiis	presidiis T
22	pars	par T
22	provinciae	prouincie T
30, 1	Chatti	cati T, catti b C, chatti B c
2	incohant	inchoant T C, incohant c, i cohaſ B, inchoat b, inchoāt <i>et post t litura β</i>
4	Chattos	cathos T, cattos b, chattos B c, cāctos C
6	artus	arctus T, arc <sup>p</sup> C c
8	sollertiae	solertię T C c b
8	praeponere	preponere T
8	praepositos	prepositos T
9	intelligere	intelligere T B b C c
9	occasiones	oēcioēs ( <i>in marg. occasiones</i> ) T
12	Romanae	rōe T, rōē C, romane B, romanę b, ratione c β, ratione <i>Muellerhoffius, D. A., p. 411</i>
12	disciplinae	discipline T
14	in pedite	impedite T <i>corr. in</i> in pedite T <sup>1</sup>
16	Chattos	cathos T, cattos b
31, 1	raro	rarō T, raro b C, rarā B, rara c
2	Chattos	cathos T, cattos b, cāttos C
2	consensum	conuentum T
7	pretia nascendi	pretia† nāscendi T, nōscendi B, nascendi c, noscendi b C
7	rettulisse	retulisse T <i>libri</i>
11	caede	cedę T, cede B
11	Chattorum	cathoꝝ T, cattorum b
14	haec	hec T
17	ad quemque	adqueng T, ad quenque b c
18	contemptores	contēptores T, contentores C
18	durae	dure T
32, 1	Chattis	cathis T, cattis b

<sup>1</sup> Magnitudo verbum (29, 11 ed. M.) fol. 9<sup>r</sup> claudit.<sup>2</sup> Pugna verbum (30, 17 ed. M.) fol. 9<sup>v</sup> claudit.

32, 3	solitum	solijum solitum ( <i>solium punctis infra positis delevit</i> T <sup>1</sup> ) T
4	praecellunt	precellunt T
4	Chattos	Cathos T, cattos b
6	infantium	infanctium T ( <i>corr. in infantium T<sup>2</sup></i> )
7	haec	hec T
9	natu	natui T ( <i>corr. in natu T<sup>2</sup></i> )
33, 4	praedae	prede
6	proelii	prelii T
6	invidere	om. T
9	quaseso	queso T
10	urgentibus	urgentibus iam T B b, i urgentib C, in urgentibus c <i>et</i> <i>supra</i> i igentib <sup>2</sup> c <sup>2</sup>
34, 1	Dulgubnii	Dulgicubuni ( <i>dulgibnii margo</i> ) T, dulgitubini b, Dulgibini ( <i>et supra</i> i dulgitubini) B, dulgibini C c <i>et supra</i> dulcubuni c <sup>2</sup>
2	Chasuarii	Thasuarii T B, tasuarii b, occasuarii C, chasudrii c
4	Frisiis	frisii T B c <i>et in marg. β</i> , frisçis C, frisiis b
5	praetexuntur	pretexuntur T
6	immensos	in mensos T
6	insuper	in super T
7	classibus	claxibus T
8	illa	illa ( <i>illis margo</i> ) T
8	temptavimus*	tentauius T C c, tētauimus B b
9	volgavit	uulgavit T b, uolgaui B C, uoligaui c
10	quidquid	quicq T <i>libri</i>
10	magnificum	magnum T, magnu; B, magnificum C c <i>et in litura β</i> , <i>magn in margine β</i>
11	consensimus	consensimus ( <i>cōsuevim<sup>2</sup> margo</i> ) T
11	Druso	Durso T <i>corr. in Druso T<sup>1</sup></i>
13	temptavit*	tentaui T B c, tētauit b, temptauit C
35, 1	in septentrionem	Inseptemtrionē T
2	ac primo	A primo T <i>corr in Ac primo T<sup>1</sup></i>
3	incipiat	incipiant T
3	Frisiis	Frisii T B b C c
4	litoris	littoris T
5	optenditur	obtendit~ T B, optenditur b, obtendere C c
5	in Chattos	in chatos T, incattos b, incaptos C

\* Equitum verbum (32, 5 ed. M.) fol. 10<sup>r</sup> claudit.<sup>2</sup> Quicquid verbum (34, 20 ed. M.) fol. 10<sup>r</sup> claudit.

35, 6	sinuetur	sinuet <sup>~</sup> (sinat <sup>~</sup> <i>margo</i> ) T, sinatur C c, sinuetur B b
6	immensum	in mensum T
7	et implent	implet <sup>~</sup> T, et implent B et implēt C
13	iniurias	Iniuriam T
36, 1	Chattorumque	cathozq <sup>3</sup> T, cattorumque b
2	ac	& <sup>ac</sup> (ac <i>supra lineam scripto</i> ) T
2	inlaccessiti	illaccessiti T
4	inpotentes	potentis T, inpotentes b C c, i <sup>~</sup> potentis B
5	nomina	nomine T B b C c
7	Chattis	Chattis T, cattis b
8	tracti	Tacti T B b C, tracti c
9	adversarum	aduersarum (adusariis <i>margo</i> ) T, aduersarum (f ad- uersariis) B b, adu <sup>9</sup> sarium C
9	aequo	equo T
9	socii	sotii T c, sunt socii C
10	fuissent	fuissē (= fuissent?) T
37, 1	sinum	situm T B b, sinum C c
2	tenent	tenent <sup>~</sup> T
3	famae	fame T
4	ambitu	ambitū <sup>tu</sup> T, ambitū <sup>tu</sup> B, ambitum C c
6	sescentessimum	Sexcentessimum T c, sesc-B b, sec- C
8	Caecilio	Cecilio T
8	ac*	& T B b, ac C c
8	Papirio	Sapirio T B, papirio C c, Šapyrio b
8	consulibus	cōss : T, cons b, cons β, eos C
9	si	om. T
10	consulatum	conuentum T, con <sup>tu</sup> B
11	Germania	in Germania T
14	saepius	sepius T
16	caedem	cedem T B
16	et ipse	& ipō & ipē T B b C c
17	obiecerit	obiecerunt T, obicit <sup>~</sup> C
18	et Scauro	Scauro T
19	Caepione	Cepione T
19	Gnaeoque	Marcoq <sup>o1q</sup> T, Marcoq <sup>o1q</sup> ; (= Marcoquoque vel Marcoque) B, m i q <sup>o</sup> (= miquoque) C, M. c, marco q <sup>o</sup> q <sup>3</sup> b
20	populo Romano	populi Romani T B b C c
24	Caesaris	Cesaris T

\* Vocantur verbum (36, 7 ed. M.) fol. 11<sup>r</sup> claudit.\* Italia verbum (37, 22 ed. M.) fol. 11<sup>v</sup> claudit.

37, 25	minae	mine T
25	versae	om. T
25	inde otium	inde ocium T B b, in otium C
27	hibernis	hybernis T B C
28	ac rursus inde pulsi proximis	ac rursus pulsi inde (nam <i>margo</i> ) pximis T, ac rursus puls <sup>i</sup> inde <sup>na</sup> proximis B, ac rursus inde pulsi proximis b, ac rursus pulsi nam proximis c, ac & expulsi rur- sus ide proximis C
38, 1	Suebis	Suevis T B b C c <i>et ubique similiter</i>
2	Chattorum	cathox <sup>r</sup> T
2	Tencterorumve	Tenctetox <sup>r</sup> ve (Tenctetorum <i>corr. in</i> Tencterorum T') T
3	optinent	obtin& T C, obtinent c
4	quamquam	q̄ T B, q̄; q̄; C c, quam <sup>na</sup> b
4	commune	comūni T, comune C
6	sic	sicut (Sic <i>margo</i> ) T
7	Sueborum	servox <sup>r</sup> T
9	quod	quid T
9	saepe	sepe <sup>r</sup> T
10	iuventae	iuuente T
12	saepe	sepe T
12	in ipso solo	in solo (in ipō <i>margo</i> ; signo   . ante solo appposito) T, in solo <sup>i ipso</sup> B, in ipso (solo <i>supra adscripsit</i> β) b, in ipso solo C c
12	vertici*	vertice T B b C c
13	formae	forme T
13	innoxia	innoxie T B b c, inopiē C
15	comptius	compti ut T B b C, compti et c
16	ornantur*	arman <sup>i</sup> tur (ōnant <sup>r</sup> <i>margo</i> ) T, arman <sup>arm</sup> tur B, ornantur b, ornantur C c, arman <sup>r</sup> tur <i>supra</i> c <sup>r</sup>
39, 1	Semnones	Semones (Semnones <i>margo</i> ) T, Semones <sup>Señones</sup> B, senones <sup>m</sup> b, semones C c
3	stato tempore	Statuto (Stato tpe <i>margo</i> ) T
3	patrum	patrium T B b C, patrum β, patruum c
4	sacram	sacrum T B b C c, sacram β
4	omnes	om̄s (nom̄is ī num̄is <i>margo</i> ) T, omnis C c, omnes B b <i>sed supra adscripto</i> ī nōis ī numinis B, ī nominis c <sup>r</sup>
4	eiusdem	eiusdemq <sup>r</sup> T B

\* Sanguinis verbum (39, 4 ed. M.) fol. 12<sup>r</sup> claudit.

39, 6	horrenda	horrentia T
13	adicit	Adiicit T B b C c
13	Semnonum	Semonum (Semnonu <sup>m</sup> <i>margo</i> ) T, Semonū († sennonū <i>supra</i> ) B, senonum b, semnonum C c
14	habitant*	habitant T B b C c
14	corpore	corpore (tempore <i>margo</i> ) T, corpore († tempore <i>supra</i> ) temp B, corpore b, corpore C c
40, 1	nobilitat	nobilitas T B b C, nobilitat c
2	cincti	cuncti T
3	proeliis	preliis T
5	Suardones	Suarines (Suardones <i>margo</i> ) T, Suarines B b C c, dones <i>supra</i> ines <i>adscript</i> β, suardones <i>cod. Hummel. et non nulli alii</i>
5	Nuithones	Nuitones T, Nuithones B c, nuitōnes C, nurtones b, i <i>supra</i> r β
7	Nerthum	Nertum T, Nerthum c, nēthum C, Neithū B, neithum b, r <i>supra</i> i β
10	eo	ea T B b C c
12	intellegit	intelligit T B b C c
13	feminis	fēminis T
13	laeti	Leti T
14	quaecumque	quecūq; T
15	sumunt	sumunt T, sumūt B, sumut C
16	pax et quies	pax & quies (& <i>supra lineam addito</i> T <sup>1</sup> ) T
20	servi	Sevi T <i>corr. in</i> Servi T <sup>1</sup>
41, 1	haec	hec T
1	Sueborum	verboꝝ T B b C c
2	Germaniae	germanie T <i>corr. in</i> germaniē T <sup>1</sup>
2	propior	proprior T c, propior <sup>tr</sup> B
3	Danuvium	Danubium T b c, Danuvium B C
3	Hermundurorum	Hermundoꝝ T
5	commercium	comertium T C, coñertiū B c
6	Raetiae	Rhetiē T b, Retie B, retiē C c
7	passim	passum T <i>corr. in</i> passim T <sup>1</sup>
42, 1	Varisti	Narisci T, Naristi B b c, Narisci <i>in margine</i> β, maristi C
2	praecipua	precipua T

<sup>1</sup>Quies tunc tantum verba (40, 16 ed. M.) fol. 12<sup>v</sup> claudunt.

42, 3	ipsa etiam	et & ip̄a (& lineola inducta delevit et signa transpositionis supra etiam et ipsa addidit T <sup>1</sup> ) T, etiam ipsa b
3	Boiis	Bois T B C c, boiis b
4	Varisti	narisci T, Naristi B b c, maristi C
5	Germaniae	Germanie T
5	Danuvio	danubio T b c, danuuio B C
6	praecingitur	peragit <sup>~</sup> T B b C c
7	manserunt*	mansere T B, manser <sup>~</sup> b, manserunt C c
8	Tudri	Trudi T
10	saepius	sepius T
43, 1	Cotini	Gotini T B b C c
2	claudunt	claudiūt T
3	Cotinos	Gotinos T B b C c
7	Cotini	Gotini T B b, Cotini C c
7	effodiunt	effodunt T
10	Suebiam	sueviam T B b C c
12	Lygiorum	Legiorum T, Legiorum B, legiorum b (Ligij in margine β), leugiorum C, legiorum c c <sup>1</sup>
14	Helvaeonas	heluetonas (halosionas margo) T, Heluetonas B, helueconas b, eluheconas C, Heueconas c c <sup>1</sup>
15	Nahanarvalos	Nahanarulos (naharualos margo) T, Nahanarualos B, naharualos b, nahanarualos C, nachanarualos c
15	apud Nahanarualos	Apd Naharualos T B b, nacharualos C c
15	religionis	religionis (regionis margo) T, religionis B b, regionis C c
16	praesidet	Presid& T
21	Harii	alii T B b C c
22	truces	trucis T B C, truciſ (s puncto deleta) b, trucis c
23	feritati	feriati T
26	sustinente	Sb <sup>2</sup> stinēte T c
28	Gotones	Gothones T B b C c
28	regnantur	regnāt T B C, regnant b, regnantur c
29	adductus	adductus T, aductius C
31	Lemovii	lemonii T b, u supra n posuit, sed in margine Lemonii β, Lemouii B C c
44, 1	ipso *	ip̄e T B, ipsae b, ip̄o C c
1	Oceano	occeanum T, oceanum B b, no supra adscripsit β, occeano C c

\* Regibus verbum (42, 9 ed. M.) fol. 15<sup>o</sup> claudit\* Ipsaque verbum (43, 25 ed. M.) fol. 15<sup>o</sup> claudit.

44, 1	praeter	preter T
3	utrinque	utrimq T, utriq; C
4	ministrant	ministrāt~ T B b C c
10	clausa	causa T
12	otiosae	Ociosa T B b, occiosa C, otiosa c
1	imotum	imotum T, inmotum C
4	ortum*	ortus T C c, ortum B b
4	edurat	edura T <i>corr. in</i> edurat T <sup>1</sup>
4	sidera hebetet	hebet & (hebet et <i>expunxit et</i> sydera hebet & <i>in margine addidit</i> T <sup>1</sup> ) T
5	equorum	deor (eor <i>margo</i> ) T, deorum B b C c, eorū <i>cod. Stuttgardiensis, cod. Vindobonensis</i>
6	adicit	aspiciūt adicit ( <i>aspicit punctis deleto</i> ) T, adicit B b C c
8	Suebici	Seuici ( <i>Sueuici margo</i> ) T, seuici b, Saenici B C c, <i>supra</i> i sueuici B c <sup>2</sup> , sueuici <i>et in margine</i> suionici β
8	Aestiorum	Aestyo T, Aestiorum B C c, estiorum b, <i>eflu supra scripsit et in margine</i> efui β
9	adluuntur	abluunt~ T B b, alluuntur c, adluuntur C
10	Britannicae	Britanice T, britanice C
10	propior	proprior T
17	sucinum	succinū T b, sucinum B C c
17	glaesum	glesum T B b C c
18	litore	littore T B C c
18	quae	que T
19	quaeve	que ue (uō <i>margo</i> ) T
19	quaesitum	quesitum T
22	perfertur *	profertur T, pfertur b
23	sucum	Succum T b C c, sucum B
24	intellegas	intelligas T B b C c
27	igitur	ergo T
28	tura	thura T c
29	terrisque . . . . solis	om. T
30	radiis	radius T B b C, radiis c
32	litora	littora <i>omissum scripsit in margine</i> T <sup>1</sup>
32	exundant	exsudant T c, exudant C
32	sucini	succini T b C, sucini B c
33	temptes	tentes T, têtes B b C c
33	taedae	tede T, tedae b c

<sup>24</sup> Quod verbum (45, 3 ed. M.) fol. 14<sup>r</sup> claudit.<sup>25</sup> Tem. syllaba prima tempestatum verbi (45, 31 ed. M.) fol. 14<sup>r</sup> claudit.

45, 36	Suionibus	Si uonibus T <i>corr. in</i> Suionibus T <sup>1</sup>
37	differunt	differi T, differunt* C
46	1 hic Suebiae finis	Hic Suevię fines T, hic sueuie ( <sup>i sueuę</sup> Sueuię B, <sup>sueuiae</sup> sueuiae c c <sup>2</sup> )
		fines B C c, hi sueuię fines b
5	torpor	tempore torpor (tempore <i>punctis deleta</i> ) T
6	conubiis	cōnubiis T B b c
6	mixtis	mixtos T B c, mistos b, o <i>puncto delevit et i supra adscripsit</i> β
8	quidquid	quicq̃ T B b c
11	figunt	figunt T C c, figunt B b
11	pedum	peditum T c, pecudum B b, <i>corr. in</i> peditum β
13	sunt	om. T
14	foeda	fedā T B
15	herba	erba T
16	solae	Sola T
16	sagittis	sagiptis T
16	inopia	in opia T
17	idemque	Idem T
19	praedae	predę T
23	inlaborare	illaborare T
25	difficillimam	difficilimam T, difficillimam C c, difficilem B b
27	Oxionas	oxionas (etionas <i>margo</i> ) T, Oxionas (tetionas <i>supra</i> ) B, oxionas b c, i etionas <i>supra</i> β, exionas C, Etionas <i>Muellerhoffius, D. A. p. 517</i>
28	voltusque	uultusq̃ T b C c, uoltusque B
28	corpora	& corpora T C c
29	ego	om. T

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: ∞ : ∞ : ∞ Finit b

finis : Θ ε λ ο σ C

∞ T ε λ ω ς o

: ∞ T ε λ ω σ

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Attention has been called already (pp. 4, 5) to the three classes of corrections which T shows. T<sup>1</sup> is the scribe himself making corrections from the MS. which he is following. The doubt which an examination of the handwriting of T<sup>a</sup> and T<sup>1</sup> and of the ink used by them leaves in one's mind (*cf.* p. 5) can best be resolved by examin-

<sup>26</sup> Aliud verbum (46, 19 ed. M.) fol. 15<sup>r</sup> claudit.



ing the corrections made by each of these hands. A conspectus of those made by T<sup>a</sup> is given in the following table, and, to facilitate comparison, the readings of certain other MSS. and early editions<sup>27</sup> are also indicated.

## CORRECTIONS BY SECOND HAND

Ed. Muell.	T	T <sup>a</sup>
1, 11 septimum	septimus	septimum enim
2, 16 Herminones	hermiones Vat. 2964, N, R	herminones
3, 13 incolitur	colitur	incolitur
6, 1 quidem	om.	quidem
13, 4 tum in	tum in K	<sup>eum</sup> cum in (cum in Vat. 2964, N)
4 pater	ipsi Vat. 2964, K, N	pater
18 cuique	om. K, N	cuique
14, 2 vinci	viam	vinci
3 ac	om.	ac
13 tuentur	tuere	tueare R (?) (tuear Vat. 2964, tueantur K, N)
20 et	om.	et
16, 1 populis	populos	populis
5 et	om. K, N	et
16 aperta	aperta	non aperta

It is necessary to anticipate a conclusion reached later in this paper (*cf.* pp. 37 ff.) by stating at this point that T is closely related to K (or L), Vat. 2964 (Massmann's Rd), the Nuremberg editions, and the Roman edition of 1474. If, therefore, the corrections of T<sup>a</sup> differ from the readings of this group,<sup>28</sup> it is apparent that he is either introducing his own conjectures, or basing his corrections on some other MS. than the archetype of T. An examination of the table will show that the state of things just supposed is the case at 1, 11; 2, 16; 13, 4 (*ipsi*); 13, 18; and 16, 5. In all these cases the first hand in T shows the same errors found in other members of the group, so that the corrections of T<sup>a</sup> give different readings from those of the E MSS. It might be assumed that T, although it was related to the MSS. and editions mentioned, belonged to a collateral branch into which the errors under discussion had not entered. It is well-nigh inconceivable, however, that the first hand in T and the copyist of the archetype from which K, Vat. 2964, R and N are descended should have committed the same errors at all of these points. The conclusion reached after an examination of these readings is confirmed by a glance at the other corrections made by T<sup>a</sup>. In no case does he restore a reading peculiar to the E MSS. The readings of T<sup>a</sup> at 3, 13; 6, 1; 14, 2;

<sup>27</sup> K = Kapplianus or Longolianus (*cf.* MASSMANN, p. 4);  
R = editio Romana (*cf.* MASSMANN, pp. 25 ff., and TAGMANN, *De Taciti Germaniae apparatus critico* p. 23) N =  
editio Norimbergensis (*cf.* MASSMANN, p. 24; TAGMANN,

p. 22, and MÜLLENHOFF, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, Vol. IV, pp. 689 ff.

<sup>28</sup> From this point on we shall designate this group of MSS. as the E class, following Müllenhoff's nomenclature.

14, 3; 14, 13; 14, 20, and 16, 1 are found, it is true, in MSS. of the class mentioned, but they also all appear in important MSS. entirely independent of that group.

Special interest attaches to 1, 11; 13, 4 (cum<sup>eum</sup> in); 13, 4 (pater); and 16, 16. In 13, 4 and 16, 16 T, in harmony with the E MSS., had ipsi and aperta, which T<sup>a</sup> changes to pater and non aperta. In 1, 11 septimus, the reading of T is nearer septimum, the reading of the E class, than septimum enim is. A similar statement may be made in regard to tum in, the reading of T at 13, 4. All of the readings of T<sup>a</sup>, with the exception of non aperta, are found in other MSS. That correction may be based on the copyist's conjecture, but the others seem to be clearly taken from some other MS.

This conclusion does not carry with it the corollary that the reading of T at all the points mentioned represents correctly the archetype. On the contrary, wherever T<sup>a</sup> coincides with the E MSS. we should adopt its reading, not because it is the reading of T<sup>a</sup>, but because evidence from the E group makes it almost certain that the archetype of T and the E MSS. had the reading in question at that point. Accordingly we should accept incolitur, 3, 13; quidem, 6, 1; vinci, 14, 2; ac, 14, 3; tueare, 14, 13; et, 14, 20, and populis, 16, 1. All these are simple errors, in their first stage of development, so to speak, and there is no difficulty in believing that they were made by the first hand in T, and that consequently they do not represent the readings of the archetype of T at these points. On the other hand, to restore the archetype of T, we should adopt the reading of T at 1, 11; 2, 16; 13, 4 (tum in); 13, 4 (ipsi); 13, 18; 16, 5, and 16, 16.

It may be surmised with some probability that the corrections made by T<sup>a</sup> were taken from Vindobonensis I (Massmann's W; cf. p. 21), or from some MS. very closely related to it. This seems to be a natural inference from the fact that W has the readings of T<sup>a</sup> at all fourteen of the points cited in the table on p. 22, while, if the reports of Massmann and Tagmann may be trusted, it is the only MS. which gives all three of the characteristic readings, septimum enim os, 1, 11; Herminones, 2, 16; and tum eum, 13, 4. That Toletanus is otherwise independent of W seems clear for two reasons. It does not, on the one hand, show the errors peculiar to W (e. g., erumpit, 1, 11; Aramisci, 28, 11; Germaniae, 28, 17; and Bastranas, 46, 3), while, on the other hand, abnormal forms like iuxu, 7, 7, and simple errors peculiar to T, like effigies, 7, 9; consilio, 8, 9; depopularium, 10, 24; and comitiis, 12, 11, are passed over by T<sup>a</sup> without correction.

The corrections made by T<sup>a</sup> are simpler. They are given in the following table.

## CORRECTIONS BY THIRD HAND

Ed. Muell.	T	T <sup>a</sup>
3, 5 futurae	future	future
5 pugnae	pugne	pugne
12 Germaniae	germanie	germanie

20, 16	si	sed	si
28, 22	libentius	lbentius	libentius
29, 14	cetera	cetera	<sup>i</sup> cetera (?)
14	similes	si miles	similes
32, 6	infantium	infanctium	infantium
9	natu	natui	natu
40, 20	servi	sevi	servi
41, 2	Germaniae	germanie	germanie
45, 36	Suionibus	Si uonibus	Suionibus

If cetera, 29, 14, be left out of account, in none of these cases is there any reason for believing that T<sup>2</sup> either based his corrections on another MS., or introduced his own conjectures. The mark over the final letter in cetera bears some resemblance to an i, but it is doubtful if it was intended for that letter. The fact has already been noticed (cf. p. 5) that the corrections of T<sup>2</sup> were made by the official corrector who inserted the titles and paragraph marks, and evidently they represent the correct reading of the archetype of T.

Having reached a conclusion in regard to the corrections in T, we are in a position to discuss the relation of T to the other MSS. of the *Germania*. The errors which T shows in common with the leading MSS. B b C c prove that they are all derived from the same archetype. The errors common to all five are voces, 3, 7; videntur, 3, 7; ACKITVPΓION, 3, 14; connubiis, 4, 2; distingunt, 6, 10; galeę, 6, 11; nobiles, 8, 7; turbae, 11, 12; poenarum, 12, 8; connexis, 16, 5; in animum, 20, 14; victus, 21, 17; comis, 21, 18; descriptis, 25, 1; aboiis, 28, 11; Neruli, 28, 16; Nubii, 28, 21; retulisse, 31, 7; quicquid, 34, 10; Frisia, 35, 3; nomine, 36, 5; et ipso et ipse, 37, 16; populi Romani, 37, 20; vertice, 38, 12; innoxie (inopie C), 38, 13; sacrum, 39, 4; adiicit, 39, 13; habitantur, 39, 14; ea, 40, 10; verborum, 41, 1; peragitur, 42, 6; Gotini, 43, 1; Gotinos, 43, 3; alii, 43, 21; Gothones, 43, 28; ministrantur, 44, 4; otiosa, 44, 12; deorum, 45, 5; adiicit, 45, 6; Suevorum, 45, 9; tentes, 45, 33; and fines, 46, 1, leaving out of account such deviations from the accepted orthography as Suevi, intelligere, and the use of e for ae. T, therefore, like all the other extant MSS. of the *Germania*, twenty or more in number, is a descendant of the Hersfeld MS., so-called.<sup>39</sup> This MS. was made known to scholars about 1455, and it seems to be proved now beyond question that Enoch of Ascoli, who found it in Germany, brought back to Italy the MS. itself, and not a copy of it, as had been commonly supposed.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Whether this MS. came from Hersfeld, Corvey, or elsewhere is not a matter of moment in this connection.

<sup>40</sup> This point was happily settled by Sabbadini in the *Rivista di Filologia*, Vol. XXIX (1901), pp. 262-4. Pier Candido Decembrio was at the papal court, as Sabbadini shows, when Enoch of Ascoli returned from Germany and thus describes the new MS., in so far as the *Germania* is concerned: "cornelii taciti liber reperitur Rome visus 1455 de Origine et situ Germanie. Incipit: 'Germania

omnis a Gallis retisque et panoniis Rheno et danubio fluminibus a Sarmatis dacisque mutuo metu aut montibus seperatur. cetera oceanus ambit.' Opus est foliorum XII in columnellis. Finit: 'Cetera iam fabulosa helusios et oxionas ora hominum vultusque corpora atque artus ferarum gerere. quod ego ut incomptum in medium relinquam.' Utitur autem cornelius hoc vocabulo 'inscientia' non 'inscitia'". Our extant MSS. in the passage in question (chap. 16) have inscitia, so that Decembrio seems to be

Having established the fact that T is descended from Hersfeldensis, let us inquire into the relation which it bears to the other *Germania* MSS., all of which have a like origin. It is now agreed on all sides that the text of the Hersfeld MS. is best preserved by MSS. of the two independent classes which Mühlenhoff has styled B and C respectively, one of which classes is represented by Vat. 1862 (B) and Leidensis (b), the other by Vat. 1518 (C) and Neapolitanus (c). At more than one hundred points these two classes of MSS. offer different readings, and a comparison of T with them at these points throws a great deal of light upon the relation which T bears to each of them and to the Hersfeld MS. In the table which follows all the passages are brought together in which B b and C c disagree. A star (\*) indicates that the reading is adopted by Mühlenhoff in his edition of the *Germania*. A dagger (†) means that T is in error with B b; a double dagger (‡) that T is in error with C c. In a supplementary table some peculiar cases are given.

TABLE SHOWING THE READINGS OF T AT POINTS WHERE B b AND C c DISAGREE.

	B b	C c
2, 12	Tristonē (Tuisman <i>marg.</i> ) B, tristonē b	Tuisconē T, Tuistonē C, Bistonem c, (Tuistonem, ed. Muell.) *
3, 13	hodieque * T B b	hodie C c
4, 2	populos * T B b	populis C c
5	q̄ q̄ (al. tanq̄ <i>marg.</i> ) B, quamquam * T b 1 lei	tanquam C c
6	ceruli B, ceruli b 1 int	cerulei C, cerulei * T c
10	assuerunt B, assuerunt b	assueuerunt ‡ T C c
5, 7	eeque * T b, eeque B	eātque C, eatque c
8	propitiine * T B b 1 pro	propitii C c
12	perinde B, perinde * T b	proinde C c
21	affectatione † T B b	affectione C c
6, 8	i mensum B b	ī imensum C c, in immensum * T
16 <sup>a</sup>	aestimanti B b, extimanti (= estimanti * ?) T	existimanti C c
21	quidem B b	quod * T C c
7, 2	aut * T B b	ac C c
2	etiam B b	et * T C c
12	aut propinquitates B b	et propinquitates * T C c

in error in his comment on this matter; but the important point in his statement, to which Sabbadini calls attention, is the fact that Enoch's MS. was written in columns, whereas in Decembrio's time it was the practice to make the lines in MSS. run across the entire page. This shows clearly enough that Enoch brought the German MS. itself with him and not a copy of it. The title which the Ger-

mania bore in the Hersfeld MS. also makes it reasonably sure that the original title was *De Origine et Situ Germanorum*. This is the title which appears in MSS. B and C.

<sup>41</sup> Upon such forms as *extimanti* for *estimanti* cf. GUDEMAN, "Bemerkungen zum Codex Toletanus des Agricola," in the *Berliner Philologische Wechenschrift*, 1902, col. 796.

7, 16	aut * T B b	et C c
8, 3	precum * T B b	pręco C c
9, 3	et herculem <i>after</i> placant B b	herculem & martem * T, herculem ac martem
10, 17	hinnitusque * T B b	hinnitus c, himnitus C
20	istos B b	illos * T C c
22	exploratur B b	explorant ‡ T C c
11, 3	pertractentur * T B b	praetractentur C c
13	tamen B b, tamen† (tantum <i>marg.</i> ) T	cum C, tum c
12, 1	concilium * T B b	consilium C c
10	uindicauit B b	uindicatur * T C c
13, 4	cum B b	tum * T C c
5	propinqui * T B b	propinquus C c
13	primus * T B b	p <sup>m</sup> C, primum c
14	principum cui * T B b	principium cui C c
14, 2	adequare * T B b	equare C c
6	eius <i>om.</i> b, ē B	eius * T C c
13	tuentur B b	tueare ‡ T C c
	<sup>1</sup> locant	
16, 4	longant B, lōgant b	locant C c, locant * (longant <i>marg.</i> ) T
17, 5	ferunt B b	gerunt * T C c
18, 11	aliquid * T B b	id C, a' c
12	hoc maximum * T B b	hec maximum C c
19, 9	inuenerit * T B b	inuenit C c
20, 3	aut * B b	ac ‡ T C c
21, 7	aliqua B b	alia * T C c
22, 1	enim † T B b	e C c
9	sed et * T B b	sed C c
14	adhec B b	adhuc * T C c
	<sup>11</sup> <sup>1</sup> loci	
15	ioci B, ioci b	ioci * T C c
24, 3	exercitatio * T B b	excitatio C c
25, 2	ministris B b	ministeriis * T C c
4	ut † T B b	et C c
6	exequuntur * T B b	exequantur C c
9-14	liberti . . . . argumentum <i>misplaced</i> B b	<i>in proper place</i> * T C c
26, 3	in uices B, inuicem b, inuices <sup>m</sup> * T	uices C, uices c
27, 1	obseruat B, obseruant b	obseruatur * T C c
28, 2	autor B b	auctorum ‡ T C c
13	commigrauerint * T B b	comigrauerunt C c
14	qui B, q b	quia * T C c

29, 3	populus B b	populis † T C c
30, 1	ulera B b	ultra * T C c
5	ac B b	atque * T C c
19	propior * T B b	propiora C c
31, 15	uultu* T B b	cultu C c
33, 11	nihil* T B b	nil C c
34, 1	Angriuarios* T B, angrinarios b	anguarios C, anguarios c <sup>i</sup>
2	Thasuarii* T B, tasuarii b	occasuarii C, Chasudrii c
3	Frisii* T B b	frisi c, frisci C
10	magnu; B, magnificum <i>in litura</i> ( <i>magn marg.</i> ) β, magnum† T	magnificum C c
35, 5	obtenditur* T B, optenditur b	obtendere C c
6	nam B b	tam* T C c
9	maluit B, malit <i>corr. from</i> malint b	malit* T C c
13	assequuntur* T B b	assequantur C c
36, 8	fusi B b	fosi* T C c
37, 1	situm* T B b	sinum C c
8	et† T B b	ac C c
8	Sapirio† T B, S <sup>p</sup> apirio b	papirio C c
38, 12	in solo B, in ipso (solo <i>written above</i> β) b	in ipso solo* T C c
12	religatur* T B b	ligant C c
40, 3	ac* T B b	& C c
3	Veusdigni B, Veusdigni (R <i>written</i> <i>above V β</i> ) b	Rendigni* T c, Reudigi C
7	Neithum B, neithum (r <i>above i β</i> ) b	nerthum C c, Nertum* T
9	populis* T B b	propriis C c
41, 7	passim* T B b	passim et C c
42, 4	parata B b	parta* T C c
7	mansere† T B b	manserunt C c
43, 1	Buri* T B b	Burii C c
2	Quadorumque* T B b	<sup>o</sup> q <sup>o</sup> dorumque C c
7	gotini† T B b	Cotini C c
18	memorat B b	memorant* T C c
44, 1	ipse† T B, ipsae b	ipso C c
1	oceanum B b, occeanum† T	occeano C c
4	frontem* T B b	fronte C c
8	non* T B b	nec C c
45, 2	cludique* T B b	claudique C c
4	ortum B b	ortus† T C c

45, 5	formasque* T B b	formas C c
9	abluuntur* T B b	adluuntur C, alluuntur c
19	gignat* T B b	gignit C c
28	sudant B b	sudantur* T C c
36	gens B b	gentes* T C c
37	differunt* B b, differ̄ T	differuntur C c
46, 11	figunt B b	figunt† T C c
25	difficilem B b	difficillimam C c, difficilimam* T
28	corpora B b	et corpora† T C c

## SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE

2, 25	etiam B b	& C, om. T c
3, 9	obiectis T B b	abiectis c, dictis C
30, 6	artus B b, arctus T	arcus C c
33, 10	urgentibus iam, T B b	in urgentibus C c
35, 6	sinuetur B b, sinuetur (sinatur marg.) T	sinatur C c
37, 19	Marcoquoque or Marcoque B, Mar- coquoque b, Marcoque T	miquoque C, M c
39, 4	omnes b, omnes. B, om̄s (nom̄s i num̄s marg.) T	omnis C c
14	corpore B, corpore b, corpore (tem- pore marg.) T	corpore C c
43, 15	naharualos T B b	nacharualos C c

Of the 100 cases given in the first table

T agrees with Bb and gives the correct reading in 47.  
T agrees with Cc and gives the correct reading in 33.  
T agrees with Bb and gives an incorrect reading in 11.  
T agrees with Cc and gives an incorrect reading in 9.

The true state of affairs and the significance of these figures will be more apparent after an analysis of the instances in which T B b and T C c are respectively in error. The text upon which the above calculation is based is that of Mullenhoff, because Mullenhoff's edition of the *Germania* is the only one which contains a satisfactory critical apparatus. During the thirty years, however, which have elapsed since its appearance, the reconstruction of the text has made considerable progress, and the present state of the investigation is perhaps well represented by Schwyzer's revision (1902) of the Schweizer-Sidler text. Let us compare the readings of his text with the eleven cases where T B b are in error, and the nine where T C c are in error, when tested by Mullenhoff's text.

TBb		Schwyzzer
5, 21	affectatione	affectione
11, 13	tamen B b, tamen (tantum marg.) T	tum
22, 1	enim	e
25, 4	ut	et
34, 10	magnum T, magnu; B, magnificum in litura and magn marg. β	magnificum
37, 8	et	et
	8 Sapirio T B, Sapyrio b	Papirio
42, 7	mansere T B b	manserunt
43, 7	Gotini	Cotini
44, 1	ipse T B, ipsae b	ipso
	1 oceanum T, oceanum B b	oceano
TCc		Schwyzzer
4, 10	assueuerunt	adsueuerunt
10, 22	explorant	explorant
14, 13	tueare	tueare
20, 3	ac	aut
28, 2	auctorum	auctorum
29, 3	populis	populus
45, 4	ortus	ortus
46, 11	figunt	figunt
	28 et corpora	corpora

In only one (37, 8) of the cases of the first group is the reading of T B b adopted, while five readings of T C c are admitted into the text.<sup>42</sup> In other words, at three points only, (viz., 20, 3; 29, 3; and 46, 28) do the MSS. T C c, as over against B b, fail to preserve the reading of Hersfeldensis, and at least two of these cases may readily be accepted as independent errors of the copyists of T and C c.

Let us pass to an examination of the supplementary table on p. 28. At 3, 9 T is correct and in agreement with B b; c has misread the first letter, and C has made a more serious blunder. At 30, 6 perhaps the archetype of all five MSS. had artus. B b neglected the variant, C c accepted c as a correction, and T thought the letter above had been omitted.<sup>43</sup> At 2, 25 B b read etiam, C &, while T and c have neither

<sup>42</sup> Mollenhoff himself in later years expressed a preference for three of the T C c readings, viz., assueuerunt (4, 10), explorant (10, 22), and ortus (45, 4) (cf. *Deutsche Altertums-kunde*, Vol. IV, pp. 147, 232, 505.) He also maintained with probability (*ibid.*, p. 81) that "an den beiden letzten Stellen (i. e., 28, 2 and 46, 11) stand in A" (i. e. Hersfeldensis) ohne Zweifel auctoꝝ und figunt und in B war durch einen glücklichen Lesefehler zufällig das richtige getroffen." At both places, therefore, figunt and auctorum of T C c represent a purer tradition than figunt and auctor. At 14, 13 he reasoned back (pp. 82, 267) to a form tueaſ, which would naturally represent tueare (cf. laboſ=labore and araſ=arare above.)

At all six of the points under discussion Mollenhoff's later conclusions are represented by Schwyzzer's readings. Of the T B b readings he favored et 37, 8; mansere, 42, 7; and ipse, 44, 1 (cf. *D. A.*, pp. 447, 480, 499).

<sup>43</sup> Of course the reading in the archetype may have been arcus or arcus. The tendency of C c to accept all letters and words written above the line as corrections, however, makes the form assumed in the text more probable. The genesis of the form in T would be essentially the same in any one of the supposed cases.



word. Perhaps the archetype had  $\bar{\&}$ , and in writing it C omitted the stroke above the symbol, while T and c, independently of one another, overlooked the symbol itself. At 33, 10 and 43, 15 T is in agreement with B b, and at 37, 19 that is essentially true, although all five MSS. are wrong at these three points. At 35, 6 T has the same reading as B b, but offers as a variant the reading found in C c. This may very well indicate, as I have attempted to show elsewhere, that the archetype of all five MSS. had at this point double readings, of which B b chose one, and C c the other. T offers the same reading in the text as all four of the other MSS. at 39, 4 and 39, 14, but, with B, as elsewhere, it has retained the variants of the archetype (*cf.* p. 36). This fact does not, of course, show that T is more closely related to B or to B b than it is to C c, but only that, like B, it reproduces the archetype in this respect more faithfully than the C class does. Of the readings cited in the supplementary table those at 2, 25; 3, 9; 30, 6; 35, 6; 39, 4, and 39, 14 may properly be left out of account for the reasons just given. The common errors of T B b at "33, 10; 37, 19, and 43, 15 are significant of the fact that T is more closely related to the B class than to the C class, but all five of the MSS. are wrong at these three points, and, since at present we are considering only those points of difference between the B and C classes where the one or the other has the true reading, these three passages must be left out of consideration in this connection. This disposes of all the readings cited in the supplementary table, and our revised statistics for the passages in which B b and C c differ are as follows:

T agrees with B b and gives the correct reading in 48 cases<sup>44</sup>  
 T agrees with C c and gives the correct reading in 39 cases  
 T agrees with B b and gives an incorrect reading in 10 cases  
 T agrees with C c and gives an incorrect reading in 3 cases

The meaning which these statistics have for the relation of T to B b and C c is perfectly clear. That T is not a simple copy of any member of the B b family, extant or now lost, is evident from the fact that in forty-two of the one hundred cases where B b and C c differ it goes with C c. It cannot be copied from any member of the C c family because in fifty-eight of the one hundred cases of disagreement between B b and C c it shows a different reading from C c. It cannot be a copy of a B b MS. with corrections from a C c MS. for this reason: In one hundred cases B b and C c differ. In forty-nine of these B b is in error, and yet in thirty-nine of these instances the reading in T is correct, agreeing with C c. It is inconceivable that a copyist, or a scholar of the fifteenth century, should have been able to choose correctly between two different readings in 80 per cent. of the cases before him. The case is still stronger against the hypothesis that T is a copy of a C c MS. corrected from B b. That theory would involve the supposition that the copyist made the right choice in 94 per cent. of the cases involved, because it would make it necessary for us to believe

<sup>44</sup> The errors at two, perhaps at three, of these points go back probably to *Hersfeldensis*, *cf.* MÜLLENHOFF, *D. A.*, pp. 62, 425, 448, and TAGMANN, p. 35.

<sup>45</sup> If we accept Mullenhoff's later conclusions, the figures for T B b would be 50 and 8 respectively.

that he had selected the correct reading in forty-eight out of fifty-one instances. Either of these suppositions is of course inconceivable. For similar reasons it is impossible to suppose that T is a copy of a MS. compounded of B b and C c.

The evidence which is available to disprove the theory that T is a copy of any one of the four extant MSS. of the B class or the C class, viz., B, b, C, or c, is still fuller. When compared with B, for instance, T shows the correct reading, not only at the thirty-nine points where both B and b are in error, but also in other passages (e.g. 9, 4 ; 21, 14 ; 33, 3 ; 39, 6, and 45, 22) where T and b are correct, while B gives a poor reading. Over against b, T gives a true reading, not only at the thirty-nine points just mentioned, but also in a large number of cases where B is correct, and b in error (e.g. 7, 11 ; 7, 16 ; 15, 6, and 28, 8). Similar facts could easily be given to show that T is independent of C or c. From the negative point of view the evidence is still stronger in support of the view that T cannot be a copy of any one of the four MSS. mentioned. Taking these MSS. one by one, and leaving mere variations in spelling out of account, T shows only two of the errors peculiar to B (viz., at 38, 4 and 39, 4), two peculiar to b (viz., at 6, 12 and 43, 31),<sup>46</sup> one peculiar to C (viz., at 5, 12) and two peculiar to c (viz., at 41, 2 and 2, 25). The last one has already been discussed (cf. p. 29). At 6, 12 *varietate* was probably a variant reading in *Hersfeldensis* (cf. MÜLL., *D. A.*, p. 65), which T b have received into the text, rejecting the other reading *variare*. At 43, 31 it is very probable that *Lemonii*, and not *Lemovii*, is the correct reading (cf. *ibid.*, p. 494). The errors peculiar to B which T shows, viz.,  $\bar{q}$  for  $\bar{q}$   $\bar{q}$  (38, 4) and *eiusdemq* for *eiusdem* (34, 9), like *aut* for *haud* (5, 12) which is found only in T and C,<sup>47</sup> are of frequent occurrence in all MSS., and do not in any way weaken the argument.

Another set of facts may be mentioned in this connection which not only seem to show that T is independent of B b C and c, but even suggest that in some cases it is closer to the *Hersfeld* MS. than is any one of the others. In fact, in some of the instances to be cited, T seems to show us how to account for the different readings in B b and C c, and helps to explain the errors in individual MSS. of these two classes. The cases in point are 19, 9, *inuenit* T, *inuenerit* B b, *inuenit* C c ; 28, 1, *auctoꝝ* T, *auctorū* C c, *autor* B b ; 30, 12 *rōe* T C, *romane* B b, *ratione* c ; 34, 1, *Dulgicubuni* (*dulgibnii marg.*) T, *dulgitubini* b, *Dulgibini* (*dulgitubini above*) B, *dulgibini* C c (cf. Müll., *D. A.*, p. 80) ; 39, 4, *om̃s* (*nom̃is, num̃is marg.*) T, *omnes* b, *omnes* (*nõis, num̃inis above*) B, *omnis* C c. The *Hersfeld* MS. probably had *invenit*, *auctoꝝ*, *rōe*, and *om̃s*, which T has faithfully preserved. In a similar way the copyist of T at 30, 9 gives in the text *occionēs*, but writes the word in full on the margin.

The fact may have been noted that the corrector of b ( $\beta$ ) has introduced at certain points the readings of C c, and it may be suspected that T is a copy of b made after these corrections were inserted, but a comparison of the readings of  $\beta$  with those

<sup>46</sup> Mention should be made of 24, 6 and 45, 22, where T and b of all the MSS. seem to have preserved true readings. It is hardly probable that they are conjectures.

<sup>47</sup> 2, 12 is not cited here because the readings of T and C seem to show merely a difference in spelling.

of T shows that this view is untenable. In the last ten chapters of the *Germania*, for instance, the following readings disprove this theory: 39, 1, Semones, (Semnones *marg.*) T, Senones  $\beta$ ; 39, 4, sacrum T, sacram  $\beta$ ; 43, 12, Legiorum T, ligiorum  $\beta$ ; 44, 1, oceanum T, oceano  $\beta$ ; 45, 36, Sitonum T, sithonum b; 46, 6, mixtos T, mistis  $\beta$ ; 46, 26, sunt T, *om.* b  $\beta$ .<sup>48</sup> T must, therefore, be regarded as entirely independent of B, b, C, and c.<sup>49</sup>

The figures given on p. 30 show, however, that it is more closely related to B b than to C c. It agrees with B b in fifty-eight of the cases under consideration, with C c in forty-two only. It shows the same error as B b in ten instances, while it follows C c into error in three cases only, and all three may be considered independent errors of the copyist of T and C c.

As for the relation that T bears to the two MSS. which make up the B class, it may be noted that it has two errors in common with b, but they probably come from variant readings in Enoch's MS. (*cf.* p. 31), while the errors peculiar to T B at 38, 4 and 39, 4 (*cf.* p. 31) scarcely warrant us in assuming any closer relation between these two MSS. than exists between T and b. At many points, however, (*e. g.*, 2, 9; 7, 16; 8, 10; 12, 7) T and B preserve the true reading, or are nearer the archetype than b is. This state of things would seem to indicate that T, or its archetype, bears the same relation to B that it does to the MS. of which b is a copy, *i. e.*, *Pontanus*.<sup>50</sup>

An interesting point of similarity, however, between T and B is brought out by comparing the variant readings in the two MSS. They are given in the following table:

<sup>48</sup> The orthography of a fifteenth-century MS. cannot be safely used in determining its relation to other MSS. of the same period, but for the sake of completeness it may be interesting to know the forms in T at the points where the spelling in B b and C c differ. There are thirty-nine such cases. They are the following: 1, 9, danubius B b, Dannubius† T, danuuius c, Dañuuius C; 1, 10, pluris\* T B b, plures C c; 2, 14, tris\* T B b, tres C c; 2, 17, pluris\* T B b, plures C c; 5, 2, feda† T B b, foeda C c; 5, 5, fecunda\* T B b, foecunda C c; 5, 15, commerciorum B b, commertiorum C c, comertiorum† T; 5, 21, sequuntur\* T B b, secuntur C c; 9, 10, consecrant\* T B b, consecrant C c; 11, 13, coerendi\* T B b, cohercendi C c; 14, 8, otio† T B b, otio C c; 15, 2, otium† T B b, otium C c; 16, 5, aedificiis\* T B b, hediñitiis C, aedifiñitiis c; 16, 12, supterraneos B b, sb\*†aneos C, subterraneos† T c; 16, 13, onerant\* T B b, honerant C c; 17, 7, commercia B b, commertia C c, comertia† T; 18, 8, delicias\* T B b, delitiis C c; 20, 5, deliciis B b, delitiis† T C c; 20, 20, precia B b, praetia C c, pretia\* T; 22, 5, negocia B b, negotia\* T C c; 23, 5, officia B b, offitia† T C c; 25, 7, coercere\* T B b, cohercere C c; 26, 8, separent B b, separent\* T C c; 28, 19, separentur B b, separentur\* T C c; 31, 7, precia B b, praetia C c, pretia\* T; 33, 1, Tencteros\* T B b, thencteros C, thencteros c; 34, 8, tetauimus B b, tentauimus T C c; 34, 13, sanctiusque\* T B b, santiusque C c; 37, 21, trisque\* T B b, tresque C c; 37, 25, otium B b, otium\* T C c; 38, 3, optinent B b, obtinet† T C, obtinent c; 38, 11, caniclem B b, canitiem\* T C c; 41, 10, inclytum B b, inclitum\* T C c; 43, 1, marco-

manorum\* T B b, Marchomanorum C c; 45, 8, litore\* T B b, littore C c; 45, 13, hostis\* T B b, hostes C c; 45, 23, pretiumque B b, pretiumque\* T C c; 45, 27, fecundiora\* T B b, foecundiora c, foecundiora C c; 46, 7, fedantur B b, foedantur\* T C c. Taking the orthography of Mullenhoff's edition as a standard, in eighteen cases T is correct with B b, in ten with C c; in four instances it is in error with B b, and in six with C c. Tentavimus in 34, 8 is left out of account. In so far as tendencies in spelling are concerned, T shows a preference for plural forms in -is (*e. g.*, tris, pluris), and the omission of the aspirate (*e. g.* coercere, Tencteros). Both of these points are characteristic of B b. In the forms of separent (separent, etc.), and in the choice of b rather than p in such words as obtinet and subterraneos it goes with C c. It inclines to C c also in showing a slight preference for t over c in such words as otium and pretium, and in the use of single consonants, but its practice in this respect is not uniform.

<sup>49</sup> Mullenhoff has stated his belief (*D. A.*, pp. 80 f.) in the independence of the class of MSS. to which it will be later shown that T belongs, but his discussion is very brief, and does not seem to me convincing. For these reasons the subject has been considered somewhat fully in this chapter, and along different lines from those followed by him.

<sup>50</sup> This relation is indicated in the stemma on p. 41.

TABLE OF VARIANTS<sup>51</sup>

Ed. Muell.	T	B	b
1, 10 Abnobae	Arnobe Arbone, Arnone	Arnobe Arbonae	
2, 12 Tuistonem	Tuisconem	Tristonē Tuisman	
4, 5 quamquam	quamquam	quamquam tanquam	
6 Caerulei	cerulei	ceruli cerulei	
10 assuerunt <sup>52</sup>	assueuerunt	assuerunt assuerint	
5, 12 perinde	perinde	perinde proinde	
6, 14 coniuncto	coniuncto	coniuncto cuncto	cuncto b coniuncto β
19 delectos	delectos	delectos dilectos	
8, 11 Albrunam	Auriniam Albrunam or Al- briniam	Auriniam Albriniam	Auriniam Albriniam
11, 13 tum	tamen tantum	tamen	
12, 5 crate	crate	crate grate	
16, 4 locant	locant longant	longant locant	longant (?) b locant β
20, 19 gratiosior	gratiosior gratior	gratiosior gratior	
22, 15 ioci	ioci	ioci loci	ioci loci
26, 6 praebent	praestant praebent	prestant prebent	
7 labore	laborare labore	labore laborare	laborare labore

<sup>51</sup> All the passages are given in which T, B, or b has any variant reading. At these points C has no variants, cōiuncto and c one only, viz., 6, 14, cuncto. Opposite the reading of Mollenhoff's edition, in the proper column, is given the reading in the body of the text, and immediately below it

the variant. Thus at 2, 12 B has Tristonē in the body of the text and Tuisman as a variant. The reading of T is given in all cases, even when T has no variant.

<sup>52</sup> At 4, 10 Schwyzer reads adsueuerunt; Mollenhoff also in D. A.

28, 9	Boihaemi	Boihemi	Boihemi Boijemionē	
29, 8	collationibus	collationibus collocationibus	collocationibus	
31, 1	raro	raro	rara	
	7 nascendi	rara nascendi	raro noscendi	
34, 1	Dulgubnii	noscendi Dulgicubuni	nascendi Dulgibini	
	8 illa	Dulgibnii illa	Dulgitubini illa	
	11 consensimus	illis consensimus	consensimus	
		consueuimus		
35, 6	sinuetur	sinuetur	sinuetur	
		sinatur		
36, 2	ac	et	ac	
		ac		
	9 adversarum	aduersarum	aduersarum	aduersarum
		adusariis	aduersariis	aduersariis
87, 4	ambitu	ambitum	ambitum	
		ambitu	ambitu	
	19 Gnaeoque	Marcoque	Marcoquoque Marcoque	
	28 inde	inde	inde	
		nam	nam	
88, 6	sic	sicut	sic	
		sic		
	12 ipso solo	ipso solo (see col- lation)	solo ipso	
	16 ornantur <sup>88</sup>	armantur	armantur	ornantur
		ornantur	ornantur.	armantur
39, 1	Semnonēs	Semones	Semones	Señones
		Semnonēs	Señones	
	3 stato	statuto	stato	
		stato		
	4 omnes	om̃s, nominis, numinis	omnes nōis, numinis	
13	Semnonum	Semonum	Semonum	Señonum <sup>m</sup>
		Semnonum	Sennonum	

<sup>88</sup> At 38, 16 Schwyzer reads armantur Müllenhoff also in D. A.

39, 14 corpore	corpore tempore	corpore tempore	corpore torpore
40, 5 Suardones	Suarines Suardones	Suarines	Suarines b Suardones $\beta$
41, 2 propior	propior	propior proprior	
43, 12 Lygiorum	Legiorum	Legiorum Lygiorum	
14 Helvaeonas	Helnetonas Halosionas	Helnetonas Helueconas	
14 Helisios	Helisios	Helysios <sup>F</sup> Halisienas	
15 Nahanarvalos	Nahanarulos Naharualos	Nahanarualos Naharualos	
15 religionis	religionis regionis	religionis	
31 protinus	protinus	protenus protinus	
45, 5 equorum	deorum eorum	deorum	
8 Suebici	Seuici Sueuici	Saenici Sueuici	
19 quaeve	que ue que $\tilde{u}e$	que ue	
46, 1 Suebiae	Sueuig	Sueuig Sueuig	
1 Peucinorum	Peucinorum Peucurorum	Peucinorum Peucurorum	
27 Oxionas <sup>44</sup>	Oxionas Etionas	Oxionas Etionas	

This table brings out the fact that in one noteworthy respect T resembles B more than it does any other MS. of the *Germania*. As has been noted, there are no variant readings in C at the points under discussion, and c has one only. Eight are found in b, while B and T have thirty-nine and thirty-four respectively. An analysis of these cases shows that at ten points the reading in the body of the text and the variant are identical in B and T, that at six more (viz., 1, 10; 8, 11; 39, 1; 39, 13; 43, 15, and 45, 8) they are very similar, and that in four more instances, not counting 34, 1, the reading in B is the variant in T and *vice versa*. At twenty points, therefore, B and

<sup>44</sup> In D. A. Mollenhoff expresses a preference for Etionas.

T show the same double readings, and at certain points (*e. g.*, 31, 7 and 37, 4) double readings seem to be reported from no other MSS. than T and B.

In this connection we are principally concerned with the double readings common to T and B, but it will be convenient to discuss here a few of those found in T, which do not appear in B. At 11, 13 perhaps the archetype had *tñ*, which would naturally be expanded into either *tamen* or *tantum*, or if misread *tū*, into *tum*, from which the further error *cū*=*cum* is an easy one to make. On 34, 1 *cf.* Müll., *D. A.*, p. 62. The readings *illis* and *sicut* at 34, 8 and 38, 6 are reported nowhere else. The second readings *sinatur*, 35, 6, and *regionis*, 43, 15, both of which stand in the text of Cc, were perhaps in the Hersfeld MS., and omitted by B, and possibly, as Mullenhoff thinks (*D. A.*, p. 85), *Suardones*, 40, 5 was added by Enoch to his MS. after B, or the MS. from which B is derived had been copied.<sup>54</sup>

We have just considered some of the instances from the list printed above, where B gives one reading only. It may be interesting to analyze briefly the other cases, *i. e.*, the cases where B gives a double reading. The facts from this point of view are presented in the following conspectus:

T has double readings; B and T, correct one in text	-	-	-	-	8
T has double readings; B and T, incorrect one in text	-	-	-	-	7
T has double readings; T correct in text, B incorrect	-	-	-	-	3
T has double readings; T incorrect in text, B correct	-	-	-	-	1
T has double readings; all four readings incorrect	-	-	-	-	2
T has one reading, correct; B, correct one in text	-	-	-	-	11
T has one reading, correct; B, incorrect one in text	-	-	-	-	3
T has one reading, incorrect; B, correct one in text	-	-	-	-	0
T has one reading, incorrect; B, incorrect one in text	-	-	-	-	1
Total <sup>55</sup>	-	-	-	-	36

The faithfulness with which B has recorded variant readings is one of the strongest proofs which we have of the conscientiousness with which that MS. was copied. Its accuracy in this respect leads us to trust it in other particulars. In a similar way the preservation of a large number of variants in T, some of which are impossible readings, like *tempore* at 39, 14, speaks for the fidelity of the copyist of T. He does not deserve the same measure of confidence as the copyist of B, however, for two reasons. In the first place, at four points where he has preserved variants, he has interchanged the variant and the reading in the text. At least this is the case if we accept the authority of B at these points. In the second place, in sixteen places he has omitted variants which B has preserved. This omission is only partially offset by his possible retention of three variants which the copyist of B overlooked, or did not find in the archetype when he made his copy.

<sup>54</sup>That *Suardones* stood as a second reading in the archetype was surmised by Waitz as early as 1874; *cf.* *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, Vol. I, p. 516, n. 1. The double readings in T at 1, 10; 29, 8; 34, 11; 36, 2; 39, 3; 39, 1; 39, 13; 43, 14; and 45, 19 are not discussed here. A reason-

able explanation can be offered for many of them, but in the present state of our knowledge of the MSS. it would be hazardous to express a positive opinion about them.

<sup>55</sup>The peculiar cases at 34, 1; 37, 19, and 38, 12 have been left out of account.

The resemblance which exists between T and B in the matter of variant readings does not indicate that T is more closely related to B than to b, but only shows that the common variants were in the archetype of T and B, and that both MSS. have preserved them with similar fidelity.

## III

## T AND THE E MANUSCRIPTS

In the last chapter we reached the negative conclusion that T is independent of B b C c, i. e., of the B and C classes of manuscripts. In this one we shall try to show that it is a member of the E class, a conclusion to which reference has already been made by way of anticipation (p. 22). Tagmann first recognized the connection between Massmann's K (or L), Vat. 2964 (Massmann's Rd), the Nuremberg editions, and the Roman edition of 1474,<sup>57</sup> and Müllenhoff established more definitely (*D. A.*, pp. 78 ff.) their relation to the other MSS. of the *Germania*. Müllenhoff secured a new collation of Rd, and himself examined R<sup>1</sup>. For L and N he took the readings of Massmann. His conclusion after comparing the four texts is as follows: "Es unterliegt . . . keinem bedenken nicht nur die Nürnberger drucke (e') mit dem in anfang und am ende unvollständigen Longolianus unter ein zeichen, sondern damit auch den römischen druck (e') und den Vaticanus selbst (η) als eine hs. E zusammenzufassen, da wesentliche differenzen unter den drei oder vier zeugen allein eintreten, wo die gemeinsame quelle doppeltesarten hatte, bei denen die abschreiber oder herausgeber sich bald so bald so entschieden, die ohnehin geringen und nicht zahlreichen besonderheiten jeder hs. oder jedes druckes aber bei jenem verfahren ohne schaden verschwinden." (*D. A.*, p. 79.) A comparison of T with any one of the E MSS. will decide, therefore, whether it belongs to that class or not. The comparison can be made most satisfactorily with the Nuremberg editions (e'), because, since Müllenhoff wrote the sentence quoted above, a complete and accurate collation of them has been made by Roediger (*cf. D. A.*, pp. 691 ff.).<sup>58</sup> The first thirteen chapters will be enough for our purpose.

I, 1 rhaetiisq T, rhaetys que e' I, II, rhaetis quae III 2 Dañubio T e' 6 rheticaꝝ T e' 9 Dannubius T, Danubius e' 10 Arnobe (at arbone at none *marg.*) T, arnobae e'.

II, 12 Tuisconē T e' I, II, Tuistonem e' III 14 conditorisq T e' 16 hermiones T e' 17 pluēsq T, plures q e' 25 etiam om. T e'.

III, 4 Barditum (Baritū *marg.*) T, barditum e' I, II (d *stricken out III*) 7 voces T e' uidentur T e' 10 Ulixem T e' 14 ACKITVPION T, Acriniprion (ακκινυπριον III) e' 16 monumentaq T e'.

IV, 2 cōnubiis T, connubys e' 10 assueverunt T, assueverint e'.

V, 15 comertioꝝ T e' 20 quoque om. T e' 21 affectatione T, affectacione e'.

VI, 5 cominus T e' 10 distingunt T e' 12 uarietate T e' (r *over te III*) 17 preliantur T e'.

<sup>57</sup>TAGMANN, *De Taciti Germaniae Apparatu Critico*, pp. 60 f.

<sup>58</sup>There are three early Nuremberg editions, but after the first few pages they give exactly the same text.



VII, 6 neque Te<sup>1</sup> 11 fortuna *corr. to* fortuita T, fortuita e<sup>1</sup> II, III, fortuna e<sup>1</sup> I 16 aut Te<sup>1</sup>.

VIII, 9 negligunt Te<sup>1</sup> 11 Auriniam (Albrunam *or* Albriniam [?] *marg.*) T, auri-  
niam e<sup>1</sup> 13 tanquam Te<sup>1</sup>.

IX, 3 Herculem & Martem Te<sup>1</sup> 8 assimilare Te<sup>1</sup>.

X, 5 fortuitu Te<sup>1</sup> 22 explorant Te<sup>1</sup>.

XI, 4 inciderit Te<sup>1</sup> 10 ne iniussi T, nec iniussi e<sup>1</sup> 11 cętuum T, coetium e<sup>1</sup> 13  
tamen (tantum *marg.*) T, tñ e<sup>1</sup>.

XII, 7 ascondi Te<sup>1</sup> 8 penaꝝ T, poenarum e<sup>1</sup> 14 adsunt Te<sup>1</sup>.

XIII, 1 private Te<sup>1</sup> 4 tum] tum T, cum e<sup>1</sup> pater] ipsi Te<sup>1</sup> 11 etiam] et & Te<sup>1</sup>  
16 semper & Te<sup>1</sup> 18 cuique *om.* Te<sup>1</sup>.

In the following list some of the readings characteristic of T are given; *i. e.*,  
readings not found in MSS. of the B or C classes:

X, 5 fortuitu Te<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η XI, 10 ne iniussi T, nec iniussi e<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η XI, 11 cętuum T,  
coetium e<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η XIII, 6 semper et Te<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η XIV, 9 adolescentum Te<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η XVI, 16 popu-  
latio Te<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η XVIII, 19 uiuentes Te<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η 19 parientes Te<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η XX, 7 in ex aucta T,  
in exauta e<sup>1</sup> (*s over ut e<sup>1</sup> II*) η XXV, 6 verberant Te<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup> XXVIII, 25 collati Te<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η  
XXXV, 13 iniuriam Te<sup>1</sup> XXXVII, 10 consulatum] conventum Te<sup>1</sup> XXXIX, 6 hor-  
rentia Te<sup>1</sup> XLII, 8 Trudi Te<sup>1</sup>η XLV, 19 que ve (vō *marg.*) T, quae vero e<sup>1</sup> XLVI,  
16 sola Te<sup>1</sup>η. That T is a member of the E class, so called, to which these four  
MSS. and early editions belong, is apparent without comment.

It would be hazardous in the present state of our knowledge<sup>59</sup> to attempt to find  
the exact relation which the several members of the E class bear to one another, but  
some general conclusions on this point may be stated with a great deal of confidence.  
We have already noted (p. 36) that the preservation in T of variant readings whose  
presence in Hersfeldensis is attested by B furnishes proof both of the fidelity of the  
copyist of T and of the excellence of the MS. which he followed. The same infer-  
ence has been drawn (p. 31) from the appearance in T of certain abbreviated forms,  
probably taken from the archetype, out of which errors have developed even in our  
best MSS. These *a priori* considerations are supported, so far as the comparative  
excellence of T and the other members of the E class is concerned, by the presence in  
T of certain words which have been overlooked by the copyists of the other E MSS.;  
*e. g.*, 10, 19, sed T, *om.* e<sup>1</sup>e<sup>1</sup>η and 16, 15 et T, *om.* e<sup>1</sup>, and by the preservation of the  
true reading in T where e<sup>1</sup> and the others have gone astray. Cases in point are 2, 21,  
primi T, pr. enī e<sup>1</sup>, primi enī e<sup>1</sup>, primum η; 15, 6, iidem T, iisdem e<sup>1</sup>; 18, 18, data T,  
parata e<sup>1</sup>, parata (aīr data parata *marg.*) η; 19, 5, abscisis] abscisis T η, adcisis e<sup>1</sup>,

<sup>59</sup> An accurate collation of e<sup>1</sup> has been given by Rödig-  
ger, as already noted. The readings of T are given in chap.  
II of this paper. Müllenhoff examined R<sup>1</sup> and η, but did  
not publish his collations. Some of the readings of R<sup>1</sup> and  
η are given by Massmann, but a comparison of Massmann's  
critical apparatus for B and b with the MSS. themselves  
has led me to distrust the readings which he reports for  
other MSS. Wütsch in *Hermes*, Vol. XXXII (1897), p. 43.

reports Müllenhoff as announcing after an examination of  
K (or L) that it was a direct copy of the Nuremberg edi-  
tion, and this statement agrees with the passage quoted  
above (p. 37) from the *Deutsche Altertumskunde* in regard  
to e<sup>1</sup>. Complete collations of R<sup>1</sup> and η are needed, there-  
fore, before the exact relations of the members of the E  
class to one another can be determined with certainty.

adscisis e<sup>1</sup>. Still more significant perhaps are the passages where the writing was not perfectly legible. In some of these places the original copyist of T has first made a mistake, and at once corrected it, whereas in the other E MSS. an error is left uncorrected, e. g., 19, 7, *finere corr. to finire* T', *finuere* e<sup>2</sup>, *funere* η; 30, 14, *impedite corr. to in pedite* T', *impedite* η. In two other cases T is in error, but is nearer the archetype than the other MSS. These are 20, 7, *inexhausta*] in *exaucta* T, *inexauta* η, in *ex auta* (s over ut in II) e<sup>2</sup>, and 37, 8, *Papirio*] *Sapirio* T, *Sapino* e<sup>2</sup>, *Sapiro* η.

In the matter of double readings T bears to the other E MSS. a relation very similar to that which B bears to b, C, and c. It may be remembered, for instance, that we find at 5, 12 <sup>1 pro</sup> *perinde* B, *perinde* b, *proinde* C c; at 26, 6, <sup>1 prebent</sup> *prestant* B, *p̄bēt* b, *praebent* c, *p̄stāt* C. In a similar way T has double readings at a great many points where each of the other E MSS. has selected one and omitted the other. Examples of this state of things are 20, 19, *gratiosior* (*gratior marg.*) T, *gratiosior* e<sup>2</sup>, *gratior* η; 31, 1, *raro* (*rara marg.*) T, *rara* e<sup>2</sup>, *raro* η; 31, 7, *nascendi* (*noscendi marg.*) T, *noscendi* e<sup>2</sup>, *nascendi* η; 34, 1, *Dulgicubuni* (*Dulgibnii marg.*) T, *Dulgibini* e<sup>2</sup>, *Dulgicubuni* η; 37, 28, *inde* (*nam marg.*) T, *inde* e<sup>2</sup>, *nam* η; and 39, 14, *corpore* (*tempore marg.*) T, *corpore* e<sup>2</sup>, *tempore* η.<sup>60</sup> It follows from all these facts that T is not a copy of any one of the E MSS., and also that it is one of the best representatives of them.

It could hardly be expected that many true readings would occur in T which are not to be found in either B b or C c. The following cases may, however, be mentioned: 19, 5, *abscisis*] *abscisis* T, *adcisis* B, *accisis* b c, *accissis* C; 20, 6, *separet*] *separet* T, *seperet* B c<sup>2</sup>, *sep* & C, *separet* c; 30, 1, *Hercynio*] *Hercynio* T, *Hircynio* B, *hercinio* C c, *hircynio* b; 37, 19, *Mallio*] *Mallio* T, *Mālio* B, *Manlio* b C, *Manīlio* c; 39, 1, *Semnonēs*] *Semones* (*Semnonēs marg.*) T, *Semones* († *Señones above*) B, *senones* b, *semones* C c, *Semnonēs above* c<sup>2</sup>; 40, 1, *Langobardos*] *Langobardos* T, *Largobardos* B, *logobardos* b, *longobardos* C c, *lōgobardos* (*Longobardi marg.*) β; 40, 5, *Suardones*] *Suarines* (*Suardones marg.*) T, *Suarines* B b C c (*dones above ines* β); 43, 14, *Helisios*] *Helisios* T, *Helysios* C c, *Helysios* († *halisienas above*) B, *elisios* b, and apparently *Albrunam*<sup>61</sup> at 8, 11, which is found in T only. One should mention in this connection 45, 22 also, where T b alone seem to have preserved the true reading, *profertur*. The real value of the E class lies in the fact, as Mūllenhoff has shown, that it casts the deciding vote when B b and C c are at variance, and thus furnishes a safe basis for the reconstruction of the text at a rather large number of points. In eighty-seven of the one hundred cases where B b and C c offer different readings (cf. p. 30) the agreement of E with the one or the other class may be accepted with safety

<sup>60</sup> Incidentally it is interesting to notice that the editor of e<sup>2</sup> consistently follows one practice in making a selection between the two readings, while the copyist of η adopts another method. In e<sup>2</sup> the reading which is found in the body of the text in B is selected and the variant is

omitted, while the copyist of η chooses the variant, perhaps in the belief that it is a correction or a preferable reading.

<sup>61</sup> It is possible that the reading in T is *Albriniam*, but it seemed to me clearly intended for *Albrunam*.

as the determining factor, and in a fair number of these instances a safe decision could not be made without the help of E. Such cases, for instance, are 2, 24; 4, 10; 10, 22; 42, 7; 45, 4; 45, 28.

## IV

## SUMMARY


THE main points developed in the foregoing discussion may be set down briefly here. Codex 49, 2 in the chapter library of the cathedral at Toledo contains the *Germania* and *Agricola* of Tacitus, an oration by Io. Antonius Campanus, a fragment of an oration, some of Pliny's *Letters*, and another oratorical fragment. The scribe was M. Angelus Crullus Tuders, who, at the end of the *Germania*, and again at the end of the oration of Antonius, speaks of himself as publicus scriba Fulgini. The subscription to the *Germania* bears the date of June 1, 1474; that to the oration of Antonius, December 5 of the same year; while the *Agricola*, which stands between these two works, was in all probability written in the half-year intervening between these two dates.

The MS. of the *Germania* has variants, thirty-nine in number, written on the margin in the hand and ink of the original copyist. There are three different classes of corrections, which are usually inserted above the line. Those of the first class, T<sup>1</sup>, are made by the original copyist, and correct errors committed by him in following the copy before him. The corrections of T<sup>a</sup> are taken from another MS., perhaps from Vindobonensis I, and are to be rejected, except in certain specified cases, where it is clear that the correction serves to restore the reading of the archetype of T. The scribe whom we have called T<sup>2</sup> also inserted the titles and paragraph marks, and his corrections, which are unimportant, come apparently from the archetype of T.

The MS. T shows the errors common to the four authoritative MSS., B (Vat. 1862), b (Leidensis), C (Vat. 1518), and c (Neapolitanus), and therefore evidently goes back, as these MSS. do, to the codex which Enoch of Ascoli brought into Italy from Germany in the fifteenth century. It is, however, independent of any one of the four MSS. mentioned above. This conclusion rests upon a number of facts. T cannot be a simple copy of any one of these MSS., because it is correct at many points where each of the others shows a false reading, or has omitted a word. The theory that it may have been a copy of one of the B or C MSS., extant or now lost, is likewise untenable. At one hundred points or more the readings in B b and C c differ, B b showing the true reading at one point, C c at another. At these points T agrees first with one group, then with the other, giving a correct text in eighty-seven of the instances mentioned. An analysis of these cases shows that, if we regard T as a copy of a B b MS., with corrections from a C c MS., we must assume that the copyist rejected the incorrect readings of B b and selected the true ones in 80 per cent. of the cases involved. If we regard T as a copy of a C c MS., with corrections from B b, the percentage rises to 94. Neither supposition seems credible. Furthermore, in cer-

tain cases T alone of the five MSS. under discussion preserves the reading of the archetype. Finally, at a number of points, T seems to be nearer the archetype than the others, and to give us the forms out of which errors or divergent readings in the others have developed. The independence of T becomes still more apparent if it be compared with an individual (extant) MS. of the B or C classes, because to the cases where it is correct with B b, while C c is wrong, must be added those where B or b or C or c is in error, while T gives the true reading.

It is more closely related to the B class than to the C class. At points where the one is correct and the other incorrect, T, if in error, is in error in almost every case with the B MSS. Equally significant are the three cases where the two groups differ, and both are wrong. In all these cases T follows B b. The retention of variant readings in T shows the fidelity of the copyist, and establishes a resemblance between that MS. and B, but does not prove that T is more closely related to B than it is to any one of the others.



T belongs to the E class, the independent members of which are Vat. 2964 (Massmann's Rd), the Nuremberg editions, and the Roman edition of 1474. This fact is apparent from the common errors of these four manuscripts and editions. It is independent of the other members of its class. The variants show this to be the case; as well as the true readings in T at points where all the others are in error. It is perhaps most conclusively shown at the points where the writing in the archetype of the E MSS. was not perfectly legible. At several of these points the copyist of T first made a mistake and then corrected it, whereas in the other E manuscripts and editions the error is left uncorrected. The copyist of T has also retained the double readings, which, in most cases, do not appear in the others. In this respect it bears the same relation to the other members of the E class that B does to b C c. T is therefore independent of the other members of the E group, and is apparently the best representative of that class.

The value of T lies partly in the true readings which it has preserved at points where B b C and c are all in error — although no one of these is new — but mainly in

the fact that the testimony of the E class settles the reading at the points where Bb and Cc are at variance, and thus places textual criticism at these points on a more secure basis. The exact relation of the E MSS. to one another cannot yet be determined, since a full collation of one of them is still lacking. Furthermore, it is not certain whether B is a direct copy of Enoch's MS. or not. Making a reservation covering this point, and merely for the sake of illustrating one of the forms which the relation of the E MSS. to one another may take, we may draw alternative stemmata (see the preceding page), the difference between the two being that in one it is assumed that a MS. intervened between B and Enoch's MS. (Hersfeldensis?), while in the other B is regarded as the direct descendant of Enoch's MS., in which case E, the archetype of the E MSS., becomes also a direct descendant of Enoch's MS.<sup>62</sup>

## APPENDIX I

### CORRECTIONS TO MÜLLENHOFF'S CRITICAL APPARATUS TO THE GERMANIA

The following corrections in Müllenhoff's critical apparatus, or additions to it, should be made:

I, 6 <sup>h</sup>Renus C; II, 2 ad<sup>v</sup>ētibus C, 11 cēlebrat C; V, 1 specie] spē C; 9 negaverint] nauigauerīt B, 18 simpliti<sup>h</sup>us C, 21 secūt<sup>v</sup> C; VI, 14 urbe (?) *corr. in orbe* B; IX 8 speciem] spēm C, 8 erroris, *corr. in oris* C; X, 9 c<sup>v</sup>hibueāt (= prohibuerant *sive* prohibuerat] C; XI, 8 si cōstituit C, 14 princeps C; XII, 13 ex plebe] & ex plebe (& *deleto*) C; XIII, 1 nichil B, 12 ei<sup>o</sup> eius C, 15 haec] hec B, 15 hae] he B; XIV, 2 cōmittatui C, 15 incēti C; XV, 12 nō mō|a|singlis C; XVI, 9 speciem] spēm C, 17 ignorā<sup>g</sup> (= ignorantur) C; XVII, 8 foeras *corr. in feras* C, 11 femine B; XVIII, 5 ambion<sup>h</sup> C, 15 admouetur C; XIX, 8 pudicie B; XXI, 10 imodo *corr. in modo* C; XXVI, 2 agro C, 11 species] spēs BC; XXVIII, 7 rehūmque, 21 quidem] q<sup>u</sup> C, 25 conlocati B; XXX, 14 quē C, 15 honorāt C; XXXI, 11 cede B; XXXIII, 2 Anguiuaros *corr. in Anguiuarios* C; XXXIV, 4 friscis *corr. in frisis* C; XXXV, 7 pplis C; XXXVI, 3 iocundius B, 4 ī potentis B, 4 falsi C; XXXVII, 1 sinum] sitū B, 10 consulatū] con<sup>u</sup> B, 13 gali<sup>u</sup> ue C, 16 cedem B, XXXVIII, 4 q̄. q̄. C; XL, 15 su<sup>u</sup>mut B, 18 conuers<sup>u</sup>ione C; XLII, 1 h<sup>u</sup>mum duos C; XLIII, 10 dirimit C; XLIV, 3 apulsui *corr. in appulsui a m. rec.* C, 13 sceuiunt *corr. in lasciuunt* C; XLV, 15 fhertia C, 24 oletē C; XLVI, 2 fonniorū 4-13 domiciliis sunt in plaustro *om.* C, 13 fōnis (= fōnniis) C, 28 ferarum C.

Navigauerīt V, 9 in B is a surprising error, and its occurrence may abate a little our confidence in the accuracy of the copyist of that MS. The -is form in inpotentis 36, 4 is one of the characteristic forms in B, if that MS. be compared with Cc. It is interesting to notice that there is no variant over quē 30, 14 in C. It had seemed strange that the copyist of C, while neglecting variant readings everywhere else, even where difficult proper names occurred, should have inserted one here. For sinum 37, 1 M. reports sinum BCc, situm b. This made it look as if situm were an error peculiar to b, and rendered it somewhat difficult to account for the same error in E without supposing that one MS. was corrected from the other. It is clear, however, now that the error existed in the archetype of the B and E MSS. Pudicie 19, 8 may be added

<sup>62</sup> Brackets inclosing a name or a letter indicate that a MS. is now lost. For a discussion of the relation which T bears to B and b respectively cf. p. 32.

to the list of places (*cf.* 9, 4; 21, 14 etc.) where B has made a mistake in writing a word of which b has preserved the correct form. The fact that the copyist of B first wrote *urbe* for *orbe* at 6, 14 reminds one of the error which was actually committed at 2, 5 by several E MSS. The most interesting of these new readings is *con* 37, 10 in B. All of the E MSS. have at this point *conventum*, which evidently came from an incorrect expansion of the abbreviated form which the copyist of B has brought over without change into his text.

## APPENDIX II

## NOTES ON A MANUSCRIPT CONTAINING PLINY'S LETTERS

The Codex, No. 49, 2 in the Chapter Library at Toledo, in which the *Germania* of Tacitus is found, also contains the *Letters* of Pliny. They run from folio 66r. to 221v., and, as already noted in my article on the *Germania*, on folio 221v. stands the subscription *Caii Plinii oratoris atque Phyllosaphi Dissertissimi epistolarum liber octavus et ultimus explicit foeliciter deo gras*, and below *Finis*, *Perusie in domo Crispolitorum (?) 1486, AMHN Teller, M. Angelus Tuders*. This subscription led Dr. Wünsch, who was allowed to make only a very few notes on the MS., to the very natural conclusion that only Books VIII and IX were given (*cf. Classical Review*, XIII [1899] p. 274). I found, however, on examining it, that the MS. contained Books I-VII and Book IX. The first leaf is gone, so that the text begins with an *ut solebas*, I, 3, 2. The manuscript does not end with an incomplete letter, as Dr. Wünsch thought, but IX, 40 is given in full. The twenty-seventh letter of the fourth book is lacking, and the letters are frequently numbered, until we reach 100 at V, 6, when the numbers cease. After No. 8 the letters in Book V stand in the order 21, 15, 10-14, 16-20, 9. The MS. apparently belongs, therefore, to Keil's second group (*cf. Praef. pp. v-vi*), of which the oldest representative is the codex archivii Casinatis of the year 1429. Manuscripts of this class are freely corrected from the one-hundred-letter collection. This accounts for the fact that the letters are numbered up to V, 6.

I did not have time enough at my disposal to make a complete collation of the MS., but I subjoin readings for the first few letters at the beginning and the end of it. The numbers refer to the pages and lines of Keil's edition.

II, 20 *aduocaris te om. foelix* 21 *tempus] temnis est enim om* 22 *curas] curas et* 23 *negocium ocium* 24 *vigilie in<sup>his</sup> etiam* 27 *cepit* 28 *quod] q̄ modo] modo i (i deleta)*

*Superscriptio* *Epla 1111 Pli. S Pompei Celeris socrui S P*

83 *Otriculano (otriculanus in marg.) Carsolano (carsolanus in marg.)* 34 *vero om. balneum* 36 *Plauti dictum in marg.* 38 *mei] mei te*

III, 1 *diverteris* 4 *servos] suos* 6 *per se ipsos*

*Superscriptio* *Pli. S. Voconio Rufo S P epla V 10 M.] Marco humilioremque* 12 *tectiona] tetora* 13 *aurileni corr. in aruleni* 16 *cicatrices tignioctum (stigmatosum marg.)* 17 *Senec-tionem* 18 *quidem] q̄ Mettius Catus meis] eis* 19 *ego] ego aut* 21 *qum* 25 *reminiscebantur corr. in reminiscebatur me ipsum* 24 *v. 13 nitebatur corr. in nitebamur* 25 *cause Mettiii* 26 *relegatus a Domitiano* 27 *sentias Iterum ego (Iterum ego verbis deletis)* 29 *affuisse* 30-1 *si de hoc . . . . sentias om. sed in marg. add.* 34 *quidem esse* 38 *ergo ex*

IV, 1 *mox a (a deleta)* 2 *reconcilient corr. in reconciliet venit corr. in pervenit* 3 *cum] qum (qui tum marg.)* 5 *ferre] perferre* 6 *a Spurinna] ait Burina* 7 *porticu] portam (porticu marg.)* 10 *parce] pce (paxa sive para marg.)* *cui ego dispicies] inqens: quoi dispiciēs (dispiciēs marg.)* *putas* 11 *decepi corr. in decipi Mauricum] maritum* 12 *ab exilio] n ab exilio* 13 *illam corr. in illum* 14 *comitem corr. in comitem* 17 *quod] q̄ aliqn* 18 *Ruffo Ruffus* 19 *secula corr. in seculi* 20 *dcm:q²* 21 *potuisse] potius se existimare* 23 *secūdi* 24 *iudicii]*

studii 25 quor es *om.* 26 quid] q Metti 27 et *om.* 27 haesitabundus] haesitabundus inquit  
interogavi 28 ut *om.* 34 Maricus 35 esse *om.* *diverxatpetero*] se diligenter 36 curatur] evitatur  
(amatur *marg.*) 37 amore fortius concussa] concisa (concussa *marg.*)

V, 1 ut] ex ut Maritum 2 et] est 3 providere *corr.* in providere temtante *corr.* in tem-  
tandi 4 constabat quia] q' equū

*Superscriptio* Plinius · S · Cornelio Tacito S · P · ep̄la VI 10 ridebis] videbis *corr.* in  
ridebis ego] ego Plinius 11 et quidem] eđ̄ cepi 12 et quiete *om.* *sed in marg. add.* 13 erat]  
erant aut (aut *deletum est et non in marg. additum est*) 14 pugilares 16 agitatione] acogi-  
tatione 18 ipsamque *corr.* in ipsumque 21 non] non (dum *in marg. add.*) 22 vale *om.*

*Superscriptio* Pli · S · Octavo Rudo · S · P · ep̄la VII 26 idem] q̄ *deletum est et idem in*  
*marg. additum est* 27 Iovi Optimo Maximo Homerus v. 29 *om.* 30 ac renutu] atque rem tu  
tuo voto 32 ex advocationem *pr. m.* 36 petis (a *supra e scripta*) id (illud *supra id scripto*)

Pagina CXCVI

*Superscriptio* C · P · S · Paulino Suo S · P · 7 hec 8 a *om.* 10 nisi te] in me 11 locan-  
dorum] tuscanorum(?) 13 lustro] iusto 14 plerique 16 natum] nā putant 16-17 occurrendum  
ergo] occurrendum quoque 17 et] a q (= a et?) est] est q (= est et?) 18 locū alioqui] alioqn  
20 iustius] istius redditus 21 acris 23 tentanda 24 non] nōm 25 quoque ut] q̄, i ut (*una littera*  
*ante i erasa est*) gaude gratulatione] celebratione

*Superscriptio* C · P · S · Saturnio suo S · P · 29 ita ut 30 librorum *corr.* in librum 31  
cui] q̄i (= quoi)

*Superscriptio* G · P · S · Mustio S · P · 36 haruspica monitu *om.* reficiendam ceteris  
CXCVII, 1 et in maius *om.* cum sit] quom scit 2 aliquid stato] quū statio 3 magnus]  
magis popule *corr.* in populi 5 ergo *om.* 5-6 religioseque] religio seq, 6 aedem] eandē  
extrusero 7 aede *corr.* in aedi has *om.* 8 quattuor] cuior quouis 9 parentes *corr.* in parietes  
10 vel faciendum] faciundum vel emendum *om.* 11-12 vetustate sui partibus 13 istinc esse]  
e . incēsse 14 rationem *corr.* in ratione loci *om.* possum 15 circumdare templo] Tito Livio  
templi] temporali abruptissimis] ablutissimis 16 ripibus *corr.* in ripis pratum] templum pratū  
(templum *deleto*) 17-18 ipsum . . . . melius *om.* 18 invenies

*Superscriptio* C · P · S · Fusco · S · P 25 permutem] permulto *corr.* in permutet 27 post]  
post cenā 28 iam non 31 nunc] nō ver et autumnum quae] vere tantum nunq, 32 hiemem]  
hiemem statim mediam ita] īa

**THE INTRODUCTION OF COMEDY INTO THE  
CITY DIONYSIA**





# THE INTRODUCTION OF COMEDY INTO THE CITY DIONYSIA

## A CHRONOLOGICAL STUDY IN GREEK LITERARY HISTORY

EDWARD CAPPS

ARISTOTLE'S brief statement in the fifth chapter of the *Poetics*, καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμφοδῶν ὅψέ ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, has proved a veritable will-o'-the-wisp to students of Attic comedy, alluring by the apparently clear and well-defined light of a definite epoch date, ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, but at the same time perplexing and baffling the eager searcher by the vague and flickering ὅψέ ποτε. And many are the victims who have been led into the bog. There have been those who have attributed the indefiniteness of the statement to a lack of definite knowledge on the part of the writer. Others, unwilling to credit Aristotle with ignorance on a matter of literary history to which he alludes in this manner, assume that the fault lies in the brevity and condensation of the utterance, and proceed to explain in precise terms what the oracle meant to say. But there is still another way of looking at the matter. I am inclined to think that, for the public which he addressed, there was no vagueness or uncertainty in these words. Had it suited the writer's purpose he could have added ἐπὶ τοῦ δέινος ἀρχοῦτος and could have given, approximately at least, the number of years in the interval ὅψέ ποτε; but he was writing for those who knew, for whom such learned commentary, for which we moderns have invented the footnote just to show that we know, would have merely encumbered the argument. The trouble with most interpreters has been, partly the lack of the evidence upon which Aristotle based his assertion (and for this they are, of course, not responsible), partly the failure to recognize the nature of this evidence, and partly a natural proneness to wrench such evidence as we have had so as to make it fit a preconceived opinion as to the degree of lateness required to justify Aristotle's phrase.

It is not my purpose in this paper to launch a new hypothesis nor to indulge in speculations concerning the early history of Attic comedy, but to endeavor to recover from material which Aristotle must have used an important date in this history, a date which Aristotle himself evidently regarded as an epoch date—the official recognition of comedy by the state through its acceptance upon the programmes of the festivals of Dionysus. Many attempts have been made by others to determine, precisely or approximately, the time of this occurrence. The evidence which I shall employ has been known and used, with a greater or less realization of its significance, for more than a quarter of a century. But no one, in my opinion, has yet reached a conclusion, based upon this evidence, which is demonstrably correct, or which either harmonizes Aristotle with the other evidence, presumably possessed by him, or explains satisfac-

torily the existence of testimony apparently at variance with him. I believe that Aristotle's information about the early Attic comedy down to the time of published texts of the plays was derived wholly from the official records of the Athenian dramatic contests. Fragments of a copy of these records are still extant. By a new reconstruction of these fragments I hope to be able to get considerably nearer the epoch date of comedy, so much nearer that Aristotle and the other literary authorities will be put beyond the possibility of misinterpretation or distrust. That we may approach the new evidence free from the current misconceptions relative to these, it will be necessary first of all to review the much-disputed passages referred to.

Lest the title chosen for this study lead to a misunderstanding, I must explain at the outset that I do not believe that *ὁ ἄρχων* contains a reference to the City Dionysia. We have every reason to believe that the administration of both festivals was essentially the same so far as the method of accepting a play, *χορὸν δίδοναι τὸν ἄρχοντα*, is concerned, though different archons had the responsibility for the contests at each festival. In view of the general form in which Aristotle's statement is cast, it would therefore be rash to assume that he had in mind the first archon as opposed to the second. Other reasons for this opinion will be given at the proper time; for the present let it suffice to state that I have specified the City Dionysia in the title only because the inscriptional evidence, by means of which I hope to arrive at the epoch date, has reference to this festival alone.

#### ARISTOTLE AND THE LITERARY EVIDENCE

1. *Epicharmus, Chionides, and Magnes*.—In the third chapter of the *Poetics* Aristotle presents briefly the grounds upon which the Dorians disputed with the Athenians the distinction of having first brought comedy to the position of a recognized branch of literature. "The Megarians of Sicily claim it," he says, "on the ground that from Megara Hyblaea came Epicharmus, who was much earlier than Chionides and Magnes."<sup>1</sup> Chionides and Magnes, according to this, are the two poets who best represent the claims of Athens. They are grouped together as belonging to the same period. They must be considered the earliest Athenian comic poets of prominence, the first who stood out as representatives of a comedy justly entitled to the name, though not necessarily the earliest persons whose names were still remembered as having had a part in the new movement. The assertion of Epicharmus's priority is put into the mouth of the Megarians, but Aristotle apparently accepts it as true.<sup>2</sup> His priority is, of course, not simply that of birth, for that alone would not have justified

<sup>1</sup> *Poetics*, 1448a, 32: καὶ οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας (ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς κωμῆδος), ἐκείθεν γὰρ ἦν Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητής, πολλῶ πρότερος ὢν Χωνιδίου καὶ Μάγνητος.

<sup>2</sup> SUSEMIHL, "De Aristotele primordiales comoediae Atticae," *Revue de philologie*, Vol. XIX (1895), p. 197, maintains that this statement is Aristotle's own. It was certainly not repudiated by him. There is no evidence of a disposition in Aristotle's day to belittle Epicharmus in

the interests of Attic comedy, as WILAMOWITZ seems to think. Aristotle frankly assigns to him the credit of introducing the plot (*Poetics*, 5), and Plato (*Theat.*, 152) places him by the side of Homer. DENIS seems to have had no predecessors or followers in the view upon which he insists, that πολλῶ πρότερος is an exaggeration of the Megarians, and not sanctioned by Aristotle; cf. *La comédie grecque*, p. 31, note and p. 116 note 3.

the pretensions of the Megarians, but of achievement. If the argument of the Megarians had any weight whatever, Epicharmus must have achieved a reputation among them considerably before Chionides and Magnes became prominent at Athens.<sup>3</sup>

Now we have a number of notices which help to establish the chronology of Epicharmus. The exceptionally well-informed Anonymous *περί κωμωδίας* II Kaibel<sup>4</sup> places his floruit (*γέγονε*) in the 73d Olympiad, 488-5. Suidas<sup>5</sup> is more explicit, saying that he was active as a poet at Syracuse "six years before the Persian Wars," i. e., in 486, at a time when certain other poets were active at Athens. The Parian Marble<sup>6</sup> synchronizes Epicharmus with Hieron (*regn.* 478-467), as do Timaeus,<sup>7</sup> Plutarch,<sup>8</sup> and others.<sup>9</sup> Add the fact that his *Nâσοι* was brought out after 477/6,<sup>10</sup> and the statement of Diogenes<sup>11</sup> that he lived to be ninety years old, and we have all that is recorded about the Sicilian poet's life without having recourse to combinations. For such combinations the most important facts, for our present purpose, are (1) the destruction of Megara Hyblaea by Gelon shortly after his accession, ca. 483; according to this, Suidas could not be far wrong in dating the poet's migration to the capital in the year 486; and (2) the statement of Suidas<sup>12</sup> that Deinolochus, son or pupil of Epicharmus, flourished in the 73d Olympiad.<sup>13</sup> Whether son or pupil, he must have been considerably younger than Epicharmus.

Regarding Chionides and Magnes, on the other hand, we have just two notices outside of Aristotle. Of the former Suidas<sup>14</sup> speaks as the *πρωταγωνιστῆς τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμωδίας*, and says that he was producing plays in 488. The first part of the notice

<sup>3</sup> POPPELREUTER's interpretation, "Epicharmus multo ante Magnetem et Chionidem comoedias scribere coepit," is in the right direction, although I think Aristotle's idea would have been better expressed by the phrase of the chronographers, *ὑποκρίσσο, clarus habetur*; cf. *De comoediis Atticis primordiis*, p. 17, note.

<sup>4</sup> *Com. Graec. frag.*, Vol. I, p. 7: *χρονοῖς δὲ γέγονε κατὰ τὴν σγ' ὀλυμπιάδα.*

<sup>5</sup> *S. v.* Ἐπίχαρμος· ἦν δὲ πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν ἐτη ζ' διδάσκων ἐν Συρακούσαις· ἐν δὲ Ἀθήναις Εὐέντης καὶ Εὐξενίδης καὶ Μύλλος ἑταίρειοντο. For many years these three persons were regarded either as comic poets or as fabrications. But now that Eutes is found in the list of tragic poets next to Aeschylus (CIA II, 977a), the fact is recognized that Suidas does not say that they are comic poets. Myllus, however, seems clearly to be due to a misapprehension—a comic character for a comic poet; but the name Euxenides may well be right. The author of the statement was therefore not an unscrupulous champion of the claims of Athens to the *εὐρεσις* of comedy, as WILAMOWITZ thought (*Hermes*, Vol. IX (1875), p. 341), who stupidly invented some names in Eê in order to carry Attic comedy back to Epicharmus. Now that we have Eutes, we see the danger in this argument; for we chance to know the names of just eleven comic poets whose names begin in Eê!

We may add that the chance discovery of Eutes in the official lists of victors—an obscure poet whose name is never mentioned elsewhere, who won only one victory at the Dionysia—and in a position that tallies with remarkable accuracy with the date assigned by Suidas, goes far to vindicate the trustworthiness of the source of Suidas. Such infor-

mation could have been derived only from the official records. Neither the names of Phrynichus or Aeschylus, which preceded Eutes in the didascalie records, nor those of Polyphrasmon or . . . Ἰωνος, which followed, would have expressed so precisely the desired synchronism with Epicharmus's residence in Syracuse as does that of Eutes.

<sup>6</sup> V. 71: *ἄφ' οὗ Ἱέρων Συρακουσῶν ἐτυράννευσεν, ἐτη ΗΗΗΙΙΙ, ἄρχοντας Ἀθήνησι Χάρης (472/1). ἦν δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ ποιητὴς κατὰ τοῦτον.*

<sup>7</sup> Quoted by Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.*, I, p. 353.

<sup>8</sup> *Apophth.*, 175 C; *Quomodo quis adulat. disting.*, 68 A.

<sup>9</sup> In KAIBEL, *Com. Graec. frag.*, Vol. I, p. 88, 5.

<sup>10</sup> BOECKH ad Pind., *Pyth.*, II.

<sup>11</sup> VIII, 3, 3. [Lucian], *Macroch.*, 25, gives 97.

<sup>12</sup> *S. v.* Δεινλόχος· κωμικὸς ἦν ἐπὶ τῆς σγ' ὀλυμπιάδος, υἱὸς Ἐπιχάρμου, ὡς δὲ τινες, μαθητὴς.

<sup>13</sup> LORENZ, *Leben und Schriften des Choers Epicharmos*, p. 55, finds it a suspicious circumstance that Suidas groups so many comic poets in the same Olympiad, five Attic and three Sicilian (the third being Phormis). But Aristotle himself groups four of the eight together, and Suidas does not state, as we have seen, that the other three are comic poets. LORENZ's suspicion, which is due to MEINEKE's influence, goes far to vitiate what would otherwise be the sanest discussion we have of the relations of Chionides and Magnes to Epicharmus.

<sup>14</sup> *S. v.* Χιονίδης· . . . ὃν καὶ λέγουσι πρωταγωνιστὴν γενέσθαι τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμωδίας, διδάσκων δὲ ἐτεσιν ὅσων πρὸ τῶν Περσικῶν, i. e., in 486/5, 488/7, or 487/6.

is merely a deduction from Aristotle's third chapter; the latter part, considered by itself, is strongly suggestive of the language of the didascalīæ, *Χιωνίδης ἐδίδασκεν*—the more so now that we know for a certainty that the hitherto suspected notice which mentions Euetes was derived from such a source. The notice in Suidas about Magnes<sup>15</sup> seems to be nothing but a weak echo of the *πολλῶ πρότερος* of Aristotle. Apart from this and the two inscriptions which mention his name we have only the combination set up by Meineke<sup>16</sup> on the basis of Aristophanes's *Knights*, 524, from which the safe inference is drawn that Magnes was dead at the time of the production of this play, in 425, and that he died in old age. But by this combination we can only arrive at about the year 465 as the latest time at which the poet may have entered upon his dramatic career.<sup>17</sup>

Now if we select from among these notices the most significant, having regard to the dates alone and not to the events underlying the dates, and compare them with the statement of Aristotle, we at once detect an apparent contradiction: Epicharmus 488–485 (Anon., Suid.), Chionides 488 (Suid.), but *Ἐπίχαρμος πολλῶ πρότερος Χιωνίδου* (Arist.). Meineke was the first, I believe, to find a difficulty here, but he has had a long line of successors. Those who assume, as he did, that the earliest date given for Epicharmus is to be regarded as the epoch date on which Aristotle's *πολλῶ πρότερος* was based, have been obliged either (1) to reject the date of Chionides given by Suidas, or (2) to discredit the text of Aristotle, or, finally, (3) to invent some explanation by which the appearance of Chionides in 488 will not count in the comparison set up by Aristotle.<sup>18</sup> The prevalent view today is that of Meineke, who placed

<sup>15</sup> *S. v. Μάγνης*: ἐπιβάλλει δ' Ἐπιχάρμης νέος πρεσβύτερ.

<sup>16</sup> *Historia critica comicorum Graecorum*, pp. 29 ff.

<sup>17</sup> MEINEKE, it is true, places his *floruit*, not the beginning of his career, *ca.* Olymp. 80 (460–457), and has been followed in this by almost everyone since. But there is nothing in Aristophanes that suggests that Magnes's failure was a quite recent event; he may have been dead a decade or more. And Meineke's calculation is based upon the assumption of a life of only sixty years, though Aristophanes seems rather to emphasize his advanced age: *ἐπὶ γήρατι, οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' ἡβῆς, ἐξεβλήθη πρεσβύτερος ὢν*. These uncertain data could therefore readily be reconciled with a *floruit* (40 years) before 460, birth before 500. BRINCK, *Inscriptiones Graecae ad choregiam pertinentes*, p. 170, places his birth *ca.* 495.

<sup>18</sup> It may be of interest to name the principal representatives of each of these three groups. The following list is by no means exhaustive:

(1) MEINEKE, *Hist. crit.* (1839), p. 27: if Suidas *s. v. Χιωνίδης* is right, Chionides would be earlier than Myllus, etc. But Aristotle regards Chionides and Magnes as the earliest poets of literary comedy in Attica. BERNHARDY, *Grundriss der griechischen Literatur*, Th. II (1845), pp. 942, 945 and ad Suid. *s. v. Χιωνίδης*. LORENZ, *Leben und Schriften des Coers Epicharmos* (1864), pp. 52 ff. Lorenz was influenced to abandon the altogether reasonable explanation, which he works out in detail, by Meineke's objection concerning Myllus, Euetes, etc., and by the suspicious circumstance that Suidas groups three Sicilian and five Attic

comic poets in the 73d Olympiad. WILAMOWITZ, "Die megarische Komödie," *Hermes*, Vol. IX (1875), pp. 340 ff., denounces any attempt to combine Suidas with Aristotle as "bare Unkritik," for the source of Suidas was an unscrupulous champion of the claims of Attic comedy against the Sicilian. This view is reasserted in "Die Bühne des Aischylos," *Hermes*, Vol. XXI (1886), p. 613, and is taken for granted in *Homerische Untersuchungen* (1884), p. 248, note 13, and in the *Herakles*, Vol. I (1889), p. 50. LEO, "Ein Sieg des Magnes," *Rhein. Mus.*, Vol. XXXIII (1878), pp. 139 ff. KAIBEL, *Pauly-Wissowa Realencyclopädie*, *s. v. Chionides* (1890): The error of Suidas can be explained only on the assumption that the passage in Aristotle was carelessly read! KIRCHNER, *Prosopographia Attica*, *s. vv. Χιωνίδης* and *Μάγνης*: The Suidas notice is omitted altogether from the testimonia on Chionides.

(2) MEINEKE objected to GETSAR's chronology on the ground that it placed Epicharmus *δαίγης*, not *πολλῶ πρότερος*. This seems to have led CROISSET and others to approve of the textual change; *cf. Histoire de la littérature grecque*, Vol. III<sup>2</sup> (1899), p. 433, note 2. I have already referred to the view of DENIS, whose interpretation amounts to a textual change. It is hard to see what BELOCH would do with the Aristotle passage, for he thinks that Epicharmus was very young when he came to Syracuse and that he lived many years after Hieron; *cf. Griechische Geschichte*, Vol. I, p. 577, note 1.

(3) HAIGH, *Attic Theatre*<sup>2</sup> (1896), pp. 30 f., 41, assumes that there were regular contests under state auspices as early as 487, believing so exact a statement as that of Suidas

the floruit of Epicharmus in the 73d Olympiad, that of Chionides and Magnes in the 80th.

Much as we may admire the ingenuity displayed by some of the greatest scholars of our time in getting rid of the contradiction which they have felt between Suidas and Aristotle—from Meineke's quiet rejection of the troublesome notice, to Wilamowitz's sleuth-like detection of the forger, and Kaibel's gentle correction of a bit of carelessness in translation—on sober reflection it seems well-nigh incredible, and by no means creditable to our modern scholarship, that any difficulty should have been found, in the first place, in the straightforward notices with which we are dealing, and that the error in reasoning should have persisted so long, especially since there have not been wanting all these years a few scholars who have found no difficulties in the way of a natural and satisfactory interpretation. I refer particularly to F. A. Wolf, Clinton, and Bergk.<sup>19</sup> The trouble has been, mainly, the failure to recognize the absolute necessity of assuming, from the words of Aristotle, that Epicharmus was a Megarian and first won distinction at Megara.<sup>20</sup> Aristotle was speaking only of the claims of the Dorians, and Syracuse<sup>21</sup> would have suited his argument as well as Megara; he would scarcely have gone out of his way to mention the Megarians had not the literary comedy of the Sicilians originated among them.<sup>22</sup> The second source of the prevalent error has been the mechanical and somewhat unintelligent use of the data furnished by the chronographers. Anonymous uses the term *γέγονε*, which often is the equivalent of *ἡκμάζετο*.<sup>23</sup> Now it is a familiar fact that the *ἡκμή* of a person was preferably fixed with reference to some important event in his career (*ἐγνοοῦντο*)—*e. g.*, Solon's by his legislation—though more frequently by reference to persons or events in a general way contemporary—*e. g.*, so many years before the Persian Wars. We are fortunate in the case of Epicharmus in that Suidas records the fact which determined the 73d Olympiad as an epoch

a. v. *Χιονίδης* trustworthy. But he inclines to the opinion that his exhibitions were at the Lenaea. BERGK at one time held a similar view, but he was at least logical, holding that these early productions at the Lenaea were unofficial, representing the crude stage of comedy which Aristotle passed over as unliterary; *cf.* "Verzeichnisse der Siege dramatischer Dichter in Athen," *Rhein. Mus.*, Vol. XXXIV (1879), p. 320. He later abandoned this view, which rested upon a strange misconception of the status of the dramatic exhibitions at the two festivals, in favor of a natural interpretation both of Aristotle and of the other notices; *Griech. Literaturgesch.*, Vol. IV (1887, posthumous), pp. 24, 46.

<sup>19</sup> WOLF, *Prolegomena ad Homerum* (1795), p. 69, note 24 (quoted by Lorens): "Utrumque (i. e. Chionidem et Magnetem) autem pluribus annis praegressa est comoedia Graecorum Siciliensium, ab Epicharmo, si natus veterum recte assequor, perscripta iam ante Gelonis tyrannidem." CLINTON, *Fasti Hellenici* (1827), Vol. II, sub an. 500: "Epicharmus perfected comedy in Sicily long before Chionides exhibited at Athens, and continued to exhibit comedy in the reign of Hiero;" sub an. 487: "Chionides first exhibits." BERGK, *Griech. Literaturgesch.*, Vol. IV, p. 24: "Epicharmos hatte damals (at his removal to Syracuse) wohl bereits die Schwelle des Greisenalters erreicht, und sich als Lustspiel-dichter einen allgemein geachteten Namen erworben;" *cf.*

p. 24, note 15. GRYSAR, *De Doriensium comoedia* (1828), seems to have perceived the correct relationship of the three poets, but to have aimed at too great precision as to dates, *e. g.*, fixing Epicharmus's first exhibition in the year 494-3. I have not been able to see this work.

<sup>20</sup> A point properly emphasized again by POPPELREUTER, *De comoediae Atticae primordiis* (Berlin, 1898), p. 17, note.

<sup>21</sup> Since Epicharmus became a Syracusan, it is not surprising that nothing is said by the Syracusans themselves about his and comedy's Megarian origin; *cf.* the epigrams in his honor, one by Theocritus, the other quoted by Diog. Laert., VIII, 3; or that some one should have said of him (*apud Suidam*), *ὅτι εἴπε τὴν κωμῆν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἀπὸ Θέμης*.

<sup>22</sup> It is hard to see how BERNHARDY's assertion that the claim rested "bloß auf seine Persönlichkeit" can be reconciled with Aristotle, even if we reject the notice of Suidas on Chionides; *cf. Grundr. d. griech. Litt.*, Th. II, p. 902.

<sup>23</sup> ROSEN concludes, as the result of his valuable study, "Γέγονε in der Biographica des Suidas," *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., XXXIII (1878), p. 165: "In der ungeheueren Mehrzahl der Fälle Suidas bezeichnet (by γέγονε) nicht das Geburtsjahr, sondern die Zeit in welcher der wichtigste Theil des Lebens eines Schriftstellers fällt." The usage of Suidas may be assumed for Anonymous, for the meaning *ἐγνοοῦντο* is of course excluded.

date—*ἢν διδασκων ἐν Συρακούσαις*. This in turn was known, not by the existence of didascalic records from Syracuse—the source of such notices concerning Athenian poets—but because the destruction of Megara occurred *ca.* 488, before which time Epicharmus must have taken up his residence at the Sicilian capital.<sup>24</sup> Another epoch date of Epicharmus, 472, is known from the Parian Marble, and it is just as good as the other, though we do not know just the event which determined it. In fact, the chronographers give, if they can, no less than four epoch dates for each great dramatic poet—birth, first appearance, first victory, and death—and as many others as the peculiar circumstances of the subject suggest. It is an obvious error in method, therefore, to seize upon one particular epoch date in the life of Epicharmus, assume that it is a fixed point in his life, like his birth date, assume further that it is the epoch which formed the point of departure for Aristotle's *πολλῷ πρότερος*, and to make the chronology of Chionides and Magnes square with these assumptions. In fact, with Aristotle's reference to the Megarians and Suidas's notice about Chionides to guide us, and in default of contradictory evidence, we must accept the sane and convincing conclusion of Bergk: "Alle drei sind Zeitgenossen; nur geht Epicharmos an Jahren wie an Werken voran."<sup>25</sup>

2. *The beginning of the official records.*—The way is now prepared for the consideration of the passage from the fifth chapter of the *Poetics*, quoted at the beginning of this paper, in the light of its context. We shall learn from it to appreciate the full significance of the first granting of a comic chorus by the archon, the reason why so much importance is attached to the exact time of the activity of Chionides and Magnes, and why a solution so simple as that outlined above has, through the influence of *ὀψέ ποτε*, been felt to be unsatisfactory by a majority of scholars.

After having discussed in the preceding chapter the important changes through which tragedy had passed before reaching maturity, Aristotle proceeds to comedy:<sup>26</sup>

Though the various steps in the development of tragedy, and the persons responsible for them, are still remembered, yet in the case of comedy, since no attention was paid to it at the beginning, they have been forgotten. For it was not until a relatively late time that the archon granted a chorus of comic performers. Before that time they had volunteered their services.<sup>27</sup> And comedy had already taken on a more or less definite form at the time when the poets

<sup>24</sup>This is generally agreed upon; the difference in opinion is as to his age at the time; and Aristotle ought to settle that.

<sup>25</sup>*Griech. Litteraturgesch.*, Vol. IV, p. 24, note 15.

<sup>26</sup>1449a, 35: αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγῳδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ δι' ἃν ἐγένοντο οὐ λεληθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ σπουδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν. καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμῳδῶν ὀψέ ποτε ὁ ἀρχὼν ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν. ἥδη δὲ σχήματά τινα αὐτῆς ἔχουσιν οἱ λεγόμενοι αὐτῆς ποιηταὶ μνημονεύονται. τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ πρόλογον ἢ πλῆθὴ ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἠγγράται. τὸ δὲ μῦθους ποιεῖν Ἐπιχάρμος καὶ Θόρμις. τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηνῶσι Κράτης πρῶτος ἤρξεν ἀφάμενος τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους καὶ μῦθους.

<sup>27</sup>That is, οἱ κωμῳδοί, all who took part in the presentation of a κωμῳδία. Those who have assumed a *constructio ad sensum*, understanding, as subject of ἦσαν, οἱ χορηγοὶ or οἱ

χορευταί, have failed to recognize the generic term in the formal phrase χορὸν κωμῳδῶν, familiar enough in such phrases as τοῖς τραγῳδοῖς, "at the time of the tragic performers." The person to whom the archon granted a chorus was the διδάσκαλος. All who were trained by him were κωμῳδοί. The didascalus was himself one of the κωμῳδοί in the early period. The distinction between actors and chorus in both tragedy and comedy was relatively late. Aristotle can use *ὑποκρίται* for all who engage in a dramatic performance; cf. *Poet.*, 1459b, 28, and FLICKINGER, "The Meaning of *ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς* in Writers of the Fourth Century," *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series, Vol. VI, p. 10. The suggestion οἱ χορηγοὶ (STAHR, SUSEMIEL) overlooks the fact that the choregia was a democratic institution, not antedating the reforms of Cleisthenes. But surely there were comic *ἐθελονταὶ* before then.

mentioned are recorded. But no one knows who was responsible for *πρόσωπα*, prologue, number of actors, etc. Crates was the first Athenian to give up the *λαμβανή ἰδέα* and to use consistent plots, following the example of the Sicilians, Epicharmus and Phormis.<sup>28</sup>

In this passage Aristotle confines himself to Attic comedy, shaping his account of it by the account just given of Attic tragedy. He knows certain important facts in the history of tragedy which he cannot give for comedy, and explains the reasons for his ignorance. We must assume that these reasons were satisfactory to his Athenian hearers, *i. e.*, that they really explained both his accurate knowledge of tragedy, on the one hand, and, on the other, his ignorance of comedy down to a certain point, and his better information after that time. We should therefore be able, by inquiring closely into the matters concerning which he is well informed, to ascertain the full significance of the reasons assigned for his ignorance.

All are agreed that *οἱ λεγόμενοι ποιηταὶ* must mean Chionides and Magnes<sup>29</sup>—the poets whose very names stood for a certain well-defined stage in the development of comedy, for the first real Attic comedy. But what is the meaning of *μνημονεύονται*? Does it refer simply to an oral tradition—"erwähnt werden," "on commence à nommer"?<sup>30</sup> Or is it an allusion to *μνήματα* of some kind, readily understood by the Athenian? Observe that a definite point of time is suggested by the occurrence of the names of these two poets. They were either "mentioned" with reference to certain datable events, or "recorded" under a specific year or period. Were others mentioned or recorded before them, or were theirs the earliest names? The answer to these questions depends upon the settlement of certain other questions first.

It is clear that the granting of a comic chorus by the archon was an outward sign that the period of indifference (*οὐκ ἐσπουδάξτε*) with respect to comedy was then at an end, so far as the state was concerned. Did Aristotle from that time on have complete knowledge of the development of comedy? If so, why does he not frankly state that at this time comedy had passed through such and such stages of those mentioned in the account of tragedy, instead of employing the vague phrase *σχήματά τινα*? Of course, after the state recognition of comedy the official didascalical records were avail-

<sup>28</sup> In view of the vast influence which the views of WILAMOWITZ have exercised in the interpretation of this passage, I append his paraphrase of the passage in full. And I may take this opportunity to acknowledge my own indebtedness to this scholar, "der gelehrteste der Hellenen" of modern times, for inspiration and guidance at every point in my study of this subject, though I am unable to follow him in his principal conclusions. Though he has adhered consistently, from "Die megarische Komödie" to the *Herakles*, to this interpretation of Aristotle and to about 465 as the epoch date of comedy, it is possible that he has since modified his views, though I have searched his recent writings in vain for an indication of the fact.

"Die megarische Komödie," *Hermes*, Vol. IX (1875), p. 332: Aristotle says, speaking of Attic comedy, "sie sei zunächst, da Niemand sich ernstlich um sie bekümmert, unbekannt geblieben. Erst spät habe der Staat sie in die Hand genommen, und die Dichter, die man anführe, würden erst in einer Zeit erwähnt, wo sich gewisse Formen festge-

setzt hatten. Denn Niemand wisse, wer die Prologe," etc. He then sums up as follows: "Also: erst gibt es die *λεγόμενοι ποιηταὶ*, dann erhält die Komödie die Staatsconcession, dann ist sie iambisch, . . . dann kommt Krates." Note that the sentence *τίς δὲ . . . ἠγνόηται* is made causal in this version, and that the causal relation of *καὶ γὰρ χρόνῳ κτλ.* is disregarded.

<sup>29</sup> All, I mean, who accept the text. USENER's *ἀλλοιοὶ μὲν* (after CASTELVETRO's *ἀλλοιοὶ μὲν εἰ*), which has found favor with some scholars, entirely reverses the order of the argument, and leaves us with a reason which explains nothing. Aristotle's ignorance of the details of the development of comedy would obviously not be explained in the least by the fact that "the names of only a few parts of the early period are still remembered." Nor is a *μὲν* needed to balance the *τίς δὲ* following. The adversative is required by the argument.

<sup>30</sup> DENIS, *La comédie grecque*, Vol. I, p. 6.



able, but they gave only the names of the contestants and choregi and the titles of the plays; at this period probably not even the titles.<sup>21</sup> How then did Aristotle know anything about the status of comedy at this time, even enough to warrant the assertion of *σχήματά τινα*? The texts of the plays of Epicharmus, probably from the time of his residence in Syracuse, were preserved; but if Aristotle had possessed the texts of the Attic poets he would have had more exact information than he gives evidence of having. For the statement *σχήματά τινα*, however, the texts were not needed; Aristotle might easily have inferred this much from the very fact that the state had given its sanction to comedy. And this would fully explain the indefiniteness of the phrase.

The *μεταβάσεις* which Aristotle records for tragedy are: *πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν* and the attendant changes, *σκηνογραφία*, *μέγεθος*, *λέξεις*, *μέτρον*, *πλήθη ἐπεισοδίων*. The data for his statements concerning them could have been derived from the tragic texts alone. I should include even *σκηνογραφία*, for it seems hardly possible that the official records of the contests should have covered matters theatrical,<sup>22</sup> while, on the other hand, this important innovation must have had an immediate and striking effect upon the inner economy and technique of the plays. It is to be noted that he does not mention any innovations before Aeschylus. Since we have one play of Aeschylus that goes back to about a decade from the time of his first appearance, and the introduction of the second actor was probably not coincident with his first appearance, we have no reason to doubt that Aristotle had in the tragic texts extant in his day an unbroken line of testimony from the time of this innovation. In tragedy, therefore, the period of indifference, not necessarily on the part of the state, but on the part of the public, shown by the non-publication of the tragedies exhibited, did not extend beyond the early years of Aeschylus.<sup>23</sup> In comedy it extended likewise down to the time of the first published plays. We have seen that this was probably some time after the first granting of a comic chorus. We shall be able to define this time more closely.

Now in spite of the fact that Aristotle, at the very outset of his account of comedy, makes a sweeping acknowledgment of his ignorance in respect of the various *μεταβάσεις* through which it had passed, he yet later on specifies three particular details upon which he has no information: *πρόσωπα*, *πρόλογος*, *πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν*. Of course

<sup>21</sup> To judge by the use of "*κωμῳδία*" instead of the title in the case of the earliest events mentioned in *Insc. Graec. Sic. et Ital.*, 1091 (CIG I, 229).

<sup>22</sup> WILAMOWITZ, who believes that the state adoption of comedy, the increase of the actors in tragedy to three, and important changes in the arrangement of the theatre, were prescribed by a νόμος Διονυσιακός about 465, includes also *σκηνογραφία*; cf. "Die Bühne des Aischylos," *Hermes*, Vol. XXI (1886), p. 613, and *Herakles*, Vol. I (ed. 1), p. 50. I agree with A. MÜLLER, *Philologus*, Supplbd. VI (1891), p. 89, and BODENSTEINER, *Bursians Jahrbuch*, Vol. CVI (1901), p. 138, that such matters as improvements in staging would not have been prescribed by a law.

<sup>23</sup> It would be natural to assume from the text of Aristotle that the granting of a chorus by the state marked the time of the emergence of tragedy, as of comedy, from

the autoschediastic stage, and was the first sign of the attainment of a certain literary form, *σχήματά τινα*, from that time to the introduction of the second actor by Aeschylus, as in comedy down to Cratinus, a period of more rapid development, but still the absence of literary quality and the non-publication of the texts. The scheme may be true enough in general outline, but it would be unsafe to extend the phrase *χορὸν δ' ἄρχων ἔδωκεν* to tragedy as an epoch date in the same sense in which it was the epoch date for comedy, for it is hardly possible that the choregic system implied in these words antedated the reforms of Cleisthenes. The dithyrambic contests of men's choruses in 500/3, archon Lysagoras (see MUNRO, "The Parian Marble," *Class. Rev.*, Vol. XV (1901), p. 357), was before the first choregia. Recognition by the state before the choregia, if there was such a recognition, took another form.

he was uninformed about these for the same reason as about the others—because the texts of the period in which these changes were accomplished were no longer extant. Why, then, does he single out these three details, one of which was included among the *μεταβάσεις* of tragedy? Evidently because they were not sufficiently covered by the preceding explanation of his ignorance—because, in his opinion, they fell in the period *after* the state concession and the “mentioning” of Chionides and Magnes.<sup>24</sup> By glancing again at the history of tragedy we shall see the significance of this passage.

Sophocles is credited with the introduction of the third actor. The change was not accomplished in 467 (*Septem*),<sup>25</sup> but it was in 458 (*Oresteia*). Now it is incredible that the number of actors should have been fixed in comedy before it was in tragedy, though the improvement was probably adopted immediately.<sup>26</sup> Now since, as we shall be able to prove later on from the inscriptions, the adoption of comedy by the state was certainly prior to 467 (or even to 471, the first appearance of Sophocles),<sup>27</sup> this innovation was made after this epoch. It is clear from this that Aristotle had no comic texts for a considerable period after the first granting of the chorus,<sup>28</sup> and that the period of public indifference to comedy extended for a considerable time after the end of the indifference of the state. This is an important result, for it permits us to fix the epoch date *ὁ ἀρχὸν ἔδωκεν*, which was a matter of official record, without reference to Aristotle's personal knowledge of comic texts, which is a matter of a very different nature. We now know for a certainty, what was only a surmise before, that Aristotle's knowledge of the status of comedy (*σχήματά τινα*) at the time of its recognition by the state was based wholly upon the fact of its recognition. Further, the period of *σχήματά τινα* and *μνημονεύονται* is synchronous with that expressed by *ὁ ἀρχὸν ἔδωκεν*.<sup>29</sup> Chionides and Magnes “are mentioned” at the time of the first official con-

<sup>24</sup> WILAMOWITZ, *Hermes*, Vol. XXI, p. 614, note 1, and SUSEMIEL, *loc. cit.*, p. 200, reached just the opposite conclusion—that the state concession antedated the employment of three actors in tragedy; for, they argue, if this innovation in comedy came after the granting of a chorus, Aristotle would have known who was responsible for it. But this assumes that information about such matters was derived from the state records, not from the texts, which both agree were not published until later; and this assumption is altogether improbable. And if the three-actor stage had been reached ca. 465, how comes it that the earliest play of Cratinus of which we know employed only two actors, as KAIBEL has shown, “Die *Ὀδυσσεύς* von Kratinos und der *Κύκλωψ* des Euripides.” *Hermes*, Vol. XXIV, p. 82? SUSEMIEL's explanation that this was “an exception” does not seem to me valid.

<sup>25</sup> I accept the opinion of the majority, that the exodos in our text is spurious.

<sup>26</sup> I do not mean to commit myself here to the view that comedy went through the same process as tragedy, gradually increasing the actors from one to three. On the contrary, I cannot understand its development from the *καὶ* except on the supposition of a large number of performers gradually reduced, so far as it ever was reduced, to the norm of tragedy.

<sup>27</sup> Euseb., *vers. Arm.*, and Hieron., *sub* Ol. 77<sup>2</sup>. On the whole, this seems more likely to be true than Plutarch's statement which synchronizes his first victory in 468 with his first appearance; *Cimon*, 8.

<sup>28</sup> WILAMOWITZ, *Hermes*, Vol. IX, has convincingly demonstrated, on other grounds, the fact that Aristotle had no comic texts before Cratinus. But when he says, p. 335: “Die Kunde über die attische Komödie die der gelehrteste der Hellenen besass, reichte nicht über die sechszigen,” we must now qualify the statement somewhat; he had the *didascaliae*. WILAMOWITZ, it is true, believed that the state concession was made in the sixties (465-460), getting at this date by the process: the granting of the chorus was much later than Epicharmus; epoch of Epicharmus, the reign of Hieron, 478-467. The error here is, of course, the selection of precisely this date as the one which proved to Aristotle the priority of Epicharmus over Chionides and Magnes.

<sup>29</sup> My interpretation differs radically from that of WILAMOWITZ at this point. He sets the state concession *after* the *λεγεμενοι* *συνταί*, i. e., makes the *εἰς* *δουρυλόγερον* period coextensive with the *ἰδύλαται* period. It totally changes the logic of Aristotle's thought to make the sentence *τῶ δὲ . . . ἡγήσεται* causal. I leave my exposition to speak for itself.

tests, Chionides, we should suppose, in connection with the very first. They were among the first comic poets of Attica whose claim to be poets in the true sense of the word was sanctioned by the state itself. Aristotle assumes to possess no direct and personal knowledge of the literary merits of their productions; it was enough for him that the state had deemed them worthy. We can no longer be in doubt as to the exact meaning of *μνημονεύονται*; the official didascalie *μνήματα* were the only source which could furnish both their names and their date in relation to the first official comic contests.<sup>40</sup> There were, of course, other poets mentioned in the early comic didascalie; these two are selected as the most representative of the number.

The phrase *ὅψε ποτε* is not so vague and baffling as before, now that we know positively that Aristotle could have given the exact year had he desired. It is, of course, used with reference to tragedy, but since we do not know precisely what period Aristotle had in mind for tragedy—its admission into the Dionysia under Peisistratus, or the establishment of the tragic choregia under the new democracy—it is useless to indulge in speculation as to the exact number of years the phrase would require.<sup>41</sup> It may be that we should interpret *ὅψε* in terms of development rather than of years; comedy had reached a state of greater maturity when taken in charge by the state than had tragedy when it was so adopted. In any event, we are no longer obliged to seek a date as late as possible, influenced by *ὅψε ποτε* combined with *πολλῶ πρότερος*; for the date of Epicharmus's reputation as a comic poet at Megara may be as early as the epoch date of tragedy.<sup>42</sup> We have learned, moreover, that the epoch date of comedy was derived from the Athenian didascalie records, and that, in trying to recover it, we are not to be influenced by what we know of the non-publication of the early comedies. The records contained the names of Chionides and Magnes, among others, at or near the beginning of the lists which reported the contests in which comedy had a part. If we had access to the original didascalie documents themselves, we should at once look for the names of these two poets, assured that the admission of comedy into the festival programme dated not far from the year of their first appearance. Now the notice of Suidas, which reports *Χίωνιδης ἐδίδασκεν* for 488 or 487, may possibly go back to an excerpt from these didascalie. At any rate there is now no chronological obstacle in the way of such an assumption, and the notice on the face of it appears to be as trustworthy as any of the didascalie information furnished by Suidas.<sup>43</sup> It is hard to account for it, besides, on any other hypothesis—plain error, forgery, or stupid translation of Aristotle. But for the present we would best reserve our final

<sup>40</sup> SUSEMIEL, *loc. cit.*, p. 199, saw this, but did not make the application: "ergo hi duo poetae antiquissimi erant, quorum nomina in indicibus victoriarum philosophus invenit et ex eis haud dubie in Didascalias suas reciperat."

<sup>41</sup> Compare ἡ λείπει . . . ὅψι ἀπεσεμνύθη in the account of tragedy. We must agree with HILLER, *Rhein. Mus.*, XXXIX (1884), p. 338, that the tragedies of Phrynichus and Aeschylus were already *σεμναι* as regards λείπει; but opinions will differ as to whether the period of λείπει γέλοια must, on account of the ὅψι, be placed before Thespis.

<sup>42</sup> The equation set up by WILAMOWITZ, ὁ ἀρχαὶν ἰδμεν "lange nach Epicharm," therefore, only adds one more unknown quantity; cf. "Die Bühne des Aischylos," *Hermes*, Vol. XXI (1886), p. 613.

<sup>43</sup> Though many errors have crept into the text, yet one can, in general, agree with BERGK's verdict, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., Vol. XXXIV (1879), p. 318, note 1: "Die Angaben des Suidas über die dramatischen Dichter verdienen im Allgemeinen volles Vertrauen, denn sie gehen auf Didaskalien zurück."

opinion upon this point until we have examined the valuable fragments of Athenian *didascalai* preserved to us on stone.

In view of the facts thus elicited we may, by way of summary, paraphrase the argument of Aristotle as follows: The various steps in the development of comedy, such as have been traced for tragedy, are beyond our knowledge, because comedy was not an object of serious attention at first. No facts, naturally, are recorded for the period of volunteer performances, which preceded the appointment of comic choregi by the state, and this event was rather late as compared with tragedy. At this time, when we meet in the official records of the comic contests the names of Chionides and Magnes, who have already been mentioned as the earliest representatives of a literary comedy in Attica, comedy must already have taken on a more or less definite form to have obtained this recognition. But no one knows who was responsible for certain important innovations which must have been introduced after the admission of comedy into the festivals; for the plays produced in this period were not published, that is, the indifference of the public still continued. We do know, however, that Crates was the first at Athens to follow the lead of Epicharmus in the matter of plots, etc.

#### THE EVIDENCE FROM INSCRIPTIONS

We are fortunate in possessing a number of fragments of a series of inscriptions, which, taken together, originally constituted a complete record of the dramatic contests at the City Dionysia and Lenaea. One inscription gave the contestants and the titles of their plays, arranged in the order of their success in the competitions.<sup>44</sup> Another gave the names of the poets, arranged chronologically, and under each name the titles of the plays brought out, at each of the festivals, the year, and the rank as fixed by the judges.<sup>45</sup> Still another reported year by year all the victors of every class—tribes and choregi for the lyric events, and poets, choregi, and actors for the dramatic contests of each festival.<sup>46</sup> And, finally, a very extensive document in eight sections gave the names of the victorious poets and actors in tragedy and comedy for the two festivals separately, the names being arranged in the order of the first victories, with the total number of victories won.<sup>47</sup> These remarkable documents, all derived from the archives of the state officials under whose supervision the contests were held, were inscribed early in the third century. They were, in all probability, transcribed from the works of Aristotle entitled *Διδασκαλῖαι* and *Νῖκαι Διονυσιακαὶ καὶ Ληναϊκαί*, so far as they could be used, or, at any rate, were authorized by the state under the influence of Aristotle's studies in this field.<sup>48</sup>

Now, when we consider the wide publicity which the records of the Athenian

<sup>44</sup> In four sections: (1) *Dionysia*, tragedy, C I A II, 973, (2) comedy, 975; (3) *Lenaea*, comedy, 972, (4) tragedy, 972. For the order, cf. my article "The Dating of Some Didascalie Inscriptions," *Am. Jour. Arch.*, 2d Ser., Vol. IV (1900), p. 86.

<sup>45</sup> *Insc. Graec. Sic. et Ital.*, 1097, 1098. These fragments embrace only the comic poets. The fragments are too

broken to furnish much specific information. The current restorations are useless as sources of information.

<sup>46</sup> C I A II, 971, and IV, p. 218. The corresponding lists for the *Lenaea* are not preserved.

<sup>47</sup> C I A II, 977, and IV, p. 220.

<sup>48</sup> WILAMOWITZ, *Herakles*, Vol. I (ed. 1), p. 50; but he sets the date of the inscriptions about fifty years too early.

dramatic exhibitions enjoyed in antiquity, through both the works of Aristotle and these documents set up on the acropolis and in the precinct of the theatre of Dionysus, we are able not only better to understand how even minute details concerning the poets and the contests, such, for example, as the period of Euetes and the victories of Eudoxus, came to be known and mentioned by grammarians, biographers, and chronographers, but also to appreciate the chances in favor of the accuracy of information, not exactly didascalie, which is occasionally furnished; for example, that certain poets were contemporaries, as Aristophanes and Nicophon, Menander and Apollodorus of Gela, Chionides and Magnes. In spite of the epitomizing, paraphrasing, and formalizing through which this material has gone, in spite of the manifold chances of error in transmission, the student in this field comes to have a profound respect for such notices scattered up and down Greek and Roman literature, feeling that in the end they probably go back to the infallible records of the Athenian archives, and that he should not reject them or attempt to correct them except upon evidence equally free from suspicion.

Let us consider next some of the fragments of these inscriptions which throw light upon the period of the Old Comedy, in the hope of getting somewhat nearer to the epoch date that we are seeking.

1. *The catalogues of all the victors at the City Dionysia.*—The name of Magnes, as victor in a comic contest at a time not far from the date of the admission of comedy into the state festivals, occurs in frag. *a* of the great catalogue of victors at the City Dionysia, C I A II, 971. This fragment does not contain a date line, but it was contiguous to frag. *f*, which does. Frag. *a* stood at the head of the first column of the second slab of the inscription; the exact position of frag. *f* is unknown. The attempt has repeatedly been made<sup>4</sup> to determine the exact position of *f* in relation to *a*, and thus to ascertain the exact date of Magnes's victory, but I have long been of the opinion that none of the conclusions reached by various scholars is possible, firstly, because they all disregard certain important epigraphical factors in the problem, and secondly, because they start with the assumption that Magnes could not

<sup>4</sup>Frag. *a* has been known since 1839 through its publication by PITTAKIS, but its importance was first recognized, after LEO, "Ein Sieg des Magnes," *Rhein. Mus.*, Vol. XXXIII (1878), pp. 139 ff., by KOEHLER, "Documente zur Geschichte des athenischen Theaters," *Ath. Mitth.*, Vol. III (1878), pp. 104 ff., and BERGK, "Verzeichniss der Siege dramatischer Dichter in Athen," *Rhein. Mus.*, Vol. XXXIV (1879), pp. 330 ff. Frag. *f* was first published by GEORGIOS 'Εφ. 'Αρχ., Vol. IV (1886), p. 267, and its significance at once recognized by LIPSIVS, *Sitzungsber. d. k. sächs. Gesell. d. Wiss. zu Leipzig*, philol.-histor. Classe (1887), pp. 278 ff. Of the other fragments, *g* and *h* were published by LOLLING, *Sitzungsber. d. k. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin* (1887), p. 1069; *b* and *d* by KOEHLER, *Ath. Mitth.*, Vol. III (1878), pp. 104 ff. What is known as frag. *c* is a hopeless jumble taken from the notes of PITTAKIS, and should not be counted as a document. Fragments *a-e*, C I A II, 971; *f-h*, IV, p. 218.

The most important discussions of the epoch date of the inscription are: BRINCK, "Inscriptiones Graecae ad

choregiam pertinentes," *Diss. Hal.*, Vol. VII (1886), pp. 164 ff., A. MUELLER, "Neuere Arbeiten auf dem Gebiete des griechischen Bühnenwesens," *Philologus*, Supplbd. VI (1891), pp. 83 ff., and BODENSTEINER, "Bericht über das antike Bühnenwesen," *Bursians Jahresber.*, Vol. CVI (1901), pp. 135 ff. Mention should also be made of the elaborate but untrustworthy essay of OEHMICHEN, "Ueber die Anfänge der dramatischen Wettkämpfe in Athen," *Sitzungsber. d. k. bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. zu München*, philol. Classe, 1889, pp. 140 ff. Though the errors of Oehmichen were promptly pointed out by Müller and later by Bodensteiner, they have continued to influence the views of his colleague, WILHELM CHRIST; cf. *Gesch. d. gr. Litt.*, Ste Aufl., p. 196, note 4, and p. 215, note 4. It is rather remarkable, considering the attention paid to this inscription, that no one has hitherto made use of the later fragments in the attempt to solve the epigraphical questions which are all important for the interpretation of the earlier.

971a

Ο Ν Κ Ω Μ Ο Ι Η Σ Α Ν Τ Ω

Ξ]ΕΝΟΚΛΕΙΔΗΞΕΧΟΡΗΓΕ  
 Μ]ΑΓΝΗΞΕΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΝ  
 ΤΡΑΓΩΙΔΩΝ  
 ΠΕΡΙΚΛΗΣΧΟΛΑΡ: ΕΧΟΡΗ  
 ΑΙΞΧΥΛΟΣΕ[Δ]ΙΔΑΣΚΕΝ

ΠΑΝΔΙΟΝΙ[ΞΑΝΔΡΩΝ]  
 ΚΛΕΑΙΝΕΤ[ΟΣΕΧΟΡΗΓΕΙ]  
 ΚΩΜΩΙΔΩΝ

971f

ΕΠΙΧΑΡΗΤΟΣ] (472/1)

[ΤΡΑΓΩΙΔΩΝ]

.....  
 .....  
 .....

ΚΩΜΩΙΔΩΝ]

..... ΟΡΗΓΕΙ  
 .....ΞΕΔΙΔ]ΑΣΚΕΝ<sup>1</sup>  
 ΤΡΑΓΩΙΔΩΝ]

.....ΕΧ]ΟΡΗΓΕΙ  
 ΠΟΛΥΦΡΑΣΜΩ]ΝΕΔΙΔΑΣ<sup>2</sup>  
 ΕΠΙΤΡΑΞΙΕΡΓΟ]Υ<sup>3</sup> (471/0)  
 ΙΠΠΟΘΩΝΤΙΞΠΑ]ΙΔΩΝ<sup>4</sup>

ΡΗΓΕΙ

ΩΝ

ΟΡΗΓ

ΕΙ

..... : ΕΧΟΡΗ

..... ΕΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΝ  
 ΕΠΙΦΙΛ]ΟΚΛΕΟΥΞ (459/8)

ΑΙ]ΝΗΙΞΠΑΙΔΩΝ

ΔΗΜΟΔΟΚΟΣΕΧΟΡΗΓΕ

ΙΠΠΟΘΩΝΤΙΞΑΝΔΡΩΝ

ΕΥΚΤΗΜΩΝΕΛΕΥ: ΕΧΟΡΗ

ΚΩΜΩΙΔΩΝ

ΕΥΡΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΞΕΧΟΡΗΓΕΙ

ΕΥΦΡΟΝΙΟΣΕΔΙΔΑΣΚΕ

ΤΡΑΓΩΙΔΩΝ

ΞΕΝΟΚΛΗΣΑΦΙΔΝΑ: ΕΧΟΡΗ

ΑΙΞΧΥΛΟΣΕΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΝ

ΕΠΙΑΒΡΩΝΟΣ (458/7)

ΕΡΕΧΘΗΙΞΠΑΙΔΩΝ

ΧΑΡΙΑΞΑΓΡΥΛΗ: ΕΧΟΡΗ

ΛΕΩΝΤΙΞΑΝΔΡΩΝ

ΔΕΙΝΟΣΤΡΑΤΟΣΕΧΟ[ΡΗΓΕΙ

ΚΩΜΩΙΔΩΝ

ΟΡΗΓ

ΒΙΩ

ΚΩΜ[ΩΙΔΩΝ

ΑΝΔ

ΚΑΛ[ΑΙΑΞ -<sup>5</sup>

ΤΡΑ[ΓΩΙΔΩΝ

ΘΑ

ΚΑ[ΡΚΙΝΟΣ<sup>6</sup>

ΥΠ[ΟΚΡΙΤΗΣ - -

ΕΠ[ΙΚΑΛΛΙΜΑΧΟΥ<sup>7</sup>  
 (446/5)

<sup>1</sup>The name that follows Magnes in CIA II, 977i; see p. 25.

<sup>2</sup>Lipsius.

<sup>3</sup>My restoration, to be established in the following discussion.

<sup>4</sup>See p. 17.

<sup>5</sup>My restoration; cf. *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XX (1899), p. 306, note 1.

<sup>6</sup>Lipsius.

have exhibited before about the date at which Meineke placed his floruit. It will therefore be necessary to consider at considerable length all of the seven published fragments of this inscription. I regret that I shall not have the advantage of using the fragments still unpublished, announced by Dr. Adolph Wilhelm some years ago; but those which we possess will suffice for our present purpose.<sup>50</sup> I give first the text of the two earliest fragments.

It will be seen that the complete record of each year, in frag. *a* and the first two columns of frag. *f*, occupies eleven lines, and that these lines always recur in the same order. In the third column of frag. *f* we notice the addition of a twelfth line, the victorious tragic actor—*ἵπ[οκρίτης ὁ δαίνα]*. This recurs in all the later fragments. The only disturbance of this twelve-line record in the extant fragments is in the narrow outer column of the latest fragment, where two lines are sometimes required for a single entry. There may, of course, have been other disturbances in the portions now lost; for example, we might expect to find during the continuance of the synchoregia (406/5 and some years thereafter)<sup>51</sup> two lines used for the two choregi of both tragedy and comedy. But for our present purpose we may treat the order and number of lines to the year as fixed for the entire inscription.

In attempts to fix the date of the events in frag. *a*, col. 1, recourse has been had to general considerations based upon the choregia of Pericles for a play of Aeschylus, combined with the current view that Magnes could not have exhibited until about the middle of the sixties. We have already seen how uncertain the data are upon which the opinion about Magnes rests; as to Pericles, the idea that he would have been too young to undertake a choregia before *ca.* 467 is the result of guesswork rather than of evidence.<sup>52</sup> The only trustworthy means available for prosecuting our inquiry to a certain conclusion—the restoration of the date-lines in the first columns of fragments *f* and *e*, using one as a check on the other—has been overlooked entirely, chiefly, it would seem, because of the fixed idea concerning the lateness of Magnes and the official adoption of comedy, and also partly, no doubt, because of certain difficulties in the way of any consistent reconstruction of the inscription as a whole, due to misleading or incorrect reports in the *Corpus* as to the condition of fragments *g* and *e*. Obviously

<sup>50</sup> The main outlines of this study were worked out some five years ago; cf. *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XX (1899), p. 388. I visited Athens in the spring of 1899 chiefly for the purpose of examining the stones, especially to clear away some doubts about KOEHLER's reports on certain fragments; see below, p. 19 (*g*) and p. 22 (*e*, col. 2). It was on the strength of my conviction regarding this inscription that I assumed *ca.* 140 lines also for CIA II, 972; cf. *Amer. Jour. Arch.*, 2d Ser., Vol. IV (1900), pp. 76, 86.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. my article, "The Dramatic Synchoregia at Athens," *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XVII (1896), pp. 319 ff.

<sup>52</sup> It is now generally admitted that the combination upon which KOEHLER (after LEO) based his theory of 63 lines has no force. Plutarch's "forty years of public life" has to be taken as a round number (*Pericles*, 16), and the choregia is misconstrued. It was an obligation put upon

the citizen—a tax on the wealthy—not voluntarily assumed, as a rule, and could hardly have been interpreted by Theopompus, or whoever was the source of Plutarch, as marking the entry of a person upon his political career. Partly as the result of Köhler's interpretation, and partly owing to WILAMOWITZ's (*Hermes*, Vol. IX, p. 337) idea that the recognition of comedy was one of the events characteristic of the first years of the dominant influence of Pericles, one finds here and there an amazing misconception of the choregia; e. g., DENIS, *La comédie grecque*, Vol. I, p. 121, note 2: "Périclès avait besoin de munificences personnelles pour gagner le peuple et pour se l'attacher;" and COUAT, *Aristophane*, p. 22: "C'était le moment où Périclès allait briser la puissance de l'aristocratie en dépouillant l'Aréopage de ses privilèges. Il se peut qu'il ait voulu alors faire servir la comédie à ses desseins."

the inscription must, if possible, be interpreted and restored epigraphically, by strict adherence to all the indications furnished by the stones themselves, before we allow ourselves to be influenced overmuch by the chronological consequences involved.

That the number of lines to the column in the portion under the heading was three lines less than a multiple of eleven, *i. e.*, 41, 52, 63, etc., is obvious from the fact that the eleventh line in any year in col. 1 is opposite the eighth in col. 2. The lower limit can be fixed by reference to the actors' contest recorded in col. 3 of frag. *f*. The fifth line of the year (B $\omega$ -) in this column is now found to be opposite the eleventh (the tragic poet) in the preceding column. The twelve-line record has therefore already occurred three times before the current year, *i. e.*, the contest of tragic actors was introduced just four years before the year of the lost archon in col. 3. If the new contest was introduced in the earliest possible year, in the archonship of Habron (458/7), the lost archon of col. 3 was of the year 454/3, and the column contained four full years of twelve lines plus four lines, *i. e.*, 52 lines.<sup>43</sup> It could not possibly have been less than 52, but it may have been indefinitely more.<sup>44</sup> For every additional eleven lines the date of the first actors' contest, of course, is later by one year, *i. e.*, if the column contained 63 lines it would be 457/6, 74 lines 456/5, 140 lines 450/49.

We may now take up col. 1 of frag. *f*. Lipsius observed that the name of the victorious tragic poet must have been unusually long, to judge by the position of its final letter - $\nu$ . We notice too that the heading *τραγωιδῶν* is entirely broken away—another indication that the lost name was at least eleven letters long. There can be no question as to the correctness of Lipsius's restoration [*Πολυφράσμων*] $\nu$ , especially since his name happens to be preserved on the list of victorious tragic poets, CIA II, 977*a*, between Aeschylus and Sophocles. The tribe Hippothontis is the only one that will fit the space below the archon's name. With the knowledge thus gained we look over the list of the archons of this period. There are only five names between Tlepolemus, of the year 463/2 (requiring 52 lines) and Praxiergus, of 471/0 (140 lines), whose names meet at all satisfactorily the conditions of space and genitive-ending. I give them in juxtaposition:

Archons	Year	Lines
(ΠΟΛΥΦΡΑΣΜΩΝ) ΕΠΙΤΑΛΗΤΟΛΕΜΟΥ	463/2	52
ΑΡΧΙΔΗΜΙΔΟΥ	464/3	63
ΛΥΣΙΣΤΡΑΤΟΥ	467/6	96
ΘΕΑΓΕΝΙΔΟΥ	468/7	107
ΠΡΑΞΙΕΡΓΟΥ	471/70	140
(ΙΠΠΟΘΩΝΤΙΣΤΑΙ-)		

<sup>43</sup> ORHMICHEN, it is true, assumes 30 lines, making the first actors' contest that which happens to be recorded in col. 3, or one year before. But this leaves him with two or three unoccupied lines after Habron's year, which he can only account for by assuming the interpolation of some explanatory words about the actors' contest—an expedient which MUELLER and BODENSTEINER rightly re-

fuse to consider. MUELLER's dates for the actors' contest (pp. 82 f.) are corrected by BODENSTEINER (p. 137).

<sup>44</sup> The notion that more than 63 lines would exceed the probable dimensions even of a large public inscription (BODENSTEINER, p. 137) was clearly not advanced by an epigraphist; KOEHLER decided upon 63 only on account of Pericles.



The position of the -Y in relation to the -N is correctly given in the copy on p. 15. Iota occupies less than (about one-half) the space of an ordinary letter, Ω a little more. 'Αρχιδημίδου and Λυσιστράτου satisfy the space relations somewhat less satisfactorily than the other three names. Lysistratus and Theagenides may be regarded as somewhat doubtful, besides, because of the possibility that another poet than Polyphrasmon was victorious in the tragic contest the year before each of them; Aeschylus brought out the *Septem* the year before Lysistratus, and won, and Sophocles's first victory was won the year before Theagenides, almost certainly at the City Dionysia.<sup>45</sup> But in spite of these possible objections it would be safer to regard these five names for the present as all equally possible, and to seek in frag. e for the information by which we shall be able to eliminate all but one of them.

971 e

..... ΧΕ]ΧΟΡΗ'	Ε]ΠΙΑΡΙΞΤ[Ο]ΦΑΝΟΥΞ (331/0)
..... Ε]ΔΙΑ[ΑΞ]ΚΕ	ΟΙΝΗΙΞΤΤΑΙΑΔΩ[Ν
ΥΠΟΚΡΙΤΗΞΑ]ΘΗΝΟΔΩΡΟΞ	..... ΤΟΞ[ΑΧ]ΑΡΝ[ΕΥΞΕΧΟΡΗ
ΕΠΙΞΩΞΙΓΕΝΟ]ΥΞ (342/1)	ΙΠΠΟΘΩΝΤΙΞΑΝΔΡΩΝ
ΑΙΓΗΙΞΤΤΑΙΑΔ]ΩΝ	..... ΟΞ[ΤΤ]ΕΙ[Ρ]ΑΙΕ[ΥΞΕΧΟΡΗ
..... ΔΙ]ΟΜΕ[ΕΥΞΕΧΟΡ]Η	[ΚΩΜ]ΩΙΑΔ[ΩΝ'
ΙΠΠΟΘΩΝΤΙΞ]ΑΝΔΡΩΝ	ΤΡΑΓ]Ω[ΙΑΩΝ
..... ΕΚΚΟΙ]ΛΗΞΕΧΟΡΗ	
ΚΩΜΩΙΑΔΩΝ]	
..... ΗΞ[ΕΧΟΡΗ'	
.....	
ΤΡΑΓΩΙΑΔΩΝ]	
..... ΕΧ]ΟΡ[Η	
ΑΞΤΥΔΑΜΑΞΕΔΙ]Δ[ΑΞΚΕΝ'	

<sup>1</sup> Σημαχ(ιδης)?

<sup>2</sup> -Λης or -δης.

<sup>3</sup> We know from CIA II, 973, that Astydamos was the victor in 341. If I rightly detect the faint outlines of a Δ in

the position indicated we have a slight confirmation of the restoration of Sosigenes.

<sup>4</sup> Very faint traces.

The archon Aristophanes was of the year 331/0. Since the restoration *ὑποκριτής* in the first column is certain (for the word is never abbreviated in this inscription), the name of the archon just below, with the genitive-ending -ους, was about ten letters in length. Now if we try here the several line-numbers shown to be possible by our consideration of frag. f, we find that only one archon of the five, the one representing a column of 140 lines, fulfils the conditions, as the following table will show:

<sup>45</sup> Plutarch, *Cimon*, 8 relates that the decision was committed to the ten generals by Aesepion, the first archon, who was evidently, therefore, in charge of the contest.

Lines	Archons frag. <i>e</i>	Year	Archons frag. <i>f</i>
	(ΥΠΟΚΡΙΤΗΣ ΑΘΗ-)		
52	ΕΠΙΤΥΘΟΔΗΛΟΥ	336/5	Tlepolemus
63	ΦΥΝΙΧΟΥ	337/6	Archidemides
96	ΛΥΞΙΜΑΧΟΥ	339/8	Lysistratus
107	ΘΕΟΦΡΑΣΤΟΥ	340/39	Theogenides
140	ΞΩΙΓΕΝΟΥΞ	342/1	Praxiergus

There would seem to be no room for doubt that the name of Sosigenes is to be restored here and that of Praxiergus in frag. *f*, if we are right in assuming that the columns throughout the inscription contained the same, or nearly the same, number of lines. But this assumption may not be right, and so no conclusion can be accepted as final until it has been tested rigorously by the other fragments.

Frag. *h* (see Plate IV, at the end of the article) also contains an archon's name in its second column, Cephisophon of 329/8, and broken line-ends in the first. Its position was near the top of the slab, for only two year-lists intervene between Aristophanes, about 17 lines from the bottom of col. 2 of *e*, and Cephisophon. The first column of *h* therefore continued the first of *e*, and its second column the second of *e*. The exact interval can now be determined. The first line of the column in which was the first column of *h* was the twelfth line in the year of Sosigenes, and this is known from CIA II, 973—ὑποκριτῆς Νεοπτόλεμος. There can be no doubt of the correctness of Köhler's restoration of -λος in the third line of *h*, col. 1, as [ὑποκριτῆς Θέττα]λος. This line was therefore the 13th from the top, and Θέτταλος was in the last line of the year 341/0. The name of Cephisophon stood in the 18th line of the second column. I shall discuss later on the irregularities in this second column of *h*; as to the first column, we know from 973 that Thettalus was indeed the victor in 340, and that Astydamos was the successful poet. The position of -σκει just above -λος gives precisely the space required for the name of Astydamos. We may therefore look upon this fragment as confirming the restoration of Sosigenes in frag. *e* and of Praxiergus in frag. *f*.

I had reached this point in the demonstration some five years ago, when occupied with the series of inscriptions relating to the dramatic contests. I could find no solution of fragments *f* and *e* except on the basis of 140 lines. Frag. *g*, however, seemed to be wholly at variance with this result, and, besides, blocked the way to any other solution. It contains eight lines, including a complete date-line—Themistocles, the archon of 347/6, i. e., five years before Sosigenes. According to the hypothesis of 140 lines, therefore, it must have had a position in the same column as the first column of frag. *e*, and about half-way up the column; for *e* was at the bottom of its slab, as Köhler reported; and this report is shown to be correct by the fact that a portion of the record of the year after Aristophanes was at the top of the next column after *e* (i. e., frag. *h*, col. 2). But Köhler also reported that frag. *g* retains an original upper margin, so that it must have stood at the top of a column. Now if Sosigenes was correctly

restored in *c*, and Köhler's observation regarding the upper margin of *g* was correct, this column would have contained only 76 lines, though the next column seemed to have 140. Either Köhler or my hypothesis was wrong. With this dilemma in mind I made a careful examination of frag. *g*, and was not surprised to find that the present upper margin is not original, but the result of a later cutting. The fragment had been put to some architectural use after it had been broken off. The broken letters which Köhler reports in the first line some distance below the present margin are, in fact, immediately below and on the margin (Plate IV); this line was half cut away when the present upper surface was made. Frag. *g*, therefore, is not against the hypothesis.<sup>56</sup>

The reconstruction of the early portions of the inscription on the basis of 140 lines to the column has been found to be the only possible solution of one of the three two-column fragments (*c*), and the most suitable, if not the only, solution of the other two (*f*, *h*), and at the same time not opposed to the facts regarding frag. *g*. It remains only to test this result by considering the reconstruction as a whole. Two tests must be applied: (1) The intervals between any two fragments whose position in the column is fixed should yield an even number of twelve-line lists distributed over an even number of columns of 140 lines without excess or deficiency of lines, and (2) the other fragments which we have not considered must find a suitable position within the column, *i. e.*, the records contained in them must not be broken by column-divisions. The only fragments to be considered under the latter head are *b* and *d*. The former contains the archon of 422/1. It would fall well within the third column to the right of frag. *f*. The undated *d* would fit into any reconstruction, but the mention of the comic poet Procleides indicates that the date is somewhere near the thirties.<sup>57</sup> Therefore it may have had a place above Aristophanes, frag. *e*, col. 2, and below Thettalus in frag. *h*, col. 1; or it may have stood between frag. *g* and the first column of *e*, as I have placed it in the Plate IV.

The first-named test is a rigorous one to apply to a document so fragmentary, for all sorts of inequalities, such as I have already suggested and such as are actually found in the last two columns, may have affected the lost portions. Besides, the extent of the heading over the columns, occupying the space of two lines, is as yet absolutely unknown. But the test must nevertheless be made, though we should not expect a perfect mathematical proof. Beginning, then, with fragg. *a* and *f*, the former of which is fixed in position, let us test the interval down to the first column of *e*, which also is fixed. In order to get a date to begin with, let us assume that *f* was directly under *a*, as I have placed it in the plate, with the smallest possible interval; the lost archon in the 16th line of the third column would accordingly, on the supposi-

<sup>56</sup>The tragic poet in the fourth line, reported as  $\alpha\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  by KOHLER, was, I think, Astydamos. Though the surface is in very bad condition, traces of the letters . . .  $\alpha\lambda\gamma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  can be made out.

<sup>57</sup>*Cf. Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XVI (1896), p. 325. I there used the position of Procleides in the list of comic poets, CIA

II, 977*g*, to establish the date of the list in 971*d*. I had not then recognized 977*g* as Lenaeon. MUELLER's criticism of the logic of my argument is well taken (*Berl. phil. Woch.*, Vol. XX (1901), col. 213), but the period to which I then assigned Procleides is right—the second half of the century instead of the first (KOHLER).

tion of 140 lines, be Callimachus, 446/5. Sosigenes, 342/1, was in the 130th line of the column. The interval of 104 years between Callimachus and Sosigenes, at the normal rate of 12 lines to the year, would require 1248 lines. Now 125 of these are needed to fill out the column after Callimachus, and 129 for the column above Sosigenes. This leaves 994 lines for the full columns between, or 14 lines more than would be accommodated by seven columns of 140 lines. Assuming, again, that frag. *f* was separated from *a* by a larger interval, the remainder becomes larger also—25, 36, 47, etc., lines according as the interval was one full year (11 lines), or two or three years, respectively. In other words, the records of the 104 years require more space by 14, 25, 36, 47, etc., lines than columns of 140 lines will yield. We have proceeded, however, as if the heading extended over all these columns. Obviously a limited number of extra lines are available if the space of two lines occupied by the heading in the first part of the inscription was used for the yearly record after the heading ceased; but this could not be more than 16 lines, for there were only eight columns between Callimachus and Sosigenes. The first remainder of 14 lines, therefore, should not disturb us. If *f* was close up to *a*, the heading was wanting in seven of these eight columns, i. e., it extended over one column beyond frag. *f*. It is easy to see that this is the correct solution. The interval could not possibly have been one, three, or five years, because the resulting number of lines left between Callimachus and Sosigenes would be an odd number, while just 1248 are required. It is altogether improbable, further, that the interval was two, four, or six years; at any rate we may not assume such an interval, because we should be obliged at the same time to assume a constantly increasing irregularity in the annual lists, and that, too, of the most improbable kind—the contraction of the lists to less than 12 lines for each year. Clearly the only safe course is to assume that the twelve-line lists were constant, and that *f* was as close as possible to *a*, and that the heading extended over one column beyond the third column of *f*. The hypothesis of 140 lines has therefore met the most rigid test fully, and we have incidentally arrived at two facts of considerable importance for the reconstruction of the inscription as a whole.

Applying the same test to fragments *e* and *h*, we obtain results not quite so remarkable for their precision, but yet not such as to discredit the conclusion which we have reached. The first column of frag. *e* connects properly with the first of *h*, as we have already seen. After this point we must recognize the existence of two lacunae, i. e., the normal twelve-lines lists do not quite fill out the space. The first is in the column above Aristophanes. This name should be the 133d after Sosigenes; it is, in fact, the 137th, about.<sup>18</sup> Four lines between the years 340 and 331 were therefore used for entries of which we have no knowledge. Again, between the second column of *e* and the second of *h* is more space by six lines, as I reckon it,<sup>19</sup> than is needed for the two years between Aristophanes and Cephisophon, after allowing for the spreading out

<sup>18</sup> The lines in the two columns are not exactly opposite.      year began in the first line of the last column. This  
<sup>19</sup> Eighteen lines are left for the year 331/0, if the next      assumes 143 lines for this column (col. xiv in Plate).

of the entries in the last column. The lower part of *e* is so corroded that Köhler thought there had never been writing upon it; but some of the space left vacant by him must have been used—all but the space of six lines, and more if the irregularity in the column above this point continued. And I am certain that I made out traces, though exceedingly faint, of letters in the upper part of this space. The existence of these lacunae does not vitiate in the least the conclusions reached above, for the evidence for the first eleven columns could scarcely be more clear and conclusive, as it seems to me. We can only explain the lacunae by supposing that occasionally, after 340, something new in the programme of the festival required additional space in the record.

I may add here that the number of columns to the slab seems not to have been always the same. The last slab, containing fragg. *g*, *e*, *d*, *h*, had three columns, for the left margin of *g* is preserved, and the crowding in the second column of *h* indicates that this was the last column on the slab.<sup>61</sup> There is no such crowding in the third column of *f*; this slab had three columns, perhaps more. Assuming three, the seven columns lying between *f* and *g* may have been distributed: 4 + 3, or 3 + 4, or 3 + 2 + 2. I should think the chances somewhat against the supposition of a slab of more than three columns, and in favor of a series of threes and twos.

This part of our reconstruction is complete. All the positive indications furnished by the fragments are in favor of 140 lines for the first four columns, and for 142 for the rest. None of the available means of control—and they seem to be adequate—tends to throw suspicion upon this result.<sup>62</sup> We turn now to the second task—to fix the position of frag. *f* with relation to frag. *a*, though the result has already been anticipated in the preceding argument.

The first two columns of *f* must have continued the two columns of *a*, as both Köhler and Lipsius assumed. Frag. *f*. cannot have preceded *a*, for the victories of Aeschylus and Magnes in *a* would then have been later than the *Oresteia*. Nor can *f* follow *a*, as Oehmichen assumed, for then the choregia of Pericles would go back into the nineties. The fact that frag. *a* was in the first column on its slab, as is shown by the preserved left margin, prevents the placing of the second column of *f* under the first column of *a*, and the resulting early date of Pericles's choregia likewise prevents the placing of the first column of *f* under the second column of *a*.<sup>63</sup> We are therefore obliged to consider *f* a direct continuation of *a*.

The interval between the two fragments has already been determined by the space required for the 104 years between Callimachus and Sosigenes; Callimachus cannot have been below the 16th line in its column. The victories of Aeschylus, Pericles, and Magnes were won in the archonship of Menon, 473/2. This was the year of Aeschylus's victory with the *Persae*-trilogy. There is nothing against this date

<sup>61</sup> The crowding may be due simply to the length of line required in the first two columns of the slab. The average for the first two columns is 20 letters to the line, while in *a* and *f* the average is about 17 or 18. But in this column there is room for only 15. The slab was therefore wide enough for three columns of the usual width.

<sup>62</sup> The introduction of the actors' contest is fixed by the length of the column (p. 17, above); it was in 450/49, archon Euthynus.

<sup>63</sup> An arrangement which BODENSTEINER thought deserved consideration. But with 140 lines it is of course out of the question.

in the fact that Pericles was choregus. For aught we know he was born *ca.* 500,<sup>64</sup> and we know of one person who served as tragic choregus at the age of 18.<sup>65</sup>

2. *The lists of victorious comic poets, Dionysia and Lenaea.*—We have already reached a date for Magnes and the beginning of the official comic contests at least as early as 473/2, and in so far have found a substantial confirmation for our interpretation of Aristotle. But we have also another inscriptional document which mentions Magnes, and its epoch date was certainly the year of the first victor in the comic contest at the City Dionysia. Through it we can establish the fact that Magnes had predecessors in the competitions prior to the year 473, and that in all probability Magnes himself exhibited and won victories considerably before the archonship of Menon. It will be advantageous to have this additional evidence before us before we continue our study of the catalogue of victors.

The name of Magnes occurs again in the catalogues of victorious comic poets, at the top of fragment *i* of C I A II, 977. I give (p. 24) the text of this fragment and of the first column (frag. *d*) of the corresponding list for the other festival. The headings are restored in the manner which seems to me best to meet the requirements of both the remains of the Lenaeian heading and the purpose of the catalogue. I have elsewhere tried to establish the fact that frag. *i* is the Dionysian list, frag. *d* the Lenaeian, and need not repeat my arguments here.<sup>66</sup> Accepting this classification, and employing the data furnished by the inscription which we have just considered and by various didascalical notices, we may gain some idea concerning the period indicated by the position of Magnes's name and concerning the beginning of the Dionysian catalogue, which, of course, began with the first victor at the comic contest after the admission of comedy into the City Dionysia.

In the full column under the heading there were originally fifteen names. The names are arranged chronologically in the order of first victories. It may therefore happen that the same poet may be mentioned at a considerably later period in one list than in the other, as for example Cratinus won a Lenaeian victory much later than his first victory at the Dionysia. But in general a poet is earlier in the Lenaeian list. To ascertain the period in which the first victory of Magnes fell we must learn from other sources the dates of the first Dionysian victories of other poets who followed him, and

<sup>64</sup> So KIRCHNER, *Prosop. Att.*: "natus est non multo post a. 500." He was born before the ostracism of his father in 484 (BELOCH, *Gr. Gesch.*, Vol. I, p. 463, note 5). Aristotle characterizes him as *vîos* in 463, *i. e.*, "in the thirties" (*Æth. Pol.*, 27, 1). There is no ground whatever for SUSZMIEL's assumption, *Revue de philologie*, Vol. XIX (1895), p. 199: "vixit Pericles iam choregi officiis functus est, priusquam ad rempublicam accederet administrandam." This liturgy was imposed upon the rich without any regard to their prominence in public affairs.

<sup>65</sup> Lysias, 21, 1. The defendant was in the year of his *δωδεκαετία*.

<sup>66</sup> "The Catalogues of Victors at the City Dionysia, C I A II, 977," *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XX (1899), pp. 388 ff. The classification in the *Corpus* is just the opposite. I am

glad to note that my results have been accepted by KIRCHNER, *Prosopographia Attica*, Add. et Corrig. in Vol. II (1903), and KRAUSE, *De Apollodoris comicis*, diss. Berol. (1903), p. 30. The late PROFESSOR KAIBEL also wrote me in approval, although in his articles on the comic poets in the Pauly-Wissowa *Encyclopädie* he had followed the current classification. ALBERT MUELLER in his able review of my article, *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.*, 1901, 209 ff., advances a series of objections to my methods of argumentation—objections often valid enough taken singly, and in most cases expressly acknowledged by me. But his defense of BERGK's classification is based upon the false assumption that there was ever any valid reason in favor of it. It is enough if I have shown that my classification satisfies the evidence better than Bergk's; the burden of proof should not be on the objector in this case.

<i>Lenaea</i>	<i>Dionysia</i>
<i>CIA II, 977 d</i>	<i>CIA II, 977 i</i>
[ΚΩΜΙΚΩΝΤΑΛΗΝΑΙ]Α[ΠΟ]ΗΤΩΝ	[ΚΩΜΙΚΩΝΕΝΑΣΤΕΙΠΟΗΤΩΝ
[ΟΙΔΕΕΝΙΚ]ΩΝ	ΟΙΔΕΕΝΙΚΩΝ]
Ξ]ΕΝΟΦΙΛΟΣ I	.....
ΤΗΛΕΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ Π	.....
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΜΕΝΗΣ II	.....
ΚΡΑΤΙΝΟΣ III	.....
ΦΕΡΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ II	ΜΑΓΝΗ]Ξ ΔI <sup>1</sup>
ΕΡΜΙΠΠΟΣ IIII	..... Ξ I
ΦΡΥΝΙΧΟΣ II	..... ΝΗΣ I <sup>2</sup>
ΜΥΡΤΙΛΟΣ I	..... Ξ I
ΕΥ]ΠΟΛΙΞ III	ΕΥΦΡΟΝ]ΙΟΣ I <sup>3</sup>
.....	ΕΚΦΑΝ]ΤΙΔΗΣ-
.....	ΚΡΑΤΙ]ΝΟΣ ΠI
.....	ΔΙΟΤ]ΕΙΘΗΣ II <sup>4</sup>
.....	ΚΡΑ]ΤΗΣ III
.....	ΚΑΛΛΙΑ]ΞII <sup>5</sup>
.....	.....

<sup>1</sup> It is strange that KIRCHNER, *Prosop. Att.*, s. v. Μάγνης, should doubt this restoration, due to KOEHLER, which not only fits the space, but also explains the eleven victories assigned Magnes by Anon. v. *καμ.* II Kaib. BERG's objection was based upon a faulty chronology and a misstatement concerning Anonymous; cf. *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XX, p. 396, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> OEHMICHEN's 'Αλαμίδ]νης suits the space and what we know of the poet; cf. MEINKE, *Hist. crit.*, p. 101. I do not

understand on what grounds KAIBEL in Pauly-Wissowa regards the name, and the title of the play attributed to him, as a fraud.

<sup>3</sup> Due to OEHMICHEN.

<sup>4</sup> My restoration. OEHMICHEN's Φαλο]ειδης is impossible. Cf. *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XX, p. 396, note.

<sup>5</sup> *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XX, p. 396, note; cf. p. 15, f, col. 3, above. KIRCHNER, *Prosop. Att.*, Vol. II, p. 467, seems to look with favor upon this restoration.

make an estimate of the interval of time which separates their names in the list.<sup>67</sup> We may also in this way gain some information as to the number of poets whose names preceded his in the list.

To begin with the last name, we have seen that the comic poet Καλ-, who won the prize in the year 447/6 (971 f, col. 3), is probably Καλλίας, whose name makes a perfect restoration here. The first city victories of Crates and of Cratinus are probably indicated by the entries of Eusebius under the years 451/0 and 453/2 respectively,<sup>68</sup> so that we may properly assume that the victory of 447/6 was the first won by Callias. The one victory of Euphronius is recorded in 971 under the year of Philocles, 459/8. These four dates for the five names are entirely in harmony with each other—

<sup>67</sup> This method was followed by OEHMICHEN, "Ueber die Anfänge der dramatischen Wettkämpfe in Athen," *Sitzungsber. d. k. bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. zu München*, philos.-philol. Classe (1899), 155 ff. He also places Magnes as low as possible, and reaches the year 478 for the beginning of the contest, 472 for the other list. But his argumentation is weak and exceedingly superficial in details.

<sup>68</sup> Vers. Armen., *sub* Ol. 823: Crates comicus et Telesilla cognoscebantur; *sub* Ol. 814: Cratinus et Platon comici his

temporibus surgebant. So also Hieronymus and Syncellus; cf. Anon. v. *καμ.* II Kaib. concerning Cratinus's first victory; *νικᾷ μετὰ τὴν κα' ἐλ.* (the correction from *κα'* is certain; see *Am. Jour. Philol.*, Vol. XX, p. 396). The error as regards Plato should not be held to vitiate the whole notice, since the part which has to do with Cratinus is manifestly correct. The "epoch years" of these two poets were determined, then, by their first victories at the City Dionysia.

Euphronius 458, Cratinus 452, Crates 450, and Callias 446. The six poets mentioned between the years 458 and 446 won just one-half of the victories in these twelve years. The others were won by the predecessors of Euphronius; and not by the three immediately preceding, for they won only one victory each, but by Magnes and his predecessors. Again, we see that the name immediately following Magnes is to be restored in 971 *f*, col. 1, as the victor of the year 472/1. In the thirteen years between this unknown poet and Euphronius, ten victories were won by Magnes and his predecessors. Magnes himself won only eleven times *ἐν ᾧσδε* in his whole career, and although we learn from Aristophanes (*Knights*, 524) that his successes were won in his youth, and that he failed to please in old age, it is inconceivable that all his victories were won between the recorded victory of 472 and the year of Euphronius. We are obliged to assume, therefore, that one or more names preceded his in the list, with victories enough to their credit to fill up the catalogue down to 446; i. e., with about seven at the least. The reputation of Chionides, whose name was linked with that of Magnes, in all probability was based upon a marked success in the competitions, as well as upon his early date; for he was not the only poet who competed in the early years after the admission of comedy. We should not be far wrong, I believe, if we should place Magnes as far down in this column as possible, assuming, say, four names before him, as I have done above. And this would bring the date of the first victory of Magnes some years before 472, possibly into the eighties, and Chionides might easily, as far as this list is concerned, have competed in the official contests as early as the year recorded by Suidas, 488 or 487.

The Lenaeon list in frag. *d* points to quite as early a date for the introduction of the comic contest into the Lenaea. By a consideration of all the datable Lenaeon victories in the fifth century I have elsewhere<sup>69</sup> shown that the first names in this fragment must be placed about 450 to 445. One full column of fifteen names must have preceded this column, as is shown by the heading. Assuming even a low average of victories in the early period covered by the lost first column, we again reach the eighties for the beginning of the Lenaeon list. Since the average number of victories won by the early poets at the Dionysia was relatively high, there is nothing against the supposition that comedy was introduced into the Lenaea and the City Dionysia at the same time. Aristotle's words, *ὁ ἀρχὸν ἔδωκεν*, as we have seen, do not necessarily refer to the City Dionysia, but may be interpreted as indicating simply the establishment of the comic choregia. Frag. *d* is a proof that this interpretation is right.<sup>70</sup>

3. *The epoch date of the great catalogue.*—Returning now to the great catalogue of victors with the information which we have derived from the lists of comic poets,

<sup>69</sup> "Chronological Studies in the Greek Tragic and Comic Poets," *Am. Jour. Phil.*, Vol. XXI (1900), pp. 52 ff., in a discussion of Aristomenes, whose first Lenaeon victory I dated ca. 445. I there raised again the question propounded by BERG, whether the Aristomenes of this list could be the same as the rival of Aristophanes of the year 388. BERG thought that there must have been two poets of the name, and I was inclined to suspect an error in the

text of the hypothesis to the *Plutus*. But I now believe that we have evidence in *Inscr. Graec. Sic. et Ital.*, 1097, to prove that there was only one Aristomenes and that he competed in 388.

<sup>70</sup> I do not mean that it is proved that the admission of comedy into the two festivals took place in the same year, probable as it may seem, but that Aristotle did not intend to distinguish between the festivals.



let us try to determine what possibilities are offered in the lost first slab for the beginning of the eleven-line year-lists somewhere in the ten or fifteen years preceding the archonship of Menon. A number of possibilities will naturally offer themselves, and the choice among them will have to be determined by considerations other than epigraphical. But it will be well to have surveyed the field, at any rate, and to have reduced the possibilities to the narrowest limits.

One slab of probably not more than three columns nor less than two preceded fragment *a*. The record of victors began with the name of the archon at the very top of one of these columns.<sup>71</sup> From the available space in these columns we must deduct the six lines needed to fill out the year of Menon. The numbers to be dealt with are accordingly: 3 cols., 414 ll.; 2 cols., 274 ll.; 1 col., 134 ll. The epoch date of the stone will be either an even number, without remainder, of 11's, if the introduction of comedy into the City Dionysia is the epoch date, or of a combination of 8's and 11's, if it was some other important event in the history of the contests at this festival.

The epoch date of the inscription was not the first comic contest under state auspices, as has been maintained by Bergk, Reisch, and particularly by Wilamowitz; for, carrying the eleven-line lists back to the beginning of the first, second, and third columns, there is an excess of 2,<sup>72</sup> 10, and 7 lines respectively. This is the sound conclusion of both Müller and Bodensteiner, and relieves us of the painful necessity of making *κῶμοι* in the heading equivalent to *κωμῳδίαι*, against which numerous protests have been raised. We must look for some event earlier than the epoch date of comedy.

The events, of which we have knowledge, which must be taken into consideration as possible epoch dates, are: (1) The first tragic exhibition, by Thespis in 535/4. Brinck, in his admirable discussion of this question, has shown that, even if records were kept of the performances from this early period, yet it is altogether improbable that there should have been regular annual contests during the whole of this period. We know that the chorus of men dates only from 509/8,<sup>73</sup> and comedy from a time many years later. If the epoch were the first exhibition of tragedy, it is strange that *χοροὶ τραγῳδῶν*, or the equivalent, was not used in the heading, instead of the more general term *κῶμοι*, "celebrations." (2) The establishment of the musical contests at the Dionysia. This is the idea of the majority, though expressed in a variety of ways; but it is an idea based upon the fragmentary heading, and leaves us as much in the dark as ever. (3) The establishment of the choregic system at the City Dionysia. This is essentially Brinck's suggestion, and he would date this event 508 or soon

<sup>71</sup> OEHMICHEN assumed that if the heading contained the archon's name it would not have been needed at the beginning of the first year and on this ground adopted the theory of two columns of the 11-line year-lists. He accordingly restored 'Ἐνὶ Μένωνος, ἡ' οἷ, etc. But, as MÜLLER pointed out, it would have to be 'Ἀπὸ Μένωνος, etc. The date line of the first year could therefore not be dispensed with. It has occurred to me as possible that the *οἷδε ἐνίκων* was reserved out of the first line and set over the first column, as in 977. This would give two lines less to deal with. But

both heading and columns work out satisfactorily without this assumption.

<sup>72</sup> *οἷδε ἐνίκων*, it is true, may have occupied the extra two lines on the assumption of one column. This would make the epoch date 485/4. But, as we have seen, a slab of one column is improbable. Other reasons will appear in the more satisfactory solution.

<sup>73</sup> Archonship of Lysagoras; see MUNRO on the Parian Marble, *Class. Rev.*, Vol. XV (1901), p. 357. The date usually given, Isagoras, 508/7, must be corrected accordingly.

after, depending upon the Parian Marble's notice about the first chorus of men in the year of Lysagoras.

The establishment of the choregic system seems to me to be, on the whole, by far the most plausible suggestion for the epoch event. It was at that time that the archon first granted a chorus to tragedy and to the dithyramb. From that time dated the foundation and organization of these contests, so peculiarly an Attic institution, upon the basis which maintained itself for the next two centuries. The essential feature of this organization, as we see it in this inscription, was the choregia itself, and the participation of the tribes in the lyric contests. These both presuppose the democratic institutions of Cleisthenes. Before that time the exhibitions of dithyramb and tragedy had depended upon the patronage of individuals and of *ἐθελονταί*. Neither the patrons nor the choruses represented the free people in the sense in which they did under the choregic system. It would be natural that the democracy should pride itself not a little upon the brilliant results of this system, and that Aristotle, the historian of these contests, should have selected this innovation as the great epoch by which should be dated the beginning of that glorious history.

This hypothesis wins in plausibility when we place ourselves, in relation to this great document as a whole, in the position of the compilers of the records of these two centuries of contests, kept in the archives of the state, which they were authorized to put upon marble and erect upon the acropolis. The record was probably not continued, at least in this form, after the discontinuance of the choregic system. Soon after Aristotle's death, between 316 and 309,<sup>74</sup> the choregia was displaced by the agonothesia. The democratic institution was abolished and the state reverted to a form of that patronage which existed before Cleisthenes. The whole conception of the musical contests had by this time suffered a complete change. When the state officials undertook to set up a permanent record of the victors under the old system in the contests—a magnificent testimony to the ideals of the old democracy now dead—what epoch could they more appropriately have chosen than the date of the establishment of the institution which, more than any other agency, had rendered this remarkable record possible? It was a review from the beginning to the end of the system in which public-spirited citizens, not independent patrons nor agonothetes in the guise of representatives of the demos, vied with each other to the honor of Dionysus and the edification of their fellow-citizens.

When was the choregia established? The inscription may help to decide; but let us first bring together the few independent data. It can hardly have been one of the institutions of Cleisthenes himself. In the stormy year of Isagoras, after his brief term of exile when Cleomenes came up from Sparta, he doubtless accomplished little more than Aristotle indicates in the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία*, 20f: the formation of the ten tribes, the establishment of the Boule of 500, the laying out of Attica into demes, the demarchs to take the place of *naukraroi*, the naming of the demes and tribes, and

<sup>74</sup> In 309/8 according to KOEHLER.

some important legislation for the strengthening of his political machine. It was not until the year of Hermocreon, *ἔτει πέμπτῳ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν*, that we learn of an innovation that suggests the wider use of the tribal system such as is implied in the choregia for lyric contests. At that time the senatorial oath was formulated; *ἔπειτα τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἡροῦντο κατὰ φυλάς, ἐξ ἑκάστης τῆς φυλῆς ἓνα*. Here is an application of the new system of tribes to administration—the essential feature of the lyric choregia. The choregia itself may, of course, have been established some years later, but it is not likely to have been earlier, than Hermocreon. Unhappily we do not know the exact date of this archon, for, although the *πέμπτῳ* would mean 504/3 or 503/2, yet in the next sentence Aristotle dates the battle of Marathon *μετὰ ταῦτα δωδεκάτῳ*.<sup>75</sup> But the period is clearly enough defined.

Guided by these considerations, let us see if a reconstruction of the lost beginning of the inscription can be obtained which shall satisfy the two fundamental conditions—a suitable epoch date for the inscription itself and a date for the first comic contest which shall be consistent with all the evidence which we have reviewed. Three columns before frag. *a* would carry us beyond the establishment of the democracy; one is improbable. On the supposition of two columns, however, two possibilities are offered if we reckon from the the victory of Magnes in the year of Menon:<sup>76</sup>

1. The first comic contest, 479/8; the epoch date of the inscription, 505/4.
2. The first comic contest, 487/6; the epoch date of the inscription, 502/1.

If Aristotle meant to define the epoch date of comedy strictly by reference to the same epoch for tragedy, the granting of a chorus by the archon, some may feel that the interval of fifteen years offered by (2) is insufficient to justify the phrase *ὄψέ ποτε*, and on this ground may prefer to accept the interval of 26 years offered by (1); although, in the case of Epicharmus and Chionides, the scant 14 years between their assumed "epochs" are generally thought ample for the *πολλῷ πρότερος*. I am inclined to think, however, that we are not at liberty to interpret Aristotle so strictly,<sup>77</sup> inasmuch as we know that tragedy had a standing in the state festivals long before the democracy, indeed as early as 534.<sup>78</sup> We must remember, too, that *ὄψέ* may refer to the relatively late stage in the development of comedy at which recognition was accorded by the state, and not merely to a term of years after tragedy. By either of the alternatives, therefore, the demands of Aristotle's text will be satisfied. But we must take into consideration here three other factors in the question which have been discussed, viz.: (1) the list of victorious comic poets, which demands several names before Magnes and a number of contests before him which the six

<sup>75</sup> KIRCHNER, in his list of archons at the end of the second volume of his *Prosep. Att.*, assigns Hermocreon provisionally to 501.0, in this following WILAMOWITZ, *Aristoteles und Athen*, Vol. I, p. 24. The year 504/3 is taken by Acestorides. It seems to me possible to explain Aristotle without altering either of these figures by making *μετὰ ταῦτα* refer to the changes indicated from *ἔπειτα* on, and regarding them as subsequent (by one year) to Hermocreon; Isagoras, 506; Acestorides, 504; Hermocreon, 503; *ἔπειτα*, 502; Marathon, 490.

<sup>76</sup> The full list of possibilities, mathematically speaking, is as follows:

274 lines—495 and 499; 487 and 502; 479 and 505.

On the assumption that *οἷς ἐνίκων* occupied two lines of the first column the figures would be:

272 lines—497 and 498; 489 and 501; 481 and 504; 473 and 507

<sup>77</sup> See p. 10, and note 33.

<sup>78</sup> It is hard to see how anyone can interpret *ἐν ἄρχῃ* in the Parian Marble to mean anything but the City Dionysia

years offered in the first alternative would scarcely satisfy; (2) the notice of Suidas about Chionides—since the victory of Magnes was won in 473/2, we obtain in the second alternative precisely the date given by Suidas;<sup>79</sup> and (3) the probability of the establishment of the choregia, considered as an institution, not far from the archonship of Hermocreon. These considerations would all favor the second alternative. We might add also (4) the slight evidence of the list of victorious tragic poets, 977a. The name of Aeschylus is first in the fragment. His first victory was won in 485/4. Possibly as many as eight names preceded him on the list, but not more. And yet, if the epoch date of the list were 20 years before the first victory of Aeschylus, the poets of this period maintained a surprisingly high average of victories. At any rate, 502 is just a little more probable, on this ground also, than 505. In view, therefore, of all these considerations, we may conclude with a fair degree of confidence, as it seems to me, that the dramatic and lyric choregia was established in the year 502/1, and that the first comic contest at the Dionysia took place in 487/6.

A word as to the heading of the great inscription: It extended over six columns, with nine or ten letters to the column. About twenty letters, therefore, preceded τ] ον κῶμοι and about twenty-five followed ἦσαν τω-. The restoration πρῶτ]ον may be regarded as certain. κῶμοι, however, if the meaning is simply "celebrations," were not held for the first time in 501; dithyrambic exhibitions as well as tragedies had characterized the City Dionysia for many years before this. I take it that κῶμοι would have no proper application in such a context except when joined to the name of a festival. Poppelreuter<sup>80</sup> has aptly compared Eurip. *Hel.*, 1469: κῶμοι ῾Τακίνθον=῾Τακίνθια. This would give us here the name of the festival, which, besides, we should regard as indispensable in the heading of such a document, where the Dionysia had to be distinguished from the Lenaea, as, *e. g.*, in the lists of victors above. Then we should expect the precise date of the epoch and the fact that the catalogue was to register the victors. The latter would in all probability follow the usual formula, οἷδε ἐνίκων; the former would very likely be the name of the archon. Now we chance to know something about the Πυθιονίκαι drawn up by Aristotle and his nephew Callistratus—a list something like this Νῆκαι Διονυσιακαί. It too, like this, was μεταγεγραμμένος εἰς στήλην λιθίνην, as we learn from the decree of the Delphians recently discovered by the French and cleverly restored by Homolle.<sup>81</sup> From the preamble we infer that precisely these three items entered into the heading: epoch date, festival, and characterization, and that the epoch date was fixed by reference to the archon.<sup>82</sup> This model would suit our inscription admirably:

῾Απ[ὸ τοῦ δέινου] . . . ἐφ' οὗ πρῶτ]ον κῶμοι ἦσαν τῶ[ν ἐν ἄσ|τει Διονυσί|ων οἷδε ἐνίκ|ων.  
The two extra letters at beginning and end would be provided for in the margins.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Taking δ'α' as an ordinal, "the eighth year."

<sup>80</sup> One of the *sententiae controversae* attached to his dissertation *De primordiis*.

<sup>81</sup> *Bull. de corr. hell.*, Vol. XXII (1898), p. 280; DITTENBERGER, *Sylloge*, ed. 2, Vol. II, No. 915.

<sup>82</sup> The preamble reads: [ἐπει . . . σν]δέ[τασαν πινυκα τ]ῶν

ἀπ[ὸ Γυλίδας νεν]ικη[στ]ῶν τ[ῶν Πύθια]. The corresponding heading would be something like ῾Απὸ Γυλίδας ἐφ' οὗ πρῶτον κῶμοι (ἀγῶνες) ἦσαν τῶν Πυθίων οἷδε ἐνίκων.

<sup>83</sup> This, the simplest possible form of heading, may be taken to show that οἷδε ἐνίκων was not reserved for the second line, and that 272 lines should not be taken instead of 274 as the basis of calculation.

